Interview with Philosophy Now
Interview · zizekpodcast.com ·
2017-07 · 1:00:50 · 9,236 words
hegel-dialecticspsychoanalysiscapitalismcommunism-socialismideologyphilosophy-generalscience-physicsliberalism-political-correctnessrevolution-violenceecology-climatetechnology-ai-cyberspacesubjectivitysexuality-genderreligion-theology
In this wide-ranging interview, Žižek reflects on his fame, his philosophical project, and the current political-economic situation. He argues for a return to Hegel and German Idealism as the framework most adequate to contemporary problems, rejects both liberal-democratic complacency and Marxist teleology, and outlines his book 'Incontinence of the Void', which explores the parallels between Lacanian surplus enjoyment, Kantian antinomies, capitalist surplus value, and an incomplete ontology of reality. The conversation moves across philosophy of appearance, quantum physics, political correctness, biogenetics, ecology, communism as a name for a problem, and the opacity of all revolutionary processes.
every located moment in this recording, click one to read it
The ideas in it 21
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
as “right violent abstraction”
Žižek's characterisation of the Hegelian dialectical method: the productive move of ignoring most details and focusing violently on one feature, letting it colour the entire approach, the only way to produce something genuinely new.
Alain Badiou's term (invoked by Žižek) for 20th-century revolutionary attempts to really change things, whose catastrophic results (Gulag, Holocaust) now counsel a return to interpretation over transformation.
An incomplete, non-fully-constituted reality structured around a gap; Žižek uses quantum physics (Bohr's ontological reading) and Hegel's negativity to argue that incompleteness belongs to the thing itself.
as “left-Fukuyamaists”
Žižek's ironic label for the mainstream left that effectively accepts liberal democracy and capitalism as the only game in town and merely advocates for incremental improvements within it.
as “communism as the name of the problem”
Žižek's ironic redefinition: communism is not a solution but the name for the set of problems around the commons (ecology, biogenetics, intellectual property) that capitalism cannot resolve on its own terms.
Shared substance (natural environment, intellectual property, genetic heritage) that cannot be privatised or left to market logic; for Žižek, the actual content of what communism must address.
Žižek's label for the dominant 20th-century philosophical move that banned direct ontological questions in favour of reflecting on discursive or transcendental horizons, exemplified by Foucault's épistémè analysis.
as “ontological incompleteness of reality”
The thesis that reality is not fully constituted but structured around a gap, derived from quantum physics (Bohr) and Hegel, and contrasted with naive materialism's assumption of a fully real external world.
Žižek's critical label for Marxist philosophy that replaces Kantian transcendental subjectivity with collective human praxis as the ultimate horizon of perception, which he views as still transcendentalist rather than genuinely materialist.
The title and central concept of Žižek's book being discussed: the constitutive void or incompleteness that every field needs as its spandrel, explored at the intersection of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and political economy.
as “spandrel”
Stephen Jay Gould's evolutionary biology concept of structural byproducts that become functionalized; Žižek appropriates it as the key to his book's argument that every field needs an empty constitutive byproduct space.
Enjoyment in its paradoxical Lacanian sense, where an obstacle or pain is what enables rather than blocks pleasure; illustrated through Goebbels's Totaler Krieg speech and Protestant guilt.
Lacan's logical structures from Seminar XX (Encore) distinguishing masculine and feminine positions; Žižek, following Joan Copjec, identifies them as the very structures of Kantian dynamic and mathematical antinomies respectively.
Kant's four pairs of contradictory propositions about the limits of reason; Žižek follows Hegel in insisting they apply to reality itself, not merely to our knowledge, and aligns them with Lacanian formulas of sexuation.
The Marxist concept that Žižek uses to argue that capitalism is an ontological phenomenon: imbalance and surplus are not a problem but the very engine of the system.
The additional twist in enjoyment beyond simple pleasure that transforms it into what we call enjoyment in the emphatic sense; here linked structurally to Marxist surplus value and used to explain why obstacles condition rather than block desire.
Implicitly present in the talk as the excess or surplus that conditions desire; most directly instantiated by the example of the 'one or two kilos too much' that retroactively makes the body seem perfect.
as “constitutive obstacle”
The paradox whereby what appears to block or disturb a system (excess weight, guilt, crisis) is in fact the very condition that keeps it going; capitalism is the social order that institutionalises this logic.
as “non-transparent revolution”
Žižek's counter to Lukács/Marx: no revolution is self-transparent or controlled; the act is by definition displaced and produces something other than intended, making Marxist teleology illusory.
Žižek's term for the irreducible opacity and non-transparency of all social processes, including progressive ones: we never fully know what we are doing, and the result is always displaced.
Hegelian sublation implicitly operative throughout; the idea that an obstacle or negation is preserved and elevated rather than simply removed.
Stories he reaches for 7
Jean-Pierre Dupuy told Žižek that the Japanese government briefly panicked that they might need to evacuate the entire Tokyo area after the 2011 tsunami and radiation disaster, illustrating that in the nuclear age, nation-state solutions to catastrophe are obsolete and transnational cooperation is unavoidable.
“Japanese government was in total panic. They thought that the radiation will be so strong that they have to evacuate the entire Tokyo area.”
Žižek uses Malcolm X's name, where X stands for the erased African origin, to argue that African Americans' deprivation of ethnic substance is not a deficiency but a structural opening for a more authentic universality than any rooted particular identity.
“He saw something ingenious... this X means we have no substantial particular way of life to which we can return... use this fact that we are deprived of our ethnic substance as a chance of new, even more authentic universality.”
Žižek takes the Marxist/optimist metaphor of the light at the end of the tunnel and reveals it as the light of an oncoming train, hope and catastrophe are structurally identical.
“the best news that we ever heard... it is, but it's the light of another train coming against you.”
Žižek describes asking protesters at Occupy Wall Street and Frankfurt what they actually want and getting no answer, illustrating that the Left has no positive programme and escapes into moralism.
“I insistently ask them a stupid question. What do you want? I told them Freud asked the wrong question, was will das Weib? I claim what do you want?”
In typical heterosexual hardcore pornography, Žižek argues, the woman is not reduced to an object but is the only real subject: man's face is invisible, he is a mere instrument, and the camera identifies with the male viewer seeking confirmation that the woman enjoys, which is actually a deeper form of humiliation.
“It's not true that woman is reduced to an object. No, woman is the only subject... Man is reduced to pure instrument.”
Žižek uses Hegel's 'owl of Minerva takes off in the evening' to argue that the Philosophy of Right is not a conservative blueprint for society but a picture of a world whose time has already passed, Hegel knew this and intended it.
“When Hegel says a certain social order, historical order, can only be grasped when its time is over.”
Žižek cites Pierre Bayard's book which proves that the best commentaries on some authors are written by people who didn't read all their work, because dialectics is the art of the right violent abstraction, not total comprehension.
“the art of dialectics is the right violent abstraction. You say ignore all that, focus on one feature, and then let this one feature color your entire approach.”
Works invoked 17
Hegel's; Žižek suspects even this is not fully read by most who cite it, but takes a Hegelian view that it doesn't matter, selective focus is more productive than total comprehension.
Less Than Nothing book
Žižek's own major work; sold very well including three reprints in Korea; described as nearly the length of the Bible; cited as evidence that the public can engage seriously with difficult philosophy.
Philosophy of Right book
Reread by Žižek against the conservative interpretation: the owl of Minerva passage shows Hegel painted a world whose time had passed, not a blueprint for a new order.
Science of Logic book
Hegel's; Žižek doubts whether people really read it, while still treating Hegelian logic as the central resource for his own project.
Absolute Recoil book
Žižek calls it, apologetically, his best book; the one he is most proud of; received 'hate mail' for having too few jokes; its first part works through how to break out of the transcendental horizon.
One of Žižek's political books he mentions with ambivalence; describes writing political books with 'bad conscience' as if filling in for someone else.
Encore (Seminar XX) book
Lacan's seminar on feminine jouissance where the formulas of sexuation appear; identified by Žižek and Joan Copjec as unknowingly encoding Kantian antinomies.
Pierre Bayard's book; cited to support the Hegelian case for selective violent abstraction over total reading.
A Theory of Justice book
John Rawls's major work; Žižek notes that people who have written books on it admitted not reading it, and suggests it can be condensed to a few pages without significant loss.
Spheres book
Peter Sloterdijk's mega-work; cited as one of the famous unread philosophical books.
Sloterdijk's book; cited for reaching a similar conclusion to Žižek: the era of nation-states and national self-sacrifice is over.
Event book
A short philosophical book Žižek recommends as entry point; covers Heideggerian Ereignis, ultimate catastrophe, Plato/Descartes/Hegel as philosophers of the Event.
Making It Explicit book
Robert Brandom's major work; another famous philosophical bestseller people buy but don't read.
Early Lukács; called still one of the greatest books of the 20th century; used to illustrate Marx's belief in the self-transparency of proletarian revolution.
Symphony No. 14 other
Shostakovich's symphony about death; brazenly pessimistic; unable to be performed in his lifetime; cited as a model of honest historical density in progressive art.
The book being discussed in the interview; explores spandrels as the empty spaces between philosophy, psychoanalysis, and critique of political economy; develops the parallel between surplus enjoyment, surplus value, and Kantian antinomies.
Habermas's major work; cited as another famous philosophical bestseller that nobody actually reads.
People invoked 37
Jean-Pierre Dupuy positive
A friend and theorist of catastrophes; told Žižek about the Fukushima near-evacuation of Tokyo, illustrating the need for transnational cooperation beyond nation-states.
Robert Pippin positive
A friend who reached the same conclusion as Žižek: the central event in the history of philosophy is still the Kant-Hegel sequence.
Making it Explicit cited as one of the great unread philosophical bestsellers.
Pierre Bayard positive
Author of 'How to Talk About Books That You Haven't Read'; used to support the Hegelian thesis that selective violent abstraction produces more than total comprehension.
Georg Lukács positive
History and Class Consciousness called still one of the greatest books of the 20th century; used to illustrate Marx's mistaken belief in the self-transparency of proletarian revolution.
Jacques Lacan positive
Used strictly as a means to reinterpret Hegel; his formulas of sexuation are shown to be unknowingly equivalent to Kantian antinomies; surplus enjoyment is the key Lacanian concept deployed.
John Rawls negative
Listed among great philosophical bestsellers nobody actually reads; Žižek suggests Rawls can be condensed to a few pages without loss, a backhanded slight.
Stephen Hawking negative
Cited for the claim that 'philosophy is dead', Žižek agrees ironically but argues philosophy is not replaceable by natural science.
Stephen Jay Gould positive
His concept of evolutionary spandrels, byproducts that become functionalized, provides the central structural metaphor for Žižek's book 'Incontinence of the Void'.
Gilles Deleuze positive
Not a Deleuzian, but cites Deleuze's point that raising the right questions is more important than giving right answers.
Francis Fukuyama negative
Žižek once told Fukuyama in person that the biggest irony of his 'end of history' thesis is that the most efficient managers of capitalism today are communists; Fukuyama laughed but is treated as a foil.
Called a 'boring idiot' as a person; used as an example of the new nationalist-market logic: integration into global capitalism plus ideological ethnocentrism.
Wolfgang Streeck positive
German sociologist/economist cited for the correct pessimistic observation that capitalism is disintegrating without a new progressive force waiting to replace it.
Alain Badiou positive
A friend; his concept 'Passion of the Real' is invoked to characterise 20th-century revolutionary catastrophism.
Similarly despised; cited alongside Zuckerberg for acknowledging capitalism's dysfunction.
Cited as an example of Marxists producing excellent post-mortem analyses of why revolutions went wrong rather than successful transformative theory.
Described as someone Žižek despises; cited only to note that even tech billionaires acknowledge capitalism's structural problems.
Werner Heisenberg negative
His uncertainty principle is cited, but Žižek sides with Bohr's more radical ontological interpretation against Heisenberg's merely epistemological reading.
Carl Jung negative
Contrasted unfavourably with Freud: Jung has a substantial notion of the unconscious (depth, the iceberg metaphor) which Žižek rejects.
Malcolm X positive
Called Žižek's hero: understood that African Americans' deprivation of ethnic substance (the X) is not a deficit but the structural opening for a more authentic universalism.
Michel Foucault negative
Used as the exemplar of the transcendental-linguistic turn: when asked about the immortal soul, a Foucauldian can only analyze the discursive field within which the question is raised, not answer it.
Peter Sloterdijk positive
A friend and right-winger whom Žižek likes for being provocative; cites his book (possibly 'Was geschah im Jahrhundert?') for arriving at similar conclusions about the obsolescence of the nation-state.
Martin Heidegger positive
The concept of Ereignis (event) from Heidegger is the starting point of Žižek's book 'Event', alongside Cartesian and Hegelian conceptions.
Joan Copjec positive
A good friend who originally developed the idea that Lacan's formulas of sexuation are the very structures of Kantian antinomies.
Quentin Meillassoux positive
Cited positively as part of the 'new materialists' attempting to return to big ontological questions beyond the transcendental horizon.
Niels Bohr positive
Bohr's claim that quantum uncertainty is in the thing itself (ontological) is endorsed against Heisenberg's epistemological reading.
Theory of Communicative Action cited as another famous unread megawork alongside Rawls, Sloterdijk, and Brandom.
