Nature for Nature’s Sake: Žižek, Singer & Sherman on Rethinking Human-Centered Morality
Debate · fediak 22 ·
2024-12-15 · 0:50:49 · 7,438 words
ecology-climatephilosophy-generaltechnology-ai-cyberspaceethics
Slavoj Žižek delivers a brief, pessimistic intervention in a panel discussion on ecology and ethics. He critiques the anthropocentric bias of mainstream environmentalism, arguing that nature is not a benevolent mother but a source of catastrophic violence. He extends this pessimism to technology, citing Thomas Metzinger’s warning that higher cognitive capacities bring intensified suffering, illustrated by the potential for direct brain stimulation. The transcript continues with other panelists discussing human-centered morality, Stoicism, and animal ethics, but Žižek’s contribution focuses on the inherent hostility of nature and the dangers of technological hubris.
every located moment in this recording, click one to read it
The ideas in it 4
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
as “ecological approach to writing”
Žižek’s ironic self-description of his prolific output as 'recycling' or 'plagiarizing' himself, framing his intellectual labor through an ecological metaphor of waste management.
The critique that popular environmentalism is not truly about nature, but about preserving a habitable environment for human survival, thus remaining anthropocentric.
as “nature as a dirty bitch”
Žižek’s provocative re-framing of nature not as a homeostatic, nurturing mother, but as a violent, catastrophic force that produces mega-disasters independent of human existence.
The idea, attributed to Thomas Metzinger, that each step in evolutionary development towards higher consciousness brings with it a disproportionately stronger capacity for suffering.
Stories he reaches for 1
Žižek subverts the 'Mother Nature' trope by pointing out that nature is also the source of oil, coal, and mega-catastrophes (ice ages, etc.) that occurred long before humans, characterizing it as a 'dirty bitch' rather than a nurturing homeostatic balance.
“if nature is our mother, this mother can also be on her or its own a dirty bitch.”
People invoked 5
Addressed directly as a panelist; Žižek asks if she agrees with his pessimistic view.
Peter Singer positive
Agrees with Peter on all points regarding sentient beings; acknowledges his serious research into plant/tree communication.
Thomas Metzinger positive
Cited as a German theorist of AI whose pessimism about evolutionary suffering Žižek adopts.
Plato positive
Mentioned by Nancy Sherman (not Žižek directly, but in the same transcript block) regarding the subordination of women as a historical contingency in the Republic.
Mentioned by Nancy Sherman (not Žižek directly, but in the same transcript block) as the source of anthropocentric morality and the first marine biologist who studied octopuses.
Transcript 60 turns
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From the time of Socrates, we have seen morality as driven by human desires and goals. But many now argue that this human focus is misguided and leaves the natural world in peril. By prioritizing human well-being, they contend, we have ransacked the earth and eradicated and misused other species and taken insufficient care of our home, the earth. It is not sufficient for us to protect nature for our benefit, they argue. Nature needs to be preserved for its own sake. Do we need to rethink morality to find a new framework that no longer places humans at the center? And if so, how are we to assess the well-being of nature independently of our human perspective? Or is the notion that we can escape human goals and desires itself deluded, risking a return to an age where humans are sacrificed to the gods of the natural world? Here with me to discuss these questions together for the very first time are Peter Singer, Slavoj Žižek, and Nancy Sherman. Peter Singer, you need no introduction, but I've been told to give you one anyway. Peter Singer is one of the most prominent figures in all of contemporary philosophy and is best known for his several bestsellers including his book Animal Liberation. The prolific Slavoj Žižek is the author of over books, which is an incredible amount. I don't know how you manage to do books. His most recent being Christian Atheism: How to Be a Real Materialist. Slavoj was recently named one of Foreign Policy's top global thinkers. And last but certainly not least, Nancy Sherman is Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University and the author of Stoic Wisdom: Ancient Lessons for Modern Resilience. Right then, so our central question is as follows. Do we need to rethink morality to find a new framework that no longer places humans at its center? Peter Singer, would you like to begin?
From the time of Socrates, we have seen morality as driven by human desires and goals. But many now argue that this human focus is misguided and leaves the natural world in peril. By prioritizing human well-being, they contend, we have ransacked the earth and eradicated and misused other species and taken insufficient care of our home, the earth. It is not sufficient for us to protect nature for our benefit, they argue. Nature needs to be preserved for its own sake. Do we need to rethink morality to find a new framework that no longer places humans at the center? And if so, how are we to assess the well-being of nature independently of our human perspective? Or is the notion that we can escape human goals and desires itself deluded, risking a return to an age where humans are sacrificed to the gods of the natural world? Here with me to discuss these questions together for the very first time are Peter Singer, Slavoj Žižek, and Nancy Sherman. Peter Singer, you need no introduction, but I've been told to give you one anyway. Peter Singer is one of the most prominent figures in all of contemporary philosophy and is best known for his several bestsellers including his book Animal Liberation. The prolific Slavoj Žižek is the author of over books, which is an incredible amount. I don't know how you manage to do books. His most recent being Christian Atheism: How to Be a Real Materialist. Slavoj was recently named one of Foreign Policy's top global thinkers. And last but certainly not least, Nancy Sherman is Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University and the author of Stoic Wisdom: Ancient Lessons for Modern Resilience. Right then, so our central question is as follows. Do we need to rethink morality to find a new framework that no longer places humans at its center? Peter Singer, would you like to begin?
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Thank you. Yes, I think we do need to re-center morality. I think we need to re-center it to place sentient beings at the center of morality. So essentially, all the beings who can have conscious
Thank you. Yes, I think we do need to re-center morality. I think we need to re-center it to place sentient beings at the center of morality. So essentially, all the beings who can have conscious
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experiences, all beings for whom
experiences, all beings for whom
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life can go well or badly in the sense that they can enjoy life or they can be miserable, they can experience pleasure or agony. That's where I think morality ought to be. And we have, of course, assumed that humans are not only at the center of it but really the only beings who count morally. I think we're starting to get beyond that. We're starting to give some recognition to the interests of non-human animals. And I think we need to go further and not only recognize them but not discount their interests when compared with similar interests of human beings. So it's a principle of equal consideration for similar interests that I think is fundamental to morality and will include all of those beings who have interests, not only natural beings, if we ever develop artificial intelligence to a point where we actually have conscious AI, conscious robots, or conscious artificial general intelligence, then that would also have interests. If we encounter aliens who are also conscious beings, then they too count. For me, nature in itself does not count if it cannot have any conscious experiences. And rivers and mountains, I think, clearly don't, which doesn't mean that they're not important and shouldn't be preserved, but it means they're not being preserved for their own sake. And, you know, we could then talk about plants. I think it's very unlikely that plants are sentient beings, but it's not completely impossible. So we could make some discoveries which enable us to include plants. But at the moment, I'm talking about essentially humans and animals, and not necessarily all animals either. Certainly all vertebrates, cephalopods like the octopus, United Kingdom has also now recognized decapod crustaceans, that is lobsters and crabs, as sentient beings. How much further you go is a
life can go well or badly in the sense that they can enjoy life or they can be miserable, they can experience pleasure or agony. That's where I think morality ought to be. And we have, of course, assumed that humans are not only at the center of it but really the only beings who count morally. I think we're starting to get beyond that. We're starting to give some recognition to the interests of non-human animals. And I think we need to go further and not only recognize them but not discount their interests when compared with similar interests of human beings. So it's a principle of equal consideration for similar interests that I think is fundamental to morality and will include all of those beings who have interests, not only natural beings, if we ever develop artificial intelligence to a point where we actually have conscious AI, conscious robots, or conscious artificial general intelligence, then that would also have interests. If we encounter aliens who are also conscious beings, then they too count. For me, nature in itself does not count if it cannot have any conscious experiences. And rivers and mountains, I think, clearly don't, which doesn't mean that they're not important and shouldn't be preserved, but it means they're not being preserved for their own sake. And, you know, we could then talk about plants. I think it's very unlikely that plants are sentient beings, but it's not completely impossible. So we could make some discoveries which enable us to include plants. But at the moment, I'm talking about essentially humans and animals, and not necessarily all animals either. Certainly all vertebrates, cephalopods like the octopus, United Kingdom has also now recognized decapod crustaceans, that is lobsters and crabs, as sentient beings. How much further you go is a
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matter for discussion and more research to try to find out, but it's not necessarily going to be the case that the boundary of sentient beings is exactly parallel to the boundary of the distinction between animals and plants that zoologists make. So that's where I think the center of morality ought to be.
matter for discussion and more research to try to find out, but it's not necessarily going to be the case that the boundary of sentient beings is exactly parallel to the boundary of the distinction between animals and plants that zoologists make. So that's where I think the center of morality ought to be.
