Another End is Possible
A wide-ranging conversation between Žižek and the hosts of a left-wing podcast (Chapo Trap House), recorded during the Covid-19 pandemic and timed to the release of his book Pandemic! Chronicles of a Time Lost. Žižek discusses the pandemic as a political and civilizational crisis that exposes the limits of capitalism, the need for forms of social solidarity and even 'communism' in response, and the current state of the American left (Biden vs. Sanders, AOC, Democratic Socialists). He also ranges across sexuality and sexbots under lockdown, digital surveillance and freedom, revolutionary tragedy versus fascist bad faith, Bolivia as a model for the realist left, and the coming mental health crisis as a third wave of pandemic damage.
The ideas in it 10
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
Stories he reaches for 2
Works invoked 7
People invoked 27
What it argues
Dialectical moves 7
Claims 14
Quotes 10
“The most dangerous moment of state control: when you are unfree, but you experience your unfreedom as freedom. I just do what I want, I surf the web, I buy what I want.”Slavoj Žižek · unfreedom experienced as freedom
“Pessimists are the only people who can be moderately happy. Because you expect nothing good then from time to time something nice happens here and there and you are glad.”Slavoj Žižek · pessimist optimism
“Another end of the world is possible.”Slavoj Žižek · apocalyptic hope / Chilean slogan
“Trump is your genuine postmodern relativist president. And if Bernie Sanders is something, he is the representative of the good old-fashioned decency and moral seriousness.”Slavoj Žižek · Trump as postmodern relativist; Sanders as moral decency
“Sex itself can be easily, not spiritualized, but dematerialized... love is much more material in the bodily sense than sex.”Slavoj Žižek · sex dematerialized; love as truly material
“Usual sex is, I claim, masturbation with a real partner. It's a real partner, but it's really masturbation.”Slavoj Žižek · sex as masturbation with a real partner
“I am a partisan of communism with Julian Assange. Communism but somebody like Assange should peek into its documents, bring out.”Slavoj Žižek · communism with transparency / Assange
“The greatest word for me is 'perhaps.' Will there be communism? Perhaps, perhaps. Perhaps not. Perhaps something even worse than our capitalism today.”Slavoj Žižek · radical uncertainty / perhaps
“Not simply social distancing. No, it's bodily distancing, but this bodily distancing involves much more of a social interaction, digital of course. It's very difficult to be alone today.”Slavoj Žižek · bodily distancing vs. social hyper-connectivity
“I'm sick and tired of this visionary left who like even secretly to lose and then they write thick books explaining why they lost because of the imperialist plot.”Slavoj Žižek · critique of the ecstatic/visionary left
Transcript 104 turns
You know, the games are designed for two people to cooperate in this—Yeah, but can I betray you also? I want enemy in order to betray effectively, you must betray the friend, you know. That's fun. I'm sure there are games like that. You—there is one game that became very popular in the past—in the past month, it's called Among Us. And it's a very—Ah, my son knows everything about it. Your son knows, okay. Okay. If you're familiar with the game—like the party game Mafia—Yeah, yeah, also my son. It's—it's basically that. You have a group of people and one of them is the imposter. And you've got to figure out and they're sabotaging, you've got to figure out which one it is. And periodically you will vote on which one is the imposter, and if there's a majority that says, you know, that, you know, accuses someone, that person is ejected from the game. They're killed,
essentially. But, you know what I mean, I—I'm interested. If—what if the majority selects the wrong imposter? Is he still killed? So sorry, guy, bad luck, but—Uh,
he—that player is killed and the remaining players are told of their mistake, that you killed an innocent person. But he remains killed.
But he is killed. In the—Yeah, he remains
killed. Yeah, he remains killed, yeah.
So no socialist humanism
here. You remain killed. No. Okay. So, just to let you know, Slavoj—Yeah. It's—uh, we're just doing audio.
Ah, that's perfect then. Then I can be more like—like more free and so
on. We—we can, you know, we can relax here. We can relax here now.
You see, Virgil, you are Virgil, not the guy with the tie, no? You know that in my imaginary a tie is a very useful object. You know why? When we take power, you know whom to hang and you already have the instrument to hang you. No, but seriously, you know what would be a nice—along those paranoia lines of a video game, a nice way of betrayal: that you tell me that my image is off, so I behave like crazy, but no, no, no, you have it recorded and then you decide, you know.
That's the—you know, that's the paranoia that people have is about their Zoom images now.
Ah, really? It's general like—but you know I have another problem with Zooming. That's why I prefer email messages, then just voice, then Zooming. Zooming is almost like meeting you and I often have to lie. People invite me somewhere, I have to say no and so on. But it's embarrassing to say, brutally, I just think you are stupid, I'm not interested, and it's much more—so you have to lie, sorry, I have, I don't know, asthma, blah blah. And it's much—it's more difficult to lie with image on, you know. That's why I like just texting messages. It's easy to lie there, you know.
Well, that was something—that's—that's something that was interesting from the early part of the pandemic, right? You could be—you could be wherever you want. You could go where you want, you don't have to go into the office, you don't have to see anyone. Uh, if you have to—if you have to phone in something like that, you know, you just—just turn off your video. You could be anywhere in the world. And like that was the perfect opportunity to disappear. If you have—if you have a guilty conscience, if you—if you did some crime, you just want to leave your family, that was the perfect time was when everyone was locking down.
Yeah, but nonetheless with all this digital control, you know which is—I wrote about it in my new [unintelligible] which is one of my favorite books and it's—no, it's not even meant a joke, but it's clearly—it clearly belongs to pre-digital and pre-this ultra-computerization time, a serious guide like—there was a series some thirty years ago published somewhere in California of these perverse guides, you know, like how to spread rumors without being caught to destroy somebody, someone and so on. And one of them was how to disappear. How you adopt a false identity, how you erase the traces, how without committing any mega crimes, you don't have to kill anybody, but how to do it. But now with all the DNA analysis, it's difficult I think now, you know.
Well, something that I always wonder is how did they solve any crime before DNA? Because you could—you know, we've talked about this on this program before because we give practical lifestyle advice in addition to political theory on—to our listeners. If—if, you know, you're in the 19th century or something, you're in, I don't know, the West—Yeah.—you know, the American West. Yeah. You—you want to get away with murder, then you just go to the next town. Well, that's it. Yeah. How are they—how are they going to know? How they—they're not going to know what you look like.
