Re-Reading the Revolution
Talk · zizekpodcast.com ·
2017-10-06 · 2:06:46 · 11,519 words
communism-socialismrevolution-violencehistoryhegel-dialecticspsychoanalysisideologygeopolitics-wardemocracyfascism-populismtechnology-ai-cyberspace
A dialogue between Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou following Badiou's presentation of his book 'Relire la Révolution' (Re-reading the Revolution). Badiou argues that the French Revolution must be read autonomously, free from the distorting lens of 'revolutionary belief,' and rehabilitates its treatment of property rights and its distinction between legal terror and mob terror. Žižek engages critically, raising the Haitian Revolution as the proof of French universalism, arguing that Stalinism represents 'university discourse brought to madness,' and offering a Hegelian reading of the Cultural Revolution as secretly preparing Deng Xiaoping's capitalism. The conversation closes with shared pessimism about European political instability and the exhaustion of the classical revolutionary ideal.
every located moment in this recording, click one to read it
The ideas in it 13
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
Badiou's term for the ideological screen, a linear, progressive ordering of revolutions toward an ideal end-point, that prevents autonomous reading of events like the French Revolution.
The cyclic theory of regime-types from Polybius (monarchy → tyranny → aristocracy → oligarchy → democracy → ochlocracy) which Badiou shows was deeply internalized by French revolutionaries themselves.
Badiou's distinction within Robespierre's own thinking: legal terror (trial-based, temporary) was deployed precisely to suppress mob terror (ochlocracy), a distinction Hegel failed to capture in the Phenomenology.
Žižek highlights Badiou's distinction, parallel to Lacan's 'idéal du moi' vs. 'moi idéal', between the concrete ideal of a specific revolution and the abstract ideal that organizes all revolutionary belief.
Žižek foregrounds how later events retroactively redetermine the meaning of earlier ones, e.g., East Germany reading Frederick the Great as a progressive bourgeois, or Mao being edited to predict Deng Xiaoping.
as “empty master”
Žižek invokes Hegel's figure of the monarch who merely 'signs his name', the formal empty One who delegates real power to experts, to contrast with Stalin, who refused the role of empty master and claimed substantive expertise.
In the closing exchange, Žižek invokes early Lacan's definition, 'that which always returns to the same place', to pay homage to Badiou as the 'real' who will have to return.
Žižek uses Lacan's 'university discourse' to characterize Stalinism: the leader presents himself as neutral expert-instrument of the people rather than as master, demanding subjects confess guilt in the language of objective knowledge.
Implicitly at work in Žižek's discussion of Stalinist show trials: the accused speaks as if from a position of neutral metalanguage, 'objective knowledge,' explaining their own guilt, performing the subject supposed to know from below.
as “List der Vernunft (cunning of reason)”
Žižek applies Hegel's 'cunning of reason' to the Cultural Revolution: its explicit aim (a China of peasants without capitalists) was dialectically subverted so its actual historical result was Deng Xiaoping's capitalist transformation.
as “ideology of survival”
Žižek (attributing it to Lin Biao) identifies the Maoist doctrine that treating mere survival as a value is itself a bourgeois ideology to be combated, a formulation he found morally intolerable when he encountered it as a Maoist.
as “Lumpenbourgeoisie”
Žižek's coinage for the post-communist Eastern European new bourgeoisie that has not yet matured into the stabilizing class role historically played by the Western bourgeoisie.
From Polybius: the degenerate form of democracy in which the demos becomes the ochlos (crowd) and exercises power in the interest of a sub-group rather than all; Žižek extends this to argue that internet and social media constitute a new form of ochlocracy.
Stories he reaches for 4
Comparing documentary footage: when a fascist/Hitler speech ends, the crowd applauds and the leader receives it; a Stalinist leader always stands up and joins the applause, signalling 'I am just one of you', the performance of being an instrument rather than a master.
“A Stalinist leader always stands up and joins the applause, like 'I'm just one of you' and so on.”
Anne Applebaum's Gulag documents that every year on Stalin's birthday, all camp inmates were gathered to collectively sign a congratulatory telegram to Stalin, a performance of loyalty impossible to imagine in the Nazi system (collecting Auschwitz prisoners to telegram Hitler).
“every year on Stalin's birthday all inmates were gathered and they had to sign each of them a telegram to Stalin wishing him all the best”
When Napoleon sent an army (including Polish soldiers) to crush the Haitian Revolution, they heard singing they assumed was African tribal music; approaching, they discovered the slaves were singing the Marseillaise, prompting Polish soldiers to defect and join the Haitian side.
“they heard some singing and they said, 'Oh, probably some stupid African tribal songs.' When they come closer they saw they were singing Marseillaise, the slaves.”
At the 1959 Lushan conference, after the Great Leap Forward disaster, Mao's self-criticism concluded with the metaphor that admitting guilt is like defecating or farting, 'if you feel the need to fart, fart; you will feel better', thereby framing mass death as a bodily relief function.
“He said, 'If you want to shit, shit. If you feel a need to fart, fart. You will feel better. That's how we should do our critique here.'”
Works invoked 12
Cited by Badiou for Hegel's analysis of the Terror, which both speakers acknowledge as profound but criticize for failing to distinguish legal terror from mob terror.
Philosophy of Right book
Žižek invokes Hegel's concept of the monarch as empty master who 'just signs the name', a figure that contrasts productively with Stalin's claim to substantive expertise.
Science of Logic book
Žižek references the beginning of the second volume ('bestimmte Reflexion' / 'determinate reflection' to 'reflexive determination') as the Hegelian precedent for the distinction between revolutionary ideal and ideal of revolution.
Žižek's own book mentioned in passing in the Q&A as relevant context.
State and Revolution book
Žižek cites Lenin's 'State and Revolution' as a text that still assumed the state was the primary stabilizer, a 19th-century assumption that the 20th century refuted.
Gulag book
Anne Applebaum's book; Žižek says he doesn't otherwise like it but cites its documentation of Gulag inmates signing birthday telegrams to Stalin as evidence for his argument about Stalinism remaining within Enlightenment norms.
Relire la Révolution book
Badiou's book under discussion; Žižek engages it enthusiastically, adds examples, praises specific passages (on the universal appeal of the French Revolution, the distinction between revolutionary ideal and ideal of revolution), and uses it as the springboard for his own arguments.
Totem and Taboo book
Badiou notes that Freud's 'Totem and Taboo' is 'Polybian without knowing it', the primal father's monopoly on power parallels Polybius's first regime type.
Tarkovsky's last film, referenced in the anecdote about Tarkovsky and Bergman's deliberate non-meeting while working in the same Swedish building.
Black Jacobins book
C.L.R. James's book on the Haitian Revolution, raised in the Q&A; Badiou agrees the Haitian Revolution is 'a tragedy because it was not completely understood.'
An early Badiou work (English translation mentioned); said to share with his later work a 'strange way of approaching language and the relationship between language and things.'
Les Paysans book
Balzac's novel about the new French peasant proprietor class; admired by Marx for explaining why the peasantry ceased to be revolutionary once the agrarian question was solved.
People invoked 36
Mentioned alongside Tarkovsky in the anecdote about their mutual avoidance out of artistic respect.
Thomas Jefferson negative
Cited as the most liberal American founder who nonetheless considered Toussaint Louverture a monster, illustrating the racial limits of American revolutionary universalism.
Polybius positive
Badiou identifies Polybius's cycle of regime-types as the deep political framework internalized by French revolutionaries themselves, making his theory indispensable for reading the French Revolution autonomously.
Žižek argues that 'Leninism' is itself a Stalinist construction, and that Lenin's own position was more ambiguous; he rejects naive Trotskyist fantasies about what would have happened had Lenin lived longer.
Thomas Müntzer positive
The peasant revolutionary whom East German TV had to reconcile with Martin Luther by scripting Luther to speak Marxist stage-theory, Žižek's example of absurd retroactive revolutionary legitimation.
Andrey Vyshinsky negative
Žižek sarcastically calls him a 'big democrat', the prosecutor in the Stalinist show trials who questioned accused party members about how they 'became traitors.'
Cited as an example of pre-revolutionary indirect political writing (as analyzed by Leo Strauss), contrasted with the direct public political speech of French revolutionaries.
Deng Xiaoping positive
Žižek uses Deng not to endorse capitalism but as the dialectical result that reveals the hidden telos of the Cultural Revolution, the cunning of reason at work.
Jacques Lacan positive
Žižek invokes Lacan's 'idéal du moi' / 'moi idéal' distinction, 'university discourse,' and the early Lacanian definition of the Real ('that which always returns to the same place') throughout the discussion.
Mentioned by Badiou as the Paris context that made Yugoslav intellectuals (including the young Žižek) interested in his work, Althusser's attempt to rebuild Marxism avoiding Stalinist pitfalls.
Mentioned dismissively as part of the naive Trotskyist fantasy that the 1920s (Bukharin's period) were a golden age before Stalin ruined everything.
Toussaint Louverture positive
Žižek mentions him as the Haitian revolutionary leader whom even radical American founders like Thomas Jefferson considered a monster, illustrating the limits of American universalism vs. French.
Žižek says he doesn't otherwise like her book 'Gulag' much, but cites her documentation of Gulag inmates signing birthday telegrams to Stalin.