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Okay. Slavoj, is it time to revise our moral framework and move away from a human-centered morality?
Okay. Slavoj, is it time to revise our moral framework and move away from a human-centered morality?
Slavoj Žižek
But I would like just to begin with a remark when you said how do I make, how was I able to write so many books? Well, that's my ecological approach. I plagiarize myself, or to put it ecologically, I recycle myself. But let me go on more seriously. Of course, I agree with Peter on all points. Maybe just, maybe it's not even a theory, but my sensitivity. I am a little bit more of a desperate pessimist, and I wonder if both of you, Peter and Nancy, would agree with me. Yes, I absolutely agree with Peter about sentient beings, and I even follow what's going on now, it's not some New Age bullshit, very serious research in communication within plants, trees, and so on. Of course, not any way of conscious awareness, but we should be very open here. Yes, we should always remember that we are just one among the species, and with our hyperactivity, we are ruining our natural environment. But I wonder if you would agree. I think that quite often, if you look a little bit deeply into this way of thinking, not you, Peter, but the usual popular story of we are just among one among the species, species, it is still in a more refined way homocentric. What they worry is not nature as such, animals, sentient, but how to keep nature habitable for us. You know, the secret logic is still if we ruin nature too much, will we be able to survive in it? The second thing, my critical point, is quite often when we get this approach critical towards humans destroying nature, we impute a notion of nature which is I think a mythic notion, as if nature means some kind of homeostatic balance, reproduction, and then we with our hubris we humans ruin it. But sorry to use, I like to use it this dirty word, if nature is our mother, this mother can also be on her or its own a dirty bitch. Remember all the, all our sources of energy, oil, coal, can we even imagine what mega-catastrophes happened on Earth prior to we, to our human emergence, to have this? And not to talk too long, the last point, I like very much the line of thought when you mention you, Peter, artificial intelligence and all that. My pessimism here is the one already pointed out by a German theorist of artificial intelligence and so on, Thomas Metzinger, who said each stage of evolution development step passage to what we at least appear as higher level, also brings out incredibly stronger the possibility at least of incredibly stronger new mode of suffering. If we really will be able, what people, some idiots celebrate now, that instead of even using images you can directly manipulate the parts of your brain which provide sexual pleasure, give you orgasms and all... Slavoj, I'm going to have to push you towards the end of your introductory remarks there. I finish it now. Can you imagine, just imagine, with this manipulation of our brain, what new form of unimaginable suffering can also be generated? That's it. Okay. Thank you. It's always good to conclude optimistically, you know. Thanks. That's a, I think that's an understated point from, from you there Slavoj. Thank you for, for keeping them to, to three. Nancy Sherman, do you want to, do you want to come in? Thank you. Thank you both. A pleasure to be on this committee, or on this panel. Um, so let me just put this in a bit of a historical perspective because I am a historian of philosophy. But first, I'm not a geologist, but apparently there was a, a brouhaha very recently about how to name the geological age we're currently in. Is it the Holocene or is it the Anthropocene? And whatever, you know, I'm no geologist, I wouldn't know a golden spike if I tripped over one on a, on a rock formation. That said, the neologism is apt. We are in the, in a place where I agree we have, geological logbook changed because of human engagement on earth. So that's, you know, a geological period that began excuse me, years ago, and the question is, so what happened years ago? And I have to say, the anthropocentric morality really is a gift largely from Aristotle, who is my favorite philosopher, but he really thought that humans and human flourishing is what well-being is about. And and in his case, we are connected to a fellowship, but the fellowship is of human fellow humans. And he had in mind family, polis or city, and then the larger, Stoics took it up, cosmos. But he really didn't have in mind well-being that involved the relationship to other, other creatures or nature. Now, that said, he is the philosopher, he was known as the philosopher, the first teacher, but he also was the first scientist. He was the first marine biologist. And he studied what Peter mentioned, octopus, cephalopods, in Aristotle's
But I would like just to begin with a remark when you said how do I make, how was I able to write so many books? Well, that's my ecological approach. I plagiarize myself, or to put it ecologically, I recycle myself. But let me go on more seriously. Of course, I agree with Peter on all points. Maybe just, maybe it's not even a theory, but my sensitivity. I am a little bit more of a desperate pessimist, and I wonder if both of you, Peter and Nancy, would agree with me. Yes, I absolutely agree with Peter about sentient beings, and I even follow what's going on now, it's not some New Age bullshit, very serious research in communication within plants, trees, and so on. Of course, not any way of conscious awareness, but we should be very open here. Yes, we should always remember that we are just one among the species, and with our hyperactivity, we are ruining our natural environment. But I wonder if you would agree. I think that quite often, if you look a little bit deeply into this way of thinking, not you, Peter, but the usual popular story of we are just among one among the species, species, it is still in a more refined way homocentric. What they worry is not nature as such, animals, sentient, but how to keep nature habitable for us. You know, the secret logic is still if we ruin nature too much, will we be able to survive in it? The second thing, my critical point, is quite often when we get this approach critical towards humans destroying nature, we impute a notion of nature which is I think a mythic notion, as if nature means some kind of homeostatic balance, reproduction, and then we with our hubris we humans ruin it. But sorry to use, I like to use it this dirty word, if nature is our mother, this mother can also be on her or its own a dirty bitch. Remember all the, all our sources of energy, oil, coal, can we even imagine what mega-catastrophes happened on Earth prior to we, to our human emergence, to have this? And not to talk too long, the last point, I like very much the line of thought when you mention you, Peter, artificial intelligence and all that. My pessimism here is the one already pointed out by a German theorist of artificial intelligence and so on, Thomas Metzinger, who said each stage of evolution development step passage to what we at least appear as higher level, also brings out incredibly stronger the possibility at least of incredibly stronger new mode of suffering. If we really will be able, what people, some idiots celebrate now, that instead of even using images you can directly manipulate the parts of your brain which provide sexual pleasure, give you orgasms and all... Slavoj, I'm going to have to push you towards the end of your introductory remarks there. I finish it now. Can you imagine, just imagine, with this manipulation of our brain, what new form of unimaginable suffering can also be generated? That's it. Okay. Thank you. It's always good to conclude optimistically, you know. Thanks. That's a, I think that's an understated point from, from you there Slavoj. Thank you for, for keeping them to, to three. Nancy Sherman, do you want to, do you want to come in? Thank you. Thank you both. A pleasure to be on this committee, or on this panel. Um, so let me just put this in a bit of a historical perspective because I am a historian of philosophy. But first, I'm not a geologist, but apparently there was a, a brouhaha very recently about how to name the geological age we're currently in. Is it the Holocene or is it the Anthropocene? And whatever, you know, I'm no geologist, I wouldn't know a golden spike if I tripped over one on a, on a rock formation. That said, the neologism is apt. We are in the, in a place where I agree we have, geological logbook changed because of human engagement on earth. So that's, you know, a geological period that began excuse me, years ago, and the question is, so what happened years ago? And I have to say, the anthropocentric morality really is a gift largely from Aristotle, who is my favorite philosopher, but he really thought that humans and human flourishing is what well-being is about. And and in his case, we are connected to a fellowship, but the fellowship is of human fellow humans. And he had in mind family, polis or city, and then the larger, Stoics took it up, cosmos. But he really didn't have in mind well-being that involved the relationship to other, other creatures or nature. Now, that said, he is the philosopher, he was known as the philosopher, the first teacher, but he also was the first scientist. He was the first marine biologist. And he studied what Peter mentioned, octopus, cephalopods, in Aristotle's
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lagoon or off the coast of, or in
lagoon or off the coast of, or in
Slavoj Žižek
the inlet in Lesbos. And, you know, he was dissecting them and analyzing and writing up taxonomies about organs. But recently his idea that, you know, these are animals, his ideas that animals have sensitive souls, we
the inlet in Lesbos. And, you know, he was dissecting them and analyzing and writing up taxonomies about organs. But recently his idea that, you know, these are animals, his ideas that animals have sensitive souls, we
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have sensitive and rational and nutritive,
have sensitive and rational and nutritive,
Slavoj Žižek
plants just nutritive, so he had a pecking order of nutritive, sentient or sensitive, and rational, and that we're at the top of
plants just nutritive, so he had a pecking order of nutritive, sentient or sensitive, and rational, and that we're at the top of
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the pecking order made us the, made us the the kings, you might say, of for well-being. But recently there's, there were some actually South African marine biologists and scuba divers who were capturing pictures underwater of octopus with a, you know, a smart, a smart camera or whatever. And the octopus mugged them or the