And I never believed in this idea, which is the Sherlock Holmes utopia, that a guy who knows how to deduce, uh, clues and so on. You know that Conan—I read this in a biography of Arthur Conan Doyle. He tried to—he joined police when he was famous and tried to help them, you know. And it was always—Oh, really? What kind—Yeah. But it was always a ridiculous failure because he looked at all the traces—ah, this guy, his left leg is a little bit stronger than the right one, he is this—and at the end, a stupid policeman who knew that part of the country caught immediately the guy and ironically said to Conan Doyle, okay, you were right in all your deductions, but they didn't matter. We simply do it faster, you know.
It's a lot like—it's like—the—when after when the government asked, uh, Jerry Bruckheimer, okay, what do you think the next terrorist attack is going to be?
That's an interesting point. You know what worries me, really, that at some point, not—they almost become indistinguishable. I think that maybe the next terrorist attack will be something that we will not even know that it was a terrorist attack. It will appear as a natural disaster, some malfunctioning and so on and so on. Because—quite often when something happens, like for example, even some paranoiac think that the pandemic, Covid, is really a designed form of terrorist attack. Then you tell them, but nonetheless China suffered at the beginning. And then they think, yeah, yeah, they sacrificed their—their own people a couple of thousand so that then they can ruin the entire world and so on, you know. How often we—we don't even know. I think that we are now approaching all the—new type of ecological catastrophes, I don't know what, you know. And I think that less and less this type of obvious terrorist attack—there is something almost old-fashioned in it, don't you think? This blow up a building or whatever. You know what I'm surprised at? If there are really, let's say, evil terrorist groups who want to do this type of classic attacks, why don't they do it more often? You know, these classic scenarios: you put some radioactive stuff or viruses or—or poison, let's say, in New York or LA water supply. Is it so difficult? They cannot protect, control the entire flow of water. It should be relatively simple to do. Well,
that was—that was the—the rebuttal, you know, during the—the War on Terror, right? To the—to the people—the civil authoritarians saying, you know, you know, the government needs these expanded powers to detain people and so on and so forth—uh, that—well, there
really isn't that much of a terrorist threat as much as you say, because the reality is, you know, if you really wanted to kill a bunch of people, it wouldn't be very hard to do. Any reasonably intelligent individual, you know, not—not like—unless you're, you know, a total lunatic or you're very sloppy or something, if you're like actually working hard at it and you have a familiarity with your surroundings, it wouldn't be difficult. That—Yeah, a little
knowledge of chemistry or whatever and so on. I mean, you know.
Yeah. Right. And—and, you know, this was—and so—so there's been an actual—there's been an actual change, because the—the ability to kill a bunch of people in—in, say, is—is about the same as it is today, right? Uh, except now is the period, you know, the past ten years is the period when you have all of these mass shootings in the United States, you know, suggesting that, okay, something flipped between and to cause people to just want to kill as many other people as—Yeah. But it can
be also a desperate thing. For example, I was even in Israel during some visit. Do you remember, I think—maybe I'm wrong—that it was some—a couple of years ago, okay, I think three, four, when there was a whole series of these individual stabbings in the West Bank or in Jerusalem. Simply, a totally desperate Palestinian guy took out a knife, stabbed some Jewish guy and he or she knew that they will be probably instantly killed and so on, you know. But you know what was so mysterious here? Even the Israeli intelligence investigating it wasn't able to locate some dark plot behind it. It wasn't a secret cell of PLO or Hamas or whatever. These were—this made me very sad. These were really simply people totally desperate, like I cannot take it anymore and just decided. I spoke there with a Palestinian girl who even wasn't poor. Her father was one of the few Palestinian, uh, success stories, had an architectural office, employed many Jewish architects, Jewish architects himself, and so he was able, by some miracle—otherwise they control it—to buy a house in Jerusalem, in the West, in the exclusive upper-class Jewish part. So although formally you should be able to do it, there was a big report about him in Israeli newspapers, like how was he able to do it? But his daughter told me at some point, after some bureaucratic problems and so on because—let's never forget that the mystery of the Israeli occupation on the West Bank and so on is more a bureaucratic occupation, these incredible—incredible forms to fill and so on, where incidentally wonderful things also happen. Kind of a things of fake humanity but nonetheless a humanity. You know what I heard from a relatively, for their standard, benevolent Jewish administrator on the West Bank? In a family, you know they have this collective punishment there, in a family where one of the sons was condemned as being a terrorist, then they dynamite your entire house, you know. That was when still Saddam was in power and at that time Saddam Hussein in Iraq. So he, when the Israelis blew up your house, he guaranteed that you will get, the family, five or ten thousand dollars in cash for every room. So he told me a guy came to his office, Palestinian, and said, please, can I ask you a question? In two days or three you are supposed to come to dynamite my house. Could you please give me just one or two days more because I am finishing two more rooms so that I will get twenty thousand dollars more in cash. And it was a weird moment. They did reach an understanding. You know what, Israelis came—because Israelis saw that he is not a serious terrorist or whatever, that he was just a head of a large family—so yes, they made a deal. We come two days later, you finish just quickly two rooms more so that you get more money. This is what always surprises me, this—although, you know, the other side of the story—I know many horrors like this from Bosnian War twenty-five years ago—is how it doesn't—you belong to a different nationality, one is, let's say, Bosnian Muslim, the other Serb, how it doesn't matter if your children were playing together, if you were close friends, it can break, they're ready to kill you, rape you, torture you and so on. I mean, you know. So I think—but still, ah, sorry if I bore you with this, I love these stories. For example, if you go from Jerusalem, which is the city down there, Bethlehem, I think, which is practically a suburb of Jerusalem but Palestinian, okay. On the road there is a monument—although it's Palestinian part, but there is there a monument to some, I don't know, ancient heroic from Bible woman, Jewish hero, doesn't matter. So Jews consider this their monument and there was a guard there. And it was of course a ritual that every couple of days, blah blah, Palestinian children came there and threw some stones at Israeli soldiers, they shot back with rubber bullets, whatever. But then a friend of mine went there just to look at it. And you know what he noticed? He saw Palestinian kids and Israeli soldiers exchanging cigarettes, smoking, talking, latest movies and so on. And then somebody shouted, CNN is coming! They said, stop! They threw stones. And then again after twenty minutes, somebody said, CNN is leaving! Okay, thanks, they said, see you tomorrow, maybe we'll see, and so on. I have a certain respect for this type of—although it can also be misused, you know, because it's the easiest way for brutal aggressors, I'm afraid, if after he ruins everything, to play the game of, but nonetheless we are ultimately human and so on, you know. Sorry, but I talk too much. Terrorize me, ask me questions.