Mentioned in the closing Q&A as someone who has written about revolutions and argues we are in a century of revolutionary exhaustion.
Emmanuel Macron negative
His formula 'la démocratie, ce n'est pas la rue' is cited to be complicated: Žižek agrees democracy is not the street but argues that the crowd has itself migrated from the street to the internet.
Alain Badiou positive
Žižek's interlocutor throughout; Žižek engages his book 'Relire la Révolution' enthusiastically, adds examples and complications, and closes by calling him 'our real.' He also notes that his Hegelian reading of the Cultural Revolution 'brought me a violent reply from Badiou.'
Lin Biao negative
Žižek argues that Lin Biao, not the Shanghai Commune, actually held power during the Cultural Revolution and radicalized the 'ideology of survival' formula; Badiou's distinction between 'good' and 'bad' Cultural Revolution is therefore frivolous.
Leon Trotsky negative
Cited as the exemplary case of reading the Russian Revolution through a French Revolution template (Tsar = Louis XVI, Mensheviks = Girondins, etc.), precisely the retroactive distortion Badiou warns against.
Protagonist of the 1949 Hungarian show trial Žižek cites to illustrate how Stalinism required the accused to perform metalinguistic self-explanation of their own guilt.
Adolf Hitler negative
Contrasted with Stalin in the applause anecdote and show trial argument: Hitler received applause passively (master discourse), needed no rational self-accounting from victims, and used radio as the technology of crowd formation.
Mentioned as one of the 'New Tsars' against whom the Chinese Cultural Revolution directed its critique of Soviet revisionism.
Benedictus de Spinoza positive
Badiou cites Spinoza's hermeneutic principle ('explain the scriptures by the scriptures') as a model for reading the French Revolution by itself.
Maximilien Robespierre positive
Both Badiou and Žižek treat Robespierre seriously as a political thinker who drew a coherent distinction between legal terror and mob terror, predicted Napoleon, and must be read on his own terms rather than as a proto-Stalinist.
Cited as the confirmation of Robespierre's Polybian prediction (the victorious general who would take power), and as the commander who made the strategic error of using Polish soldiers against the Haitian Revolution.
Jacques-Alain Miller positive
Cited by Badiou in analogy: just as Miller says Lacan must be explained by Lacan, the French Revolution must be explained by itself.
Viktor Orbán negative
Žižek identifies Orbán as a symbol of the new Eastern European axis exploiting European disunity, joking about 'Urbi et Orbi' becoming 'Orbi,' and warning he is 'silently winning.'
Mao Zedong negative
Žižek recounts Mao's obscene flatulence metaphor at Lushan (comparing self-criticism about mass death to defecating), and argues the Cultural Revolution dialectically prepared capitalism's return under Deng.
Hannah Arendt negative
Badiou criticizes Arendt's idealization of the American Revolution at the expense of the French, and her critique of the droits de l'homme / droits du citoyen distinction as brilliant but unjust; Žižek endorses this critique and notes Arendt's dismissal of Toussaint Louverture.
Referenced for his analysis of Montesquieu's indirect writing style as characteristic of political philosophy before the French Revolution.
C. L. R. James positive
Mentioned in a Q&A question about the Haitian Revolution and 'The Black Jacobins'; Badiou calls the Haitian Revolution 'a tragedy because it was not understood completely.'
Andrei Tarkovsky positive
Žižek invokes the Tarkovsky-Bergman non-meeting anecdote to characterize his relationship with Badiou: mutual respect expressed through deliberate distance.
Joseph Stalin negative
Žižek analyzes Stalin as embodying 'university discourse brought to madness', refusing the role of empty master, demanding show trials and self-confessions, yet remaining perversely within the Enlightenment tradition.
Karl Marx positive
Referenced by Badiou for admiring Balzac's 'Les Paysans' as an explanation of why the French peasantry ceased to be a revolutionary class; also cited as having given revolutionary belief its theoretical grammar.
Sigmund Freud positive
Badiou notes that Freud's 'Totem and Taboo' is unknowingly Polybian, the primal father holding power corresponds to Polybius's natural first regime of the one.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel positive
Žižek repeatedly invokes Hegel: the empty master in the Philosophy of Right, 'determinate reflection' vs. 'reflexive determination' in the Logic, List der Vernunft (cunning of reason) for the Cultural Revolution, and Hegel's treatment of the Terror in the Phenomenology (which Badiou critiques for missing the two-terror distinction).
Honoré de Balzac positive
Badiou cites 'Les Paysans' as the novel that explains why the French peasantry ceased to be revolutionary once the agrarian question was solved, admired by Marx for this reason.
What it argues
re-reading the French Revolution without revolutionary beliefStalinism as university discourse gone madthe Haitian Revolution as proof of French universalist universalismCultural Revolution as dialectical preparation for Deng Xiaoping capitalismEuropean political instability and the end of bourgeois stabilizationochlocracy, social media, and the new crowdthe retroactive construction of revolutionary lineages
Dialectical moves 8
“The true utopia today is not revolution but the belief that our current relative welfare can go on indefinitely.”
Žižek inverts the standard accusation against radicals: it is the defenders of the status quo, not the revolutionaries, who hold the truly utopian position.
“Deng Xiaoping was not simply a betrayal of the Cultural Revolution; in a deeper Hegelian sense he is maybe even its result.”
The cunning of reason: the revolution that most violently attacked capitalism dialectically produced the conditions, erasure of tradition, atomized individuals, most favorable to capitalism's introduction.
“With enemies like you, who needs friends?”
Žižek reverses the adversarial framing of his relationship with Badiou: the quality of one's intellectual enemies is more valuable than ordinary friendship.
“Stalinism is, unfortunately, still part of the Enlightenment — you may be the lowest trash, but there is some neutral knowledge from which you explain yourself.”
Far from being Enlightenment's opposite, Stalinism perverted Enlightenment norms by requiring its victims to perform rational self-accounting, which Nazism, more consistent in its irrationalism, never demanded.
“The state is not stable by itself — the great discovery at the end of the 20th century is that the state needs other stabilizers.”
Reverses the 19th-century and even Leninist assumption that the state is the stabilizer of last resort; it turns out to be itself in need of stabilization from class and supranational structures.
“Democracy is not the street — but the crowd is no longer the street either; today's ochlocracy is Facebook and Twitter.”
Žižek extends and corrects Macron's formula: the real locus of crowd power has migrated from physical space to digital networks, making it immune to physical containment.
“You are our real — that which always returns to the same place.”
Žižek closes by applying Lacan's definition of the Real to Badiou himself, making a compliment into a theoretical claim about repetition compulsion.
“Unfaithfulness in one's own work is another name for a deep faithfulness — as in marriage, but here one's partner is one's own earlier writing.”
Badiou inverts the apparent contradiction between intellectual self-revision and continuity: changing topics is the sign of fidelity to an underlying method.
