Interview with Slavoj Zizek: The Dark Side of Liberalism
Interview · Death Drive Dialectics ·
published 2023-07-25 · 0:16:15 · 1,847 words
the date above is when the video was uploaded, no recording date was found
hegel-dialecticshistoryideologyrevolution-violencerace-antisemitismliberalism-political-correctness
Žižek argues that Hegel’s dialectics is not a guarantee of progress but a framework for understanding how positive ideas inevitably turn into their opposites (e.g., equality into terror). He applies this to the French Revolution, the colonial history of the 19th century, and the lead-up to World War I, noting Engels’ accurate prediction of the conflict. He further illustrates the dialectic of violence and negotiation using the South African transition from apartheid and the US Civil Rights Movement, suggesting that radical threats are often necessary conditions for peaceful outcomes.
every located moment in this recording, click one to read it
The ideas in it 5
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
as “Hegel's big obsession”
The focus on how a positive, progressive idea, when actualized by a historical agent, inevitably turns terribly wrong, rather than being a mere contingent failure.
The hidden, violent, or traumatic reality (such as colonialism or slavery) that underpins the official narrative of gradual liberal progress in the 19th century.
A specific sentiment among some black poor in post-apartheid South Africa, viewing the past as more stable and secure despite its oppression, illustrating the failure of the transition.
as “threat of violence”
The idea that radical, violent movements serve as a necessary background condition that enables peaceful negotiations and reforms to succeed.
as “permanent intellectual orgasm”
A provocative metaphor for Hegel’s hypothetical reaction to the 20th century, where historical outcomes constantly subvert liberal expectations of progress.
Stories he reaches for 1
Friedrich Engels, in an 1882 letter, accurately predicted the alliances, death toll, and subsequent German-triggered second war of World War I, demonstrating that the 'era of progress' was an illusion masking impending catastrophe.
“Engels: if Germany will lose this war, in a decade or two, Germany will trigger another war.”
People invoked 12
Mentioned as the author of a book about the resolution of tensions through negotiations, though Žižek forgets his name.
Vladimir Lenin positive
Defended against the label of 'coup d'etat' or 'terrorist'; Žižek views the October Revolution as an 'emancipatory event' marked by an explosion of modern art and social movements.
Friedrich Engels positive
Praised for a 'stroke of genius' in an 1882 letter where he accurately predicted the details and consequences of World War I.
Chris Hani positive
Described as a 'famous Communist figure' who, despite supporting negotiations, warned about the dangers of the transition, aligning with Žižek’s dialectical view.
Nelson Mandela negative
Cited alongside MLK as a case of negotiation, but Žižek points to the 'terrible, growing' crisis in South Africa as evidence of the failure of this model.
Martin Luther King Jr. negative
Žižek argues that the idealization of MLK is a 'false and misrepresentation' that recaptures his legacy by the ruling ideology, ignoring the necessary role of radical violence.
Cited as a conservative who introduced elementary healthcare and retirement, used to illustrate the relative progress of the 19th century before WWI.
Joseph Stalin negative
Represented as the 'terribly wrong' outcome of the October Revolution; Žižek rejects the liberal view that Stalinism was a logical necessity of Leninism.
Karl Marx positive
Referenced as the companion of Friedrich Engels, who is credited with the prescient prediction of WWI.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel positive
Žižek considers Hegel 'unique and active for our time,' specifically valuing his focus on how ideas turn into their opposites, though he disagrees with Hegel's specific analysis of the French Revolution.
Lyndon B. Johnson positive
Viewed as a 'pragmatic' who 'made a deal,' potentially better than Kennedy, illustrating the necessity of compromise backed by the threat of radical movements.
John F. Kennedy negative
Contrasted with Lyndon Johnson; Žižek suggests Kennedy is 'so much more celebrated' but implies Johnson was more pragmatic and effective.
Transcript 5 turns
Slavoj Žižek
Now let's time to sit down.