I don't—I don't want to terrorize you. Why not? Terror
is the basis of good relations. I'm afraid of people who are too kind in the sense of, you know, just allowing you to do what you want. I don't want to do what I want. I don't trust myself. I'm afraid that I explode with some obscenities and so on. I like control. Well, we are on a Zoom call. I think it's hard to terrorize someone when you're on the internet. Though, now that I think about it, that is kind of my job. Yeah, but you should find some way to pressure people. You know, when you were young, there were pre-Covid times when we had mass gatherings, meetings, you remember those times? I remember meetings, yeah. Your party, orgies, raves—yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And—speaking about orgies, you know what was the single most comical state regulation done in Europe in Covid times? At the
beginning, somewhere already in March—uh, when thing began to explode, the rumor in Europe is that Belgium is the place to do large group orgies. Okay. So it's not a joke, I've seen. Their government issued a—now it's difficult to say this—a law, a regulation
order, prohibiting orgies with more than ten people participating, you know. This was their contribution to—to—to fight and so on. The—the funny law would be prohibiting orgies with more than two people involved. Yeah, but even this,
you see,
it gets complicated. You see, we learned so much from Covid. For example, especially in the Far East, but not only there, do you know that the cell of these—how do you call them—sexbots, plastic dolls? Checked, yes. Yeah,
we—we reviewed them on the show.
Yeah. Exploded. But at least according to some analysis that I read from Japan, Singapore, South Korea, those countries—you know what is the paradox? You have this image of a guy who went to a prostitute or had one night stands, now with all this social distancing, what can he do? You order a sexbot, no? But you know that the quite large majority, between sixty and seventy percent of the people who bought—at least in those places of the world—sex—sexbots are married couples.
Married couples, yeah.
Yeah, it's such a paradox. I think it's maybe this cynical reaction that like what—what can we do? You know, like if social life goes on, you have an excuse when you—for me, always the problem with sex is not to do it, but many people are quite lazy in their thirties, forties and don't want to do it and in the old days, pre-Covid days, it was easy to find an excuse: sorry, I have late business in my office and so on. Now if you're quarantined at home, there is no excuse, no, so you have to come out openly and you say, okay, I cannot do it, you have a—a doll there and so on. I think that, again, we can learn many paradoxical thing. I also, for example, do you have the same experience? I—my problem with all this quarantining, blah blah, distancing, is not that now I'm alone. No, yes, maybe alone in the sense of material bodily distance. But socially I'm more connected than ever. People annoy me all the time, want to talk, we are controlled digitally and so on and so on. So what I miss now is good old-fashioned loneliness, you know. I think that it's not simply social distancing. No, it's bodily distancing, but this bodily distancing involves much more of a social interaction, digital of course: phones, Zoom or whatever. But it's very difficult to be alone today. I talk too much again, go on. Well, to return to sex, I found that to be one of the more interesting chapters from your forthcoming book, Pandemic! Chronicles of a Time Lost, which will be out soon from OR Books—uh, was your—your ruminations on sex, and you describe this very phenomenon of married couples buying sexbots, yeah, uh, in order to avoid intimacy. Yeah. And—and the question I had is, uh, what—why do you suppose it is that people are—people don't want to be physically intimate with their partner? Or another example you bring up, another thing you mention, is you brought up the story of a—a pornographic actor. From Gaby—I read it with a lady called Eva—Eva Wiseman or whoever. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Isn't this story a beautiful one? We should tell it, yes. A guy, he saw a—I love them, they are so depressive—the hardcore populationists. That is to say, they are shooting a hardcore scene, but then the camera is like ten yards back so that you see also the background, everything. So again, the guy was doing bang-bang, penetrating, and then in the middle of it, he stepped back and say, sorry, I am losing erection, could you please give me my iPhone so that I look at Pornhub a little bit to get erection? Of course this sounds madness because, my god, you have there, sorry
for vulgarity, a probably nice woman with her legs spread wet and
so on, you have the thing itself there. But I think that's the—the truth of sexuality. Fantasy is always there. We are terribly afraid of being really alone with our partners. So from here I come, I think in that text, to my paradoxical solution, again, what we can learn from this: that it may sound romantic idealism but I think it's true, that sex itself can be easily, not spiritualized, but dematerialized. Like many researchers here in Slovenia, in Germany, in United States told me that independently of Covid, for the last ten years, there is less and less of actual sex activity
among teen generations, high school and so on. And I've spoken with some friends of my son who told me openly: who has time for all the complicated game of flirting, seduction? One night stand maybe, but not anything more. But it won't be—isn't much more practical? You go to a hardcore website, you masturbate, it's over in a couple of minutes, then you are free again and so on. So I think that—that's my old theory that this type of pure sex has the structure of masturbation. In masturbation you think about it, but you really just do it to yourself. Usual sex is, I claim, masturbation with a real partner. It's a real partner, but it's really masturbation. And I think that to be really in contact with the other, when you make love, it must be love, it must be real love. Love makes all the difference. Love is this shock, my God, sorry for my male-chauvinist perspective, this really her that I hold now naked in my hands is this incredible intensity. So, again, for me, love is much more material in the bodily sense than sex. Sex precisely can be easily virtualized. It's one nice lesson from Covid, I think. Well, no one's disputing that there were good things that came out of the pandemic. I hope—this is why so many people laughed at me, you know, oh what do you mean by communism and all that, you know. No, I'm not crazy, I don't think there will be now a new Leninist party or whatever. Although one must be honest to say that, not so much China—China did it with extreme brutality—but look at true miracle stories, Vietnam and even—even Cuba. They are doing pretty well and from what I've read, do you know that they remobilized—you know that old socialist totalitarian nightmare—you have local committees? In Cuba they are called Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, you know, they take care, they control if there is some suspect activity in their block or a couple of blocks. But now they remobilized them and they are doing a very good job. Like people gather, okay, in our block, do you know is there some old family where they cannot take care of themselves and so on. Because it's obvious that the state cannot do everything. You need this type of local mobilization. That's one must say that Cuba and especially Vietnam, you know, but so now that you will not accuse me of communism just, you know, people say China nonetheless they did it. Yeah, but do you know that the true miracle is Vietnam, no, sorry, Taiwan, which definitely doesn't want to be part of China? They are the true miracle. They did it even better, you know. I don't have a good theory, but what I want to say is that, yes, Covid is a health problem, virus, pandemic and so on, but it's not only already in itself, at the same time, a social and economic problem. Like only in a certain stage of global capitalism was it possible for Covid to