Claims 15
asserts
The French Revolution must be read autonomously — explained by itself, not through the retroactive screen of later revolutions or revolutionary belief.methodology for reading the French Revolution · unknown
asserts
The French Revolution's inclusion of property rights in the Rights of Man was correct and does not entail endorsing capitalism, because it solved the agrarian question (peasants owning the soil they work) that Soviet and Chinese revolutions catastrophically failed to solve.property rights and the French Revolution · unknown
asserts
Robespierre's Terror was not fascination with death but a temporary political-legal measure against mob rule under war conditions, categorically different from Stalinist terror as a permanent mode of government.Robespierre's Terror vs. Stalinism · unknown
asserts
The Haitian Revolution is the biggest empirical proof that the French Revolution had a truly universal appeal, since enslaved people adopted its principles more thoroughly than most Europeans.the universal appeal of the French Revolution
asserts
Stalinism is university discourse brought to madness: it required even its victims to speak from a position of neutral objective knowledge and explain their own guilt, something categorically impossible under Nazism.the structure of Stalinism vs. Nazism
asserts
Stalinism's insistence on show trials and self-confessions proves it remained, in a perverted way, within the Enlightenment tradition — unlike Nazism, which had no need for the accused to explain themselves rationally.Stalinism and the Enlightenment
asserts
The term 'Leninism' is itself a Stalinist product — Lenin's thought was codified and fixed as 'Leninism' only under Stalin, so it is anachronistic to project it back onto Lenin's own ambiguous practice.Leninism as a Stalinist construction
asserts
The Cultural Revolution, in a deeper Hegelian sense, dialectically produced Deng Xiaoping's capitalism: by erasing tradition, destroying the intellectual class, and creating disoriented individuals, it prepared the ideal ground for market introduction.the Cultural Revolution and Deng Xiaoping
asserts
The classical revolutionary ideal is over and meaningless today, but this does not mean the status quo can continue indefinitely — on multiple fronts (refugees, ecology, intellectual property) a serious deadlock is approaching that will force radical change.the future of radical politics
asserts
The state is not self-stabilizing; it requires an external stabilizing class (historically the bourgeoisie) and the European Union now functions as a supplement to that stabilizing function.state stability and the European Union
asserts
Internet and social media constitute a new form of ochlocracy that is far more destabilizing than street crowds, since physical force cannot contain them.technology, crowds, and political destabilization
rejects
Hannah Arendt's idealization of the American Revolution and her critique of the French Revolution's rights of man is unjust and misses the depth of the distinction between droits de l'homme and droits du citoyen.Hannah Arendt on the French Revolution · unknown
reframes
The true utopia is not radical change but the belief that current relative Western welfare can continue indefinitely — radical change is coming whether we want it or not.utopianism and the status quo
asserts
Stalin did not resolve the Leninist deadlock through arbitrary cruelty but intervened with a specific formula at a genuine structural impasse in the revolutionary project.Stalin's historical role
asserts
The post-communist Eastern European bourgeoisie is a Lumpenbourgeoisie, not yet capable of playing the stabilizing class role the Western bourgeoisie historically fulfilled.Eastern European post-communist elites
Quotes 11
“With enemies like you, who needs friends?”Slavoj Žižek · intellectual adversaries as the highest form of relationship
“The true utopia is that our relative welfare, the way we have it now, can go on indefinitely. No, it will not go on. We are approaching serious times.”Slavoj Žižek · the status quo as utopia; inevitability of radical change
“Stalinism unfortunately in this sense is still part of Enlightenment; you may be trash but there is some neutral knowledge.”Slavoj Žižek · Stalinism as perverted Enlightenment
“Deng Xiaoping was not simply a betrayal; in some deeper Hegelian sense he is maybe even the result of it.”Slavoj Žižek · Cultural Revolution dialectically producing capitalism
“You are our real, at least in early Lacan: that which always returns to the same place. So you are our real, so you will have to come back here again.”Slavoj Žižek · the Real as compulsive return; compliment as theory
“The great discovery at the end of the 20th century is that the state is not stable by itself. It needs other stabilizers.”Slavoj Žižek · the state's dependence on external stabilizing forces
“In my ideal new humanist totalitarian state I would everything prohibit Twitter, prohibit Facebook, that would be my rule.”unknown · social media as ochlocracy; ironic totalitarian prescription
“Metaphors are never neutral.”Slavoj Žižek · language and political unconscious
“Unfaithfulness is like in marriage; it's another name for a deep faithfulness.”unknown · intellectual self-revision as fidelity to method
“It's very easy to destroy a class. The existence of a class is connected with the existence of the bodies that compose that class.”unknown · Cultural Revolution and the physical annihilation of classes
“Leninism itself is a Stalinist term. It was codified at that point.”Slavoj Žižek · Leninism as a retroactive Stalinist construction
Transcript 62 turns
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shall try to begin by recalling a certain data about the relationship Slavoj Žižek and I have because it's quite strange in some way. For a long time, Žižek was just a name for me, and at the beginning, he was the name of a translator, because he was the first translator, of course, in his own language, Slovenian, but he was also the first translator ever at that time. I was at the beginning of my work and before Žižek nobody had translated anything. And it seemed to me, maybe I'm wrong, but this interest that came from what was at that time Yugoslavia was connected with the fact that Yugoslavia was a communist country. And on the one hand, and on the other hand, the fact that in Paris at that time there was an attempt connected with Althusser to rebuild a Marxist approach that would avoid all the pitfalls of Stalinism but also of the Italian version of Marxism. And so it's the reason why Žižek was interested by my work was not personal in connection with me. It may have been personal after that, but at the beginning, it was more connected with a general situation for intellectuals in a country like Yugoslavia with respect to intellectuals, Marxist intellectuals, in Paris. Of course, this situation changed a lot across history. Yugoslavia disappeared, Slavoj Žižek became a global philosopher, an international philosopher rather than a Slovenian philosopher, while myself remained a French philosopher. I mean, I was not, it was just like that, I was not very well-known outside the national frontiers of France. But Žižek kept translating certain parts of my work or giving some signs of interest. But we never met. The first time we met was two years ago or three years ago in Ljubljana. So this relationship is quite strange because on the one hand, it's very constant and close and connected with great events of what happened in Europe—the destruction of classical communism, the attempt to rebuild communism in France, the idea that some people had, some people among which I was, that there was a possible connection between Marxism and Lacan's theory. So our relation was very close on the one hand and very distant on the other hand, since we didn't know each other. And the first time Žižek didn't translate a text I wrote but directly commented this text, it was in order to criticize me, of course. So it's a sort of irony of history. Hence the question that was asked to me by you: Do you loathe Slavoj Žižek? And my answer was that I understood why the question was raised. It was connected with superficial events, but it didn't take into account, because of
shall try to begin by recalling a certain data about the relationship Slavoj Žižek and I have because it's quite strange in some way. For a long time, Žižek was just a name for me, and at the beginning, he was the name of a translator, because he was the first translator, of course, in his own language, Slovenian, but he was also the first translator ever at that time. I was at the beginning of my work and before Žižek nobody had translated anything. And it seemed to me, maybe I'm wrong, but this interest that came from what was at that time Yugoslavia was connected with the fact that Yugoslavia was a communist country. And on the one hand, and on the other hand, the fact that in Paris at that time there was an attempt connected with Althusser to rebuild a Marxist approach that would avoid all the pitfalls of Stalinism but also of the Italian version of Marxism. And so it's the reason why Žižek was interested by my work was not personal in connection with me. It may have been personal after that, but at the beginning, it was more connected with a general situation for intellectuals in a country like Yugoslavia with respect to intellectuals, Marxist intellectuals, in Paris. Of course, this situation changed a lot across history. Yugoslavia disappeared, Slavoj Žižek became a global philosopher, an international philosopher rather than a Slovenian philosopher, while myself remained a French philosopher. I mean, I was not, it was just like that, I was not very well-known outside the national frontiers of France. But Žižek kept translating certain parts of my work or giving some signs of interest. But we never met. The first time we met was two years ago or three years ago in Ljubljana. So this relationship is quite strange because on the one hand, it's very constant and close and connected with great events of what happened in Europe—the destruction of classical communism, the attempt to rebuild communism in France, the idea that some people had, some people among which I was, that there was a possible connection between Marxism and Lacan's theory. So our relation was very close on the one hand and very distant on the other hand, since we didn't know each other. And the first time Žižek didn't translate a text I wrote but directly commented this text, it was in order to criticize me, of course. So it's a sort of irony of history. Hence the question that was asked to me by you: Do you loathe Slavoj Žižek? And my answer was that I understood why the question was raised. It was connected with superficial events, but it didn't take into account, because of
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course they were not known, the deepest factors of our relationship. And these deepest factors are connected with the European history—the history of Marxism, the history of what happened in France during the sixties, and not French theory in a narrow sense, but French theory in a wider sense, and so on and so on. My own position is, I could summarize it using the term unfaithfulness, I don't know if it exists. I'm not faithful necessarily to what I have done or written during my life. And of course, for instance, if you could read, you may read in English For the Love of Language, it has been translated. But as far as I know, Les Noms indistincts, the Indistinct Nouns, have not been translated. You would have, I think, the same feeling that Žižek felt, had a sort of strange way of approaching language and the relationship between language and things and thoughts. While on the other hand, what I'm writing today is quite different because I'm talking or writing about factual events, namely the French Revolution, or my very last book which is a book of entretiens—what is the English word for that, an exchange, a conversation, yes—with a journalist, is the title is Considerations about France. It's about contemporary or present-day France. So it's empirical, while it was not the case with the book that Žižek mentioned. So there is a sort of unfaithfulness. But on the other hand, I think that let's call that a method, the method I used in my previous book and the method I used today are similar. So this unfaithfulness is like in marriage; it's another name for a deep faithfulness. But of course, my partner in that case is something I wrote myself, so there is no question of divorce or alimony or things like that. Let's talk about this book, Relire la Révolution. Since it doesn't exist in English until now, I shall begin by summarizing, well, underline certain points I think are important to me. The first thing, of course, is relire, read again. In read again, you have two words: you have to read and you have again. Why read? Why the question of reading is important for the French Revolution? For a reason, the fact that first off, French revolutionaries didn't have to speak to parties because parties did not exist. And of course, especially not a Bolshevik party. If you think the major texts of Lenin or a Mao Zedong are texts that are not addressed to the masses, but they are addressed to the party. They are in fact instructions given to the party in order that the intermediary members of the party would explain to the masses what is going on. This sort of double-level structure did not exist in the French Revolution. The activity of the French revolutionaries