the pecking order made us the, made us the the kings, you might say, of for well-being. But recently there's, there were some actually South African marine biologists and scuba divers who were capturing pictures underwater of octopus with a, you know, a smart, a smart camera or whatever. And the octopus mugged them or the
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photographer, stole the, the camera, scuttled back to the octopus cave, but then came back and started taking pictures of the photographer and his fellow marine biologist. And the marine biologist eventually recaptured the, the camera and saw the perspective through the eyes of the octopus, you know, what these creatures were doing and looking like. And it was an eye-opening experience that the water we breathe, the air, you know, is all, is all shared. So, um, the relation to our environment is, um, is often a one-sided, but I also think here in the realm of animals, um, de Waal just died, the great primatologist, and and his, if you've never read Mama's Last Hug, it's an amazing book. And and he sort of says we we always misunderstood that, you know, thought we were unique and we're not. And this, that's chimps, not not octopus. Can I just, I want you to continue but open up the first theme of the debate, which is whether or not we think morality is necessarily human? I think, and correct me if I'm wrong, all the panelists seem to be saying that non-human animals and maybe some other entities are like ethical subjects in that, like, they count morally. But I'm interested in the question of whether or not they have moral agency in and of themselves. I know that your former supervisor, Nancy, Martha Nussbaum, recently argued in a book, Justice for Animals, from this Aristotelian perspective that they they are sort of moral agents as well. They they do seem to have, I guess, ethical goals that they they move towards. Do you want to begin on this question? Do you do you see
photographer, stole the, the camera, scuttled back to the octopus cave, but then came back and started taking pictures of the photographer and his fellow marine biologist. And the marine biologist eventually recaptured the, the camera and saw the perspective through the eyes of the octopus, you know, what these creatures were doing and looking like. And it was an eye-opening experience that the water we breathe, the air, you know, is all, is all shared. So, um, the relation to our environment is, um, is often a one-sided, but I also think here in the realm of animals, um, de Waal just died, the great primatologist, and and his, if you've never read Mama's Last Hug, it's an amazing book. And and he sort of says we we always misunderstood that, you know, thought we were unique and we're not. And this, that's chimps, not not octopus. Can I just, I want you to continue but open up the first theme of the debate, which is whether or not we think morality is necessarily human? I think, and correct me if I'm wrong, all the panelists seem to be saying that non-human animals and maybe some other entities are like ethical subjects in that, like, they count morally. But I'm interested in the question of whether or not they have moral agency in and of themselves. I know that your former supervisor, Nancy, Martha Nussbaum, recently argued in a book, Justice for Animals, from this Aristotelian perspective that they they are sort of moral agents as well. They they do seem to have, I guess, ethical goals that they they move towards. Do you want to begin on this question? Do you do you see
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the, do you see non-human animals as as moral agents and not just subjects of morality? Yeah, I think we we absolutely misunderstand them as as subjects. Those of us that have pets know the way in which empathy works with animals, how they pick up grieving. Um, we also misunderstand the fact, I mean this is actually something Aristotle got, um, you know, he didn't understand quite what the nervous system of a fish was like, but he knew it was sensitive. There are also sensitive plants, we now know, you touch them and they curl up. Um, and so, yeah, I think the the cosmos is much larger than the cosmos of fellow rational beings. And that's a way to sort of keep this in mind. We're in a much larger globe or outer space, or, you know, certainly AI has the, has a potential future to to bring us different ways of being sensitive, conscious, and rational. Let's bring Peter in on this. Yeah. So I think it's clear that morality evolves in social animals, reasonably long-lived social animals. Uh, and we can see that in other primates, which are all social animals. So Jane Goodall and others, Frans de Waal, have observed it in chimpanzees. Uh, for example, chimpanzees groom each other. They get lice or other things in their in their backs, in the fur on their backs. Um, and a chimpanzee will come and sit down in front of another chimpanzee and that one will the that one will then groom it. And then it's reversed, the one who was doing the grooming will move in front of the other one. Um, and occasionally it will happen that after being groomed the chimpanzee doesn't groom the one who groomed him or her. And there's clearly an angry response when that happens, right? It's like, you know, this is
the, do you see non-human animals as as moral agents and not just subjects of morality? Yeah, I think we we absolutely misunderstand them as as subjects. Those of us that have pets know the way in which empathy works with animals, how they pick up grieving. Um, we also misunderstand the fact, I mean this is actually something Aristotle got, um, you know, he didn't understand quite what the nervous system of a fish was like, but he knew it was sensitive. There are also sensitive plants, we now know, you touch them and they curl up. Um, and so, yeah, I think the the cosmos is much larger than the cosmos of fellow rational beings. And that's a way to sort of keep this in mind. We're in a much larger globe or outer space, or, you know, certainly AI has the, has a potential future to to bring us different ways of being sensitive, conscious, and rational. Let's bring Peter in on this. Yeah. So I think it's clear that morality evolves in social animals, reasonably long-lived social animals. Uh, and we can see that in other primates, which are all social animals. So Jane Goodall and others, Frans de Waal, have observed it in chimpanzees. Uh, for example, chimpanzees groom each other. They get lice or other things in their in their backs, in the fur on their backs. Um, and a chimpanzee will come and sit down in front of another chimpanzee and that one will the that one will then groom it. And then it's reversed, the one who was doing the grooming will move in front of the other one. Um, and occasionally it will happen that after being groomed the chimpanzee doesn't groom the one who groomed him or her. And there's clearly an angry response when that happens, right? It's like, you know, this is
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unfair, I did it to you, you owe me a favor now. Uh, and there are many other instances that you can find described in the literature, uh, where there's a sense of reciprocity. Um, or there's a sense actually, de Waal has an experiment with capuchin monkeys of requiring equal pay for equal work. Uh, he gets them to do a task, and then one of them is rewarded with a special treat, um, and the other is just rewarded with an ordinary food pellet. And the one who's rewarded with the ordinary food pellet, um, gets angry, may throw the pellet back at the person who gave it to him. Um, so there's clearly these these senses are not specifically human, they evolved before us. And just to come in here, Peter, is it is it required though that they have, like they knowingly do the good? Like when we accidentally do things that are good, say I'm throwing a ball up and down here and someone tries to assassinate you or something and the bullet deflects, it doesn't seem like I've made like a moral decision in the same way that if I'm just hardwired to
unfair, I did it to you, you owe me a favor now. Uh, and there are many other instances that you can find described in the literature, uh, where there's a sense of reciprocity. Um, or there's a sense actually, de Waal has an experiment with capuchin monkeys of requiring equal pay for equal work. Uh, he gets them to do a task, and then one of them is rewarded with a special treat, um, and the other is just rewarded with an ordinary food pellet. And the one who's rewarded with the ordinary food pellet, um, gets angry, may throw the pellet back at the person who gave it to him. Um, so there's clearly these these senses are not specifically human, they evolved before us. And just to come in here, Peter, is it is it required though that they have, like they knowingly do the good? Like when we accidentally do things that are good, say I'm throwing a ball up and down here and someone tries to assassinate you or something and the bullet deflects, it doesn't seem like I've made like a moral decision in the same way that if I'm just hardwired to
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take the fleas off your back, it doesn't seem like I'm, it doesn't seem like I'm acting morally. Do I need to know or be actively pursuing the good in order for an action to be good? Uh, well, you can you can look at it obviously from both those perspectives. You can say it was really good that something happened, um, but it was just good luck so there's no moral praise for the person who did it. They didn't mean to do something good. Uh, so you can you can ask those questions from two different ways and just draw that distinction. Now, but I suppose what you're asking is, can non-human animals intend to do good? Yeah. So I think these examples suggest that they do have a sense of justice or, you know, what's in some sense wrong. It's obviously not as developed as our sense,
take the fleas off your back, it doesn't seem like I'm, it doesn't seem like I'm acting morally. Do I need to know or be actively pursuing the good in order for an action to be good? Uh, well, you can you can look at it obviously from both those perspectives. You can say it was really good that something happened, um, but it was just good luck so there's no moral praise for the person who did it. They didn't mean to do something good. Uh, so you can you can ask those questions from two different ways and just draw that distinction. Now, but I suppose what you're asking is, can non-human animals intend to do good? Yeah. So I think these examples suggest that they do have a sense of justice or, you know, what's in some sense wrong. It's obviously not as developed as our sense,