His Theses on Feuerbach (with Marx) are inverted by Žižek: for our time we should interpret rather than change.
Dmitri Shostakovich positive
His 14th Symphony, openly pessimistic about death, unable to be performed in his lifetime, is cited as an example of honest historical density within progressive art.
Plato positive
Identified as one of the three greatest philosophers (with Descartes and Hegel) because each defined the entire subsequent philosophical tradition.
Mentioned briefly and negatively, Žižek alludes to Chomsky's critical writing about him as part of what makes him distrust his own 'fame'.
Žižek identifies as a Marxist but argues Marx was more idealist than Hegel, believed in a minimal teleology and the self-transparency of revolution, and was philosophically a regression from Hegel.
René Descartes positive
One of the three greatest philosophers; the Cogito is not a thinking substance but a pure self-relating event of thought, a philosopher of the Event.
Sigmund Freud positive
Not a naive naturalist but the source of a vision of the human that fits German Idealism; the unconscious is purely phenomenal, not a substantial depth, contrasted with Jung.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel positive
Žižek's central philosophical reference throughout; argues Hegel is more materialist than Marx, that Kantian transcendentalism and naive realism can only be transcended through Hegel, and that we have not really moved beyond him.
Immanuel Kant positive
Kant's antinomies are taken as genuinely ontological rather than merely epistemological; Žižek follows Hegel's critique of Kant as 'too tender towards things' while still treating the Kantian framework as a crucial starting point.
His concept 'mauvaise foi' (bad faith) is used self-deprecatingly by Žižek to describe his guilty feeling when writing political rather than philosophical books.
What it argues
return to Hegel as the most adequate framework for contemporary problemscommunism as name of the problem rather than the solutionontological incompleteness of reality and the status of appearancessurplus enjoyment, surplus value, and the logic of the constitutive obstaclethe failure of leftist teleology and the opacity of revolutionary processescritique of political correctness and the presupposed figure of the humanparallels between Kantian antinomies, Lacanian sexuation, and capitalist logic
Dialectical moves 15
“Fame is not recognition but a way to keep him at a distance — the more famous, the less seriously engaged.”
Celebrity functions as a mechanism of dismissal: being called interesting replaces being taken seriously.
“The light at the end of the tunnel is another train coming at you.”
The Marxist metaphor of historical optimism is inverted: the very sign of hope (the light) is already the sign of catastrophe.
“The most efficient managers of global capitalism today are communists who are still in power.”
The victory of capitalism over communism is ironically completed by communists administering it, the opposition collapses into identity.
“Communism is not a solution but the name of the problem today.”
The old positive content of communism is evacuated; it remains as a placeholder naming what cannot yet be solved rather than as a ready-made answer.
“Fear of unemployment because of robotization: this should be the best news we ever heard.”
The standard left anxiety about automation is inverted, eliminating toil is the goal, so its arrival should be celebrated, not feared.
“True anti-racism is not changing the language but using the same language in a different non-racist way.”
The political correctness programme of linguistic purification is shown to miss the point, the same word can function differently depending on the underlying relationship.
“Hegel's problem is the opposite of Kant's: not can we reach reality beyond appearances, but how can reality appear to itself at all.”
The standard epistemological problem (can we know the thing-in-itself?) is reversed into an ontological one (how is it possible for reality to be self-reflexive?).
“When you feel abandoned by God, you do not work harder to reach God — you identify with Christ's abandonment, transposing your division into God himself.”
The Christian solution is not to overcome the gap between self and God but to discover that the gap is already inscribed in God; the problem is its own solution.
“God underestimated us: we with quantum physics caught God with his pants down.”
The ontological incompleteness of the universe (the creator's 'lazy' programming stopping at the subatomic level) is revealed precisely by human inquiry exceeding the expected horizon.
“In hardcore pornography, woman is not reduced to an object — she is the only subject; the man is reduced to a pure instrument.”
The standard feminist critique (woman as object) is inverted: the camera identifies with the male viewer's need to confirm female enjoyment, making woman the structural subject.
“The constitutive obstacle: far from blocking the thing, it conditions it — the one or two kilos too much is the very condition of the illusion of perfection.”
The surplus that appears to disturb harmony is revealed as the retroactive condition of harmony itself; remove the obstacle and you lose what it was blocking.
“The more capitalism is in crisis the stronger it emerges out of it — Marxists always count on crisis but crisis is capitalism's engine, not its undoing.”
Marxist crisis theory is inverted: capitalist crises are not signs of breakdown but of reproduction; imbalance is the solution, not the problem.
“Marx is literally more idealist than Hegel: he believed revolution would be self-transparent, while Hegel knew the act is by definition displaced.”
The usual hierarchy (Hegel idealist, Marx materialist) is reversed: Hegel's acceptance of opacity and non-transparency is more materialist than Marx's dream of self-knowing praxis.
“Evolution's greatness, even in the animal kingdom, is based in byproducts — the thing itself cannot ever, even conceptually, fully function without byproducts.”
Gould's spandrel argument is radicalised: byproducts are not secondary extras but the condition of any system's operation.
“Malcolm X's X means we are deprived of our ethnic substance — and this is not a loss but the chance for a more authentic universality.”
The mark of dispossession (X as unknown/erased origin) is inverted from stigma into a structural opening for a universalism beyond ethnic particularity.
Claims 23
asserts
Fame functions as a way to keep Žižek at a distance and avoid engaging seriously with his arguments — he is 'interesting' but not to be taken seriously.his own public reception and celebrity
asserts
The Theses on Feuerbach should be reversed for our time: philosophers have tried to change too much; what we need now is to step back and interpret.the role of philosophy and theory today
asserts
Our situation is Hegelian rather than Marxian: like Hegel after the French Revolution, we must think how to keep the legacy of failed emancipatory attempts alive without teleological guarantees.the contemporary political-philosophical situation
asserts
The biggest irony of Fukuyama's 'end of history' is that today the most efficient managers of global capitalism are communists still in power.Fukuyama's thesis and actually existing capitalism
asserts
The Left's retreat into political correctness and moralism is a symptom of its failure to articulate a positive programmatic vision of what it actually wants.contemporary left-wing politics and political correctness
asserts
Capitalism is approaching its limits — ecology, fictitious financial capital, biogenetics, refugees — but unlike in classical Marxism, no new progressive force is waiting to replace it.capitalism's structural crisis
asserts
The ideal country today is one fully integrated into global markets but ideologically ethnocentric, and this model — not liberal universalism — is winning globally.contemporary nationalism and global capitalism
reframes
Communism is not a solution but the name for the problem of how to manage the commons — ecology, intellectual property, biogenetics — outside of market relations.what communism means today
reframes
Fear of robotization and unemployment is irrational: automation should be the best news we have ever heard, since it means we could all work less.technological unemployment and automation
reframes
Political correctness misfires because true anti-racism is not a matter of changing language but of using the same language in a different, non-racist way.political correctness and anti-racism
rejects
Philosophy is not dead but must break out of the transcendental-linguistic turn and return to direct ontological questions, informed by but not reducible to natural science.Hawking's claim that philosophy is dead
asserts
Hegel's philosophy of appearance — how reality appears to itself — is the most important philosophical question of our time, confirmed by quantum physics.the status of appearances as the central philosophical problem
asserts
Bohr was right against Heisenberg: quantum uncertainty is ontological, not merely epistemological — particles do not simultaneously have both velocity and position.the interpretation of quantum mechanics
asserts
Psychoanalysis is not a positive naturalist science but expresses a vision of the human that fits German idealism; reading them through each other is the fundamental philosophical task.the relationship between psychoanalysis and German idealism
asserts
Lacan's formulas of sexuation are, without Lacan knowing it, the very structures of Kantian antinomies — dynamic antinomies are masculine, mathematical antinomies are feminine.the structural identity of Lacan's sexuation and Kant's antinomies
rejects
Kant was too tender towards things: antinomies are not merely limitations of our knowledge but belong to reality itself.Kant's epistemological containment of antinomies
asserts
Capitalism is an ontological phenomenon: it is the only social order in history that institutionalises imbalance and surplus not as a problem but as the solution.the ontological structure of capitalism
asserts
Marx was more idealist than Hegel: he believed the proletarian revolution would be self-transparent, whereas in fact no revolution is controlled or self-knowing.Marx versus Hegel on the transparency of revolutionary praxis
rejects
We should resist visions that communism will mean a better private life; we do not know what it will bring, and must accept historical opacity even for progressive processes.utopian communist visions of personal flourishing
rejects
Relying on local indigenous traditions to fight global capitalism is wrong; we must fight it on its own terms with a new universal global vision.cultural particularism as anti-capitalist strategy
asserts
The best books are sometimes written by people who have not read all of an author, because dialectics is the art of the right violent abstraction, not total comprehension.reading, knowledge, and Hegelian method
asserts
Malcolm X understood that being deprived of ethnic substance is not a loss but a chance for a more authentic universality than that of rooted particular identities.identity, race, and universalism
asserts
Philosophy will not supply a new political programme but can do the crucial work of showing how the very way we formulate our problems reproduces rather than resolves them.the role and limits of philosophy in politics
Quotes 20
“my so-called fame is basically just a way to keep me at a distance, not to engage seriously with what I'm doing.”Slavoj Žižek · celebrity as a mechanism of intellectual dismissal
“the art of dialectics is the right violent abstraction. You say ignore all that, focus on one feature, and then let this one feature color your entire approach. This is the only way to produce something really new.”Slavoj Žižek · Hegelian dialectics as violent selective abstraction
“philosophers and others have tried to change too much things in the 20th century. The result were, to put it mildly, Gulag, Holocaust, not exactly the best.”Slavoj Žižek · critique of 20th-century revolutionary praxis
“Marxists like to say even if times are dark we can see the light at the end of the tunnel... it is, but it's the light of another train coming against you.”Slavoj Žižek · inversion of leftist hope
“isn't the irony that today, now, the most efficient managers of global capitalism are communists who are still in power?”Slavoj Žižek · the irony of communist capitalism
“I insistently ask them a stupid question. What do you want? I told them Freud asked the wrong question, was will das Weib? I claim what do you want?”Slavoj Žižek · the Left's programmatic vacuum
“communism is for me not a solution, but the name of the problem today.”Slavoj Žižek · communism redefined as problem-name rather than solution
“I find it so irrational that people are afraid of robotization because it will cause unemployment. This should be the best news that we ever heard.”Slavoj Žižek · automation anxiety inverted
“even more important than to give the right answers is to raise the right questions.”Slavoj Žižek · philosophy's role as question-raiser rather than answer-giver
“what if we should analyze the extent to which the very way we formulate these problems doesn't resolve them but reproduces the problems?”Slavoj Žižek · philosophy as critique of problem-formulation
“Hegel's problem is the opposite one. The true miracle, that's the miracle of negativity, is how come that reality is not just flat reality, how can reality appear to itself?”Slavoj Žižek · the status of appearances as Hegel's central question
“God on the cross is separated from himself. It means that the very distance, the very gap is part of the thing itself.”Slavoj Žižek · negativity inscribed in the absolute
“the true definition of materialism for me. We can think this incompleteness without God. You don't need a creator. Just reality is incomplete.”Slavoj Žižek · materialism as ontological incompleteness without a creator
“It's not true that woman is reduced to an object. No, woman is the only subject. Typical scene is this one... Man is reduced to pure instrument.”Slavoj Žižek · inversion of standard feminist pornography critique
“the surplus which bothers harmony is the very retroactive condition of harmony.”Slavoj Žižek · constitutive obstacle as condition of the thing it disturbs
“capitalism is in this sense an ontological phenomenon. It's the first social order... where imbalance it's not a problem, it's a solution.”Slavoj Žižek · capitalism as ontological institutionalisation of imbalance
“Marx is here literally more idealist. Marx thought that proletarian revolution will be a self-transparent act.”Slavoj Žižek · Marx more idealist than Hegel on revolutionary transparency
“we never know what we are doing. The act is by definition displaced, you get something else.”Slavoj Žižek · historical opacity and the non-transparency of all praxis
“my heart really is only in this more purely philosophical books. I feel bad with my political books.”Slavoj Žižek · Žižek's self-assessment: philosophy over political commentary
“He saw something ingenious... this X means we have no substantial particular way of life to which we can return. But... use this fact that we are deprived of our ethnic substance as a chance of new, even more authentic universality.”Slavoj Žižek · dispossession as opening for universalism — Malcolm X
Transcript 97 turns
unknown
So, so professor Žižek... If
So, so professor Žižek... If
Slavoj Žižek
you don't want me to kill you.
you don't want me to kill you.
unknown
Oh, right, okay, so
Oh, right, okay, so
Slavoj Žižek
Slavoj, whatever, don't call me... I feel so uneasy when somebody calls me professor.
Slavoj, whatever, don't call me... I feel so uneasy when somebody calls me professor.
unknown
My dentist told me, where is the professor? But you are a professor. That's my
My dentist told me, where is the professor? But you are a professor. That's my
Slavoj Žižek
problem. I have deep problem, distrust with any official titles and so on. But I'm not proud of it. It
problem. I have deep problem, distrust with any official titles and so on. But I'm not proud of it. It
unknown
makes life difficult. You know, I
makes life difficult. You know, I
Slavoj Žižek
automatically, when somebody called me with professor, whatever, I take it automatically as an irony.
automatically, when somebody called me with professor, whatever, I take it automatically as an irony.
unknown
Oh, no, no, but it's... but you've earned it. That's the thing. It's not like an inherited title. It's not like you're a lord or something.