course they were not known, the deepest factors of our relationship. And these deepest factors are connected with the European history—the history of Marxism, the history of what happened in France during the sixties, and not French theory in a narrow sense, but French theory in a wider sense, and so on and so on. My own position is, I could summarize it using the term unfaithfulness, I don't know if it exists. I'm not faithful necessarily to what I have done or written during my life. And of course, for instance, if you could read, you may read in English For the Love of Language, it has been translated. But as far as I know, Les Noms indistincts, the Indistinct Nouns, have not been translated. You would have, I think, the same feeling that Žižek felt, had a sort of strange way of approaching language and the relationship between language and things and thoughts. While on the other hand, what I'm writing today is quite different because I'm talking or writing about factual events, namely the French Revolution, or my very last book which is a book of entretiens—what is the English word for that, an exchange, a conversation, yes—with a journalist, is the title is Considerations about France. It's about contemporary or present-day France. So it's empirical, while it was not the case with the book that Žižek mentioned. So there is a sort of unfaithfulness. But on the other hand, I think that let's call that a method, the method I used in my previous book and the method I used today are similar. So this unfaithfulness is like in marriage; it's another name for a deep faithfulness. But of course, my partner in that case is something I wrote myself, so there is no question of divorce or alimony or things like that. Let's talk about this book, Relire la Révolution. Since it doesn't exist in English until now, I shall begin by summarizing, well, underline certain points I think are important to me. The first thing, of course, is relire, read again. In read again, you have two words: you have to read and you have again. Why read? Why the question of reading is important for the French Revolution? For a reason, the fact that first off, French revolutionaries didn't have to speak to parties because parties did not exist. And of course, especially not a Bolshevik party. If you think the major texts of Lenin or a Mao Zedong are texts that are not addressed to the masses, but they are addressed to the party. They are in fact instructions given to the party in order that the intermediary members of the party would explain to the masses what is going on. This sort of double-level structure did not exist in the French Revolution. The activity of the French revolutionaries
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was essentially to talk and to talk aloud about politics. Aloud, that meant that they could be heard by people who were there, who were on the one hand members of an assembly but also because these sessions were always open, including to women. So they were heard, not only by professionals let's say, but by ordinary people. That's one level. The second level was that every important discourse was published, printed. And at that time, it's a question that of course should be raised: how many people could read at that time? Well, the answer has been given quite recently because a lot of people thought beforehand that a minority of people could read. But the answer is quite the reverse. At that time, the degree of the reading ability—I'm not talking about writing ability—the extension of the reading ability was so large that it was never reached again until the end of the 19th century in France. For many reasons connected with the way the church thought it necessary for Christians to read fluently and so on and so on. And the lower church, I mean the priests of the small villages, were quite revolutionary in their ideas. Of course, after that you had a rupture between the Catholic priests and the revolution, but at the beginning it was not the case. So you have really through the texts a direct connection, more direct than it was possible in Russia or in China. A direct connection with every important discourse at that time. So read, to read these texts is important. And of course, I just made an allusion, the fact that these texts that were public were public about politics is quite a new thing because for a long time politics were a secret affair. Someone like Montesquieu wrote about politics, L’esprit des lois, The Spirit of the Laws, I don't know what the English classical translation is. But it has been shown that Montesquieu wrote in a way that Leo Strauss has analyzed, of course; he wrote in an indirect way, and that was the way of writing about politics at that time. While during the French Revolution, from the beginning, people wrote directly, not in an indirect way but directly. When they thought that the King should be demoted, they said so. They didn't use metaphors or didn't use parables; they talked directly about institutions and changes that should be made. Why read again? It's connected with an hypothesis, the hypothesis that between the French Revolution and the present-day reader, especially in Europe, something functions as a sort of screen, a sort of intermediate screen which I call in French la croyance révolutionnaire, the revolutionary belief. And this belief has several interesting features. The first feature is the idea that there
was essentially to talk and to talk aloud about politics. Aloud, that meant that they could be heard by people who were there, who were on the one hand members of an assembly but also because these sessions were always open, including to women. So they were heard, not only by professionals let's say, but by ordinary people. That's one level. The second level was that every important discourse was published, printed. And at that time, it's a question that of course should be raised: how many people could read at that time? Well, the answer has been given quite recently because a lot of people thought beforehand that a minority of people could read. But the answer is quite the reverse. At that time, the degree of the reading ability—I'm not talking about writing ability—the extension of the reading ability was so large that it was never reached again until the end of the 19th century in France. For many reasons connected with the way the church thought it necessary for Christians to read fluently and so on and so on. And the lower church, I mean the priests of the small villages, were quite revolutionary in their ideas. Of course, after that you had a rupture between the Catholic priests and the revolution, but at the beginning it was not the case. So you have really through the texts a direct connection, more direct than it was possible in Russia or in China. A direct connection with every important discourse at that time. So read, to read these texts is important. And of course, I just made an allusion, the fact that these texts that were public were public about politics is quite a new thing because for a long time politics were a secret affair. Someone like Montesquieu wrote about politics, L’esprit des lois, The Spirit of the Laws, I don't know what the English classical translation is. But it has been shown that Montesquieu wrote in a way that Leo Strauss has analyzed, of course; he wrote in an indirect way, and that was the way of writing about politics at that time. While during the French Revolution, from the beginning, people wrote directly, not in an indirect way but directly. When they thought that the King should be demoted, they said so. They didn't use metaphors or didn't use parables; they talked directly about institutions and changes that should be made. Why read again? It's connected with an hypothesis, the hypothesis that between the French Revolution and the present-day reader, especially in Europe, something functions as a sort of screen, a sort of intermediate screen which I call in French la croyance révolutionnaire, the revolutionary belief. And this belief has several interesting features. The first feature is the idea that there
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are a finite set of revolutions that could be called major revolutions. And this finite set, in fact, includes the French Revolution, the Soviet Revolution, the Chinese Revolution. You may add, according to your preferences, the Cuban Revolution or other events, but these three, the three revolutions I quoted, are generally considered as the major revolutions. Second, people think that these revolutions are in fact ordered. The second one, namely the Soviet Revolution, is a way of rebuilding what had been achieved by the first one, namely the French Revolution, in order to go further. And of course, the main point is the question of property. The French Revolution didn't, well, included property in the Rights of Man, human rights, while Soviet Revolution did not include them in the human rights, well they didn't speak of human rights but they considered private property as something that should be destroyed. So the idea is that one step forward was made. So of course this ordering is an ordering that goes in a progressive way; the second revolution goes further than the first one. And the third revolution, when I was a Maoist, it was very clear that the third revolution, namely the Chinese Revolution, went a step forward with respect to the second one. And in fact, if you read the Chinese texts, it's exactly the position that the Chinese had. They considered the Russian Revolution as incomplete because it could not prevent what they called the "New Tsars," namely Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and so on. So there was in the second revolution the possibility of being weakened, this possibility was to be fought against by the third revolution. And inside the Chinese Revolution, Alain Badiou distinguishes a first Chinese Revolution and a second Chinese Revolution, namely the Cultural Revolution. I'm not sure that he's right, but that's not the point. He has a, he's right in thinking that the Cultural Revolution thought that it made a step forward with respect to the first half of the Chinese Revolution. The first half of the Chinese Revolution was dominated by the communist party; the Cultural Revolution made a step forward by substituting communes to the party—Shanghai Commune, Beijing Commune, and so on and so on. It's a very difficult question, but the idea is there. This conception of a linear order, which is also a progress, makes no sense, makes no sense if you don't believe in a final goal which may have not been reached yet or you may believe it has been reached. For instance, when I was a Maoist, we strongly believed that the Cultural Revolution was reaching the final end, which is not, let's say, the classless society, but the revolution that will—the last revolution that
are a finite set of revolutions that could be called major revolutions. And this finite set, in fact, includes the French Revolution, the Soviet Revolution, the Chinese Revolution. You may add, according to your preferences, the Cuban Revolution or other events, but these three, the three revolutions I quoted, are generally considered as the major revolutions. Second, people think that these revolutions are in fact ordered. The second one, namely the Soviet Revolution, is a way of rebuilding what had been achieved by the first one, namely the French Revolution, in order to go further. And of course, the main point is the question of property. The French Revolution didn't, well, included property in the Rights of Man, human rights, while Soviet Revolution did not include them in the human rights, well they didn't speak of human rights but they considered private property as something that should be destroyed. So the idea is that one step forward was made. So of course this ordering is an ordering that goes in a progressive way; the second revolution goes further than the first one. And the third revolution, when I was a Maoist, it was very clear that the third revolution, namely the Chinese Revolution, went a step forward with respect to the second one. And in fact, if you read the Chinese texts, it's exactly the position that the Chinese had. They considered the Russian Revolution as incomplete because it could not prevent what they called the "New Tsars," namely Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and so on. So there was in the second revolution the possibility of being weakened, this possibility was to be fought against by the third revolution. And inside the Chinese Revolution, Alain Badiou distinguishes a first Chinese Revolution and a second Chinese Revolution, namely the Cultural Revolution. I'm not sure that he's right, but that's not the point. He has a, he's right in thinking that the Cultural Revolution thought that it made a step forward with respect to the first half of the Chinese Revolution. The first half of the Chinese Revolution was dominated by the communist party; the Cultural Revolution made a step forward by substituting communes to the party—Shanghai Commune, Beijing Commune, and so on and so on. It's a very difficult question, but the idea is there. This conception of a linear order, which is also a progress, makes no sense, makes no sense if you don't believe in a final goal which may have not been reached yet or you may believe it has been reached. For instance, when I was a Maoist, we strongly believed that the Cultural Revolution was reaching the final end, which is not, let's say, the classless society, but the revolution that will—the last revolution that