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um,
um,
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but I think it's there. And the other thing I would add is, you know, it's as Nancy said, um, we are rational beings in a sense that non-human animals generally are not, although I don't think it's a sharp distinction, I think there's a continuum. But certainly would say some non-human animals are not rational beings. They're they're more instinctive or more moved by immediate emotions and desires. Uh, but I think I think with us morality has a rational component. But what I think we're getting there is an insight into something that other rational beings, if they exist, would also see. So in that sense, I don't think morality is purely human either. I think if we had intelligent aliens coming to visit us or maybe even super-intelligent AGI, it would recognize some of our moral principles as being rationally defensible. Let's bring Slavoj in on on this point. Slavoj, I came across a quote from you recently where you described Peter's view as he's outlined it there as traumatic and intolerable and scandalous. Whereas your, your, in your outline of your view, you seemed very much on board with Peter and Nancy's opening remarks. So so where is the point of disagreement? Wait a minute, wait a minute, you totally, you totally misunderstood my deeply pathological worldview. For me, the words that you used, scandalous, traumatic, this is the highest praise that I can give unto somebody, my God. People who are not this are boring everyday idiots. I mean,
but I think it's there. And the other thing I would add is, you know, it's as Nancy said, um, we are rational beings in a sense that non-human animals generally are not, although I don't think it's a sharp distinction, I think there's a continuum. But certainly would say some non-human animals are not rational beings. They're they're more instinctive or more moved by immediate emotions and desires. Uh, but I think I think with us morality has a rational component. But what I think we're getting there is an insight into something that other rational beings, if they exist, would also see. So in that sense, I don't think morality is purely human either. I think if we had intelligent aliens coming to visit us or maybe even super-intelligent AGI, it would recognize some of our moral principles as being rationally defensible. Let's bring Slavoj in on on this point. Slavoj, I came across a quote from you recently where you described Peter's view as he's outlined it there as traumatic and intolerable and scandalous. Whereas your, your, in your outline of your view, you seemed very much on board with Peter and Nancy's opening remarks. So so where is the point of disagreement? Wait a minute, wait a minute, you totally, you totally misunderstood my deeply pathological worldview. For me, the words that you used, scandalous, traumatic, this is the highest praise that I can give unto somebody, my God. People who are not this are boring everyday idiots. I mean,
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all discoveries work like this. Let's go, although I'm an atheist, can you even imagine, I don't believe it really happened but let's imagine it, what absolute scandal Jesus Christ was for the Jewish community. He was mostly considered a kind of a beggar bandit, but let's move on to serious things, more serious things. Uh, first, uh, you know, uh, I agree with both of you about this, um, that something like, okay, we don't have a better term, morality, reciprocity, even justice exists at a certain level also with
all discoveries work like this. Let's go, although I'm an atheist, can you even imagine, I don't believe it really happened but let's imagine it, what absolute scandal Jesus Christ was for the Jewish community. He was mostly considered a kind of a beggar bandit, but let's move on to serious things, more serious things. Uh, first, uh, you know, uh, I agree with both of you about this, um, that something like, okay, we don't have a better term, morality, reciprocity, even justice exists at a certain level also with
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certain, uh, higher, from our standard, some highly developed animals. But nonetheless, I would say, that was my not critical point, but simple observation that, isn't it nonetheless that we humans are exceptions in the precise sense that precisely those who claim we are just among one of the species on the Earth, they, under quotation marks, humiliate us like don't think you are the center, but at the same time they give us the privilege to act as universal agents. To take care, to have a responsibility also for the well-being, less suffering of all other animals. And I think as far as I know, I may be corrected here, but I think that this is maybe something uniquely human. The second thing, yes, I believe that morality, however we call it, should be extended, that that non-humans and so on have rights. But I would be skeptical to transfer onto them also the notion of responsibility. You know, like let's say a dog senselessly attacked you, but you did nothing to that dog. Now where does here responsibility enter? And my last point because I know there is a joke in Slovenia, how do you make one hour interview with me? You ask me one question. So I will try to stop now. Nancy, I like what you said, I agree, just can I do something which fits my totalitarian nature? Nonetheless give a, give also Plato a chance. Aristotle's ontology was nonetheless traditionally sexualized. Even his big opposition hyle-morphe was, you know, male form, male active principle forms the feminine
certain, uh, higher, from our standard, some highly developed animals. But nonetheless, I would say, that was my not critical point, but simple observation that, isn't it nonetheless that we humans are exceptions in the precise sense that precisely those who claim we are just among one of the species on the Earth, they, under quotation marks, humiliate us like don't think you are the center, but at the same time they give us the privilege to act as universal agents. To take care, to have a responsibility also for the well-being, less suffering of all other animals. And I think as far as I know, I may be corrected here, but I think that this is maybe something uniquely human. The second thing, yes, I believe that morality, however we call it, should be extended, that that non-humans and so on have rights. But I would be skeptical to transfer onto them also the notion of responsibility. You know, like let's say a dog senselessly attacked you, but you did nothing to that dog. Now where does here responsibility enter? And my last point because I know there is a joke in Slovenia, how do you make one hour interview with me? You ask me one question. So I will try to stop now. Nancy, I like what you said, I agree, just can I do something which fits my totalitarian nature? Nonetheless give a, give also Plato a chance. Aristotle's ontology was nonetheless traditionally sexualized. Even his big opposition hyle-morphe was, you know, male form, male active principle forms the feminine
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stuff, matter. Second thing, if you look at his proto-totalitarian for some people, for some people, Republic, read it in detail, at least you have to admit two things. First, there is no place for slaves in Plato's Republic. Why? For
stuff, matter. Second thing, if you look at his proto-totalitarian for some people, for some people, Republic, read it in detail, at least you have to admit two things. First, there is no place for slaves in Plato's Republic. Why? For
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Aristotle there are slaves, talking tools or whatever he said. Second thing, uh, Plato says explicitly somewhere that it's... And Slavoj, and the second point from the Republic, sorry just briefly
Aristotle there are slaves, talking tools or whatever he said. Second thing, uh, Plato says explicitly somewhere that it's... And Slavoj, and the second point from the Republic, sorry just briefly
Slavoj Žižek
so we can open it up. Second point, very briefly, I'm so sorry, yes, that it's the same with women. Plato explicitly says that the subordination of women in our, in his point of view Greek society, is a historical contingency. It's not part of his conceptual apparatus. So give Plato a chance. I will give Plato a chance, certainly on the question of women, Republic Book They're part of the Republic and the city. And would you say that a cobbler who's bald rather than a cobbler who has hair is different in their cobbling? No, says Plato. Same with women and men with regard to possibility of becoming guardians. That makes us happy, those of us who are receding, so thank you. I'll take up cobbling now in my retirement. Cobbling, I'm sure you'll be great. So the second part of the debate I wanted us to focus on is perhaps the underlying ethics there behind your views, because again there's a fair consensus on the panel I think in terms of treatment of non-human animals broadly speaking. My question is whether or not it's possible for us to move away from human-centered morality. I think a lot of people, Peter, from speaking to students a lot of the time who all study your work, they they say I buy Peter's arguments on this but I can't quite bring it, bring it about that I move away from my own desires and ends. Bacon tastes too good, as you often hear them say. So like do you think that it's possible for us to have this big cultural shift away from a human-centered morality? How optimistic are you of that that mindset change? Look, I I certainly think that it's possible because there are a lot of people who tell me that, you know, yes, and in fact I'm like this myself. I grew up in Australia where where meat was good and cheap at the time. Uh, and in fact when I got a scholarship to go to Oxford, people said oh Oxford is great but you know the meat in England is really terrible and expensive too. Um, and for about a year I was still eating it before I, you know, recognized what we're doing to animals and changed. So um, yeah, I was enjoying it and it did take an adjustment to get used to not eating it. Uh, but pretty soon I was fine with that and enjoying it. Um, but I know other people who've said the same and then there are some people who say as you said, you know, oh yeah I agree with your arguments but I just love my steak too much. So, you know, given that it's possible for humans to make that shift, uh, then you couldn't say that it's impossible. But um, given that not everybody does it even when they accept the arguments, you'd have to say that it's difficult and whether we will get to the point of convincing the majority that morality extends to non-human animals and that the way that we treat animals, especially in industrial agriculture in factory farms, is an abomination that we should not participate in. Um, I don't really know. And it may be, uh, that we have to make those decisions easier to act on by providing the kinds of meat that people are used to eating and that they're used to cooking, uh, either from plant-based ingredients or from cellular meat produced without going through any animal, just just grown at the cellular level. Some people think that, that that we need that to to make it easier to make the transition. Um, I can't really say for sure. I think it's an option. I'm still hopeful that we will get there simply through persuasive argument, but um, I can't say that I'm confident that that will happen. Well, I I saw out the corner of my eye Nancy nodding in in agreement. But I would have thought I mean for the Stoic perspective, Peter's idea that you can sort of flatten out morality to