explode the way it did. Imagine the same thing happening in the late or early fifties in
China. Maybe it did, we wouldn't even have known about it, you know. It's the international exchange, colonization of nature and so on and world travel and so on. So—but on the other hand, also I think that Covid is a political problem, in the sense that it makes us aware how—and everybody knows this, I think—how a certain type of capitalism we were used to is reaching its limits. And this is why, look, when people ask me, are you crazy, what communism? I say, by communism I only mean among other thing a little bit more radical socialization of economy. You use market when it's useful, but you establish some type of control as you usually do in extreme emergency situation. And this is our situation today. There are things which have to be done. Globalized healthcare, we try to avoid it, but it will have to be done. How we will deal with food, how we will deal with new economic crises and so on and so on. And it's as simple as that. This cannot be left to the market. And they are doing it! Look, Trump manipulated like crazy, we know where the money went, no, all these trillions of dollars, most of it to save companies. But even nonetheless he had to do some kind of very limited, uh, how do you call it, basic income stuff. People—they have to do this, they have to—to regulate the economy much—the state has to intervene much more. Capitalism as we knew it is reaching its limit and I'm not a utopian here. I think that those in power, if I may use this general term, know it more and more and the different scenarios are already—this is what I write about in my book—they are already played out or rather envisaged and so on. One is this Bolsonaro-Trump scenario, you know, basically you not ignore it, but it's more refined. It's, yes, there is a problem, but let's not think about it, vaccines, scientists will do their job, we just should go on with our life the way it was as much as possible. And I don't think this is just some dark Trumpian plot. I understand people. They are slowly going nuts. Many people identify—I don't know how it is, where are you on East Coast, New York, where? Brooklyn. Brooklyn, yeah, my favorite part. Because you are there, but—but it's some more—okay, let's go—what I—what I wanted to say is that you have now in Brooklyn, in the new part, also Katz's, you know, that famous—that famous restaurant. Oh, Katz's Deli. Yeah, you have also one in Brooklyn now, no? I—I'm not sure. I only know the one in the Lower East Side. Yeah, but I was there a year ago, just before, yes. There is some new area there where you have some high rises—doesn't matter. Let's go back to this. So, uh, I want to say that I understand people for whom respecting all these rules, quarantine, wearing masks and so on, deprives them of something that they perceive as the essence of being human, as a social being, face-to-face debating and so on and so on. I understand that it's a serious conflict. No wonder, do you know it's very interesting phenomenon how it's not only the right, in Europe at least, even some leftists in Italy like Giorgio Agamben or in Germany protest against Covid restrictions, claiming this is the plot, blah blah. So we have this line of libertarian reply. No, even if we risk our lives, our life should go on. Then we have this technocratic dream, I write about it, how do you call it, Screen New Deal or whatever, you know. Which I think it's another catastrophe because—first, it's not possible for maximum thirty, forty percent of us to live like that in safe isolation, there should be others who run around, do the job and so on and so on. And the big task of the left is, I think, to invent a new mode of sociality, and it can be done at a local level. For example, friends in—friends in Madrid told me wonderful stories how—it's the same as in Cuba or Vietnam, you know—local—locally people organize themselves in committees and—state cannot do it alone. This is why I don't agree when people see just bad things. Didn't also—didn't the pandemic also show a much greater than we expected wave, emergence of solidarity? It's not just the usual story of all those nurses, health workers, but also them. There are people who without any bombastic effectively act as heroes. They are risking their life, they are not well paid. In Slovenia here it happens all the time. Everybody celebrates nurses but they are still paid with delay and so on. So I think that Covid for me is even more basically than a medical problem, a
political problem: how to reinvent a new social
space, because again, it's not just Covid, there will be other epidemics, there will be global warming and so on, and things like this couldn't be done without even international cooperation and organization. Let me give a story
that I often use, then I
let you talk. Do you remember, uh,
Fukushima, the accident in Japan, now it's already ten
years or how much? I spoke with my friend Jean-Pierre Dupuy, who is specialist for catastrophes, he went as part of the European delegation there and said that, do you know that for one day approximately the Japanese government was in total despair because it looks that the pollution will be so strong that they will have to evacuate the entire Tokyo area? And where could they go? Okay, if we were to live in an abstract rational universe, the idea is clear: ask Russia to give you some of the Siberia, which is empty and getting more or less empty and you have now because of global warming better conditions for agriculture. But you cannot do it now! And things like this will happen. We will have to deal with mass movements of people and so on and—the only alternative to war will be some type of global cooperation. What will happen, I don't know, I'm rather a pessimist if you ask me. I think there will be more wars because you remember Macron at the beginning of the epidemic? He proposed a truce to all great and small powers, stop all wars till the pandemic is over. What's happening now is the exact opposite. Many powers use the pandemic to fight their wars, thinking that, okay, everybody is now focused on pandemic and nobody will notice. It's—we live in very sad times. But there is hope. My only thing on which I insist—okay, to recapitulate a little—are two things. First, it's not true that we live now in a time of emergency, no time for politics, let's just do what those authorities are telling us to get over. No, now things are changing incredibly. Not only economically—it's incredibly how the whole structure of wealth distribution, not only poor—the poor are much poorer, the rich are much richer—but also how—how the seats of economic power, the centers, change and so on. Uh, our lives, the whole structure of social authority and so on is changing. And I don't know here, I don't have here easy answers. But my answer to those who laugh at me, "Oh, you are a utopian, things cannot change," is, I'm sorry, they are already changing. They are changing radically. That's why, for example, I still stick to guys like Julian Assange, you know. And my idea is always, even if Trump is now preparing long lists of pardons for everybody, including himself and his family, it would be nice, I would look at Trump a little bit more kindly if he were to include into the list Snowden and Julian Assange, you know. Because we cannot avoid being controlled, but we can make control, at least the way we are controlled, more transparent. That's crucial today because again—that's my critique of the United States, not that they are guilty of it, but—you know, I always