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will produce that. I call this supposition the ideal of revolution. There is an ideal, which, like in a classical painting, you have a perspective point that organizes the whole painting. Well, in the revolutionary belief, you have a point, an ideal point, which is the ideal of revolution that organizes all the history of mankind in fact, and all the main events of this history, and these main events for someone who believes in revolutions, these main events are precisely the major revolutions. But if you believe that, of course, I'm not, I have to add that this conception was represented very early by Marx himself, and the Marxist language, as opposed to other languages about revolution, for instance, the anarchist language, the Marxist language was in fact a sort of theoretical, gave to this revolutionary belief a grammar, a lexicon, a syntax, and in fact a dictionary. So there is a deep connection between the revolutionary belief and the primacy, is that an English word, the primacy of the Marxist language, Marxist way of speaking about reality. This primacy that Slavoj and I knew, it was still in force in Europe during the sixties. For instance, Wittfogel wrote a book about the Oriental despotism, and in his second edition, which was late fifties or in the sixties, I don't remember exactly, he says that Marxism was now the lingua franca of the learned world. As, let's say, Aristotle had been in the Middle Ages. It was impossible to talk about any social or historical event, at least in Western Europe, without using this Marxist language. And this Marxist language was impossible to disconnect from the revolutionary belief, and the revolutionary belief was impossible to disconnect from the Marxist language. A consequence of this situation was that it was impossible to read revolution, the French Revolution, since the reading was always in a certain way predetermined. It was impossible to read the texts as they were written because they were always read, let's say, belatedly. The main example, I quote it and comment it in my book, the night of the 14th of July, the Bastille Day, the King who had not been informed, didn't know what happened. It happened in Paris; the King was in Versailles. He had spent the day in hunting, so nobody around him thought it advisable to tell him that something had happened in Paris. And one nobleman, who was in fact in charge of the hunting, a very important nobleman, thought that it was impossible that the King should be advised. And he used all his privileges to get to the King who was in his bed
will produce that. I call this supposition the ideal of revolution. There is an ideal, which, like in a classical painting, you have a perspective point that organizes the whole painting. Well, in the revolutionary belief, you have a point, an ideal point, which is the ideal of revolution that organizes all the history of mankind in fact, and all the main events of this history, and these main events for someone who believes in revolutions, these main events are precisely the major revolutions. But if you believe that, of course, I'm not, I have to add that this conception was represented very early by Marx himself, and the Marxist language, as opposed to other languages about revolution, for instance, the anarchist language, the Marxist language was in fact a sort of theoretical, gave to this revolutionary belief a grammar, a lexicon, a syntax, and in fact a dictionary. So there is a deep connection between the revolutionary belief and the primacy, is that an English word, the primacy of the Marxist language, Marxist way of speaking about reality. This primacy that Slavoj and I knew, it was still in force in Europe during the sixties. For instance, Wittfogel wrote a book about the Oriental despotism, and in his second edition, which was late fifties or in the sixties, I don't remember exactly, he says that Marxism was now the lingua franca of the learned world. As, let's say, Aristotle had been in the Middle Ages. It was impossible to talk about any social or historical event, at least in Western Europe, without using this Marxist language. And this Marxist language was impossible to disconnect from the revolutionary belief, and the revolutionary belief was impossible to disconnect from the Marxist language. A consequence of this situation was that it was impossible to read revolution, the French Revolution, since the reading was always in a certain way predetermined. It was impossible to read the texts as they were written because they were always read, let's say, belatedly. The main example, I quote it and comment it in my book, the night of the 14th of July, the Bastille Day, the King who had not been informed, didn't know what happened. It happened in Paris; the King was in Versailles. He had spent the day in hunting, so nobody around him thought it advisable to tell him that something had happened in Paris. And one nobleman, who was in fact in charge of the hunting, a very important nobleman, thought that it was impossible that the King should be advised. And he used all his privileges to get to the King who was in his bed
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eating, because he ate at every hour of the day. He was a very big man, more than six feet, very strong. Well, you have this exchange of words which is quite interesting. Well, the Duke explains to the King what happened in Paris, the Bastille, what happened around the Bastille, which was quite violent. And the King says, "C'est une révolte?" ("It is a revolt?"). And the answer is, "Non, sire, c'est une révolution." Of course, it's quite interesting. But the question is: what do they mean? If we read this exchange now, we feel that we understand what is at stake, because we think that the Duke used révolution in the way we use it now, as if he was in fact predicting what would happen several years after, including the death of the King himself. But of course, it makes no sense. So the question is, a very simple question about one word, but the question should be raised about every sentence of every discourse during the French Revolution. Nobody at that time could speak about politics and know what would happen the following months, let's not talk about the following years. So what did the Duke had in mind? What did the King have in mind? Because the King understood. So there is a research which is quite philological in that sense. I would say that I remain faithful to my interest for nouns. What are the philological basis for the use of the word révolution at a time when the French Revolution had not existed? So that's one research I had to make. It was quite philological, but it had political consequences. Because from that word only, by extending what happened for that unique word to the whole sentences that were uttered during the French Revolution, you begin by understanding that the French Revolution should be read in an autonomous way. In the same way that Spinoza says, well, you have to explain the scriptures by the scriptures, or Jacques-Alain Miller says that Lacan must be explained by Lacan. Well, the French Revolution must be explained by the French Revolution itself. As all political events should be explained, in fact. What I'm trying to do about the French Revolution should be done about the Soviet Revolution and should be done about the Chinese Revolution, of course. But not taking into account what happened during the French Revolution. Trotsky, for instance, is quite convinced at each moment of the Russian, Soviet, revolution that they are repeating the French Revolution. The Tsar is like the French King, the Tsarina is like the French Queen, Marie Antoinette. The Mensheviks are like the
eating, because he ate at every hour of the day. He was a very big man, more than six feet, very strong. Well, you have this exchange of words which is quite interesting. Well, the Duke explains to the King what happened in Paris, the Bastille, what happened around the Bastille, which was quite violent. And the King says, "C'est une révolte?" ("It is a revolt?"). And the answer is, "Non, sire, c'est une révolution." Of course, it's quite interesting. But the question is: what do they mean? If we read this exchange now, we feel that we understand what is at stake, because we think that the Duke used révolution in the way we use it now, as if he was in fact predicting what would happen several years after, including the death of the King himself. But of course, it makes no sense. So the question is, a very simple question about one word, but the question should be raised about every sentence of every discourse during the French Revolution. Nobody at that time could speak about politics and know what would happen the following months, let's not talk about the following years. So what did the Duke had in mind? What did the King have in mind? Because the King understood. So there is a research which is quite philological in that sense. I would say that I remain faithful to my interest for nouns. What are the philological basis for the use of the word révolution at a time when the French Revolution had not existed? So that's one research I had to make. It was quite philological, but it had political consequences. Because from that word only, by extending what happened for that unique word to the whole sentences that were uttered during the French Revolution, you begin by understanding that the French Revolution should be read in an autonomous way. In the same way that Spinoza says, well, you have to explain the scriptures by the scriptures, or Jacques-Alain Miller says that Lacan must be explained by Lacan. Well, the French Revolution must be explained by the French Revolution itself. As all political events should be explained, in fact. What I'm trying to do about the French Revolution should be done about the Soviet Revolution and should be done about the Chinese Revolution, of course. But not taking into account what happened during the French Revolution. Trotsky, for instance, is quite convinced at each moment of the Russian, Soviet, revolution that they are repeating the French Revolution. The Tsar is like the French King, the Tsarina is like the French Queen, Marie Antoinette. The Mensheviks are like the
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Girondins, the Bolsheviks are like the Jacobins. Lenin has some features of Robespierre; he himself has some features of Saint-Just, and so on and so on. And Stalin is Thermidor, no? Of course, he says so explicitly. A lot of writing by Trotsky are based on this repetition. Of course, that's precisely the way to not understand what happened. So I leave aside the question of the Soviet Revolution because it's not what about that that I wrote, but nevertheless, you have to keep in mind that this rereading of revolutions in plural should be done for all major revolutions. So, by doing that work, well, first thing I thought that the common basis that enabled people to understand what the word révolution meant at the time, although the revolution itself had not existed, was a Greek historian named Polybius. This Greek historian has a theory that it's tremendously important; it is the basis of, let's say, the whole political philosophy till the modern times. You find it in Cicero, you find it in Machiavelli, you find it in Montesquieu. The idea is that you have basically three types of regime, and the principle is the number of people that hold the power. One, many, or all. One: Monarchy. Many: Aristocracy or Oligarchy. All: Democracy. But, and this system is connected with a necessity of evolution. The most natural and direct regime is the regime of the power of the one. In fact, if you read Freud, for instance, you find—I don't think Freud thought of Polybius—but he had the same idea. The most natural regime is the regime where the father has all the power. In fact, Totem and Taboo is Polybian without knowing it. So, the most simple, immediate form of power: the power of one. But this power goes to the strongest, the most wise, the wisest, the—whatever. But of course we are among men, men are mortal. So this wise man or strong man who holds the power is respected by everyone. Well, he dies and he has followers. And the unique follower he has, since it is a monarchy, is not necessarily worthy of the power. So the possibility of a decay of the monarchy is always possible, is always open. The decay of the monarchy is called the tyranny. In order to struggle and to triumph from the disorders and violences of the tyranny, well, the people is rebellious and gives the power to a small group of the wisest and the strongest. Several, a little group: the best. So if they are the best, you have the aristocracy (Aristos means the best in Greek). Few of them, Oligos in Greek means a few: Oligarchy. And so you have a