Oh, no, no, but it's... but you've earned it. That's the thing. It's not like an inherited title. It's not like you're a lord or something.
Slavoj Žižek
Look at what Chomsky wrote about me and so on.
Look at what Chomsky wrote about me and so on.
unknown
I was a bit hurt... okay, sorry, I talk too much. No, no, no, you're doing very well. But you know, the thing, the most obvious fact about you is that you are not just a philosopher, but you're a famous philosopher. And that's kind of a cool, a rare thing, right? So I'm gonna ask you about the philosophy thing in a bit, but I would like to find out about what does it mean to you that you're famous? You know, is fame somehow important? First, fame is very
I was a bit hurt... okay, sorry, I talk too much. No, no, no, you're doing very well. But you know, the thing, the most obvious fact about you is that you are not just a philosopher, but you're a famous philosopher. And that's kind of a cool, a rare thing, right? So I'm gonna ask you about the philosophy thing in a bit, but I would like to find out about what does it mean to you that you're famous? You know, is fame somehow important? First, fame is very
Slavoj Žižek
relative. I have, as you know maybe better than me, many enemies. People who think that I'm just a clown, people who think that beneath my amusing nature there is some evil proto-fascist or Stalinist whatever dimension and so on. So I think my so-called fame is basically just a way to keep me at a distance, not to engage seriously with what I'm doing. I seriously think this. Because you know, this fame in conversation, as far as I can guess, functions like this: Oh, he's an interesting guy, don't take him too seriously, but go to one of his talks, you will be amused and so on. You know? So I'm very proud, what I'm really proud of is that it's not limited to this. For example, you know my crazy book, the length of the Bible almost, Less Than
relative. I have, as you know maybe better than me, many enemies. People who think that I'm just a clown, people who think that beneath my amusing nature there is some evil proto-fascist or Stalinist whatever dimension and so on. So I think my so-called fame is basically just a way to keep me at a distance, not to engage seriously with what I'm doing. I seriously think this. Because you know, this fame in conversation, as far as I can guess, functions like this: Oh, he's an interesting guy, don't take him too seriously, but go to one of his talks, you will be amused and so on. You know? So I'm very proud, what I'm really proud of is that it's not limited to this. For example, you know my crazy book, the length of the Bible almost, Less Than
unknown
Nothing. You
Nothing. You
Slavoj Žižek
know that it sold very well? Over in English. In Korea, it was reprinted three times. Why? I don't know, but it gives me hope that nonetheless, don't underestimate the public. The publishers themselves, now they are putting pressure on me, why don't you write a nice bestseller on Donald Trump? Why should I? He's not interesting at all as a person. He's a boring idiot and so on. But, but are you worried about your books becoming sort
know that it sold very well? Over in English. In Korea, it was reprinted three times. Why? I don't know, but it gives me hope that nonetheless, don't underestimate the public. The publishers themselves, now they are putting pressure on me, why don't you write a nice bestseller on Donald Trump? Why should I? He's not interesting at all as a person. He's a boring idiot and so on. But, but are you worried about your books becoming sort
unknown
of coffee table books, you know, people buy them but they
of coffee table books, you know, people buy them but they
Slavoj Žižek
don't actually read them? Oh, I am, but there is a big philosophical tradition. Now you started another topic that interests me. You know that they are not, I wouldn't say coffee table book, but I would characterize them as big bestsellers, classics. People buy them, nobody really reads them. And I will give you a list: John Rawls, Theory of Justice. I know in New York people who wrote a book on Rawls, and privately they admitted to me they didn't read the book. And I think they're right, because unfortunately Rawls, the way he writes, you really can condense it into like pages and you don't lose a lot. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action. It's mega. Let's go on. He is my friend, although a right-winger, but he's provocative, I like him: Peter Sloterdijk. His Spheres. Do you think people really read them? And the... ah, Robert Brandom, Making it Explicit. All these are famous books, reprinted all the time, people, people don't read them. And I have some suspicions that it's up to a point similar even with Hegel, Phenomenology maybe, but with Logic, you know, I have doubts if people really read them. But in a way, I don't think it matters. Here is my, I claim Hegelian view. Did you read a wonderful book by a French author, now it's translated, Pierre Bayard? B-A-Y-A-R-D. It's called How to Talk About Books That You Haven't Read. And the beauty is that in the best French style, it's not just irony. He takes it seriously and proves precisely apropos of Joyce and some others that the best books on certain authors, because he went to check it up with authors, I mean who wrote about this writer, are written by guys who didn't read all of it. He goes through Shakespeare, people who don't... sometimes, and that's a deep dialectical Hegelian view. Hegel is not a holist in the sense you have to know all aspects. No, the art of dialectics is the right violent abstraction. You say ignore all that, focus on one feature, and then let this one feature color your entire approach. This is the only way to produce something really new. So I claim that the paradox of philosophy, you don't have to read it all. If you know too much, you just get
don't actually read them? Oh, I am, but there is a big philosophical tradition. Now you started another topic that interests me. You know that they are not, I wouldn't say coffee table book, but I would characterize them as big bestsellers, classics. People buy them, nobody really reads them. And I will give you a list: John Rawls, Theory of Justice. I know in New York people who wrote a book on Rawls, and privately they admitted to me they didn't read the book. And I think they're right, because unfortunately Rawls, the way he writes, you really can condense it into like pages and you don't lose a lot. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action. It's mega. Let's go on. He is my friend, although a right-winger, but he's provocative, I like him: Peter Sloterdijk. His Spheres. Do you think people really read them? And the... ah, Robert Brandom, Making it Explicit. All these are famous books, reprinted all the time, people, people don't read them. And I have some suspicions that it's up to a point similar even with Hegel, Phenomenology maybe, but with Logic, you know, I have doubts if people really read them. But in a way, I don't think it matters. Here is my, I claim Hegelian view. Did you read a wonderful book by a French author, now it's translated, Pierre Bayard? B-A-Y-A-R-D. It's called How to Talk About Books That You Haven't Read. And the beauty is that in the best French style, it's not just irony. He takes it seriously and proves precisely apropos of Joyce and some others that the best books on certain authors, because he went to check it up with authors, I mean who wrote about this writer, are written by guys who didn't read all of it. He goes through Shakespeare, people who don't... sometimes, and that's a deep dialectical Hegelian view. Hegel is not a holist in the sense you have to know all aspects. No, the art of dialectics is the right violent abstraction. You say ignore all that, focus on one feature, and then let this one feature color your entire approach. This is the only way to produce something really new. So I claim that the paradox of philosophy, you don't have to read it all. If you know too much, you just get
unknown
confused. But you, so what about, you know, the people buying your books and perhaps not reading them? Do you nonetheless sort of see this as a good sign in the sense that people are kind of interested in philosophy and... Yes, because
confused. But you, so what about, you know, the people buying your books and perhaps not reading them? Do you nonetheless sort of see this as a good sign in the sense that people are kind of interested in philosophy and... Yes, because
Slavoj Žižek
I nonetheless, my secret hope is that there is a certain strata of people who are looking for just jokes. So I got some, not exactly hate mail, but after this series of my latest more philosophical books like Absolute Recoil, which if you ask me at a gunpoint, I think that's my, sorry to say this, I even find it too arrogant myself, my best book, Absolute Recoil. But I got hate mail like where are the jokes, not enough jokes and so on. Yes, but you know what's the secret here? I will tell you. Some people who accused me that behind my vulgar jokes appearance that I'm a very traditional even philosopher. In some sense they are right, and I am returning to that. Don't you see that behind all my jokes and so on, even the reason I even use Lacan is strictly as a means to reinterpret Hegel. I'm very old-fashioned here. My friend, we don't think the same but we have good relations, Robert Pippin. Once we talked and came to the same conclusion, still, it's a very traditional conclusion that still the big thing in history of philosophy is Kant-Hegel. All these questions: was the move from Kant to Fichte legitimate? What happened with Hegel? Is he a... I, I can see
I nonetheless, my secret hope is that there is a certain strata of people who are looking for just jokes. So I got some, not exactly hate mail, but after this series of my latest more philosophical books like Absolute Recoil, which if you ask me at a gunpoint, I think that's my, sorry to say this, I even find it too arrogant myself, my best book, Absolute Recoil. But I got hate mail like where are the jokes, not enough jokes and so on. Yes, but you know what's the secret here? I will tell you. Some people who accused me that behind my vulgar jokes appearance that I'm a very traditional even philosopher. In some sense they are right, and I am returning to that. Don't you see that behind all my jokes and so on, even the reason I even use Lacan is strictly as a means to reinterpret Hegel. I'm very old-fashioned here. My friend, we don't think the same but we have good relations, Robert Pippin. Once we talked and came to the same conclusion, still, it's a very traditional conclusion that still the big thing in history of philosophy is Kant-Hegel. All these questions: was the move from Kant to Fichte legitimate? What happened with Hegel? Is he a... I, I can see
unknown
that that's very interesting especially for someone who's also interested in the history of philosophy. Of course, you know, at philosophy now we're very interested in what philosophy can do in our time. So
that that's very interesting especially for someone who's also interested in the history of philosophy. Of course, you know, at philosophy now we're very interested in what philosophy can do in our time. So
Slavoj Žižek
what do you think philosophy can or should do in our time
what do you think philosophy can or should do in our time
unknown
and is Hegel particularly significant? Absolutely.
and is Hegel particularly significant? Absolutely.
Slavoj Žižek
I even, to provoke, to provoke my Marxist friends, you know, I, although I consider myself some kind of a Marxist, I like to say that the Thesis of Feuerbach for our time should be: philosophers and others have tried to change too much things in the 20th century. 20th century they tried to do it, what my friend Alain Badiou calls Passion of the Real. Let's really change thing. The result were, to put it mildly, Gulag, Holocaust, not exactly the best, no? So maybe the time today is to not try to change but step back and precisely to interpret, to think. Because even at this level, would you agree with it? I think what we need today is a materialist reversal of Marx back to Hegel. Hegel is in a subtle way much more materialist. You know which Hegel I like? When Hegel, when he says, you know, the one of the most famous passages from his Philosophy of Right, the Owl of Minerva takes off in the evening. But you know that this simple sentence belies the usual claim Hegel was a conservative who in his Philosophy of Right wrote, painted a almost proto-fascist, how do you call it, Stände, estate, as a picture of society. So what do you think it means? I think it means something different. When Hegel says a certain social order, historical order, can only be grasped when its time is over. That's the point, no? But do you think really Hegel was such an idiot that he didn't know the same was whole for his Philosophy of Right? The message, he doesn't bring in his Philosophy of Right a system of how our society should look. He paints a certain world whose time has passed. And he knew it. But where I think Hegel is actual, so that I don't lose my thread, is here. Our situation is much more Hegel's than Marx's. Marx still believed in some kind of minimal teleology. You know, like, like we are at the crucial point, there is a chance, if not necessity, of proletarian revolution, universal redemption. While Hegel perceived his situation as a post-revolutionary one. The big event happened, French Revolution. In some sense it went wrong, but Hegel is here truly progressive. The whole problem of his thought is not to say French Revolution was a bullshit and let's return to tradition, but how to repeat it, how to keep in spite of some catastrophic outcomes the legacy alive. And I think our situation is the same. 20th century attempts at radical emancipation, the communism we got there, they failed. The problem is how to, yeah, how to keep that legacy alive. We have to abandon all that Marxist simple metaphorics: we are riding the train of history and there is, you know, I always use this metaphors ironically. Marxists like to say even if times are dark we can see the light at the end of the tunnel. And you know with which metaphor I always... Oh, I know. Yes, it is, but it's the light of another train coming against you. You know? So that's our situation. And as Hegel knew it, it's open, we cannot make any plans. Hegel, this is very Hegelian.