Now let's time to sit down.
unknown
I'm switching. We're going to the first question. And again we're going to... I think our general goal here is to start abstract, general, and become more specific as questions go on. So, relevant to what Nick just said, our first question is concerning dialectics. So our question is what is dialectics? Your definition, and how exactly does your understanding of definition differ from other, perhaps mainstream definitions? What would you say is the core definition, your definition?
I'm switching. We're going to the first question. And again we're going to... I think our general goal here is to start abstract, general, and become more specific as questions go on. So, relevant to what Nick just said, our first question is concerning dialectics. So our question is what is dialectics? Your definition, and how exactly does your understanding of definition differ from other, perhaps mainstream definitions? What would you say is the core definition, your definition?
Slavoj Žižek
It's too much to do it in a couple of minutes. I will just give you one hint that I find crucial. Why I am, in spite of Hegel's obvious historical limitation, so focused on Hegel. I will now briefly repeat points that I generally make. You know there is, with many critics of dialectics, one big misunderstanding: as if dialectics is a kind of a ultra-rational scheme which guarantees that no matter how bad things are, at the end there will be a kind of a synthesis, progress, higher level and so on. I think that if there is on the contrary, if there is something which makes Hegel unique and active for our time, is that Hegel's view was not this: no matter how bad things are, this is just a subordinated moment in general progress. If you look at Hegel's concrete analyses, they always focus on one point. I simplify: there is a good idea, even progressive one, but then when you try to actualize—not you-you, but some historical agent—tries to actualize this idea, things go terribly wrong. Why? Hegel never plays this simple idealist game: 'Oh, the idea was good, just because of contingent circumstances things went wrong.' And this is Hegel's big, big obsession. So it's not 'it will turn good,' but you begin with a positive idea, it turns out terribly. Hegel's big example, of course, is—and I don't agree with him here—is the French Revolution. It began with, like, equality and so on, it turned into terror. Although Hegel is here much more refined. His point is not 'terror was a wrong choice, there was another option.' No, it had to turn into terror. So, if—let's play this stupidly utopian game—let's say that if Hegel were, through some biological miracle, to stay alive till 1900s, '40s, '50s, I think he would have ultra-enjoyed it. He would have gone from one to another intellectual orgasm. In what sense? Look at the official history of the second half of the 19th century. Of course, around the world horrible things happened. All the holocausts in Africa, slaves, all the horrors of colonialism. The main two are Africa slavery and—never forget—this is such a traumatic event: the Opium Wars, the Western invasion of China. Are people... this wasn't just a limited invasion. Do you know that China was in 1820—not per capita, but in its overall product—by far the strongest country in the world? Three times United Kingdom—at that point, British Empire, whatever we call it—product. In years, China lost almost two-thirds of its bruto product, social chaos, and so on. So, back to Hegel. I think that the general view is that we abstract from all this—slavery, what happens outside—and we limit ourselves to the Western Europe—or Europe in general, United States—and we perceive the second half of 19th century as a time of gradual progress. Things were getting better and better. And except for a short war here and there, like the French-Prussian War up to a point, very relatively, this was true. For example, even conservatives like Bismarck in Germany, they were the first to introduce elementary healthcare, retirement, women got votes and so on and so on. But then something happened which took by surprise not only of the public, but even of social scientists: The Great War, World War I. And Hegel would have been, you see my point, obsessed by this. Era of progress, liberal ideal, what... how could then this happen? Because don't... I think we tend to overestimate World War II. It was a nightmare. But it was a consequence of World War I. You know who predicted this? I'm sorry if you already know the point, but I was surprised to read this. Of all people, he's usually reduced to a big category, not so important maybe philosophically, but he was not an idiot: Marx's companion, Friedrich Engels. In a letter from, I think, '82, in a stroke of a genius, very pragmatic, he said Europe is slowly drifting towards a Pan-European war. And then it was incredible what details he guessed. He said it will be Germany-Austria versus Russia and on the west France-England. And then he said the death toll will be around million. Today the official number is Then he says maybe this will lead to a revolution in Russia. But now comes the big point. He then says, Engels: if Germany