repeat this point. In, for example, China, yes, you are controlled, but everybody knows you are controlled. Nobody has an illusion. While in the United States, control works perfectly because you still think and act as if you are free. And this is for me, as I often repeat, the most dangerous moment of—of—of state control: when you are unfree, but you experience your unfreedom as freedom. I just do what I want, I surf the web, I buy what I want, and so on and so on. Sorry, please. Oh, don't apologize. This is—this is all very—Yeah, because I feel bad. You know why? Because I—I break my own rules all the time. And you do your censorship stuff, yes, or the other guy, yeah, yeah. I, uh—I just wanted to go back to your book and ask you, I think, the most glaring question that comes out of it, which is: this pandemic is, as you argue, this is the beginning of a cascading series of ecological crises. This is the beginning of the end. This is the beginning of the end that we've all known was coming for the past few decades, scientists have warned us and so on. Uh, you know, and particularly someone of my age, you know, my entire life, you know, I've kind of been waiting for this. Yeah. And now it's here. And there's a—you make this observation in the book that, you know, something that—that's very—very imminent for me, that for most people, we've stopped talking about the pandemic. It's fallen off the front page. We're—we're obsessed with other things now. Uh, you give the example of this soccer game and, you know, Kamala Harris, the election, whatever. Anything as an excuse to, uh, if not deny that the pandemic exists but just ignore it, just, you know, just put it out of your head. Yet simultaneously the inequalities and irrationalities that the pandemic has laid bare—for instance, you know, we're in this deep recession in the United States, the stock market is going up every day—But that's a very—sorry to interrupt you, a very interesting point which signals how capitalism is changing. You are in the greatest recession, at least after 1930s, yeah, and nonetheless stock market is going up and up. Yeah. There is a new logic, sorry, go on. And so my point being this: you know, it's not even—you can't even pull the wool over people's eyes anymore. They're not even trying, in the way that, you know, Trump in his vulgarity, you know, he says the quiet part loud, he takes the mask off. Uh, that's pretty much it for global capitalism at this point. And yet, in the United States anyway, we're not moving radically to the left. We're moving aggressively to the center. We're doubling down on neoliberal solutions. We elected a right-wing Democrat as president, who won the primary against Bernie Sanders, who represented, I think, the direction
that you're describing in your book that
we as a society, as a civilization, if we're going to persist, we need to go in. The question I have then is, all right, well how do we get back on track? You know, people broadly, I think people will agree with what you're describing, which is, you know, okay, you know, you call it communism, call it socialism, call it whatever you want, but, you know, this is the direction that we have to go in. Well, why aren't we going in that direction? And how do we—how do people listening to this program, how do we start going in that direction? Well, I'm very modest here. I—what I like—liked, it's brutal cynical to say this, in the pandemic crisis is how it's not us—okay, me at least, radical leftist—who had to invent it. Look at what governments had to do. Boris Johnson had to nationalize railways temporarily and so on and so on. They were doing—they, even Trump up to a point, were forced to do measures
which, if you were to mention them a year
ago even, you would be accused of radical leftist madness, communism or whatever, and so on. So people, I hope that this will
remain as the legacy of Covid, people were a little bit awakened, they saw the limit. Now—now the real struggle—the real struggle begins. And I think that the left—I will give
you a very simplified answer—didn't learn enough from Trump. This
obsession with the center, you know, we—we, Trump is too extreme. But that's how Trump won! Trump played a more radical game. He didn't worry about liberal center and so on and so on. And that's how he won. And this is also for me—don't misunderstand this—uh—don't under-estimate this. My god, now I talk like George Bush who made—[unintelligible]. Yeah, like George. Yeah. Yeah. The reason Democrats—Mike Davis analyzed this well. Okay, Biden was elected, but barely. And if you look at the distribution of votes, there are so many surprises. Like all those for whom people thought that they are the natural—they are predestined by their ethnic identity and so on to vote for Democrats, voted for Trump. Many Latino Americans in southern Texas voted for Trump. Yeah. Some Blacks voted for Trump, some women voted for Trump. So, uh, what I'm saying is that the only—good thing that happened is that Democrats'—Democratic majority in Congress is now minimal,
you know. I see a hope in this. You know in what sense? Very manipulative one. The only—it's very good if you look at the—electoral—very instructive if you look at the electoral results of the so-called Democratic Socialists, AOC and so on. They did very well, they got out
stronger. So my hope is that they will be in a position that Biden will not be able to pass some measures without their support. You know, he will not have enough majority so maybe their position will be stronger. So at least something happens, I'm not a total pessimist here. First, people said Occupy Wall Street, it was an explosion, then people said it disappeared. It disappeared, but in the subterranean political life it left something. Now the term socialism at least is politically rehabilitated. Now the most interesting thing the way I judge
in the United States is not what happens in Republican Party but what happens in the Democratic Party, which is really now two distinct parties, Biden-Sanders and so on. What will happen with this? And I think that this—the dream of all of them, Biden, we suffer for half a year then things will return back to some kind of a normal. Maybe for some time, but the crisis will go on and on and on. And by this on and on I don't mean, yes, in two hundred years we will have communism
or whatever. Talking about like who knows what will be in ten years from now. You know where you see this, I don't know how it is in United States, but in Europe, the number of newborn children, of birth, has fallen radically. People massively don't trust the future and it's very important. I don't—I don't have time to go on in it, but the way you described now the situation. In a new text that's not yet in the books that I will try to publish now, I oppose the so-called—it's a wrong name, too Eurocentric—first wave and second wave. In the first wave, first wave, sorry, the panic—panic, okay, we were all afraid—was an almost, would you agree, rational, healthy panic. My god, we have a problem, quarantine, whatever, it was rational. Now something much weirder is happening. On the one hand, uh, people know the truth, as you said. They even expect it, but at some deeper level they don't accept it. Like in my country, listen, Slovenia. We are now, you know, I know where I'm talking from. We are now in per capita deaths, the top of the world, you know. Yesterday over fifty people died. Daily we are now between forty and fifty, but this is a country of two million inhabitants. So, uh, but if I compare the situation now with the one in—in March and April, the peak of the first wave, there is—you don't feel this sense of panic emergency. Life goes on although people don't meet, it's much more normal, but this normality is a fake normality. It's not even fear, it's some kind of despair and depression, you know. Even when people still meet privately, go to parties and so on, it's not this, oh the worst is over, don't take it seriously. There's always this desperate undertone of well, let's enjoy it a little bit as long as we can. Nobody even dares to think in the long term. So here is my sad prediction. And some scientists in Latin America I heard, psychologists, already made it. If at first we were worried about health, if now we worry about economy, then the third stage—if it will have the name of third wave or not, I don't know—it will be mental health, if you ask me. The whole mode of socialization, culture,