I even, to provoke, to provoke my Marxist friends, you know, I, although I consider myself some kind of a Marxist, I like to say that the Thesis of Feuerbach for our time should be: philosophers and others have tried to change too much things in the 20th century. 20th century they tried to do it, what my friend Alain Badiou calls Passion of the Real. Let's really change thing. The result were, to put it mildly, Gulag, Holocaust, not exactly the best, no? So maybe the time today is to not try to change but step back and precisely to interpret, to think. Because even at this level, would you agree with it? I think what we need today is a materialist reversal of Marx back to Hegel. Hegel is in a subtle way much more materialist. You know which Hegel I like? When Hegel, when he says, you know, the one of the most famous passages from his Philosophy of Right, the Owl of Minerva takes off in the evening. But you know that this simple sentence belies the usual claim Hegel was a conservative who in his Philosophy of Right wrote, painted a almost proto-fascist, how do you call it, Stände, estate, as a picture of society. So what do you think it means? I think it means something different. When Hegel says a certain social order, historical order, can only be grasped when its time is over. That's the point, no? But do you think really Hegel was such an idiot that he didn't know the same was whole for his Philosophy of Right? The message, he doesn't bring in his Philosophy of Right a system of how our society should look. He paints a certain world whose time has passed. And he knew it. But where I think Hegel is actual, so that I don't lose my thread, is here. Our situation is much more Hegel's than Marx's. Marx still believed in some kind of minimal teleology. You know, like, like we are at the crucial point, there is a chance, if not necessity, of proletarian revolution, universal redemption. While Hegel perceived his situation as a post-revolutionary one. The big event happened, French Revolution. In some sense it went wrong, but Hegel is here truly progressive. The whole problem of his thought is not to say French Revolution was a bullshit and let's return to tradition, but how to repeat it, how to keep in spite of some catastrophic outcomes the legacy alive. And I think our situation is the same. 20th century attempts at radical emancipation, the communism we got there, they failed. The problem is how to, yeah, how to keep that legacy alive. We have to abandon all that Marxist simple metaphorics: we are riding the train of history and there is, you know, I always use this metaphors ironically. Marxists like to say even if times are dark we can see the light at the end of the tunnel. And you know with which metaphor I always... Oh, I know. Yes, it is, but it's the light of another train coming against you. You know? So that's our situation. And as Hegel knew it, it's open, we cannot make any plans. Hegel, this is very Hegelian.
unknown
But the light could be anything. I mean, it doesn't have to be another train, it could really be the light at the end of the tunnel, couldn't
But the light could be anything. I mean, it doesn't have to be another train, it could really be the light at the end of the tunnel, couldn't
Slavoj Žižek
it? Yes, but that's why the beginning is to get rid of false hopes. Even the left today is mostly, we have the majority which I ironically call them this, is still after Fukuyama, left-Fukuyamaists they are mostly. They basically accept liberal democracy and some type of capitalism are the only game in town, so let's just get it better, more solidarity, healthcare, gay marriages, whatever you want. The big question is then we have some, the biggest irony of, this is my answer to Fukuyama. Once I met him, I told him this, he laughed, is that okay, let's say you are right, capitalism won. But isn't the irony that today, now, the most efficient managers of global capitalism are communists who are still in power? You know? So I think that we have finally to accept that 20th century is over. The way we did it in 20th century, either social democratic welfare state, hardline real socialism, or even more, that's my, what I hate, this type any dreams which are coming alive now of some kind of non-representative direct democracy. I don't believe in this. I mean, isn't there also, isn't there a problem of, of labels? So when you say capitalism, it's actually, you know, sort of driven forward by communists, so they're not really... I know what for me... Okay, in what sense I'm still a communist, just in a very limited sense. First, aren't we today witnessing a great irony? The Left, whatever remains of the Left, obviously is not able to offer an actual feasible global alternative. Like whenever the Left protests, I remember when there was Occupy Wall Street, I was with them in New York, in Frankfurt, and I insistently ask them a stupid question. What do you want? I told them Freud asked the wrong question, was will das Weib? I claim what do you want? What do you want? And they, they, nobody gave me the answer,
it? Yes, but that's why the beginning is to get rid of false hopes. Even the left today is mostly, we have the majority which I ironically call them this, is still after Fukuyama, left-Fukuyamaists they are mostly. They basically accept liberal democracy and some type of capitalism are the only game in town, so let's just get it better, more solidarity, healthcare, gay marriages, whatever you want. The big question is then we have some, the biggest irony of, this is my answer to Fukuyama. Once I met him, I told him this, he laughed, is that okay, let's say you are right, capitalism won. But isn't the irony that today, now, the most efficient managers of global capitalism are communists who are still in power? You know? So I think that we have finally to accept that 20th century is over. The way we did it in 20th century, either social democratic welfare state, hardline real socialism, or even more, that's my, what I hate, this type any dreams which are coming alive now of some kind of non-representative direct democracy. I don't believe in this. I mean, isn't there also, isn't there a problem of, of labels? So when you say capitalism, it's actually, you know, sort of driven forward by communists, so they're not really... I know what for me... Okay, in what sense I'm still a communist, just in a very limited sense. First, aren't we today witnessing a great irony? The Left, whatever remains of the Left, obviously is not able to offer an actual feasible global alternative. Like whenever the Left protests, I remember when there was Occupy Wall Street, I was with them in New York, in Frankfurt, and I insistently ask them a stupid question. What do you want? I told them Freud asked the wrong question, was will das Weib? I claim what do you want? What do you want? And they, they, nobody gave me the answer,
unknown
and
and
Slavoj Žižek
I think that precisely because they don't know what they want, the Left takes escape into moralism, the excesses of political correctness and so on and so on. So my problem is this one. On the one hand we have all these protests which don't have a clear idea. On the other hand, don't we get clear signs all around that capitalism, at least the way we know it, is approaching an end? Look at... we can only hope... yeah, look at ecology. It's obvious that although capitalism can do something through taxes, regulation, it's not enough. When there is a big catastrophe you need larger actions. Look at, here I agree with Fukuyama, look at the dark potentials of biogenetics. Our brains can already be, and that's the philosophical problem even, our brains can already be directly wired connected with a PC. It gives us magical power. You can already do it. Do you know that Stephen Hawking no longer needs his finger? He thinks forward, his wheelchair moves forward. But at the same time it goes the other way. I think for example this is a thing, the possibility of directly wiring our brain, which will change the very basic definition of what a human being is, my God. So we're back with labels, even with the label of human. With labor, you know what's the problem with the labor? But also... No,
I think that precisely because they don't know what they want, the Left takes escape into moralism, the excesses of political correctness and so on and so on. So my problem is this one. On the one hand we have all these protests which don't have a clear idea. On the other hand, don't we get clear signs all around that capitalism, at least the way we know it, is approaching an end? Look at... we can only hope... yeah, look at ecology. It's obvious that although capitalism can do something through taxes, regulation, it's not enough. When there is a big catastrophe you need larger actions. Look at, here I agree with Fukuyama, look at the dark potentials of biogenetics. Our brains can already be, and that's the philosophical problem even, our brains can already be directly wired connected with a PC. It gives us magical power. You can already do it. Do you know that Stephen Hawking no longer needs his finger? He thinks forward, his wheelchair moves forward. But at the same time it goes the other way. I think for example this is a thing, the possibility of directly wiring our brain, which will change the very basic definition of what a human being is, my God. So we're back with labels, even with the label of human. With labor, you know what's the problem with the labor? But also... No,
unknown
sorry, just to finish that line then we move on. All I want to say is that, and I'm sorry I know I speak too much. All I want to say is that we have a serious,
sorry, just to finish that line then we move on. All I want to say is that, and I'm sorry I know I speak too much. All I want to say is that we have a serious,
Slavoj Žižek
or financial capital, all this fictitious capital. It doesn't help if European banks for example are throwing hundreds of billions of freshly printed money into economy. Most of it, it gets lost in fictitious capital speculations. Then we have the problem of refugees and so on. Intellectual property, if you ask me, capitalism is falling apart here. Even people like, I despise them, like Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk, even they talk about it. But you know who said the right pessimistic thing here? You must know him, it's your fellow, I mean, the German sociologist, economist, who is now modest bestseller, Wolfgang Streeck with two E's. He said that something totally unexpected for Marxists happened. Capitalism is clearly approaching its limit, but for Marxists this always meant there is another more progressive force waiting to take over. Today capitalism is just disintegrating, you know, getting into trouble. We see that we have to improvise more and more and already we have the first very sad consequence as I always warn: a new figure of country, the ideal country today is a country which is fully integrated into global market, but at the same time ideologically it's ethnocentric, focus on its culture. Even Trump is doing this. That's why Trump gets well with all dictators. His basic deal with Saudi Arabia is: we are part of the same market, you buy our arms, we buy your oil, whatever, it doesn't matter what you do to women there, it's your problem. This logic of partial cultures, China is playing this game, India, Modi is playing this game, Putin is playing this game and so on. So we are approaching a new world where global market will coexist with a lack of universally accepted emancipatory rules. This is very sad. But to go back to your question, why communism? Because I think that all the problems that I enumerated are the problems of commons. Some shared substance
or financial capital, all this fictitious capital. It doesn't help if European banks for example are throwing hundreds of billions of freshly printed money into economy. Most of it, it gets lost in fictitious capital speculations. Then we have the problem of refugees and so on. Intellectual property, if you ask me, capitalism is falling apart here. Even people like, I despise them, like Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk, even they talk about it. But you know who said the right pessimistic thing here? You must know him, it's your fellow, I mean, the German sociologist, economist, who is now modest bestseller, Wolfgang Streeck with two E's. He said that something totally unexpected for Marxists happened. Capitalism is clearly approaching its limit, but for Marxists this always meant there is another more progressive force waiting to take over. Today capitalism is just disintegrating, you know, getting into trouble. We see that we have to improvise more and more and already we have the first very sad consequence as I always warn: a new figure of country, the ideal country today is a country which is fully integrated into global market, but at the same time ideologically it's ethnocentric, focus on its culture. Even Trump is doing this. That's why Trump gets well with all dictators. His basic deal with Saudi Arabia is: we are part of the same market, you buy our arms, we buy your oil, whatever, it doesn't matter what you do to women there, it's your problem. This logic of partial cultures, China is playing this game, India, Modi is playing this game, Putin is playing this game and so on. So we are approaching a new world where global market will coexist with a lack of universally accepted emancipatory rules. This is very sad. But to go back to your question, why communism? Because I think that all the problems that I enumerated are the problems of commons. Some shared substance
unknown
which shouldn't be privatized left to the market. Like ecology
which shouldn't be privatized left to the market. Like ecology
Slavoj Žižek
is the problem of our natural substance, to what extent we can manipulate it and so on. Intellectual property, it's the problem of our intellectual substance. Biogenetics, problem of our substance and so on and so on. In this sense, as I put it once ironically, communism is for me not a solution, but the name of the problem today. And we will have to find a solution at that level of how to deal with commons with our commons outside market relations. My God, even my friend who is otherwise despised as almost neo-fascist, Peter Sloterdijk. In a chapter of his... I don't know, he writes even faster than me, although it's unthinkable. I think it's Was geschah im Jahrhundert? (What Happened in the 20th Century?), his book. He also comes to the same conclusion. The era of nation states where the highest ethical value is: are you ready to sacrifice yourself for your country? is over. We need to make a step further. For example, just imagine this, a friend of mine, Jean-Pierre Dupuy, D-U-P-U-Y, maybe you should interview him, he's very intelligent theorist of catastrophes. He told me that he was in Fukushima two days, as part of some European delegation, two days after that big tsunami and then radiation. He told me that you know for a couple of hours, Japanese government was in total panic. They thought that the radiation will be so strong that they have to evacuate the entire Tokyo area. Where would these people go? The problem in the old days it would be invasion, these people invade another country. Today you can't do it.
is the problem of our natural substance, to what extent we can manipulate it and so on. Intellectual property, it's the problem of our intellectual substance. Biogenetics, problem of our substance and so on and so on. In this sense, as I put it once ironically, communism is for me not a solution, but the name of the problem today. And we will have to find a solution at that level of how to deal with commons with our commons outside market relations. My God, even my friend who is otherwise despised as almost neo-fascist, Peter Sloterdijk. In a chapter of his... I don't know, he writes even faster than me, although it's unthinkable. I think it's Was geschah im Jahrhundert? (What Happened in the 20th Century?), his book. He also comes to the same conclusion. The era of nation states where the highest ethical value is: are you ready to sacrifice yourself for your country? is over. We need to make a step further. For example, just imagine this, a friend of mine, Jean-Pierre Dupuy, D-U-P-U-Y, maybe you should interview him, he's very intelligent theorist of catastrophes. He told me that he was in Fukushima two days, as part of some European delegation, two days after that big tsunami and then radiation. He told me that you know for a couple of hours, Japanese government was in total panic. They thought that the radiation will be so strong that they have to evacuate the entire Tokyo area. Where would these people go? The problem in the old days it would be invasion, these people invade another country. Today you can't do it.