so we can open it up. Second point, very briefly, I'm so sorry, yes, that it's the same with women. Plato explicitly says that the subordination of women in our, in his point of view Greek society, is a historical contingency. It's not part of his conceptual apparatus. So give Plato a chance. I will give Plato a chance, certainly on the question of women, Republic Book They're part of the Republic and the city. And would you say that a cobbler who's bald rather than a cobbler who has hair is different in their cobbling? No, says Plato. Same with women and men with regard to possibility of becoming guardians. That makes us happy, those of us who are receding, so thank you. I'll take up cobbling now in my retirement. Cobbling, I'm sure you'll be great. So the second part of the debate I wanted us to focus on is perhaps the underlying ethics there behind your views, because again there's a fair consensus on the panel I think in terms of treatment of non-human animals broadly speaking. My question is whether or not it's possible for us to move away from human-centered morality. I think a lot of people, Peter, from speaking to students a lot of the time who all study your work, they they say I buy Peter's arguments on this but I can't quite bring it, bring it about that I move away from my own desires and ends. Bacon tastes too good, as you often hear them say. So like do you think that it's possible for us to have this big cultural shift away from a human-centered morality? How optimistic are you of that that mindset change? Look, I I certainly think that it's possible because there are a lot of people who tell me that, you know, yes, and in fact I'm like this myself. I grew up in Australia where where meat was good and cheap at the time. Uh, and in fact when I got a scholarship to go to Oxford, people said oh Oxford is great but you know the meat in England is really terrible and expensive too. Um, and for about a year I was still eating it before I, you know, recognized what we're doing to animals and changed. So um, yeah, I was enjoying it and it did take an adjustment to get used to not eating it. Uh, but pretty soon I was fine with that and enjoying it. Um, but I know other people who've said the same and then there are some people who say as you said, you know, oh yeah I agree with your arguments but I just love my steak too much. So, you know, given that it's possible for humans to make that shift, uh, then you couldn't say that it's impossible. But um, given that not everybody does it even when they accept the arguments, you'd have to say that it's difficult and whether we will get to the point of convincing the majority that morality extends to non-human animals and that the way that we treat animals, especially in industrial agriculture in factory farms, is an abomination that we should not participate in. Um, I don't really know. And it may be, uh, that we have to make those decisions easier to act on by providing the kinds of meat that people are used to eating and that they're used to cooking, uh, either from plant-based ingredients or from cellular meat produced without going through any animal, just just grown at the cellular level. Some people think that, that that we need that to to make it easier to make the transition. Um, I can't really say for sure. I think it's an option. I'm still hopeful that we will get there simply through persuasive argument, but um, I can't say that I'm confident that that will happen. Well, I I saw out the corner of my eye Nancy nodding in in agreement. But I would have thought I mean for the Stoic perspective, Peter's idea that you can sort of flatten out morality to
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pleasure, happiness, suffering and pain and just deal with the calculus in
pleasure, happiness, suffering and pain and just deal with the calculus in
Slavoj Žižek
terms in these terms, I imagine the Stoics not happy to reduce morality to these these four, let's say, concepts. Well, they wouldn't be utilitarians, but on the other hand, they certainly would go for Peter's idea of self-persuasion, self, you know, athletic self-discipline, if that's, you know, that is a core Stoic idea and that's part of the appeal, um, that you can you can do it with enough grit, that sort of
terms in these terms, I imagine the Stoics not happy to reduce morality to these these four, let's say, concepts. Well, they wouldn't be utilitarians, but on the other hand, they certainly would go for Peter's idea of self-persuasion, self, you know, athletic self-discipline, if that's, you know, that is a core Stoic idea and that's part of the appeal, um, that you can you can do it with enough grit, that sort of
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thing. But I would agree that external incentives or an easier environment would would make it reasonable. I mean, I think you ended your comments on the note of persuasion, rational persuasion. We're in a place where rational persuasion is almost impossible because we're in affirmation, you know, confirmation bias bubbles. You're not going to get persuaded if you're in the meat industry or the cattle grazing
thing. But I would agree that external incentives or an easier environment would would make it reasonable. I mean, I think you ended your comments on the note of persuasion, rational persuasion. We're in a place where rational persuasion is almost impossible because we're in affirmation, you know, confirmation bias bubbles. You're not going to get persuaded if you're in the meat industry or the cattle grazing
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industry or... and so actually the reverse is now the case. Uh, my husband and I were talking and DeSantis, the governor of Florida, has
industry or... and so actually the reverse is now the case. Uh, my husband and I were talking and DeSantis, the governor of Florida, has
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sanctioned, well he has said he
sanctioned, well he has said he
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will not permit broadcasters who do meteorological reports to mention climate change. So you know, there's actually censorship and punishment going on because... so you know, will the... there was one thought we had about will we sacrifice ourselves, the gods sacrifice us to change climate. Well, I think, you know, if the fuel, the fossil industry might sacrifice the climate people and enjoy the, enjoy it all. Um, I will say one thing we haven't talked about at all and that just is we all have cell phones here we're operating at the, you know, they mine they need lithium batteries, lithium batteries are very destructive of of the environment um in Africa. And that's not going to change. So I don't think in that regard, or AI, or or Bitcoin, these are highly, highly climate-sucking devices. So that's that's a tough one. Slavoj,
will not permit broadcasters who do meteorological reports to mention climate change. So you know, there's actually censorship and punishment going on because... so you know, will the... there was one thought we had about will we sacrifice ourselves, the gods sacrifice us to change climate. Well, I think, you know, if the fuel, the fossil industry might sacrifice the climate people and enjoy the, enjoy it all. Um, I will say one thing we haven't talked about at all and that just is we all have cell phones here we're operating at the, you know, they mine they need lithium batteries, lithium batteries are very destructive of of the environment um in Africa. And that's not going to change. So I don't think in that regard, or AI, or or Bitcoin, these are highly, highly climate-sucking devices. So that's that's a tough one. Slavoj,
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let's let's bring you back in here. Uh, sorry to keep quoting yourself back to you. You've you've said in the past that, you described vegetarians in a talk recently as degenerates. I wonder, again, is that more praise or or do you disagree that that's the goal? I mean it and I mean it literally, literally. Listen, even human sexuality by definition in some fundamental sense degenerate, because it's against procreation. Sorry, I never understood Catholic Church when they say the ultimate goal of of sexual act should be giving giving birth. Sorry, animals are doing like this. We humans have something that we call love, passion, which is much more spiritual, where it's ridiculous to say honey we may enjoy it but remember we really are doing it for a child. In this sense again degenerate is for me a good term. But more seriously, one notion of morality, here I hope we will all agree. Uh, you know, morality is for me very ambiguous term. Yes, of course, I am not a postmodern relativist and all this bullshit every culture blah blah has its own. But are you aware how many horrible things are, were and are
let's let's bring you back in here. Uh, sorry to keep quoting yourself back to you. You've you've said in the past that, you described vegetarians in a talk recently as degenerates. I wonder, again, is that more praise or or do you disagree that that's the goal? I mean it and I mean it literally, literally. Listen, even human sexuality by definition in some fundamental sense degenerate, because it's against procreation. Sorry, I never understood Catholic Church when they say the ultimate goal of of sexual act should be giving giving birth. Sorry, animals are doing like this. We humans have something that we call love, passion, which is much more spiritual, where it's ridiculous to say honey we may enjoy it but remember we really are doing it for a child. In this sense again degenerate is for me a good term. But more seriously, one notion of morality, here I hope we will all agree. Uh, you know, morality is for me very ambiguous term. Yes, of course, I am not a postmodern relativist and all this bullshit every culture blah blah has its own. But are you aware how many horrible things are, were and are