Girondins, the Bolsheviks are like the Jacobins. Lenin has some features of Robespierre; he himself has some features of Saint-Just, and so on and so on. And Stalin is Thermidor, no? Of course, he says so explicitly. A lot of writing by Trotsky are based on this repetition. Of course, that's precisely the way to not understand what happened. So I leave aside the question of the Soviet Revolution because it's not what about that that I wrote, but nevertheless, you have to keep in mind that this rereading of revolutions in plural should be done for all major revolutions. So, by doing that work, well, first thing I thought that the common basis that enabled people to understand what the word révolution meant at the time, although the revolution itself had not existed, was a Greek historian named Polybius. This Greek historian has a theory that it's tremendously important; it is the basis of, let's say, the whole political philosophy till the modern times. You find it in Cicero, you find it in Machiavelli, you find it in Montesquieu. The idea is that you have basically three types of regime, and the principle is the number of people that hold the power. One, many, or all. One: Monarchy. Many: Aristocracy or Oligarchy. All: Democracy. But, and this system is connected with a necessity of evolution. The most natural and direct regime is the regime of the power of the one. In fact, if you read Freud, for instance, you find—I don't think Freud thought of Polybius—but he had the same idea. The most natural regime is the regime where the father has all the power. In fact, Totem and Taboo is Polybian without knowing it. So, the most simple, immediate form of power: the power of one. But this power goes to the strongest, the most wise, the wisest, the—whatever. But of course we are among men, men are mortal. So this wise man or strong man who holds the power is respected by everyone. Well, he dies and he has followers. And the unique follower he has, since it is a monarchy, is not necessarily worthy of the power. So the possibility of a decay of the monarchy is always possible, is always open. The decay of the monarchy is called the tyranny. In order to struggle and to triumph from the disorders and violences of the tyranny, well, the people is rebellious and gives the power to a small group of the wisest and the strongest. Several, a little group: the best. So if they are the best, you have the aristocracy (Aristos means the best in Greek). Few of them, Oligos in Greek means a few: Oligarchy. And so you have a
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solution. But this solution is also subjected to the decay because the sons of the wisest are not necessarily wise. So you have the decay of aristocracy in something that is not aristocracy, but precisely oligarchy, where the few who govern who have the power do not use the power for the best of all, but for their own benefit. In order to... then you have a revolt, rebellion, and now comes the solution of the all. Democracy. The name in Greek of the political all is demos. Democracy. But it's possible that at one time the people, the demos, doesn't use the power in the interest of all, but in the interest of a sub-part of the all that is the people as opposed to the other member of the people, who are, for instance, the rich or the best born, and so on and so on. So the democracy becomes something else: the power of the people becomes the power of the crowd, and the Greek name for the crowd is ochlos, hence ochlocracy. This distinction in three types doubled by three decay form and the idea that you have a cycle that goes from one to several to all, and each time the change has a cause, the decaying of the preceding form, this representation is the basis of almost all political philosophy in the Western world. And it's quite interesting, not only from a philological point of view, but also from a historical point of view, to notice that the revolutionary themselves in France were convinced that that would happen if they were not careful. It's a cycle. So the idea, for instance, Robespierre says when his assembly is on the point to take a decision which was in fact a catastrophic, the decision was to enter into the war against all Europe, says, "Well, if you do so, the revolution is ended, the people will not have the power, the power will go to a general, a victorious general." Of course, what is remarkable is that it happens exactly like that. Napoleon was just a victorious general at the beginning. So this Polybian representation was deeply ingrained in the mind of the revolutionary, but also it seemed to be confirmed by the turn of events. If I had time, I would like to comment two things that the French Revolution, or three things the French Revolution did. One thing is a reflection that seems to be accepted by everyone today, but is not, that seems to be understood by everyone today, but is not, namely a reflection about the distinction between droits de l'homme
solution. But this solution is also subjected to the decay because the sons of the wisest are not necessarily wise. So you have the decay of aristocracy in something that is not aristocracy, but precisely oligarchy, where the few who govern who have the power do not use the power for the best of all, but for their own benefit. In order to... then you have a revolt, rebellion, and now comes the solution of the all. Democracy. The name in Greek of the political all is demos. Democracy. But it's possible that at one time the people, the demos, doesn't use the power in the interest of all, but in the interest of a sub-part of the all that is the people as opposed to the other member of the people, who are, for instance, the rich or the best born, and so on and so on. So the democracy becomes something else: the power of the people becomes the power of the crowd, and the Greek name for the crowd is ochlos, hence ochlocracy. This distinction in three types doubled by three decay form and the idea that you have a cycle that goes from one to several to all, and each time the change has a cause, the decaying of the preceding form, this representation is the basis of almost all political philosophy in the Western world. And it's quite interesting, not only from a philological point of view, but also from a historical point of view, to notice that the revolutionary themselves in France were convinced that that would happen if they were not careful. It's a cycle. So the idea, for instance, Robespierre says when his assembly is on the point to take a decision which was in fact a catastrophic, the decision was to enter into the war against all Europe, says, "Well, if you do so, the revolution is ended, the people will not have the power, the power will go to a general, a victorious general." Of course, what is remarkable is that it happens exactly like that. Napoleon was just a victorious general at the beginning. So this Polybian representation was deeply ingrained in the mind of the revolutionary, but also it seemed to be confirmed by the turn of events. If I had time, I would like to comment two things that the French Revolution, or three things the French Revolution did. One thing is a reflection that seems to be accepted by everyone today, but is not, that seems to be understood by everyone today, but is not, namely a reflection about the distinction between droits de l'homme
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(rights of man, not human rights—the difference between noun and adjective is important), droits de l'homme and droits du citoyen. The idea that the conditions for being a human being, an homme, are not the same as the condition for being a citizen. This entails a very, very deep reflection which has been almost completely forgotten, which has been criticized in my opinion in an unjust way essentially by Hannah Arendt, who is the most brilliant critic of this conception. And I wrote a whole chapter about that in order to make clear that not only political action, but also political theory, was the center of the French Revolution. The second thing is the question of terror, la terreur. Under a lot of people in France, maybe elsewhere, consider that the terror and Robespierre are in fact the ancestors of Stalinism. If you read carefully what happened, it appears two things appear. One thing is that terror was divided in two types for someone like Robespierre. You had the terror by the crowd, which was the political absolute evil, and la terreur by the law, which could be necessary at certain times. And the terror by the law was decided precisely in order to stop the terror by the crowd. The terror
(rights of man, not human rights—the difference between noun and adjective is important), droits de l'homme and droits du citoyen. The idea that the conditions for being a human being, an homme, are not the same as the condition for being a citizen. This entails a very, very deep reflection which has been almost completely forgotten, which has been criticized in my opinion in an unjust way essentially by Hannah Arendt, who is the most brilliant critic of this conception. And I wrote a whole chapter about that in order to make clear that not only political action, but also political theory, was the center of the French Revolution. The second thing is the question of terror, la terreur. Under a lot of people in France, maybe elsewhere, consider that the terror and Robespierre are in fact the ancestors of Stalinism. If you read carefully what happened, it appears two things appear. One thing is that terror was divided in two types for someone like Robespierre. You had the terror by the crowd, which was the political absolute evil, and la terreur by the law, which could be necessary at certain times. And the terror by the law was decided precisely in order to stop the terror by the crowd. The terror
Slavoj Žižek
by the crowd was, to Robespierre's mind, to Danton's mind, to all people who were at that time active, was the beginning
by the crowd was, to Robespierre's mind, to Danton's mind, to all people who were at that time active, was the beginning
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of ochlocracy. And since they were Polybian in their mind, that was the end of the revolution and of course the beginning of a new monarchy that would be either the return of the previous royal family or worse, the power of any general—and you had a lot of general at that time because it was a war. So a lot of comments about the terror do not make this distinction. And although Hegel wrote one of the most deepest texts about the terror in the Phenomenology, he himself did not make this distinction. The terror by the crowd without the law or external to the law was represented by, for instance, the drownings of Nantes, where people in charge of the terror built up boats with a removable bottom, yeah, and priests, noblemen, but also very ordinary people, people who had been denounced by their neighbors, were by twenty or thirty were on the boat, and when the boat arrived in the middle of the Loire, the river, the bottom opened and they drowned. Robespierre thought that it was absolutely criminal. Because it was quite the contrary of what he had in mind when he talked about terror. For him, the terror was something that should be accomplished by a trial.
of ochlocracy. And since they were Polybian in their mind, that was the end of the revolution and of course the beginning of a new monarchy that would be either the return of the previous royal family or worse, the power of any general—and you had a lot of general at that time because it was a war. So a lot of comments about the terror do not make this distinction. And although Hegel wrote one of the most deepest texts about the terror in the Phenomenology, he himself did not make this distinction. The terror by the crowd without the law or external to the law was represented by, for instance, the drownings of Nantes, where people in charge of the terror built up boats with a removable bottom, yeah, and priests, noblemen, but also very ordinary people, people who had been denounced by their neighbors, were by twenty or thirty were on the boat, and when the boat arrived in the middle of the Loire, the river, the bottom opened and they drowned. Robespierre thought that it was absolutely criminal. Because it was quite the contrary of what he had in mind when he talked about terror. For him, the terror was something that should be accomplished by a trial.