unknown
We need larger
We need larger
Slavoj Žižek
transnational forms of cooperation. The only way to deal with economy, the only way to deal with biogenetics. If just singular states regulate it, then Chinese they are doing it already like crazy, I mean. Rich American, you have clinics in suburbs of Shanghai where rich Western parents go and they manipulate before
transnational forms of cooperation. The only way to deal with economy, the only way to deal with biogenetics. If just singular states regulate it, then Chinese they are doing it already like crazy, I mean. Rich American, you have clinics in suburbs of Shanghai where rich Western parents go and they manipulate before
unknown
even it's born the genes of
even it's born the genes of
Slavoj Žižek
your... all I'm saying is that I, first as a good Marxist still, I'm absolutely not simply against capitalism. I think capitalism, let's face it, it's the most dynamic system in the history of humanity, it brought incredible progress and so on. That's why, what does this mean? That, and this brings me a lot of trouble, I'm absolutely opposed to this bullshit of relying on local indigenous traditions to fight global capitalism. No, we have to fight it on its own terms with new universal global vision. Capitalism, that's what my friends don't get it, it began, it's very instructive to study British colonization of India. It wasn't you should all become like us. It was no, you should keep your culture. You know that under the influence of the British colonizers, the traditional caste system in 19th century was even reinforced, brought to new life. So I claim that, and this is why another paradoxical conclusion, who is my hero? Malcolm X. He saw it. Malcolm X, you know what X stands for? We were uprooted from... but he saw it clearly that this X means we have no substantial particular way of life to which we can return. But he saw something ingenious. His point was, so our African American, I never like this term because it's, it means like Caribbean blacks can say what are we and so on, but okay. The return is not roots, let's look for. It's to use this fact that we are deprived of our ethnic substance as a chance of new, even more authentic universality than that of my... so again, my point is we have to go through capitalism. There's no, no escape back into... but at the same time we have to move over not because I'm a utopian and want more but it's clear that capitalism itself is approaching a crisis in the simplest sense that the problems it encounters today, from ecology and so on, I am here a pessimist in the sense that capitalism will not be over to resolve them in its own terms. Which is why we get this paradoxes, now I didn't forget it, I return to your question: labor. Listen, I find it so irrational that people are afraid of robotization because it will cause unemployment. This should be the best news that we ever heard. Nobody says perfect, we will have to work less, let's... no, the automatic assumption is it's a catastrophe. We all used to think that, you know, right in the 1970s we had all these science fiction stories where all the machines would eventually do all the work and we'd have a lot of time to enjoy our... yeah, but in principle it can be done. We live now in irrational society where we are afraid of unemployment but those who work work more and more intensely. I want to come back to something else because you know you've taken us on a really, really interesting journey here going from... you take me as a madman clearly. No, no, no at all. Don't I recall you Alice in Wonderland, that crazy, crazy rabbit in Alice in Wonderland. I've happily followed you. So we started off with Hegel and started at a sort of highly theoretical level where we talked about philosophy in that sense, and you've pointed us to real-life problems sort of really, you know, very, very down to earth real problems. And for me, the question still remains of what the philosopher meant to do. Do you look at yourself mainly as a theorist? Theory, absolutely theory. But you've also talked about your activism, is there connection between theory and practice? But you need theory
your... all I'm saying is that I, first as a good Marxist still, I'm absolutely not simply against capitalism. I think capitalism, let's face it, it's the most dynamic system in the history of humanity, it brought incredible progress and so on. That's why, what does this mean? That, and this brings me a lot of trouble, I'm absolutely opposed to this bullshit of relying on local indigenous traditions to fight global capitalism. No, we have to fight it on its own terms with new universal global vision. Capitalism, that's what my friends don't get it, it began, it's very instructive to study British colonization of India. It wasn't you should all become like us. It was no, you should keep your culture. You know that under the influence of the British colonizers, the traditional caste system in 19th century was even reinforced, brought to new life. So I claim that, and this is why another paradoxical conclusion, who is my hero? Malcolm X. He saw it. Malcolm X, you know what X stands for? We were uprooted from... but he saw it clearly that this X means we have no substantial particular way of life to which we can return. But he saw something ingenious. His point was, so our African American, I never like this term because it's, it means like Caribbean blacks can say what are we and so on, but okay. The return is not roots, let's look for. It's to use this fact that we are deprived of our ethnic substance as a chance of new, even more authentic universality than that of my... so again, my point is we have to go through capitalism. There's no, no escape back into... but at the same time we have to move over not because I'm a utopian and want more but it's clear that capitalism itself is approaching a crisis in the simplest sense that the problems it encounters today, from ecology and so on, I am here a pessimist in the sense that capitalism will not be over to resolve them in its own terms. Which is why we get this paradoxes, now I didn't forget it, I return to your question: labor. Listen, I find it so irrational that people are afraid of robotization because it will cause unemployment. This should be the best news that we ever heard. Nobody says perfect, we will have to work less, let's... no, the automatic assumption is it's a catastrophe. We all used to think that, you know, right in the 1970s we had all these science fiction stories where all the machines would eventually do all the work and we'd have a lot of time to enjoy our... yeah, but in principle it can be done. We live now in irrational society where we are afraid of unemployment but those who work work more and more intensely. I want to come back to something else because you know you've taken us on a really, really interesting journey here going from... you take me as a madman clearly. No, no, no at all. Don't I recall you Alice in Wonderland, that crazy, crazy rabbit in Alice in Wonderland. I've happily followed you. So we started off with Hegel and started at a sort of highly theoretical level where we talked about philosophy in that sense, and you've pointed us to real-life problems sort of really, you know, very, very down to earth real problems. And for me, the question still remains of what the philosopher meant to do. Do you look at yourself mainly as a theorist? Theory, absolutely theory. But you've also talked about your activism, is there connection between theory and practice? But you need theory
unknown
to see where activism fails. You need theory
to see where activism fails. You need theory
Slavoj Žižek
to see where the activism fails. Especially the left theory. Isn't the whole history of the left even in the last century one big history of catastrophic failures? Which is why as I put it somewhere ironically, the best Marxist books were usually analysis after the fact of why revolution had to go, had to go wrong. Trotsky's analysis and... isn't it sad that all we get are excellent analysis of why we lost, sorry, of why we lost? So I would say why philosophy? First, because I don't trust practice. Practice is blind without theory. We need theory today more than ever, and by theory I don't mean this type of direct activist theory. No, why do we need theory? But will practice really follow out of theory? Does that really, does that really happen do you think? I mean, do you think as a theorist this is what you're... I don't... okay, I will be very modest here. I will be very modest here. It's doubtful if we philosophers, I doubt it, will provide a new platform, political program. But I follow here Gilles Deleuze, otherwise I'm not a Deleuzian, who said somewhere that even more important than to give the right answers is to raise the right questions. And here philosophy can be of some use. We are dealing with serious problems today. But what if we should analyze the extent to which the very way we formulate these problems doesn't resolve them but reproduces the problems? And coming back to your question,
to see where the activism fails. Especially the left theory. Isn't the whole history of the left even in the last century one big history of catastrophic failures? Which is why as I put it somewhere ironically, the best Marxist books were usually analysis after the fact of why revolution had to go, had to go wrong. Trotsky's analysis and... isn't it sad that all we get are excellent analysis of why we lost, sorry, of why we lost? So I would say why philosophy? First, because I don't trust practice. Practice is blind without theory. We need theory today more than ever, and by theory I don't mean this type of direct activist theory. No, why do we need theory? But will practice really follow out of theory? Does that really, does that really happen do you think? I mean, do you think as a theorist this is what you're... I don't... okay, I will be very modest here. I will be very modest here. It's doubtful if we philosophers, I doubt it, will provide a new platform, political program. But I follow here Gilles Deleuze, otherwise I'm not a Deleuzian, who said somewhere that even more important than to give the right answers is to raise the right questions. And here philosophy can be of some use. We are dealing with serious problems today. But what if we should analyze the extent to which the very way we formulate these problems doesn't resolve them but reproduces the problems? And coming back to your question,
unknown
that's why for example I have
that's why for example I have
Slavoj Žižek
doubts about political correctness. Of course I agree with its goals, no humiliation, against power relations. But you know what makes me so sad, and here at least a little bit of philosophy enters. Think about the figure of human being that is silently
doubts about political correctness. Of course I agree with its goals, no humiliation, against power relations. But you know what makes me so sad, and here at least a little bit of philosophy enters. Think about the figure of human being that is silently
unknown
presupposed by political correctness. It's obsession with harassment and victimization. We are always threatened. I look
presupposed by political correctness. It's obsession with harassment and victimization. We are always threatened. I look
Slavoj Žižek
into your, I don't want to choose the lady, eyes for two seconds too long: visual rape. I was already...
into your, I don't want to choose the lady, eyes for two seconds too long: visual rape. I was already...
unknown
so this, the vision is very sad beneath it. The vision is the one of we are all potential victims, and even I think that... I don't think that's true. Oh my God, you should visit an American campus there and see how... you know what I already experienced there? Once I gave a speech and a lady stood up and said, I'm half-black, and I am a single mother, I have AIDS, and you are wrong. It was so tragic that she didn't even have to go into details. No, you have this logic of... no, but that's the abuse, isn't it? I mean, I think on the
so this, the vision is very sad beneath it. The vision is the one of we are all potential victims, and even I think that... I don't think that's true. Oh my God, you should visit an American campus there and see how... you know what I already experienced there? Once I gave a speech and a lady stood up and said, I'm half-black, and I am a single mother, I have AIDS, and you are wrong. It was so tragic that she didn't even have to go into details. No, you have this logic of... no, but that's the abuse, isn't it? I mean, I think on the
Slavoj Žižek
whole political correctness just tells us that we should, that we should adjust our language to you know, the reality of the world and prejudices that we've had. Yeah, but the way, the way it does it misfires. Because for me, the true step beyond racism is not to change the language, we would have to go now more into philosophy, but even to use the same language but in a different ironic non-racist way. Look for example, my black friends in the United States, they all provoke me and tell me, call me nigger. You know what this means? Of course I shouldn't call them nigger, it's an empty offer. But what they want to signal me in this way is not I'm a masochist I want to be humiliated, but simply we have a real contact. I doubt if you can have a real contact with a real person without at least, it doesn't work
whole political correctness just tells us that we should, that we should adjust our language to you know, the reality of the world and prejudices that we've had. Yeah, but the way, the way it does it misfires. Because for me, the true step beyond racism is not to change the language, we would have to go now more into philosophy, but even to use the same language but in a different ironic non-racist way. Look for example, my black friends in the United States, they all provoke me and tell me, call me nigger. You know what this means? Of course I shouldn't call them nigger, it's an empty offer. But what they want to signal me in this way is not I'm a masochist I want to be humiliated, but simply we have a real contact. I doubt if you can have a real contact with a real person without at least, it doesn't work
unknown
always, but as a rule, a small exchange of obscenities or something like that. But sorry, what
always, but as a rule, a small exchange of obscenities or something like that. But sorry, what
Slavoj Žižek
I want to say, back to my basic point, is that all these problems that we have, even with political correctness, how language functions, are we free or not with digitalization, with brain sciences. These are basically philosophical problems, and ordinary people will have to deal with them. Abortion is maybe the first case of this. Are we aware that to answer the question, I'm for it, don't misunderstand, but to answer the question should there be abortion or not, you have implicitly at least to answer some philosophical question: old values, you cannot simply say let's look at Christianity or whatever. Because precisely because we are in this confused state where we cannot simply rely on old norms. Like again, something like direct link of our brains with the computer changes our entire pedagogy. What does it mean to learn something when you just click the button and you know that? So what I'm saying is that questions usually reserved for philosophy will become everyday questions. And the next thing that happens... But it's the other way round anyway, isn't it? I mean everyday questions actually are philosophical
I want to say, back to my basic point, is that all these problems that we have, even with political correctness, how language functions, are we free or not with digitalization, with brain sciences. These are basically philosophical problems, and ordinary people will have to deal with them. Abortion is maybe the first case of this. Are we aware that to answer the question, I'm for it, don't misunderstand, but to answer the question should there be abortion or not, you have implicitly at least to answer some philosophical question: old values, you cannot simply say let's look at Christianity or whatever. Because precisely because we are in this confused state where we cannot simply rely on old norms. Like again, something like direct link of our brains with the computer changes our entire pedagogy. What does it mean to learn something when you just click the button and you know that? So what I'm saying is that questions usually reserved for philosophy will become everyday questions. And the next thing that happens... But it's the other way round anyway, isn't it? I mean everyday questions actually are philosophical
unknown
questions because
questions because
Slavoj Žižek
a lot of what we take are philosophical... yeah, but the problem with some brain scientists as others, they think that philosophy is over. Like Stephen Hawking put it in one of his last books, that philosophy is dead. In some ironic sense he is right. And I think, and now we come from actual questions to my philosophical concerns. The big tragedy for me was this, I call it transcendental linguistic turn, where all these, let's call them this way, naive direct ontological questions were prohibited, were considered naive, so that all you were allowed to do is to reflect on the horizon of understanding or as Michel Foucault would have put it, on the épistémè. For example, if you were to ask Michel Foucault or a Foucauldian, do I have an immortal soul? His answer would have been something like, we should analyze within which discursive field it's, we can even raise this question. All you could do is just to point out the discursive horizon within which it's happening. And so this big naive ontological question,