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happening
happening
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on account of
on account of
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morality? Uh, for example, and I am a leftist, look at Holodomor and and collectivization of farms early 30s in Soviet Union. It was presented to the people as the highest moral duty, ethico-political. People who were sent to the to the to the farms to convince, convince with pressure farmers, were told if you feel any compassion for them, this means you are small bourgeois bigot. Second thing, Peter made a statement outrageous, half-criminal,
morality? Uh, for example, and I am a leftist, look at Holodomor and and collectivization of farms early 30s in Soviet Union. It was presented to the people as the highest moral duty, ethico-political. People who were sent to the to the to the farms to convince, convince with pressure farmers, were told if you feel any compassion for them, this means you are small bourgeois bigot. Second thing, Peter made a statement outrageous, half-criminal,
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with which I totally agree. He said somewhere something so beautiful about how people are mostly criminal, egotistical and so on. You know that Peter Royben I think, I don't know, okay, some Latin American philosopher put writer put this nicely when he imitated this phrase, you know, irrespective of race, sex, religion, blah blah we have certain rights. His words were irrespective of sex, ethnic identity, religion and so on we are all evil, egotist
with which I totally agree. He said somewhere something so beautiful about how people are mostly criminal, egotistical and so on. You know that Peter Royben I think, I don't know, okay, some Latin American philosopher put writer put this nicely when he imitated this phrase, you know, irrespective of race, sex, religion, blah blah we have certain rights. His words were irrespective of sex, ethnic identity, religion and so on we are all evil, egotist
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and brutal and so on. I think this is the zero level. So I will end up soon. What to do? Would the two of you agree, precisely because we people maybe or may convince ourselves that are rational but are not ready as you nicely said, yeah yeah I'm for animal rights but don't disturb me while I'm eating my nice juicy steak. You know what maybe works, it's very naive, what about, here comes my Stalinist side, a well-organized global as possible state propaganda where you simply inform people, but this should be put at the prime time on TV. For example, you eat pork, pigs. But are people aware of the horror reality of the daily lives of pigs grown to be slaughtered, who are half-blind, cannot even walk, the same goes with chicken or my favorite terrifying example, maybe you know the name, isn't now some special coffee made mostly in Indonesia, some apes, I don't know the name, are compelled, forced to eat, it's literally we eat shit, to eat coffee beans and then shit becoming part of shit makes them to taste don't ask me why excellently. If people are can be convinced with good disgusting examples. I will give you an example me myself, spontaneously I'm a filthy liberal, I'm for human rights, that's why as far as I go, I don't like to eat parts of the body of an animal where it's clearly where it comes from. I like to have this abstract rump steak, you know, which looks like a piece of bread made you don't know how in a factory. This set, I I think, do you think I'm too optimistic, that this can have a certain effect? Just to convince with brutal maybe even... Okay, Slavoj, um, I'm bringing in the, the third strand of the debate
and brutal and so on. I think this is the zero level. So I will end up soon. What to do? Would the two of you agree, precisely because we people maybe or may convince ourselves that are rational but are not ready as you nicely said, yeah yeah I'm for animal rights but don't disturb me while I'm eating my nice juicy steak. You know what maybe works, it's very naive, what about, here comes my Stalinist side, a well-organized global as possible state propaganda where you simply inform people, but this should be put at the prime time on TV. For example, you eat pork, pigs. But are people aware of the horror reality of the daily lives of pigs grown to be slaughtered, who are half-blind, cannot even walk, the same goes with chicken or my favorite terrifying example, maybe you know the name, isn't now some special coffee made mostly in Indonesia, some apes, I don't know the name, are compelled, forced to eat, it's literally we eat shit, to eat coffee beans and then shit becoming part of shit makes them to taste don't ask me why excellently. If people are can be convinced with good disgusting examples. I will give you an example me myself, spontaneously I'm a filthy liberal, I'm for human rights, that's why as far as I go, I don't like to eat parts of the body of an animal where it's clearly where it comes from. I like to have this abstract rump steak, you know, which looks like a piece of bread made you don't know how in a factory. This set, I I think, do you think I'm too optimistic, that this can have a certain effect? Just to convince with brutal maybe even... Okay, Slavoj, um, I'm bringing in the, the third strand of the debate
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and I I want to bring you back in once I've got Nancy's and Peter's thoughts on our last central question.
and I I want to bring you back in once I've got Nancy's and Peter's thoughts on our last central question.
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excerpt,
excerpt,
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yes. Our final the final topic of the debate is whether or not we think it's possible to abandon this human-centered morality, but I think something which perhaps we've glossed over a little bit, Peter you mentioned it at the beginning
yes. Our final the final topic of the debate is whether or not we think it's possible to abandon this human-centered morality, but I think something which perhaps we've glossed over a little bit, Peter you mentioned it at the beginning
Slavoj Žižek
and I think we've left it to a side is this question of like the gods of nature and the value of the environment in and of itself, the intrinsic value of of the natural world. I think perhaps when we litter in a woodland or perhaps someone suggests that we paint the, paint Mount Everest blue or something, say that had no effect on the on the creatures that depend on those environments, it would still seem wrong in itself to fill a field with shopping centers or paint Everest blue. Is there any case that can be made for the intrinsic value of of nature which doesn't depend on the enjoyment of the creatures that are part of those those systems? I think there's a case that can be made against doing all the things that you mentioned, but I don't think it depends on the intrinsic value of nature. I think it's a kind of vandalism which will spoil it for others and for future generations for however many millennia or even longer we we exist on this planet. Uh, and it's very unlikely that these things will not have an effect on on some non-human animals living in this area. But you know, if as a philosopher you you try a thought experiment as philosophers talking about the environment have done, and somehow you're the last person on the planet, uh, there are no other sentient beings left on the planet, and you know that there won't be anybody coming to the planet ever again, uh, and you decide you would like to do all of these things or even worse, you know, you set fire to all the forests you can, um, but remember there are no sentient beings to be burnt up in the forest. Um, I don't see how that would be wrong, right? Because I do think something is wrong only if it harms some sentient being in some way or will harm some sentient being. So um, yes I'm with the environmentalists in preserving the forests and preserving nature, uh, but not because I think that there is intrinsic value beyond any kind of state of awareness. It seems like you're you're unflinching in in response to this, like you're quite happy to make the trade-off or cash it out in like uh in the in the values. Right, because I just can't see how you harm something, you know, if I smash this glass um there's a risk somebody will cut their feet on it but there's nothing I'm not doing any harm to the glass. Well what what about the trade-offs between not things that aren't experiencing the world pleasure, pain, happiness and suffering, um and but a trade-off between two creatures that are both capable of this? So the common problem put towards utilitarians is that when you have to uh sacrifice some entity as a means for an end, you know say uh say you love your Aussie rules football don't you and say you really enjoyed it quite a lot, you enjoy it so much and you get so much pleasure from watching Aussie rules football, I'm not sure how I don't understand. Uh, well you need to watch, but that's another topic we should have another panel on that. So say you uh some creature suffers immensely for uh your enjoyment of it, but you get so much out of it that that it's worth it. I mean a lot of people those thought experiments strike them as going against the grain of morality and their human-centered approach to it. Uh, yeah because you're troubled by the idea that somebody should suffer intensely for the pleasure of others and generally speaking that's not a good thing, we should not encourage that. Uh, but um there does have to be a trade-off somewhere. I think we're all prepared to make trade-offs, we're all prepared to walk through mud in order to have this intellectual experience of coming here today, um and you know there would be other things that we would do. So I actually don't think we can live and make decisions