interaction, manners and
so on, that's disintegrating. At the end, I even think that let's call it the mental health will be the problem. Now what we have it's depression. It's not even frustration in the sense of I want to get that I cannot get it. It's as if we even don't know how to reorganize our desire, what to desire. For example, you know how many students—okay, many of them study even more now—now—but many of them say what's the point now of studying, everything will in any case fall apart and so on. They take as a fact of life the idea that we are approaching some kind of new barbarism, where who knows how it will be, will the elite live in bubbles or whatever. So, uh, I would say I'm, of course, nothing will happen now immediately. But I try to be optimist—pessimist optimist. You know why? Because my idea is always pessimists are the only people who can be moderately happy. Because you expect nothing good then from time to time something nice happens here and there and you are glad. If you are an optimist you are never happy because you are always falsified by reality. So I'm saying that things will have to move in this direction, that the situation itself, and people are aware of it, calls for more international cooperation, socialization of economy, more solidarity, egalitarianism. For example, the big ethical test today is the availability of vaccines. And although they will be cheating like crazy and so on, but nonetheless the in principle at least the decision was that no part of the world should be left out, that it should be equally distributed and so on and so on. So I think that this—how should I call it, although I oppose the term, but nonetheless basic socialist awareness that new forms of social reorganization will have to be invented and so on and so on. Now why am I mentioning this? Because I think the big mistake of the mainstream Biden Democrats is that they know even less than Trump what is going on at the level of customs, social morality, communal spirit. They simply think Trump was a catastrophe, let's return to. I mean, their point is even more than Trump's let's make America great again like the way it was. Yeah, it's—it's—it's, I believe you called it that—that particular psychosis in your book. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So I think that—the one who convinced me are two people. One is—although he is now old, probably he will not be able to do a lot, but—I know because I didn't meet him but I know people who know him, Bernie Sanders. And he is so aware that the key to a true democratic victory is not this Biden obsession, the middle classes we shouldn't scare them with too much leftism, but the—precisely those desperate new impoverished lower, even white lower, middle-class people who now vote for Trump. For Sanders he was clear on this, although he didn't like for obvious reason to talk too much, that the key to the authentic victory of the democratic left should be let's get Trump's voters, those who otherwise vote for—vote for Trump. And on the other hand, AOC, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, also saw very clearly that, okay, Trump should have been deposed because things were getting simply too crazy in the sense of—he was undermining to such an extent what Hegel called *Sittlichkeit*, customs, the set of unwritten rules which hold our society together. Which is why even—I wonder if you would accept this madness of mine, along the lines of Angela Nagle: I think that the left today should accept this term "silent majority." My critique, and this is what I forgot to tell you before, this is where Trump—those partisans of Trump who claim he is a Christian and so on and they dismiss Democrats as some LGBT
madmen—I
am for LGBT incidentally—crazy—no. If by postmodern relativism we mean guys who claim everything is relative, everything can be cynically manipulated, relativism, universal irony, then Trump is your genuine postmodern relativist president. And if Bernie Sanders is something, he is—I love this—he is the representative of the good old-fashioned decency and moral [unintelligible]. I think we should shamelessly play—play—this—this game. Which is why as AOC said: okay, we had to get rid of Trump, now the real battle for the soul of the Democratic Party and so on begins. Because there is one text, I think, in my book where I tried to develop it, how basically United States are now a four-party system, no, not two. You have Trump populists, you have the old Republican conservatives, you have liberal Democrats, and you have Democratic Socialists. And the point is how all these four are combined. The victory of Biden I think is really, as you said, a victory over Sanders. He—even I read some statement of these centrist Democrats when they were attacking Bernie Sanders and their message was quite clear: that Sanders is a greater danger. So their message was better four more years for Republicans
than—than Bernie Sanders.
And then people tell me—and this is my, I try to be a little bit upbeat optimist—but can it be done, today's economy, what can we do, it's—listen, left is learning in the world. Yes, I was, for example, always critical about Chávez-Maduro. Even when there was still Chávez there I was critical. And let's, with all the sympathy how Cuba resisted American boycott, it's not my model. They didn't really invent a new model. But look at a country like Bolivia. I think there was a coup against Bolivia there, against the Morales regime, not because they were too leftist, but because it worked. That's why I personally supported him. My hero now is Lucho Arce, their new president. You know who was he? The third person, the crucial. You had Morales, the visionary, you had Linera, very good theorist vice president, Lucho Arce was the Minister of Economy. He defines himself as an efficient socialist technocrat. No bullshit about experiments and then you lose and then you blame capitalists. He delivered. In—in—at no point in their history was an average Bolivian living better than in the ten years when Lucho Arce was Minister of Economy. And it's one of the
few authentic electoral successes that they now return to power. So he is a model for the left to