a lot of what we take are philosophical... yeah, but the problem with some brain scientists as others, they think that philosophy is over. Like Stephen Hawking put it in one of his last books, that philosophy is dead. In some ironic sense he is right. And I think, and now we come from actual questions to my philosophical concerns. The big tragedy for me was this, I call it transcendental linguistic turn, where all these, let's call them this way, naive direct ontological questions were prohibited, were considered naive, so that all you were allowed to do is to reflect on the horizon of understanding or as Michel Foucault would have put it, on the épistémè. For example, if you were to ask Michel Foucault or a Foucauldian, do I have an immortal soul? His answer would have been something like, we should analyze within which discursive field it's, we can even raise this question. All you could do is just to point out the discursive horizon within which it's happening. And so this big naive ontological question,
unknown
what's the origin of our universe and so on,
what's the origin of our universe and so on,
Slavoj Žižek
were neglected. That's why I think that natural sciences entered and the philosophical game entered. And Hawking is right when he said what till years ago were considered philosophical question, does the world has a beginning or not, do we have free will and so on, these are today perceived as scientific questions. Here I remain a traditional European philosopher. I don't think philosophy disappears. I don't think positive natural science can do the entire job. There is still a work for philosophy to do it, but at the same time we have to break out of this transcendental reflexive questioning and we have to, and that's the big problem, we have to what people like Quentin Meillassoux and all these new materialists are doing, we have to return to big ontological questions, but in a non-naive, not naive naive realist way. You can't, and that's my problem. That's why I look into Hegel. How to move beyond the alternative between Kantian transcendentalism, things in themselves are out there, we don't care about them, all we can do is our horizon of understanding, and naive realism, we humans are part of a universe, we are just one of the element. No, I think that I work so hard about these specific problems, the whole first part pages of my Absolute Recoil works of this. How to break out of the transcendental horizon without falling into naive realism. And again, I think Hegel is the way. Or even at this level I see the great legacy of Christianity. Hegel's trick is that the problem itself is its own solution. And in what sense Christianity? What's the Christian solution? I'm an atheist, incidentally, but I see a certain legacy in Christianity. Let's say you as a believer feel abandoned by God. What's the Christian solution? It's not oh, if you work hard, fast yourself, you will rejoin God. No, it's a much more radical one is at that point
were neglected. That's why I think that natural sciences entered and the philosophical game entered. And Hawking is right when he said what till years ago were considered philosophical question, does the world has a beginning or not, do we have free will and so on, these are today perceived as scientific questions. Here I remain a traditional European philosopher. I don't think philosophy disappears. I don't think positive natural science can do the entire job. There is still a work for philosophy to do it, but at the same time we have to break out of this transcendental reflexive questioning and we have to, and that's the big problem, we have to what people like Quentin Meillassoux and all these new materialists are doing, we have to return to big ontological questions, but in a non-naive, not naive naive realist way. You can't, and that's my problem. That's why I look into Hegel. How to move beyond the alternative between Kantian transcendentalism, things in themselves are out there, we don't care about them, all we can do is our horizon of understanding, and naive realism, we humans are part of a universe, we are just one of the element. No, I think that I work so hard about these specific problems, the whole first part pages of my Absolute Recoil works of this. How to break out of the transcendental horizon without falling into naive realism. And again, I think Hegel is the way. Or even at this level I see the great legacy of Christianity. Hegel's trick is that the problem itself is its own solution. And in what sense Christianity? What's the Christian solution? I'm an atheist, incidentally, but I see a certain legacy in Christianity. Let's say you as a believer feel abandoned by God. What's the Christian solution? It's not oh, if you work hard, fast yourself, you will rejoin God. No, it's a much more radical one is at that point
unknown
when
when
Slavoj Žižek
you feel abandoned, you identify with Christ that, you know, Eli Eli lama sabachthani, Father, why have you forsaken me? So you transpose your division, your separation from God into God himself. God on the cross is separated from himself. It means that the very distance, the very gap is part of the thing itself. And this is the formula that Hegel repeats again and again. It's not to reach some unity above the gap, it's to see how what you experience as separation is a negativity inscribed into the absolute itself. I go very fast now, but nonetheless I can see that also again following Hegel clearly you know there are different philosophical questions that come to the fore at different times. That's very clear. And you've given us a good idea of what kind of... okay, now you are silently already sharpening your knife before you strike, strike. But go to "but" directly. No, no, you've shown us what kind of approach we might take. I was just wondering whether there's a sort of single philosophical question that you think is the salient question of our time. Maybe, I will go into this, maybe it may sound strange, but I would say the status of appearance. Because another way to wrap it up in one formula: what's the greatness of Hegel is that the usual even for Kant problem is always: are we limited to our constraint to our world of appearances? Can we move beyond to reach reality itself the way things really are? And Hegel, he says it somewhere, Hegel's problem is the opposite one. The true miracle, that's the miracle of negativity, is how come that reality is not just flat reality, how can reality appear to itself? Because appearance means a terrible gap. Things are not directly what they are, they appear to themselves. And now if you dare to use it, here I'm absolute Hegelian. This minimum of reflexivity, appearance, is absolutely universal for me. Now I'm jumping very fast. The lesson of quantum physics is that appearances matter. How you measure it, how things appear determine what things are. And is that a translation problem basically? No, no, although there are translations, you know in what sense. If one wants to be more seriously philosopher, one has to be very precise here. Phänomen, phenomenon, is not the same as Erscheinung. Oh, no, no, I meant in terms of language. I meant in terms of spheres, you know, when you're talking about the quantum level, there's a gap and there's a lack of understanding... I know, and I'm totally opposed to those simplists who claim who want to somehow ground the possibility of human freedom directly into uncertainty, indeterminacy of reality. No, but I wouldn't talking about this. All I was talk what really attracts me, and it's a very abstract idea, philosophically in quantum physics is, a, this idea of and I vary it a lot of times in my book, this idea of ontological incompleteness of reality. It's not as Lenin and naive materialists thought, reality is out there fully real, we just cannot get to know it. No, what if reality in itself is in a way structured around the gap, not fully real? Do you know the story? I love it for your readers, maybe you know it, which is my favorite story here. I found it in some popular introduction to philosophy. The guy tries to read quantum physics based on video games. You know in video games when you are immersed into a game, reality there is not fully constituted. For example, you have a forest in the background. If it's not part of the game that you can go into that forest, then all the trees are not programmed in detail. Or even most of the houses, you just see the outside of the house. If it's not part of the game that you enter the house, then with very well know that these houses are within the computer program without inside. And the idea of this guy, I love it, is that something... Why did the game programmer not construct full
you feel abandoned, you identify with Christ that, you know, Eli Eli lama sabachthani, Father, why have you forsaken me? So you transpose your division, your separation from God into God himself. God on the cross is separated from himself. It means that the very distance, the very gap is part of the thing itself. And this is the formula that Hegel repeats again and again. It's not to reach some unity above the gap, it's to see how what you experience as separation is a negativity inscribed into the absolute itself. I go very fast now, but nonetheless I can see that also again following Hegel clearly you know there are different philosophical questions that come to the fore at different times. That's very clear. And you've given us a good idea of what kind of... okay, now you are silently already sharpening your knife before you strike, strike. But go to "but" directly. No, no, you've shown us what kind of approach we might take. I was just wondering whether there's a sort of single philosophical question that you think is the salient question of our time. Maybe, I will go into this, maybe it may sound strange, but I would say the status of appearance. Because another way to wrap it up in one formula: what's the greatness of Hegel is that the usual even for Kant problem is always: are we limited to our constraint to our world of appearances? Can we move beyond to reach reality itself the way things really are? And Hegel, he says it somewhere, Hegel's problem is the opposite one. The true miracle, that's the miracle of negativity, is how come that reality is not just flat reality, how can reality appear to itself? Because appearance means a terrible gap. Things are not directly what they are, they appear to themselves. And now if you dare to use it, here I'm absolute Hegelian. This minimum of reflexivity, appearance, is absolutely universal for me. Now I'm jumping very fast. The lesson of quantum physics is that appearances matter. How you measure it, how things appear determine what things are. And is that a translation problem basically? No, no, although there are translations, you know in what sense. If one wants to be more seriously philosopher, one has to be very precise here. Phänomen, phenomenon, is not the same as Erscheinung. Oh, no, no, I meant in terms of language. I meant in terms of spheres, you know, when you're talking about the quantum level, there's a gap and there's a lack of understanding... I know, and I'm totally opposed to those simplists who claim who want to somehow ground the possibility of human freedom directly into uncertainty, indeterminacy of reality. No, but I wouldn't talking about this. All I was talk what really attracts me, and it's a very abstract idea, philosophically in quantum physics is, a, this idea of and I vary it a lot of times in my book, this idea of ontological incompleteness of reality. It's not as Lenin and naive materialists thought, reality is out there fully real, we just cannot get to know it. No, what if reality in itself is in a way structured around the gap, not fully real? Do you know the story? I love it for your readers, maybe you know it, which is my favorite story here. I found it in some popular introduction to philosophy. The guy tries to read quantum physics based on video games. You know in video games when you are immersed into a game, reality there is not fully constituted. For example, you have a forest in the background. If it's not part of the game that you can go into that forest, then all the trees are not programmed in detail. Or even most of the houses, you just see the outside of the house. If it's not part of the game that you enter the house, then with very well know that these houses are within the computer program without inside. And the idea of this guy, I love it, is that something... Why did the game programmer not construct full
unknown
reality? Because he would just lose time, it's meaningless. Why to program the inside of a house when it's not part of the game that you enter it? Okay, the idea, isn't it a wonderfully simple one? is that God did the same when he created universe. He stopped at subatomic level because he thought we humans are too stupid to progress so far. Oh, they will not be able to move beyond atoms
reality? Because he would just lose time, it's meaningless. Why to program the inside of a house when it's not part of the game that you enter it? Okay, the idea, isn't it a wonderfully simple one? is that God did the same when he created universe. He stopped at subatomic level because he thought we humans are too stupid to progress so far. Oh, they will not be able to move beyond atoms
Slavoj Žižek
so why should I bother to program velocity and position of... And the idea is a very nice cynical one, is that God underestimated us. We with quantum physics, we as it were caught God with his pants
so why should I bother to program velocity and position of... And the idea is a very nice cynical one, is that God underestimated us. We with quantum physics, we as it were caught God with his pants
unknown
down, you know. Ah, you were too lazy, but now comes the true definition of materialism for me. We can think this incompleteness without God. You don't need a creator. Just reality is incomplete. That's one mega result. Then there are many others. So you see I'm very careful here. I don't try to teach quantum physicists what. I just try to
down, you know. Ah, you were too lazy, but now comes the true definition of materialism for me. We can think this incompleteness without God. You don't need a creator. Just reality is incomplete. That's one mega result. Then there are many others. So you see I'm very careful here. I don't try to teach quantum physicists what. I just try to
Slavoj Žižek
provide a materialist even philosophical reading and I think it's important. And again, it all focuses on the status of appearances. So again, as Hegel says, the true problem is how appearances emerge. Or as he put it, Hegel and other German idealists, the problem is not: are we caught into our subjectivity, can we reach...? The problem is: how must reality be structured in itself so that something like subjectivity, subjective appearance can emerge out of it? You know, must there be some reflexivity, incompleteness, negativity already out there? And Hegel explicitly raises this question. That's my, now comes the provocation, as they would put in United States, trigger warning you get it now. Recently a friend of mine showed me some, and I really mean it, I'm not denying that when I was young I didn't watch hardcore pornography. But a friend of mine has shown me some typical hardcore heterosexual scenes and we analyzed them and came to the
provide a materialist even philosophical reading and I think it's important. And again, it all focuses on the status of appearances. So again, as Hegel says, the true problem is how appearances emerge. Or as he put it, Hegel and other German idealists, the problem is not: are we caught into our subjectivity, can we reach...? The problem is: how must reality be structured in itself so that something like subjectivity, subjective appearance can emerge out of it? You know, must there be some reflexivity, incompleteness, negativity already out there? And Hegel explicitly raises this question. That's my, now comes the provocation, as they would put in United States, trigger warning you get it now. Recently a friend of mine showed me some, and I really mean it, I'm not denying that when I was young I didn't watch hardcore pornography. But a friend of mine has shown me some typical hardcore heterosexual scenes and we analyzed them and came to the
unknown
point
point
Slavoj Žižek
how much more complex things are. Let's say this is traditional hardcore pornography addressed at a man. It's not true that woman is reduced to an object. No, woman is the only subject. Typical scene is this
how much more complex things are. Let's say this is traditional hardcore pornography addressed at a man. It's not true that woman is reduced to an object. No, woman is the only subject. Typical scene is this
unknown
one.
one.