and I think we've left it to a side is this question of like the gods of nature and the value of the environment in and of itself, the intrinsic value of of the natural world. I think perhaps when we litter in a woodland or perhaps someone suggests that we paint the, paint Mount Everest blue or something, say that had no effect on the on the creatures that depend on those environments, it would still seem wrong in itself to fill a field with shopping centers or paint Everest blue. Is there any case that can be made for the intrinsic value of of nature which doesn't depend on the enjoyment of the creatures that are part of those those systems? I think there's a case that can be made against doing all the things that you mentioned, but I don't think it depends on the intrinsic value of nature. I think it's a kind of vandalism which will spoil it for others and for future generations for however many millennia or even longer we we exist on this planet. Uh, and it's very unlikely that these things will not have an effect on on some non-human animals living in this area. But you know, if as a philosopher you you try a thought experiment as philosophers talking about the environment have done, and somehow you're the last person on the planet, uh, there are no other sentient beings left on the planet, and you know that there won't be anybody coming to the planet ever again, uh, and you decide you would like to do all of these things or even worse, you know, you set fire to all the forests you can, um, but remember there are no sentient beings to be burnt up in the forest. Um, I don't see how that would be wrong, right? Because I do think something is wrong only if it harms some sentient being in some way or will harm some sentient being. So um, yes I'm with the environmentalists in preserving the forests and preserving nature, uh, but not because I think that there is intrinsic value beyond any kind of state of awareness. It seems like you're you're unflinching in in response to this, like you're quite happy to make the trade-off or cash it out in like uh in the in the values. Right, because I just can't see how you harm something, you know, if I smash this glass um there's a risk somebody will cut their feet on it but there's nothing I'm not doing any harm to the glass. Well what what about the trade-offs between not things that aren't experiencing the world pleasure, pain, happiness and suffering, um and but a trade-off between two creatures that are both capable of this? So the common problem put towards utilitarians is that when you have to uh sacrifice some entity as a means for an end, you know say uh say you love your Aussie rules football don't you and say you really enjoyed it quite a lot, you enjoy it so much and you get so much pleasure from watching Aussie rules football, I'm not sure how I don't understand. Uh, well you need to watch, but that's another topic we should have another panel on that. So say you uh some creature suffers immensely for uh your enjoyment of it, but you get so much out of it that that it's worth it. I mean a lot of people those thought experiments strike them as going against the grain of morality and their human-centered approach to it. Uh, yeah because you're troubled by the idea that somebody should suffer intensely for the pleasure of others and generally speaking that's not a good thing, we should not encourage that. Uh, but um there does have to be a trade-off somewhere. I think we're all prepared to make trade-offs, we're all prepared to walk through mud in order to have this intellectual experience of coming here today, um and you know there would be other things that we would do. So I actually don't think we can live and make decisions
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without trade-offs um and even trade-offs among different people, right? Maybe you're part of a group that had to decide whether to go to this event or some other event. So you have to think well, you know, some of you would really like to go to the other event much more, some of you like to go to this one, you have to try and work out some arrangement. So yes, that's a problem for utilitarianism, but I also think it's a problem for everyday living anyway. For you, Nancy, is this one of the the reasons these trade-offs that you you don't see yourself following in the utilitarian tradition? No, I think it's, you know, I want to bring a term in we haven't thought about. Um, we uh it may not just be for our moral well-being, um or the consciousness as an ethical agent that we think about nature,
without trade-offs um and even trade-offs among different people, right? Maybe you're part of a group that had to decide whether to go to this event or some other event. So you have to think well, you know, some of you would really like to go to the other event much more, some of you like to go to this one, you have to try and work out some arrangement. So yes, that's a problem for utilitarianism, but I also think it's a problem for everyday living anyway. For you, Nancy, is this one of the the reasons these trade-offs that you you don't see yourself following in the utilitarian tradition? No, I think it's, you know, I want to bring a term in we haven't thought about. Um, we uh it may not just be for our moral well-being, um or the consciousness as an ethical agent that we think about nature,
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but aesthetic. You know, many of us go are here, go for walks in gorgeous greenland of of the UK because it is simply awe-striking as as Kant might have put it. And that sense of expanded consciousness, you might say, being freed from all the digital input that we get and seeing nature in its own terms is actually quite amazing. And so seeing nature in its own terms already, you know, seeing is me as the sensitive being taking it in consciously. But on the other hand, I do lose myself when I'm in nature because I see how large it is and how I'm you know how it I am a part of it and you know I I don't see the dependency the same way. So the experience is actually very expansive, takes humans out of the human-centeredness even though it's us that's doing the experiencing. Slavoj, what do you make of this? So two themes, the one is the collapsing of morality into these uh terms of happiness, pleasure, pain and suffering, whether or not you're you're happy for that type of moral system on the ground. And second of all is whether or not you dismiss the idea of the intrinsic value of nature in and of itself.
but aesthetic. You know, many of us go are here, go for walks in gorgeous greenland of of the UK because it is simply awe-striking as as Kant might have put it. And that sense of expanded consciousness, you might say, being freed from all the digital input that we get and seeing nature in its own terms is actually quite amazing. And so seeing nature in its own terms already, you know, seeing is me as the sensitive being taking it in consciously. But on the other hand, I do lose myself when I'm in nature because I see how large it is and how I'm you know how it I am a part of it and you know I I don't see the dependency the same way. So the experience is actually very expansive, takes humans out of the human-centeredness even though it's us that's doing the experiencing. Slavoj, what do you make of this? So two themes, the one is the collapsing of morality into these uh terms of happiness, pleasure, pain and suffering, whether or not you're you're happy for that type of moral system on the ground. And second of all is whether or not you dismiss the idea of the intrinsic value of nature in and of itself.
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I don't like here to to use this terms value and so on, they are too human for me. I would just like to draw very
I don't like here to to use this terms value and so on, they are too human for me. I would just like to draw very
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briefly attention to two points. First one is that uh, but you know when you Nancy spoke about this being impressed by unspoiled nature and
briefly attention to two points. First one is that uh, but you know when you Nancy spoke about this being impressed by unspoiled nature and
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so on and so on, yes but as we all know this historically changes. For example, correct me if I'm wrong, but I read somewhere till late 18th century, early romanticism, Alp, Italy was the ideal, Alps were just a horrible place you have to go through as fast as possible to arrive to big Italian wonderful cities. Then all of a sudden with early romanticism, Alps became the big thing. I follow that line, if you ask me
so on and so on, yes but as we all know this historically changes. For example, correct me if I'm wrong, but I read somewhere till late 18th century, early romanticism, Alp, Italy was the ideal, Alps were just a horrible place you have to go through as fast as possible to arrive to big Italian wonderful cities. Then all of a sudden with early romanticism, Alps became the big thing. I follow that line, if you ask me
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independently of other humans, French, let's say that's not a problem, where I would like to live, I have a precise answer. Please visit it, does anybody of you know Svalbard Island? North of Norway, you fly half the way to Northern Pole, a group of islands, only moss, but not too cold, nothing is
independently of other humans, French, let's say that's not a problem, where I would like to live, I have a precise answer. Please visit it, does anybody of you know Svalbard Island? North of Norway, you fly half the way to Northern Pole, a group of islands, only moss, but not too cold, nothing is
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there just one settlement, it was paradise on Earth for me. I was there for one week, I was just resting and working all the time. And I felt at the same time I rest I got I had a rest and I achieved a lot. Sorry, for me this is I as close as I came to communism. Just another brief question to Nancy, I hope you will allow her to answer. You know what's my problem with Marcus Aurelius? I found in his, I don't know where letters, meditations, an argument against against okay against not overestimating sexual contact, intercourse where he says I'm simplifying it something like think about what it is for a couple of seconds some juice come out some stupid muscles are amusing so are are are tickling and
there just one settlement, it was paradise on Earth for me. I was there for one week, I was just resting and working all the time. And I felt at the same time I rest I got I had a rest and I achieved a lot. Sorry, for me this is I as close as I came to communism. Just another brief question to Nancy, I hope you will allow her to answer. You know what's my problem with Marcus Aurelius? I found in his, I don't know where letters, meditations, an argument against against okay against not overestimating sexual contact, intercourse where he says I'm simplifying it something like think about what it is for a couple of seconds some juice come out some stupid muscles are amusing so are are are tickling and
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so on, so what? No, I am here a par... I like love, my again the degenerate, precisely in its crazy aspect. Love is a catastrophe.
so on, so what? No, I am here a par... I like love, my again the degenerate, precisely in its crazy aspect. Love is a catastrophe.