will lose this war, in a decade or two, Germany will trigger another war. You see, this would worry Hegel. What is wrong in this deceiving picture of slow progress, 19th century, always look at the dark underside. And as a Hegelian, I'm now adding to this: this underside can also be good, progressive. For example, the big point of liberals is: history teaches us that true progress is done only by negotiations, never by violence. But maybe you know the name, I forgot the guy, who wrote now a book I read about it, where he claims that usually two cases of resolution of a tension through negotiations are mentioned: Martin Luther King, American struggle for black emancipation, and ANC in South Africa, Mandela. Let's leave open the question: were these two attempts really successful? Now in South Africa, we know that the crisis is terrible, growing. And if I hope you will not be mad if I improvise a little bit because this fascinates me. You know that around two weeks ago I had one of the most depressive experiences at Birkbeck College. There was a general debate at the end of the summer school, and there was a lady, black lady from South Africa, very progressive, an old ANC fighter. And I asked her frankly: should I believe the Western media? Like, I wanted first-hand report on how are things there. And she told me something that totally depressed me. She told me that because of all this corruption, confusion, all... I will not go into the problems, she said—isn't this sad?—that more and more among the black poor majority, poor blacks, the new sentiment is nostalgia for apartheid. I wanted to kill... the idea is this one. That's how people perceive it, because you know, you always change the past in memory, no? Their idea is that it was tough, but it was stable, we were even a little bit less poor than now, plus since South Africa was a police state, there was a certain level of social security. Now, not only we are as poor as before, but there is explosive violence and so on and so on. You see, this is... this would be the focus of Hegel. How could things have gone so wrong? Or to go
It's too much to do it in a couple of minutes. I will just give you one hint that I find crucial. Why I am, in spite of Hegel's obvious historical limitation, so focused on Hegel. I will now briefly repeat points that I generally make. You know there is, with many critics of dialectics, one big misunderstanding: as if dialectics is a kind of a ultra-rational scheme which guarantees that no matter how bad things are, at the end there will be a kind of a synthesis, progress, higher level and so on. I think that if there is on the contrary, if there is something which makes Hegel unique and active for our time, is that Hegel's view was not this: no matter how bad things are, this is just a subordinated moment in general progress. If you look at Hegel's concrete analyses, they always focus on one point. I simplify: there is a good idea, even progressive one, but then when you try to actualize—not you-you, but some historical agent—tries to actualize this idea, things go terribly wrong. Why? Hegel never plays this simple idealist game: 'Oh, the idea was good, just because of contingent circumstances things went wrong.' And this is Hegel's big, big obsession. So it's not 'it will turn good,' but you begin with a positive idea, it turns out terribly. Hegel's big example, of course, is—and I don't agree with him here—is the French Revolution. It began with, like, equality and so on, it turned into terror. Although Hegel is here much more refined. His point is not 'terror was a wrong choice, there was another option.' No, it had to turn into terror. So, if—let's play this stupidly utopian game—let's say that if Hegel were, through some biological miracle, to stay alive till 1900s, '40s, '50s, I think he would have ultra-enjoyed it. He would have gone from one to another intellectual orgasm. In what sense? Look at the official history of the second half of the 19th century. Of course, around the world horrible things happened. All the holocausts in Africa, slaves, all the horrors of colonialism. The main two are Africa slavery and—never forget—this is such a traumatic event: the Opium Wars, the Western invasion of China. Are people... this wasn't just a limited invasion. Do you know that China was in 1820—not per capita, but in its overall product—by far the strongest country in the world? Three times United Kingdom—at that point, British Empire, whatever we call it—product. In years, China lost almost two-thirds of its bruto product, social chaos, and so on. So, back to Hegel. I think that the general view is that we abstract from all this—slavery, what happens outside—and we limit ourselves to the Western Europe—or Europe in general, United States—and we perceive the second half of 19th century as a time of gradual progress. Things were getting better and better. And except for a short war here and there, like the French-Prussian War up to a point, very relatively, this was true. For example, even conservatives like Bismarck in Germany, they were the first to introduce elementary healthcare, retirement, women got votes and so on and so on. But then something happened