unknown
Woman is being
Woman is being
Slavoj Žižek
penetrated. Man is reduced to pure instrument. We find dozens of movies he found where you don't even see man's face, he doesn't matter. So the typical scene
penetrated. Man is reduced to pure instrument. We find dozens of movies he found where you don't even see man's face, he doesn't matter. So the typical scene
unknown
is this one. Because you're taking the perspective of the man, that's
is this one. Because you're taking the perspective of the man, that's
Slavoj Žižek
why. No, I don't think so. I will tell you which perspective you are taking. A man is, you see in front man's penis penetrating the woman, legs spread wide, and then in the background between her thighs you always see her face staring into the camera or at least showing her face. So I claim you don't identify with the man. You identify with yourself as a viewer, what you are looking for is not your pleasure, but the confirmation that woman enjoys. So this is not greatness for women, I claim women are in this way even
why. No, I don't think so. I will tell you which perspective you are taking. A man is, you see in front man's penis penetrating the woman, legs spread wide, and then in the background between her thighs you always see her face staring into the camera or at least showing her face. So I claim you don't identify with the man. You identify with yourself as a viewer, what you are looking for is not your pleasure, but the confirmation that woman enjoys. So this is not greatness for women, I claim women are in this way even
unknown
more humiliated. I'm
more humiliated. I'm
Slavoj Žižek
not a fan. What I'm saying is that even here when you think oh my God, it's just sex whatever, the structure is that of minimal reflexivity. It doesn't, if you were to show just from a close-up sex organs penetrating each other, it would have been vulgar boring. It has to be the woman stares back and, it's very humiliating for her, she has to do... oh, I will not go into it, all the sounds and so on. Yes, but what I'm saying is that how you see how even in the most immediate sexual pleasure, the structure is more complicated one. And isn't the same lesson for quantum physics that measurement is not a measurement of some reality which is out there, measurement in a way constitute partially reality? But how, how to read this in a non-idealist... measurement doesn't constitute reality, measurement constitutes the way that we look at reality, right? Measurement is just a human... it's a little bit more radical. Here it was a conflict between your guy, your guy I mean ironically, Heisenberg and Niels Bohr. Heisenberg thought that his uncertainty principle is
not a fan. What I'm saying is that even here when you think oh my God, it's just sex whatever, the structure is that of minimal reflexivity. It doesn't, if you were to show just from a close-up sex organs penetrating each other, it would have been vulgar boring. It has to be the woman stares back and, it's very humiliating for her, she has to do... oh, I will not go into it, all the sounds and so on. Yes, but what I'm saying is that how you see how even in the most immediate sexual pleasure, the structure is more complicated one. And isn't the same lesson for quantum physics that measurement is not a measurement of some reality which is out there, measurement in a way constitute partially reality? But how, how to read this in a non-idealist... measurement doesn't constitute reality, measurement constitutes the way that we look at reality, right? Measurement is just a human... it's a little bit more radical. Here it was a conflict between your guy, your guy I mean ironically, Heisenberg and Niels Bohr. Heisenberg thought that his uncertainty principle is
unknown
only epistemological. We
only epistemological. We
Slavoj Žižek
cannot measure at the same time velocity and position of a particle. Bohr criticized him, Bohr claimed no, this uncertainty is in the thing itself. Particles do not have at the same time... So the problem is that measuring the appearance, the effect, in a way affects reality itself. And again the problem is how to read this in a non-idealist way, you know, to avoid all that bullshit that oh, there must be a mind to construct... but then maybe you're right, maybe it has to do with the structure of reality but maybe also it has to do with the expectations we have of reality, wouldn't you say? Okay, but again, I agree with you but I would nonetheless add here the Hegelian point. The big problem, don't put reality there and us here. How is reality structured so that our expectations of reality can influence it? But okay, not lose let's not lose time here, you see which problems are bothering me. Yeah, and that's why basically I'm an old-fashioned, I'm even tempted to say old-fashioned philosopher. I think we didn't get really moved beyond Hegel. What happened after Hegel was different variations of transcendentalism, even the most creative Marxism. There for me praxis transcendentalism. Human collective praxis is the ultimate transcendental horizon of how we perceive. Either they are transcendentalist or they're vulgar naive materialists. Okay, thank you very much, I would like to just move on so we can
cannot measure at the same time velocity and position of a particle. Bohr criticized him, Bohr claimed no, this uncertainty is in the thing itself. Particles do not have at the same time... So the problem is that measuring the appearance, the effect, in a way affects reality itself. And again the problem is how to read this in a non-idealist way, you know, to avoid all that bullshit that oh, there must be a mind to construct... but then maybe you're right, maybe it has to do with the structure of reality but maybe also it has to do with the expectations we have of reality, wouldn't you say? Okay, but again, I agree with you but I would nonetheless add here the Hegelian point. The big problem, don't put reality there and us here. How is reality structured so that our expectations of reality can influence it? But okay, not lose let's not lose time here, you see which problems are bothering me. Yeah, and that's why basically I'm an old-fashioned, I'm even tempted to say old-fashioned philosopher. I think we didn't get really moved beyond Hegel. What happened after Hegel was different variations of transcendentalism, even the most creative Marxism. There for me praxis transcendentalism. Human collective praxis is the ultimate transcendental horizon of how we perceive. Either they are transcendentalist or they're vulgar naive materialists. Okay, thank you very much, I would like to just move on so we can
unknown
talk just very
talk just very
Slavoj Žižek
briefly at least about your new book, so you've got a new book out again. I have no idea how you do this, but... I cheat, I copy myself all the time. Many of the political books, no, no, it's not like people think do you write pages per day. No, no, no, my output is quite human or to put it in ironic terms, somebody like Sloterdijk writes three, four times more than me, you know. Don't worry here. Okay, um, so now your new book is called and I haven't read it yet because I haven't been able to see a copy but it sounds intriguing. If you want today I can send both to both of you the final proof. But you know... Yes, so do. No, no and I promise you something. You will see that I have method and I promise you if we
briefly at least about your new book, so you've got a new book out again. I have no idea how you do this, but... I cheat, I copy myself all the time. Many of the political books, no, no, it's not like people think do you write pages per day. No, no, no, my output is quite human or to put it in ironic terms, somebody like Sloterdijk writes three, four times more than me, you know. Don't worry here. Okay, um, so now your new book is called and I haven't read it yet because I haven't been able to see a copy but it sounds intriguing. If you want today I can send both to both of you the final proof. But you know... Yes, so do. No, no and I promise you something. You will see that I have method and I promise you if we
unknown
ever meet
ever meet
Slavoj Žižek
again, I will never ask you did you already have the time to read it. I hate authors who do this, you know, here you have my book but then you get them: oh, did you maybe already have a chance to read it? Sorry, go on. We will read it as well. So the book is called Incontinence of the Void: Economico-Philosophical Spandrels. Now, okay, so I've just had this short summary that I looked at and that said that you explore, I quote, "the empty spaces between philosophy, psychoanalysis, and the critique of political economy." Now, okay, to talk about spandrels... It's a term from Stephen Jay Gould and so on, you know. Yes. I'm familiar with the term, so it comes from architecture but then finds use in evolutionary biology. But yes, so to talk about spandrels really means that of course you have to assume the integrity of those disciplines. So why, you know, if you're trying to find spaces then you have to assume the arches,
again, I will never ask you did you already have the time to read it. I hate authors who do this, you know, here you have my book but then you get them: oh, did you maybe already have a chance to read it? Sorry, go on. We will read it as well. So the book is called Incontinence of the Void: Economico-Philosophical Spandrels. Now, okay, so I've just had this short summary that I looked at and that said that you explore, I quote, "the empty spaces between philosophy, psychoanalysis, and the critique of political economy." Now, okay, to talk about spandrels... It's a term from Stephen Jay Gould and so on, you know. Yes. I'm familiar with the term, so it comes from architecture but then finds use in evolutionary biology. But yes, so to talk about spandrels really means that of course you have to assume the integrity of those disciplines. So why, you know, if you're trying to find spaces then you have to assume the arches,
unknown
don't you? Ah, here I would doubt it. Why? Can't you
don't you? Ah, here I would doubt it. Why? Can't you
Slavoj Žižek
say, can't you say that, I would have claimed in a Hegelian way, sorry can I be of any help? These things always makes me, make me nervous. I, I, my solution would have been that what if every field in order to exist needs a spandrel, needs an empty place which can be trans... isn't the thesis of Gould for example that you don't have fully constituted organisms and
say, can't you say that, I would have claimed in a Hegelian way, sorry can I be of any help? These things always makes me, make me nervous. I, I, my solution would have been that what if every field in order to exist needs a spandrel, needs an empty place which can be trans... isn't the thesis of Gould for example that you don't have fully constituted organisms and
unknown
then by chance spandrels and
then by chance spandrels and
Slavoj Žižek
so on. The whole evolution according to Gould is based on spandrels. You have empty spaces, you have organs of no use, we just remain like appendix or... yes, but they are byproducts of things that have been, you know, have been driven towards... yeah but my... but his idea, and he is really radical here, is that this imbalance in the sense that a product never, never fully fits its function. There is an element byproduct, he goes to the end and the beauty of Gould is that he interpret accounts for human
so on. The whole evolution according to Gould is based on spandrels. You have empty spaces, you have organs of no use, we just remain like appendix or... yes, but they are byproducts of things that have been, you know, have been driven towards... yeah but my... but his idea, and he is really radical here, is that this imbalance in the sense that a product never, never fully fits its function. There is an element byproduct, he goes to the end and the beauty of Gould is that he interpret accounts for human
unknown
language in this way. It's a, it's a byproduct. Yeah that's right, but a byproduct of
language in this way. It's a, it's a byproduct. Yeah that's right, but a byproduct of
Slavoj Žižek
things that are actually driven by adaptive value. So there are other things that have adaptive value so you have to assume the existence of those in order to have... yeah, but for him adaptation work, works through spandrels, works through spandrels. That would be my view. As byproducts of... yeah but the paradox is that thing itself, the thing itself cannot ever not even conceptually fully function. You need byproducts. You need all the time byproducts. Our entire human progress but even in animal kingdom, greatness of Darwin for Gould is based in byproducts. So going back to my book, what I would have said is that in the same way I think that from the very beginning that, okay I put it like this, I have to go to the point: something happens with modern
things that are actually driven by adaptive value. So there are other things that have adaptive value so you have to assume the existence of those in order to have... yeah, but for him adaptation work, works through spandrels, works through spandrels. That would be my view. As byproducts of... yeah but the paradox is that thing itself, the thing itself cannot ever not even conceptually fully function. You need byproducts. You need all the time byproducts. Our entire human progress but even in animal kingdom, greatness of Darwin for Gould is based in byproducts. So going back to my book, what I would have said is that in the same way I think that from the very beginning that, okay I put it like this, I have to go to the point: something happens with modern
unknown
philosophy. By
philosophy. By
Slavoj Žižek
modern philosophy I'm old-fashioned here, I mean post-Kantian, Kant and post-Kantian thought, which has privileged link with other fields, with for example psychoanalysis. I claim that Freud was not simply a positive scientist and so on. There is, this is maybe the fundamental thesis of my work: the
modern philosophy I'm old-fashioned here, I mean post-Kantian, Kant and post-Kantian thought, which has privileged link with other fields, with for example psychoanalysis. I claim that Freud was not simply a positive scientist and so on. There is, this is maybe the fundamental thesis of my work: the
unknown
philosophy or the philosophical stance implied
philosophy or the philosophical stance implied
Slavoj Žižek
by Freud, it's not some simple naturalism in the sense of sexuality is important and so on. It's a vision of man which fits Kantian philosophy or German idealism. So for me, my ultimate task would be to read again German idealism against the background of what psychoanalysis brought us. Because psychoanalysis is a much more delicate thing. It's not this substantialism of the
by Freud, it's not some simple naturalism in the sense of sexuality is important and so on. It's a vision of man which fits Kantian philosophy or German idealism. So for me, my ultimate task would be to read again German idealism against the background of what psychoanalysis brought us. Because psychoanalysis is a much more delicate thing. It's not this substantialism of the
unknown
unconscious, you know all these stupid metaphors: our conscious ego is just like the tip of the iceberg, all the depth there. No, unconscious is purely phenomenal for Freud. Unconscious for Jung has a substantial notion of the unconscious, no? So again, in one line my program is that only by reading psychoanalysis
unconscious, you know all these stupid metaphors: our conscious ego is just like the tip of the iceberg, all the depth there. No, unconscious is purely phenomenal for Freud. Unconscious for Jung has a substantial notion of the unconscious, no? So again, in one line my program is that only by reading psychoanalysis
Slavoj Žižek
through German idealism can we
through German idealism can we
unknown
arrive at what psychoanalytic revolution really amounts to and vice versa. Only again, only reread through Freud can we keep alive the tradition of German idealism. And I think here it's a line, I'm saying this still as a kind of a leftist
arrive at what psychoanalytic revolution really amounts to and vice versa. Only again, only reread through Freud can we keep alive the tradition of German idealism. And I think here it's a line, I'm saying this still as a kind of a leftist
Slavoj Žižek
Marxist, more important than Marx himself. I
Marxist, more important than Marx himself. I
unknown
think
think
Slavoj Žižek
philosophically Marx following Feuerbach and all those is a regression with regard to Hegel. But when you ask me, my point is this one. I now I can give you an only a very condensed version. The idea came to me and to my good friend Joan Copjec that the structure, you know Lacan in his Seminar Encore, on feminine jouissance and some others develops his famous or infamous formulas of sexuation. He wants to account for the masculine versus feminine sexuality through some logical paradoxes: universality with exception and so on. And Joan Copjec originally came to this idea that what Lacan is describing there, and he wasn't aware of it, I checked with his people who knew Lacan, are the very structures of Kantian
philosophically Marx following Feuerbach and all those is a regression with regard to Hegel. But when you ask me, my point is this one. I now I can give you an only a very condensed version. The idea came to me and to my good friend Joan Copjec that the structure, you know Lacan in his Seminar Encore, on feminine jouissance and some others develops his famous or infamous formulas of sexuation. He wants to account for the masculine versus feminine sexuality through some logical paradoxes: universality with exception and so on. And Joan Copjec originally came to this idea that what Lacan is describing there, and he wasn't aware of it, I checked with his people who knew Lacan, are the very structures of Kantian
unknown
antinomies.
antinomies.