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And of course at that time, death penalty was usual in all European countries, not only in France. And at that time the most, quote-marks, humane way of putting someone to death was considered to be the guillotine because it lasted very one instant, it was a machine, it did not depend on an individual called "le bourreau," and so on and so on. So the guillotine. And it is very interesting in Hegel's text that he considers as equivalent both types of death: the death by drowning and the death by guillotine. That means that he himself had not captured the deep distinction between the two types of terror: terror by the crowd and terror by the trial, by the law. Nevertheless, one has to wonder: why did Robespierre and others, but essentially Robespierre, did he consider terror as necessary? And why did he consider that at one moment suspicion was sufficient rather than proof? You have to ask something, you have to raise a question. But not without underlining the fact that the whole process of Robespierre's terror lasts one year. It's not a way of governing people; it's not a government. There is no government by terror. But the terror is something that is a necessity that makes government impossible. As opposed to the Stalinist terror, which is a way of governing. The Stalinist terror lasts for decades, let's say. And in fact, the Stalinist government is a government where terror is a means of governing. In the case of Robespierre, his conclusion—we may not agree with that conclusion—his conclusion was that the situation was such, was a war, not only was it a war but it was a war such that everyone could be a traitor because money was everywhere in order to pay traitors. He thought and concluded that governing a country was at that time impossible without terror. But terror was in fact in his own mind the contrary of a government, as opposed to the Stalinist conception. The last point, scandalous to some I made—the preceding point was scandalous to some people but not the same people—because to be for or against Robespierre is still an open question in France. The idea that Robespierre was not fascinated by death but was reasoning in political terms in a situation where politics became, to his own mind, impossible because of the war, is of course a contradiction in terms. It's in fact already a dialectic, a dialectical situation. But of course Robespierre did not think in terms of dialectics. It was
And of course at that time, death penalty was usual in all European countries, not only in France. And at that time the most, quote-marks, humane way of putting someone to death was considered to be the guillotine because it lasted very one instant, it was a machine, it did not depend on an individual called "le bourreau," and so on and so on. So the guillotine. And it is very interesting in Hegel's text that he considers as equivalent both types of death: the death by drowning and the death by guillotine. That means that he himself had not captured the deep distinction between the two types of terror: terror by the crowd and terror by the trial, by the law. Nevertheless, one has to wonder: why did Robespierre and others, but essentially Robespierre, did he consider terror as necessary? And why did he consider that at one moment suspicion was sufficient rather than proof? You have to ask something, you have to raise a question. But not without underlining the fact that the whole process of Robespierre's terror lasts one year. It's not a way of governing people; it's not a government. There is no government by terror. But the terror is something that is a necessity that makes government impossible. As opposed to the Stalinist terror, which is a way of governing. The Stalinist terror lasts for decades, let's say. And in fact, the Stalinist government is a government where terror is a means of governing. In the case of Robespierre, his conclusion—we may not agree with that conclusion—his conclusion was that the situation was such, was a war, not only was it a war but it was a war such that everyone could be a traitor because money was everywhere in order to pay traitors. He thought and concluded that governing a country was at that time impossible without terror. But terror was in fact in his own mind the contrary of a government, as opposed to the Stalinist conception. The last point, scandalous to some I made—the preceding point was scandalous to some people but not the same people—because to be for or against Robespierre is still an open question in France. The idea that Robespierre was not fascinated by death but was reasoning in political terms in a situation where politics became, to his own mind, impossible because of the war, is of course a contradiction in terms. It's in fact already a dialectic, a dialectical situation. But of course Robespierre did not think in terms of dialectics. It was
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either/or. That Robespierre terror in terms of either/or is very difficult to capture, but nevertheless that's the way he thought of it. What the third thing, the third point I made, which was scandalous to some, not the same as I repeat, was the fact that I connected one feature of one very essential feature of French Revolution with the status it recognized to the right of property. As you remember, the Soviet Revolution and the Chinese Revolution thought that private property should disappear, and that it was a limitation of the French Revolution to have thought of a solution in terms of property. But on the other hand, what is very seldom underlined is that French Revolution solved a question that had been unsolved, that remained unsolved in Europe since the Roman Empire. That is the question of the property of the soil. The notion of paysan (peasant) is a notion that has no meaning in France before French Revolution. Before French Revolution, the notion was fermier (farmer), métayer, various terms. In other words, people who worked on the soil but did not own the soil and paid a certain fee, either in money or in, you mean ten percent of the product they return to the, yes, but also in work in fact, in product in fact, in fruits, in... well, the best solution was the solution of farming, farming in a narrow sense; a farmer is someone who pays in money, as opposed to the métayer who pays in product. And the fermier could expect to become reasonably well, have a good situation, while the métayer could not expect that. But in general, the fact was that the owner of the soil did not work on the soil and those who worked on the soil did not own the soil. This situation was the normal situation in Europe since the Roman Empire and in fact since the Roman Republic, since the instability of the Roman Republic was based on that precisely. The French Revolution, for the first time in European history, built up a program—of course it was not effective immediately—but built up a program where the ideal was that people who worked on the soil were also owners of the soil. That is the narrow sense of paysan. When Balzac wrote a novel whose title was Les Paysans, he described a new class of society which was this class of people who owned the soil, worked the soil, and could become rich by doing so. Which was, in Balzac's conception, quite scandalous. He thought that richness without
either/or. That Robespierre terror in terms of either/or is very difficult to capture, but nevertheless that's the way he thought of it. What the third thing, the third point I made, which was scandalous to some, not the same as I repeat, was the fact that I connected one feature of one very essential feature of French Revolution with the status it recognized to the right of property. As you remember, the Soviet Revolution and the Chinese Revolution thought that private property should disappear, and that it was a limitation of the French Revolution to have thought of a solution in terms of property. But on the other hand, what is very seldom underlined is that French Revolution solved a question that had been unsolved, that remained unsolved in Europe since the Roman Empire. That is the question of the property of the soil. The notion of paysan (peasant) is a notion that has no meaning in France before French Revolution. Before French Revolution, the notion was fermier (farmer), métayer, various terms. In other words, people who worked on the soil but did not own the soil and paid a certain fee, either in money or in, you mean ten percent of the product they return to the, yes, but also in work in fact, in product in fact, in fruits, in... well, the best solution was the solution of farming, farming in a narrow sense; a farmer is someone who pays in money, as opposed to the métayer who pays in product. And the fermier could expect to become reasonably well, have a good situation, while the métayer could not expect that. But in general, the fact was that the owner of the soil did not work on the soil and those who worked on the soil did not own the soil. This situation was the normal situation in Europe since the Roman Empire and in fact since the Roman Republic, since the instability of the Roman Republic was based on that precisely. The French Revolution, for the first time in European history, built up a program—of course it was not effective immediately—but built up a program where the ideal was that people who worked on the soil were also owners of the soil. That is the narrow sense of paysan. When Balzac wrote a novel whose title was Les Paysans, he described a new class of society which was this class of people who owned the soil, worked the soil, and could become rich by doing so. Which was, in Balzac's conception, quite scandalous. He thought that richness without
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instruction or without nobility, just based on the fact that you owned the soil and worked on the soil was a bad richness. So his novel about Les Paysans is quite interesting to read because it explains—that's the reason why Marx admired it so much—it explains why peasantry in France ceased to be a revolutionary class. It ceased to be a revolutionary class because the agrarian question had been solved. And in fact, as opposed to the Chinese, the Soviet and Chinese Revolution, which are characterized by the fact that they did not find any solution for peasantry, and on the contrary created terrible situations for peasantry with terrible consequences, not only consequences in terms of simple life, but also consequences from an ecological point of view. I recently learned that in Ukraine since the antiquity you had a certain earth called black earth, chernozem. It was very fertile because you had something like fifteen meters of earth, of soil. Well, while for instance the most fertile part of France you have something like five or four meters of soil. Well, now in Ukraine the soil has disappeared. The wind has blown over everything because of the type of culture, because of the consequence of the fact that nobody thought the earth as something that he was responsible of. And of course, morally speaking you may regret it, but in order to make someone responsible for the soil, one way is to make him a proprietor of the soil. That's the solution that the French Revolution built up with, in fact, very short circulation—of course this situation is not true anymore, but for one century at least it existed. It seems to me that it cannot be you cannot approach the question of private property without raising the question of the soil. If you do not do so, well, the result is to me unavoidable—what happened in Soviet Union, in fact the destruction of the Russian peasantry, which became well with massacres and so on and so on, but at the end became a sort of variable of adjustment for policies that were defined every five years, and contradictory objectives were fixed to the peasantry and it didn't work. And worse, the Chinese solution which now has produced the fact that Chinese peasantry has been deported massively, has become a lumpenproletariat surrounding the cities. The soil has been covered in many places by water with the huge dams. And all that because the question that