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Let's say you have an ordinary everyday life, you meet with friends, you have a nice work, maybe a one-night stand here and there, then you passionately fall in love. It's ruin everything is ruined. You are all the time in blah blah blah, but I much prefer love to stupid everyday life. I'm on the spot. I'm on the spot defending Marcus Aurelius on sexuality, that's tricky. But let me say, you know, he wrote the Meditations during eight years of battle in the Danube, sleeping in a tent. So eight years of this, and and these are good tents. And there was the plague, the Antonine Plague. It would be hard to imagine that this emperor was happy. He himself suffered from the plague and he was a horrible sleeper. So
Let's say you have an ordinary everyday life, you meet with friends, you have a nice work, maybe a one-night stand here and there, then you passionately fall in love. It's ruin everything is ruined. You are all the time in blah blah blah, but I much prefer love to stupid everyday life. I'm on the spot. I'm on the spot defending Marcus Aurelius on sexuality, that's tricky. But let me say, you know, he wrote the Meditations during eight years of battle in the Danube, sleeping in a tent. So eight years of this, and and these are good tents. And there was the plague, the Antonine Plague. It would be hard to imagine that this emperor was happy. He himself suffered from the plague and he was a horrible sleeper. So
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he's away from, you know, from Rome and uh and his uh and his family and his court, uh doing battle for eight years. I don't think there's a lot of opportunity for sex and I'm not sure who, you know, this wasn't Greece uh where uh
he's away from, you know, from Rome and uh and his uh and his family and his court, uh doing battle for eight years. I don't think there's a lot of opportunity for sex and I'm not sure who, you know, this wasn't Greece uh where uh
Slavoj Žižek
homosexuality was as um common. So I have no idea what he took up with in his tent in the wee hours of the night. But I can say he didn't sleep well and so he wrote the Meditations instead. We we owe him that I say we owe him owe him a lot, you know, for withholding uh sexual passion, his libido went into Stoicism. But if you cannot fall asleep, isn't it a nice idea to have a brief sex which makes you tired and then you fall asleep nicely? I'll recommend that. We're getting distracted very slightly here by libidos. I just, to bring us back on topic for a for a moment, just a last question. Missionary position on top you're talking about now? I'm not going to come to your thoughts on this, Peter. I want to ask you something slightly separate. There's been a movement in like the animal rights uh literature to not just argue that we owe non-human animals like better treatment on our part but to stop them from harming each other, or even to owe them some kind of reparations that we've caused them so much harm that we've got a moral responsibility to make life as as good as it possibly could be for these creatures. How far do you go there and maybe as well do you worry that this kind of rhetoric about reparations or stopping uh animals from harming each other is counter-productive for the for the movement? Uh, I do worry that certainly at this stage where we are, where we're inflicting immense harm on uh you know really hundreds of billions of animals simply in the food industry. It's about billion animals a year we're raising and in very crowded conditions worldwide, that to focus on how could we make nature rather kinder is is largely a distraction and and could harm the movement. Uh, you know it's it's not that there isn't a lot of suffering in
homosexuality was as um common. So I have no idea what he took up with in his tent in the wee hours of the night. But I can say he didn't sleep well and so he wrote the Meditations instead. We we owe him that I say we owe him owe him a lot, you know, for withholding uh sexual passion, his libido went into Stoicism. But if you cannot fall asleep, isn't it a nice idea to have a brief sex which makes you tired and then you fall asleep nicely? I'll recommend that. We're getting distracted very slightly here by libidos. I just, to bring us back on topic for a for a moment, just a last question. Missionary position on top you're talking about now? I'm not going to come to your thoughts on this, Peter. I want to ask you something slightly separate. There's been a movement in like the animal rights uh literature to not just argue that we owe non-human animals like better treatment on our part but to stop them from harming each other, or even to owe them some kind of reparations that we've caused them so much harm that we've got a moral responsibility to make life as as good as it possibly could be for these creatures. How far do you go there and maybe as well do you worry that this kind of rhetoric about reparations or stopping uh animals from harming each other is counter-productive for the for the movement? Uh, I do worry that certainly at this stage where we are, where we're inflicting immense harm on uh you know really hundreds of billions of animals simply in the food industry. It's about billion animals a year we're raising and in very crowded conditions worldwide, that to focus on how could we make nature rather kinder is is largely a distraction and and could harm the movement. Uh, you know it's it's not that there isn't a lot of suffering in
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nature, I don't
nature, I don't
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think
think
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we should you know revere nature. Clearly nature is absurd in some ways in the in species that who produce hundreds or even thousands of offspring uh when nearly all of them are going to die. You know that on average only two of them are going to survive um otherwise we'd be knee-deep in frogs or fish or whatever species we're talking about. Um, so yes nature is incredibly wasteful um and you can certainly imagine trying to reduce the amount of suffering in it, but I don't think we we really have much idea of how to do that except maybe around the margins, you know, we can try and we can stop your your cat playing with a mouse maybe if you uh see that that going on. Uh, you could try to install glass where birds are not going to fly into the
we should you know revere nature. Clearly nature is absurd in some ways in the in species that who produce hundreds or even thousands of offspring uh when nearly all of them are going to die. You know that on average only two of them are going to survive um otherwise we'd be knee-deep in frogs or fish or whatever species we're talking about. Um, so yes nature is incredibly wasteful um and you can certainly imagine trying to reduce the amount of suffering in it, but I don't think we we really have much idea of how to do that except maybe around the margins, you know, we can try and we can stop your your cat playing with a mouse maybe if you uh see that that going on. Uh, you could try to install glass where birds are not going to fly into the
Slavoj Žižek
windows, you
windows, you
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know some of those things will will help nature. But actually to try to interfere with predator-prey relationships or with methods of reproduction seems to me to be far-fetched at at this stage. I think we've probably got time for a brief response from Slavoj or Nancy if you... Slavoj, a brief response if you'd like
know some of those things will will help nature. But actually to try to interfere with predator-prey relationships or with methods of reproduction seems to me to be far-fetched at at this stage. I think we've probably got time for a brief response from Slavoj or Nancy if you... Slavoj, a brief response if you'd like
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to come in on this? Yeah yeah yeah. I strangely, I don't know
to come in on this? Yeah yeah yeah. I strangely, I don't know
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what's going wrong because we should hate each other with Peter but I more and more agree with you. You know what, uh correctly, you must know this better, I think I read somewhere, correct me
what's going wrong because we should hate each other with Peter but I more and more agree with you. You know what, uh correctly, you must know this better, I think I read somewhere, correct me
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again if I'm wrong,
again if I'm wrong,
Slavoj Žižek
that how Darwin began to doubt in God. In one of these stupid islands that he visited in Latin America, weren't there some turtles whose natural reproduction was they approach the the coast, but they had to pass over a certain gap and most of them turned fell wrongly down turned on their back and suffered because they couldn't turn around uh terrifying long uh suffering before they died. So there came some too aggressive ecologists who said why don't we help them, so they hired locals to turn the turtles on their back. Yes, turtles survived, but their excessive survival ruined the whole balance of life in that part. You see, that's the tragedy, so again agreeing with Peter I would say be very careful here, we don't really know how things that may appear horrible to us may be a crucial part of how nature reproduces itself.
that how Darwin began to doubt in God. In one of these stupid islands that he visited in Latin America, weren't there some turtles whose natural reproduction was they approach the the coast, but they had to pass over a certain gap and most of them turned fell wrongly down turned on their back and suffered because they couldn't turn around uh terrifying long uh suffering before they died. So there came some too aggressive ecologists who said why don't we help them, so they hired locals to turn the turtles on their back. Yes, turtles survived, but their excessive survival ruined the whole balance of life in that part. You see, that's the tragedy, so again agreeing with Peter I would say be very careful here, we don't really know how things that may appear horrible to us may be a crucial part of how nature reproduces itself.
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Please join me in thanking our wonderful speakers: Peter Singer, Slavoj Žižek, and Nancy Sherman.
Please join me in thanking our wonderful speakers: Peter Singer, Slavoj Žižek, and Nancy Sherman.