Slavoj Žižek
Dynamic antinomies are what Lacan calls masculine, mathematical antinomies are what Lacan calls feminine. So of course I'm not talking about biological sexuality. I'm talking about why our universe even the most abstract conceptual universe is sexed because of certain paradoxes of symbolization and so on and so on. My second point is that this Kantian structure of antinomies as the ultimate horizon we
Dynamic antinomies are what Lacan calls masculine, mathematical antinomies are what Lacan calls feminine. So of course I'm not talking about biological sexuality. I'm talking about why our universe even the most abstract conceptual universe is sexed because of certain paradoxes of symbolization and so on and so on. My second point is that this Kantian structure of antinomies as the ultimate horizon we
unknown
cannot move beyond
cannot move beyond
Slavoj Žižek
them. Kant's mistake was that as Hegel put it in his well-known critique of Kant, that Kant was too tender towards things. For him antinomies
them. Kant's mistake was that as Hegel put it in his well-known critique of Kant, that Kant was too tender towards things. For him antinomies
unknown
were
were
Slavoj Žižek
limited to our knowledge. Antinomies were... things themselves cannot be antinomic. Hegel's point is yes, they can. So what I try to do is through this approach by taking Kantian antinomies seriously in the sense of they concern the thing itself, to read the implicit Kantian and Hegelian then ontology in accordance to what I improvised: that unfinished universe and so on. It means that the world in itself is antinomic, not fully constituted and so on. That's, there we have the connection with Freud, sexuality, sexual difference and ontology. I'm moving very fast. You may not be convinced, I'm just giving you the outline. My next step is an old-fashioned Marxist, but it's reading Hegel believe, that nonetheless capitalism is something exceptional. The logic of, and here we come back to your spandrels and so on. The logic of surplus value that we find in capitalism where the thing cannot exist without its surplus. What appears as a secondary surplus is the very motive what triggers it and so on. I in the second part of the book I go into detail, in detail of this parallel between what Lacan calls surplus enjoyment. The additional twist in enjoyment which changes simple pleasure in what we usually call in more emphatic terms enjoyment. And I give, I hope some of them will be amusing, numerous examples. For example, for me, what fascinates me is, I give you a horrible political example of enjoyment in pain. You know, my God, you must know it, Goebbels, Totaler Krieg speech. He does something genius in a terrifying way, Goebbels there in Sportpalast in early '43. All he promises to German people is more suffering. He says do you want a Krieg, a war, which will be so total that you cannot even imagine how much you will suffer? And people cry. So this paradoxes of pleasure in pain. Or what I claim is that for a certain type I'm now jumping just to give an idea to examples: for a certain type of sexuality maybe it's Protestant sexuality, if you don't feel guilty you don't really enjoy it. You have to add guilt to enjoyment, to pleasure, to really enjoy it. And I think all these twists of how an obstacle, far from blocking the thing, conditions it, keeps you moving. For example, I'm sorry this will appear sexist but I love the example: a friend of mine told me this story, maybe you even know it, how he told me that he had an affair with an elder lady who had a beautiful body but she... the lady told him that her last lover who saw her naked told her that except for one or two kilos too much she has a perfect body. And my friend made the right reaction. He told her just don't lose that one or two kilos because the paradox is that you have to have one or two kilos too much, in this way you create the illusion that without those two kilos too much your body is perfect. But if you effectively take away one or two kilos you lose also the perfection. You know? And this fundamental imbalance, the surplus which bothers, bothers harmony is the very retroactive condition of harmony. Marx traced it but he wasn't radical enough. Marx's dream of communism was that we can get capitalist dynamics, always more expansion without the obstacle, without this paradox. Okay it's more complex here, but what I want to say is that for me capitalism is in this sense an ontological phenomenon. It's the first social order and the only in the history of humanity where imbalance it's not a problem, it's a solution. This is why always Marxists had a problem with capitalism. They always count on crisis but then the more capitalism is in crisis the stronger it emerges out of it, you know? So I deal with this ontological consequences of capitalism and then I do something very pessimistic at the end. I claim that in the classical Marxist view, when you get that proletarian revolutions, revolutions will not be contained in this bourgeois deadlock, you want something, freedom, the result is catastrophic and so on. No, that we have to accept that all revolutions, even proletarian ones, are caught in a process that they don't dominate. Like October Revolution. Okay we can play this game that it was meant in a great way but nonetheless it was a big attempt at liberation ended... so there are no controlled revolutions. Sorry? Then there are no controlled revolutions. Yeah, there are no controlled revolutions. We have to, we have to accept, it's a very Hegelian view. Because you know Marx is here literally more idealist. Marx thought, and you have this nicely done in early Lukács still one of the greatest books of 20th century, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (History and Class Consciousness). Marx thought that proletarian revolution will be a self-transparent act. At that point of history working class, the subject, will know what it is doing and do it. No, as you put it nicely, it's not controlled, it's not self-transparent. You have the same historical dialectic and so on. And then I approach at the end of the book these questions that I really like, wonderful questions of mortality in communism. And although I don't like, like I fight not only against transparency of revolutions, but against this visions that somehow in communism private life will be better, if there will be communism. I claim no, who knows, maybe it will be worse and so on. And you know whom I take as an example? I like to jump from one drastic example: Shostakovich, the 14th Symphony. It's really a symphony about the death, dying. And it's so openly brazenly pessimistic etc. No wonder he wasn't able to perform it while he was still alive and so on. So again, without betraying Marxism I think we should introduce this, let's call it historical density. In all social processes, also the progressive ones, they are non-transparent, the result is another one and so on. Which means that fundamentally we never know what we are doing. The act is by definition displaced, you get something else and so on and so on. That's actually a nice, a nice note on which to end this particular segment. I was just going to ask you one last question. So there may well be a lot of readers or people who actually see this video sort of think, "Ah, Žižek turns out to be a really interesting guy." So what, what should they read? You know, what's a recommend one of your many books or or maybe even a book about you? If they have the time, the will, please read philosophical stuff. For example, I think I wrote a short philosophical book on Ereignis, Event, it was translated also in German, which precisely tries to go through all the dimension: the Heideggerian event Ereignis, the ultimate catastrophe Ereignis end of the world, the Ereignis of the fall, then all the three greatest philosophers, they are for me Plato, Descartes, Hegel. Why? Because each of them
limited to our knowledge. Antinomies were... things themselves cannot be antinomic. Hegel's point is yes, they can. So what I try to do is through this approach by taking Kantian antinomies seriously in the sense of they concern the thing itself, to read the implicit Kantian and Hegelian then ontology in accordance to what I improvised: that unfinished universe and so on. It means that the world in itself is antinomic, not fully constituted and so on. That's, there we have the connection with Freud, sexuality, sexual difference and ontology. I'm moving very fast. You may not be convinced, I'm just giving you the outline. My next step is an old-fashioned Marxist, but it's reading Hegel believe, that nonetheless capitalism is something exceptional. The logic of, and here we come back to your spandrels and so on. The logic of surplus value that we find in capitalism where the thing cannot exist without its surplus. What appears as a secondary surplus is the very motive what triggers it and so on. I in the second part of the book I go into detail, in detail of this parallel between what Lacan calls surplus enjoyment. The additional twist in enjoyment which changes simple pleasure in what we usually call in more emphatic terms enjoyment. And I give, I hope some of them will be amusing, numerous examples. For example, for me, what fascinates me is, I give you a horrible political example of enjoyment in pain. You know, my God, you must know it, Goebbels, Totaler Krieg speech. He does something genius in a terrifying way, Goebbels there in Sportpalast in early '43. All he promises to German people is more suffering. He says do you want a Krieg, a war, which will be so total that you cannot even imagine how much you will suffer? And people cry. So this paradoxes of pleasure in pain. Or what I claim is that for a certain type I'm now jumping just to give an idea to examples: for a certain type of sexuality maybe it's Protestant sexuality, if you don't feel guilty you don't really enjoy it. You have to add guilt to enjoyment, to pleasure, to really enjoy it. And I think all these twists of how an obstacle, far from blocking the thing, conditions it, keeps you moving. For example, I'm sorry this will appear sexist but I love the example: a friend of mine told me this story, maybe you even know it, how he told me that he had an affair with an elder lady who had a beautiful body but she... the lady told him that her last lover who saw her naked told her that except for one or two kilos too much she has a perfect body. And my friend made the right reaction. He told her just don't lose that one or two kilos because the paradox is that you have to have one or two kilos too much, in this way you create the illusion that without those two kilos too much your body is perfect. But if you effectively take away one or two kilos you lose also the perfection. You know? And this fundamental imbalance, the surplus which bothers, bothers harmony is the very retroactive condition of harmony. Marx traced it but he wasn't radical enough. Marx's dream of communism was that we can get capitalist dynamics, always more expansion without the obstacle, without this paradox. Okay it's more complex here, but what I want to say is that for me capitalism is in this sense an ontological phenomenon. It's the first social order and the only in the history of humanity where imbalance it's not a problem, it's a solution. This is why always Marxists had a problem with capitalism. They always count on crisis but then the more capitalism is in crisis the stronger it emerges out of it, you know? So I deal with this ontological consequences of capitalism and then I do something very pessimistic at the end. I claim that in the classical Marxist view, when you get that proletarian revolutions, revolutions will not be contained in this bourgeois deadlock, you want something, freedom, the result is catastrophic and so on. No, that we have to accept that all revolutions, even proletarian ones, are caught in a process that they don't dominate. Like October Revolution. Okay we can play this game that it was meant in a great way but nonetheless it was a big attempt at liberation ended... so there are no controlled revolutions. Sorry? Then there are no controlled revolutions. Yeah, there are no controlled revolutions. We have to, we have to accept, it's a very Hegelian view. Because you know Marx is here literally more idealist. Marx thought, and you have this nicely done in early Lukács still one of the greatest books of 20th century, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (History and Class Consciousness). Marx thought that proletarian revolution will be a self-transparent act. At that point of history working class, the subject, will know what it is doing and do it. No, as you put it nicely, it's not controlled, it's not self-transparent. You have the same historical dialectic and so on. And then I approach at the end of the book these questions that I really like, wonderful questions of mortality in communism. And although I don't like, like I fight not only against transparency of revolutions, but against this visions that somehow in communism private life will be better, if there will be communism. I claim no, who knows, maybe it will be worse and so on. And you know whom I take as an example? I like to jump from one drastic example: Shostakovich, the 14th Symphony. It's really a symphony about the death, dying. And it's so openly brazenly pessimistic etc. No wonder he wasn't able to perform it while he was still alive and so on. So again, without betraying Marxism I think we should introduce this, let's call it historical density. In all social processes, also the progressive ones, they are non-transparent, the result is another one and so on. Which means that fundamentally we never know what we are doing. The act is by definition displaced, you get something else and so on and so on. That's actually a nice, a nice note on which to end this particular segment. I was just going to ask you one last question. So there may well be a lot of readers or people who actually see this video sort of think, "Ah, Žižek turns out to be a really interesting guy." So what, what should they read? You know, what's a recommend one of your many books or or maybe even a book about you? If they have the time, the will, please read philosophical stuff. For example, I think I wrote a short philosophical book on Ereignis, Event, it was translated also in German, which precisely tries to go through all the dimension: the Heideggerian event Ereignis, the ultimate catastrophe Ereignis end of the world, the Ereignis of the fall, then all the three greatest philosophers, they are for me Plato, Descartes, Hegel. Why? Because each of them
unknown
define
define
Slavoj Žižek
the whole posterity. As Michel Foucault put it somewhere, isn't the whole history of philosophy a history of criticism of Plato? The whole... and after Descartes they all want to get rid of Descartes. 19th century they all want to get rid of Hegel, how to... and I think they are all philosophers of an event. Cartesian Cogito is not as we thought wrongly a thinking substance, it's a pure self-relating event of thought, the same of Hegel. So I would say read Ereignis, Event. If you have more energy, a little bit more, read Absolute Recoil. Please go also to these philosophical books. This is where my real work is, all that philosophical stuff like the one I just published, The Courage of Hopelessness and so on. Listen, I'm doing them with some kind of what Sartre called mauvaise foi, bad conscience, you know. It's as if somebody else should be, what do I know about society, about politics? I'm an amateur. I always have this feeling that somebody else should have been doing it, not me, and that I'm just filling in for somebody else. I feel bad with my, with my political books. My heart really is only in this more purely philosophical books. Thank you very much, that's, that's fantastic. But now you should be a good journalist and I will... okay, interviewer.
the whole posterity. As Michel Foucault put it somewhere, isn't the whole history of philosophy a history of criticism of Plato? The whole... and after Descartes they all want to get rid of Descartes. 19th century they all want to get rid of Hegel, how to... and I think they are all philosophers of an event. Cartesian Cogito is not as we thought wrongly a thinking substance, it's a pure self-relating event of thought, the same of Hegel. So I would say read Ereignis, Event. If you have more energy, a little bit more, read Absolute Recoil. Please go also to these philosophical books. This is where my real work is, all that philosophical stuff like the one I just published, The Courage of Hopelessness and so on. Listen, I'm doing them with some kind of what Sartre called mauvaise foi, bad conscience, you know. It's as if somebody else should be, what do I know about society, about politics? I'm an amateur. I always have this feeling that somebody else should have been doing it, not me, and that I'm just filling in for somebody else. I feel bad with my, with my political books. My heart really is only in this more purely philosophical books. Thank you very much, that's, that's fantastic. But now you should be a good journalist and I will... okay, interviewer.
unknown
You know how I define
You know how I define
Slavoj Žižek
it? Every idiot, and I hope you the two of you are not one, can reproduce what I said. A true journalist can do this: you don't cheat, you use only what I said, but you combine it with other questions and montage it so that you make me say a totally different thing, but I cannot complain. You say "fuck off, sorry, you said this" and so on. There's a challenge. Thank you very much. This
it? Every idiot, and I hope you the two of you are not one, can reproduce what I said. A true journalist can do this: you don't cheat, you use only what I said, but you combine it with other questions and montage it so that you make me say a totally different thing, but I cannot complain. You say "fuck off, sorry, you said this" and so on. There's a challenge. Thank you very much. This
unknown
is
is
Slavoj Žižek
the challenge. Thank you, thank you. Thank you.
the challenge. Thank you, thank you. Thank you.