which took by surprise not only of the public, but even of social scientists: The Great War, World War I. And Hegel would have been, you see my point, obsessed by this. Era of progress, liberal ideal, what... how could then this happen? Because don't... I think we tend to overestimate World War II. It was a nightmare. But it was a consequence of World War I. You know who predicted this? I'm sorry if you already know the point, but I was surprised to read this. Of all people, he's usually reduced to a big category, not so important maybe philosophically, but he was not an idiot: Marx's companion, Friedrich Engels. In a letter from, I think, '82, in a stroke of a genius, very pragmatic, he said Europe is slowly drifting towards a Pan-European war. And then it was incredible what details he guessed. He said it will be Germany-Austria versus Russia and on the west France-England. And then he said the death toll will be around million. Today the official number is Then he says maybe this will lead to a revolution in Russia. But now comes the big point. He then says, Engels: if Germany will lose this war, in a decade or two, Germany will trigger another war. You see, this would worry Hegel. What is wrong in this deceiving picture of slow progress, 19th century, always look at the dark underside. And as a Hegelian, I'm now adding to this: this underside can also be good, progressive. For example, the big point of liberals is: history teaches us that true progress is done only by negotiations, never by violence. But maybe you know the name, I forgot the guy, who wrote now a book I read about it, where he claims that usually two cases of resolution of a tension through negotiations are mentioned: Martin Luther King, American struggle for black emancipation, and ANC in South Africa, Mandela. Let's leave open the question: were these two attempts really successful? Now in South Africa, we know that the crisis is terrible, growing. And if I hope you will not be mad if I improvise a little bit because this fascinates me. You know that around two weeks ago I had one of the most depressive experiences at Birkbeck College. There was a general debate at the end of the summer school, and there was a lady, black lady from South Africa, very progressive, an old ANC fighter. And I asked her frankly: should I believe the Western media? Like, I wanted first-hand report on how are things there. And she told me something that totally depressed me. She told me that because of all this corruption, confusion, all... I will not go into the problems, she said—isn't this sad?—that more and more among the black poor majority, poor blacks, the new sentiment is nostalgia for apartheid. I wanted to kill... the idea is this one. That's how people perceive it, because you know, you always change the past in memory, no? Their idea is that it was tough, but it was stable, we were even a little bit less poor than now, plus since South Africa was a police state, there was a certain level of social security. Now, not only we are as poor as before, but there is explosive violence and so on and so on. You see, this is... this would be the focus of Hegel. How could things have gone so wrong? Or to go
unknown
back... To me, this to me like kind of reminds of the material conditions, that there is this, you know, contradiction, you know, within the idea itself, but then also these ideas run aground when it comes to navigating, you know, the economy, especially with the ANC, you know. The ANC, there was this, you know, revolution in terms of ending apartheid as a, you know, system, but there was not the attempt to reform the economy in any meaningful way, uh, you know, to end private property, to redistribute, you know, in any sort of socialist manner. I agree. On the other hand, did Mandela have really
back... To me, this to me like kind of reminds of the material conditions, that there is this, you know, contradiction, you know, within the idea itself, but then also these ideas run aground when it comes to navigating, you know, the economy, especially with the ANC, you know. The ANC, there was this, you know, revolution in terms of ending apartheid as a, you know, system, but there was not the attempt to reform the economy in any meaningful way, uh, you know, to end private property, to redistribute, you know, in any sort of socialist manner. I agree. On the other hand, did Mandela have really
Slavoj Žižek
a chance? I think he did, but you know what I mean by this. I knew people who knew the famous Communist figure there, Chris Hani, who although basically supporting it through negotiations was already giving warnings about this. Yes, to be very brutal, do you know that South Africa is today a country with the greatest, strongest social division between rich and poor? So all that effectively happened is that the old white ruling class was joined by a new black ruling class, which is very exclusive, a tiny minority of blacks. But what I want to say is not to go into these details, just to point this out, that the guy—I'm sorry, whose name I escaped me now—proved that it's not as simple as that. Realistic solution: let's negotiate. Even these negotiations worked because behind them