me. I'm a bit tired of this ecstatic left, you know: one million people on—name it, on—on that square, on—on Syntagma Square in Athens. No, what interests me more and more is what happens, as they usually say if you are an alcoholic, the morning after. What happens two, three months after when the pathos ecstasies are over, how ordinary people feel the change. And even in United States, you know where interesting thing are happening now? I don't know good enough the situation in New York. But I was even told some good things about how is the guy called, Bill de Blasio, you have there. Or especially I know the situation in Newark, where till recently the mayor was Baraka, the son of the Black Panther poet, you know. How—I like this left which remains a principled left, but—I will be very brutal—doesn't ruin the economy, you know. Realist but at the same time principled left. And it is appearing all around the world. I'm sick and tired of this—I'm very ironic usually about it—of this visionary left who like even secretly to lose and then they write thick book explaining why they lost because of the imperialist plot and so on. No, wouldn't it be like to win a little bit, make actually life better for ordinary people? Which is why now after the referendum in Chile, the candidate I support there is—I think it's Jadue, something like this, the mayor of—I think Valparaíso, one of the cities there—who did excellent things at the lower level. Free public transport, free—free libraries, schools. But he didn't ruin the economy. Very moderately, you know, these small everyday things. This is the hope I have for a new left. It is radical. They know capitalism is the limit, but they also know that at the end don't dismiss, don't despise ordinary people. Which is why, if we can conclude, I don't know if I even use it in the book, my favorite motto—they have such a wonderful sense for rhetoric is—you know when in October last year big demonstrations started in Chile, you know what was one of the slogans? It's the answer of this—it's the end of the world. It was not no, it's not, there is progress. Their formula was: another end of the world is possible. It's a beautiful slogan. Like they expect, yes, it's coming to an end, but wait a minute, we can do a different end. That was in the book. That was in the book, which again is called—Sorry, no, I don't—you mentioned it enough. You did your duty. I don't want to over-exploit you. Well, I want to—no, I—I enjoyed the book very much, in addition to your earlier book, Pandemic!, I guess that's Pandemic! Episode Yeah, but this one—isn't this one a little bit more substantial, more complex? Like the first one retroactively appears to me a little bit too simplistic sometimes, you know. It is. I find it—I mean, I found it an interesting experience that—uh—you, you know, you—you wrote this as it was happening. And then, you know, you got a—your publisher got a galley copy out, uh, in something like May, which is when I got a copy of the first book. And I'm still in quarantine. I still hadn't seen anyone in about two months, you know, so I'm—I'm kind of going nuts there. And then to, like, have this book dropped in my lap, uh, as—as—almost like—it's almost like reading your diary about this. Uh, what I appreciate about the second book is—is it is giving more form to the ideas in the first book. And I do admire that—And I—and I loved to write all those details: sexuality, which movies to watch. Like did you—did you do—some of my friends did. I think it is in this book that I mention that wonderful—what's the title?—wonderful short story from which—Yeah. I haven't—I didn't watch the—I didn't watch the—I have not yet watched the film. Oh, Melancholia? No, really! You know this idea of—this idea of how—first it's very deep psychoanalytic insight. You think the guy is still searching for what he wants to, but he is already in his dream realizing desire and so on. It's a door of the world, sorry, yes. This is I think the best metaphor for our time now. And so I am, again, the only way to describe my position is I am a pessimist and for this reason I am a moderate optimist because unfortunately you have to be shaken to come with something new. We just need—but everybody knows. My God, listen, Bill Gates knows this, Warren Buffett knows this, Elon Musk knows this, that the form of capitalism the way we knew it is over. And now it's the true fight. We are already in this fight. That's important. And I'm not preaching this type of a violent revolution or whatever. No, as we saw clearly now in the United States even, you know, it's the new right who is playing this popular uprising violence. We should emphasize this: we are the decent guys today, my god, you know. Can I ask you something? Maybe it would even interest our potential listeners: what other books or movies did you enjoy? Okay, I'm not saying you should—During the—during the pandemic or in my life? I don't care about your life, pandemic. Uh, one that I know you like, uh, that—that—Yeah, that—that—that affected me a lot that I enjoyed very much was, uh, I watched the full, I think it's about five hours long, director's cut of Until the End of the World. Is this—is this that German guy, how is it called? By Wim Wenders. Wim Wenders. Really! Wait, wait, it's called—it's Until the End of the World, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. I must say, now you caught me here, I—I was too nervous, I wasn't able to watch it to the end and so on. Really? You didn't get—It doesn't—The end is not like what it says in the title, trust me. It's a—it's actually a happy end. Yeah, but my—my sense of what is happy is very perverted and degenerate. You know which movie I consider a movie with a happy ending? Did you see Lars von Trier, uh, that—how's it go—where—the earth is hit, my god, by the—uh—Deep Impact? No, no, you—you mean—Deep Impact is that kids by Mimi Leder where—no, no, no, it's Melancholia, Melancholia. Oh, I didn't see that. You should. You should. It's literally the end of the world, but in a deeply satisfactory way, paradoxically. It is one of the great movies. But do you have the same problem as I do? I now notice that I watch many of old TV series when I have time, but is this simple everyday life pleasure that life is so nice: look, you are tired, you go to a bar, you meet friends.
Usually kind of with nostalgia
you watch it, you know. Like this is what makes me sad. Okay, in some sense with vaccine
some kind of normal life may return, but what I'm really afraid is from global warming to all these other catastrophes, you
know. It's for me either barbarism or some kind of a much tighter—not totalitarian. I don't believe in supranational
world government. It would be incredible seat of corruption, you know. You know what was my, maybe you will like, two ways I was designated. My—once I designated myself, the other by a conservative friend. I designated myself as—that I'm a partisan of communism with Julian Assange. Communism but somebody like Assange should peek into its documents, bring out. And another, I forgot his name, conservative, more liberal, good friend of mine described me as a moderately
conservative communist. That's the best title. I'm proud. I've—yeah, I—I see your—not just your friends but your critics describing you like that as well. Yeah. Because, you know, Marx already knew this. He said that
an intelligent radical leftist always reads
intelligent conservative. Not reactionary, reactionaries are stupid. But you know what conservatives have? A sense which in capitalism it's—saves lives very worthy—when there is some change which just appears a change for the good. To ask, my god, but aren't there any other potentials to—to also to catastrophic outcome? That for me to be a Hegelian today. Hegel—finish with my big philosopher—he always asked this question, you know. He was always fascinated by—by how things go wrong. French Revolution, freedom, up, you end in terror. And twentieth century is full of this, Bolshevik Revolution, I still believe it was meant as a gigantic step towards emancipation, op, op, then Comrade Stalin comes and gives it a specific spin. And I'm not saying as some naive guys, oh if only Lenin were to survive three years longer, made a pact with Trotsky, it would be okay. No, unfortunately the space for something like Stalinism was already there from the beginning. So this is difficult to think, the difficulty in thinking revolutions. Not condemn them, but also not just blame
circumstances or the enemies. They are genuinely
tragic. Fascism is
in this sense not tragic, because fascism was what? Bad guys told exactly what they wanted and they came to power and they more or less did what they told they were do. But
Bolshevism is genuinely tragic. They
proposed new freedoms
and so on, some
of them they realized, equality of women and so on, and then you have the
mega-catastrophe, Stalinism. You know. So it—isn't for me, that's why—I think I say it in the book—the greatest catastrophe, don't you agree, is—like what happens today in China. Okay, I admire them,
economic success, the way they—but—I think I have this in the book, that how the left in the twentieth century was
defined by its opposition to two bad guys, enemies: brutal free market competition and strong authoritarian state. Didn't China precisely unite the two, you know? You have strong
authoritarian state
and very brutal market. So I—I—that's the problem for me. I don't hate China, but how to prevent that China will be our future. That should be a true worry of any authentic leftist today. Uh, well forgive me but I do want to plug the book one more time and your publisher asked if we wanted to offer a promo code for a discount to our listeners. Okay, but then demand a percentage for yourself at least, you know. Ah, one has to—No, no, no. I don't need—I don't need—I don't need the percentage. It's my—it's my—it's my pleasure to—Thanks very much. That's a—it's a Christmas—it's a Christmas gift. It's a Christmas gift from your publisher. Use the code—I don't know—Chapo. It's the name of our show. Use the promo code Chapo. We'll put the link in the description of this episode. It's available now, Pandemic! Chronicles of a Time Lost, available now from OR Books. But you know what I mean by time lost? At least in Europe we saw that it's nice example of what we mentioned before. We knew it coming, what is coming. Everybody was—all scientists and so on were predicting second wave. And even when we began, it began late August for serious. And in this strange immobility we were
too late to act. Now we know, if we were to act with—with lockdowns
and so on at the end of August, it could have been to a large extent avoided. We did—we did not. So that's what I mean by time lost. We are shocked now—okay, some countries like Germany were a little bit more prepared. And also what makes me so sad is how little we know. You remember a month ago, Germany was good, France was in a horrible situation and Spain. Now Spain is doing very well, Germany is so-so. And it's so many things are still not well known. That's the horror for me of the pandemic. It's as if the relations between cause and effect are not clear, you know what I mean. Like things happen, we are disoriented, we don't know why they are happening. I think, again, don't—I stand behind what I said. At the end it will be also a mega mental health problem. Well, another end is possible. Let's—I—I believe, I hope, I believe the—the great word for me is "perhaps." I discovered this word—I don't know which writer used it a lot, it was even Kafka, I think, you know—that, you know, like my idea is: will there be communism? Perhaps, perhaps. Perhaps not, you know. Perhaps something even worse than our capitalism today. Listen, I am grateful. Why don't you buy a proper cigar, or is it a proper cigar? This is a Juul. It's a—a vape. Sorry? It's a vape, it's an e-cigarette, you know. Ah, yeah, yeah, but are they—do they still work? Isn't the idea that they really—I like how this—you always get a different message from authorities, so-called health authorities. At some point it was hailed, now they say it's maybe even more dangerous. No, it's good for you. That's all bullshit, it's good for you. Really? It's—it's—it's the distilled nicotine without the—the tar and the additives from the tobacco. Yeah, but you know that I'm a madman. Look: never in my life did I smoke a cigarette. I somehow wasn't even attracted, it doesn't affect me. Never in my life, and everybody here did it—we were normal country—did I try not even marijuana, some very soft drug. Never in my life did I get drunk. It's—I'm totally unnatural at this level, you know. Totally. Even I hate winter sports. I have a philosophical problem with them. Slovenia before global warming, now we don't have enough snow, was a country of skiing. You know what's my problem with skiing? Look, think logically: why should I go up a mountain and then slide down when I can stay down and read a good book? You know. It seems—seems—to be logical. I've never—I've never been skiing myself. Uh, I think—I think that's good for the—uh—for the interview. I feel like that's a good amount for our producer and I don't want to give him too much material because he's got to—you know, he's got to cut this and put it out to—Okay. Yeah, but you—you and your producer have all the authority to do, if I may put it like this, a nice Stalinist purge that would make Comrade Stalin laugh with pleasure in his grave with my text, with—what I—what I said. I just want to say one thing very, very quickly. Yeah. Which
is—you know—have you ever read the book A Canticle for Leibowitz? Which one? A Canticle for Leibowitz. No. Sorry, don't. It's a
book—it's—it's A Canticle for
Leibowitz. I forget the name of the author—um, it was a science fiction novel in the 1950s. And, uh, the—the premise—it's post-apocalyptic fiction. And, uh, it—takes place in the—the—uh, in this Catholic—uh—monastery, Catholic
church in the West, in the—the post-nuclear-war American West. And they—uh, this—this young acolyte initiate named Leibowitz, he finds a schematic to—uh, I don't know what it is, it's like an engineering schematic. Mm-hmm. He finds it and he thinks, oh this is a sacred document. And the—it's signed with the name Leibowitz. And he thinks, oh that—who was just some guy, he was just some engineer, some random guy—and thinks, oh that must be a saint. And then they—they develop this—uh—they incorporate that into the Catholic canon and they go through the whole, you know, beatification. That's nice. That's nice. I was always interested in this, how sacred documents emerge and so on. This
is—And
it's—it's—it's—I mean, it—it founded a kind of genre of post-apocalyptic fiction, which has always been very interesting to me, about—uh—people with no real knowledge of—of—the modern society that was destroyed, uh, attempting to piece it together, you know, based on the artifacts that remain from
it—Oh my god.—whether they're
ideological artifacts or actual pieces. Oh my god. Hopefully we have now Amazon, it's—it's not next time that I go to the United States, but it's a question of days that I can get it. But one thing you should do is—uh—you
should play the game Fallout: New Vegas, which is the same premise. It's—it's a—it's
the same form—it's a post-apocalyptic game. Uh, where—uh—it's—it's very satirical, it's a funny—it's a funny game where—uh—it's—it's this—uh—it takes place in a—a version of the—uh—late 21st century—there was a big war with United States and America—and it's—uh—where the—the twist is—the, I don't know—I forget what you call this, but where the twist is—uh—like—uh—microcircuits—uh, microchip technology was never invented. So they have robots and all of these things, but they're big clunky things with—uh—transistor tubes and shit like that. Uh, it's a very interesting game and
if—if you're—if you have any free time, you should come, uh, play it with us on our Twitch stream. Or rather, you can watch
us play and you can comment. What's the—the name of the game? Fallout, Fallout: New Vegas. I will ask my son. I trust my son here. Ask—ask him
about the Fallout series. It's a whole series of games, New Vegas was the best one. But I promise you, if you came on and you did that, yeah, people would love that. And we'd make a shitload of money. Ah, it's even
better. Okay. That's even better. It's wonderful that—like different names but the same stupid guys we meet a week from now
on,
I wonder. Perfect. Uh, what are you drinking now? Something—something—what? This is a—this is a Diet
Red
Bull. Ah, I—I'm—Red Bull, I'm—I'm afraid of them—uh, you know what Brecht liked to drink? Which is one of those classic—not Coke, but one of those which don't have the Coke taste, 7-Up or what, I don't know. Sprite. Sprite, Sprite, Sprite. Sprite. Brecht was obsessed
with Sprite. Really? Stay. See you. Bye bye.