there was a threat: Hey, we could get more violent. You know, without this hardliner, no, white people wouldn't concede to what they conceded. You know, like ANC and fear, I think precisely the threat of violence played a positive role. And I think it was the same in the United States. You may correct me if I am wrong. But I think with this idealization, which is false and misrepresentation, this recapturing by the ruling ideology of Martin Luther King, you know. Yes, it worked up to a certain point, and here it's very delicate. I think it even can be argued that maybe with all his compromises, Lyndon Johnson was better than so much more celebrated Kennedy, you know. As a pragmatic, he made a deal. But what I want to say is that again, without the threat of all those much more radical black movements, I don't think this relative—we now see how false it was, nonetheless reconciliation—would have worked. This is also where a Hegelian approach would help. This would be maybe one of my definitions: when a certain movement wins, don't focus just on what happened and was successful but also take into account how there were other alternatives which remain in the background, but as such as a potential threat were necessary condition here in this case for the peaceful version to win. So in other terms, I think that you can only win a political battle in this very balanced way. But let me take my last example of what I see in dialectics. For example, October Revolution. I don't want to dismiss Lenin as just coup d'etat, terrorist, and so on. No. Whatever you say, and it's enough to see the explosion of modern art, social movement in Soviet Union in the 1920s, this was an emancipatory event. How then Stalinism? What went wrong? Again, to avoid a misunderstanding, I am not a liberal or conservative Western one who says 'Oh, it didn't matter. It was a logical necessity that Leninism should have evolved into Stalinism.' No, it's not as simple as that. But nonetheless, that would have been the key enigma for Hegel. How can things turn so terribly wrong? And I think here Hegel would have be, sorry for this tasteless metaphor, in a permanent intellectual orgasm looking at what happens today, my God.
a chance? I think he did, but you know what I mean by this. I knew people who knew the famous Communist figure there, Chris Hani, who although basically supporting it through negotiations was already giving warnings about this. Yes, to be very brutal, do you know that South Africa is today a country with the greatest, strongest social division between rich and poor? So all that effectively happened is that the old white ruling class was joined by a new black ruling class, which is very exclusive, a tiny minority of blacks. But what I want to say is not to go into these details, just to point this out, that the guy—I'm sorry, whose name I escaped me now—proved that it's not as simple as that. Realistic solution: let's negotiate. Even these negotiations worked because behind them there was a threat: Hey, we could get more violent. You know, without this hardliner, no, white people wouldn't concede to what they conceded. You know, like ANC and fear, I think precisely the threat of violence played a positive role. And I think it was the same in the United States. You may correct me if I am wrong. But I think with this idealization, which is false and misrepresentation, this recapturing by the ruling ideology of Martin Luther King, you know. Yes, it worked up to a certain point, and here it's very delicate. I think it even can be argued that maybe with all his compromises, Lyndon Johnson was better than so much more celebrated Kennedy, you know. As a pragmatic, he made a deal. But what I want to say is that again, without the threat of all those much more radical black movements, I don't think this relative—we now see how false it was, nonetheless reconciliation—would have worked. This is also where a Hegelian approach would help. This would be maybe one of my definitions: when a certain movement wins, don't focus just on what happened and was successful but also take into account how there were other alternatives which remain in the background, but as such as a potential threat were necessary condition here in this case for the peaceful version to win. So in other terms, I think that you can only win a political battle in this very balanced way. But let me take my last example of what I see in dialectics. For example, October Revolution. I don't want to dismiss Lenin as just coup d'etat, terrorist, and so on. No. Whatever you say, and it's enough to see the explosion of modern art, social movement in Soviet Union in the 1920s, this was an emancipatory event. How then Stalinism? What went wrong? Again, to avoid a misunderstanding, I am not a liberal or conservative Western one who says 'Oh, it didn't matter. It was a logical necessity that Leninism should have evolved into Stalinism.' No, it's not as simple as that. But nonetheless, that would have been the key enigma for Hegel. How can things turn so terribly wrong? And I think here Hegel would have be, sorry for this tasteless metaphor, in a permanent intellectual orgasm looking at what happens today, my God.