instruction or without nobility, just based on the fact that you owned the soil and worked on the soil was a bad richness. So his novel about Les Paysans is quite interesting to read because it explains—that's the reason why Marx admired it so much—it explains why peasantry in France ceased to be a revolutionary class. It ceased to be a revolutionary class because the agrarian question had been solved. And in fact, as opposed to the Chinese, the Soviet and Chinese Revolution, which are characterized by the fact that they did not find any solution for peasantry, and on the contrary created terrible situations for peasantry with terrible consequences, not only consequences in terms of simple life, but also consequences from an ecological point of view. I recently learned that in Ukraine since the antiquity you had a certain earth called black earth, chernozem. It was very fertile because you had something like fifteen meters of earth, of soil. Well, while for instance the most fertile part of France you have something like five or four meters of soil. Well, now in Ukraine the soil has disappeared. The wind has blown over everything because of the type of culture, because of the consequence of the fact that nobody thought the earth as something that he was responsible of. And of course, morally speaking you may regret it, but in order to make someone responsible for the soil, one way is to make him a proprietor of the soil. That's the solution that the French Revolution built up with, in fact, very short circulation—of course this situation is not true anymore, but for one century at least it existed. It seems to me that it cannot be you cannot approach the question of private property without raising the question of the soil. If you do not do so, well, the result is to me unavoidable—what happened in Soviet Union, in fact the destruction of the Russian peasantry, which became well with massacres and so on and so on, but at the end became a sort of variable of adjustment for policies that were defined every five years, and contradictory objectives were fixed to the peasantry and it didn't work. And worse, the Chinese solution which now has produced the fact that Chinese peasantry has been deported massively, has become a lumpenproletariat surrounding the cities. The soil has been covered in many places by water with the huge dams. And all that because the question that
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the French Revolution had raised—people who work on the soil has a right to become owner of the soil—this question has not been raised. And has not been raised because the notion of being proprietor of something had completely disappeared. So, what was scandalous for some was the fact that I consider that the French Revolution were right including the right of property among the rights of man. And that does not entail necessarily that capitalism is a part of the rights of man. There is a sharp distinction between the property, the individual rights of individual property and the non-individual property which characterizes on the contrary capitalism. Well. Everyone of us has lots of food for thought. I've got lots of questions, but Žižek goes first. First, I must say that I was so enthusiastic listening to you that I almost became a Derridean. No, no, in the sense of, you know, when Derrida was fashionable, when Derrida was in, to fight the linear metaphysical notion of time. And my idea was, couldn't we stretch time with you in a non-linear... like, minutes would be one hour and minutes, you know? So I will try to leave some time for the debate just to raise some questions. But first I was very touched by your introductory remark and if I can briefly answer them. Yes, we personally didn't meet but for me at least it was something like, it's very personal what I will say, I read in a book on Andrei Tarkovsky that you know, in his last years the only place that he could get money to do a movie was Sweden. So he got an office there preparing Sacrifice, his last film, in the same building where Ingmar Bergman had also an office. But they took care of never meeting each other precisely because they had such a respect for each other that they were afraid. So I think I would say even another thing. Many people tell me, "But he is a Zionist, he should be your enemy," you or whatever what, no? And I, you know what's my answer to them? Not this stupid "no, but blah blah blah," but I say something different. I refer to that stupid American or even in English you have it here, phrase, you remember when you have a friend who is a clumsy, stupid friend who does a lot of damage to you? And then the saying is,
the French Revolution had raised—people who work on the soil has a right to become owner of the soil—this question has not been raised. And has not been raised because the notion of being proprietor of something had completely disappeared. So, what was scandalous for some was the fact that I consider that the French Revolution were right including the right of property among the rights of man. And that does not entail necessarily that capitalism is a part of the rights of man. There is a sharp distinction between the property, the individual rights of individual property and the non-individual property which characterizes on the contrary capitalism. Well. Everyone of us has lots of food for thought. I've got lots of questions, but Žižek goes first. First, I must say that I was so enthusiastic listening to you that I almost became a Derridean. No, no, in the sense of, you know, when Derrida was fashionable, when Derrida was in, to fight the linear metaphysical notion of time. And my idea was, couldn't we stretch time with you in a non-linear... like, minutes would be one hour and minutes, you know? So I will try to leave some time for the debate just to raise some questions. But first I was very touched by your introductory remark and if I can briefly answer them. Yes, we personally didn't meet but for me at least it was something like, it's very personal what I will say, I read in a book on Andrei Tarkovsky that you know, in his last years the only place that he could get money to do a movie was Sweden. So he got an office there preparing Sacrifice, his last film, in the same building where Ingmar Bergman had also an office. But they took care of never meeting each other precisely because they had such a respect for each other that they were afraid. So I think I would say even another thing. Many people tell me, "But he is a Zionist, he should be your enemy," you or whatever what, no? And I, you know what's my answer to them? Not this stupid "no, but blah blah blah," but I say something different. I refer to that stupid American or even in English you have it here, phrase, you remember when you have a friend who is a clumsy, stupid friend who does a lot of damage to you? And then the saying is,
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"With friends like these who needs enemies?" Well, with you I would say maybe we are enemies but with enemies like you who needs friends, no? That's what I would say. Let's go on. There are so many things to say. So I would like to be short. For example, when you mention that ideal revolution and so on, I think you have it in the book, a wonderful distinction which has, if you know history of theory, great echoes from Lacan to Hegel, I think you do draw it, the distinction between revolutionary ideal and ideal revolution. It's strictly parallel, for example, to in Lacan "idéal du moi" and "moi idéal." And this reflexive term, I don't have time to go on it, has in Hegel, you find at the beginning of second volume of logic the same: from "bestimmte Reflexion," from determinate reflection to reflexive determination. There is a whole wealth there. But let me begin with this very important, I will just to get warm things up a little bit, add some examples which I love, of this retroactivity how French Revolution was retroactively read. I always find so wonderfully stupid attempts—for example, do you know this? In East Germany, German Democratic Republic, in the last years approximately of its existence, from mid-1970s, they had this great movement of rehabilitating their German past. As all, precisely in the way of French Revolution, pointing towards like Goethe's Faust, "Oh, we realized it in," and my favorite one is they rehabilitated at the end even Frederick the Great. He became a progressive bourgeois king and so on, pointing towards, and so on. But my favorite example is I remember in late 70s, early 80s, they made a TV series celebrating, of course it was one of them, Martin Luther. But they had a problem there. Nonetheless, their heroes were also Thomas Müntzer, peasant revolutionary. So you know, Luther, apart from a short period in the beginning, wasn't exactly for peasants. How to do this? Oh my god, I love this for things like this I am nostalgic for communism. You know how they solved in the TV series? You have Müntzer visiting Luther, trying to convince him. And you know what Luther tells him? He speaks like today's Marxists. He says, "Your goal is right, but historically we are not yet there. Now we are at the period of bourgeois revolution,
"With friends like these who needs enemies?" Well, with you I would say maybe we are enemies but with enemies like you who needs friends, no? That's what I would say. Let's go on. There are so many things to say. So I would like to be short. For example, when you mention that ideal revolution and so on, I think you have it in the book, a wonderful distinction which has, if you know history of theory, great echoes from Lacan to Hegel, I think you do draw it, the distinction between revolutionary ideal and ideal revolution. It's strictly parallel, for example, to in Lacan "idéal du moi" and "moi idéal." And this reflexive term, I don't have time to go on it, has in Hegel, you find at the beginning of second volume of logic the same: from "bestimmte Reflexion," from determinate reflection to reflexive determination. There is a whole wealth there. But let me begin with this very important, I will just to get warm things up a little bit, add some examples which I love, of this retroactivity how French Revolution was retroactively read. I always find so wonderfully stupid attempts—for example, do you know this? In East Germany, German Democratic Republic, in the last years approximately of its existence, from mid-1970s, they had this great movement of rehabilitating their German past. As all, precisely in the way of French Revolution, pointing towards like Goethe's Faust, "Oh, we realized it in," and my favorite one is they rehabilitated at the end even Frederick the Great. He became a progressive bourgeois king and so on, pointing towards, and so on. But my favorite example is I remember in late 70s, early 80s, they made a TV series celebrating, of course it was one of them, Martin Luther. But they had a problem there. Nonetheless, their heroes were also Thomas Müntzer, peasant revolutionary. So you know, Luther, apart from a short period in the beginning, wasn't exactly for peasants. How to do this? Oh my god, I love this for things like this I am nostalgic for communism. You know how they solved in the TV series? You have Müntzer visiting Luther, trying to convince him. And you know what Luther tells him? He speaks like today's Marxists. He says, "Your goal is right, but historically we are not yet there. Now we are at the period of bourgeois revolution,
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we need this. years later, you know, maybe your time will come." And the same as an old Maoist, you know they do in China every years when there is an anniversary of '49 victory, they do a new movie of the Chinese victory. And in the last version, which is very Hollywood-made, you have Mao pointing towards Deng Xiaoping. You have a famous scene: Mao with a couple of guards walks around Beijing, Peking, and says, "Oh my god, I don't have my cigarettes. There is a traffic there, let's go there and buy a cigarette." And his companion tells him, "Sorry President, but you know the owner of the traffic escaped as revolutionaries, I cannot." And you know what Mao says? "My god, I cannot even buy my cigarettes. You know what? In some time, even if it takes decades, we will have to bring capitalism back, you know?" Now, I love this because as you know, that's the highest semiotic hermeneutic pleasure of reading communist documents. How when you have some new movement, change of line, first it's usually hinted by: "Oh, you take an author years old, we have to change, he's not good, or all of a sudden he is good." You know, for example, in China, I think that one of the signs of Cultural Revolution was that Mao all of a sudden was for legalists and so on. It was apparently a debate about the First Emperor and so on. But let's go on so that I don't get lost in this pure pleasure. I will of course, it's my duty, but I will try not to totally convert you, but just to complicate a little bit. Isn't the paradox nonetheless of October Revolution that, you can say it was all a manipulation, but Lenin was aware that they won with the slogan "Land and Peace"? It's October Revolution at the beginning, they did in a way something similar to French Revolution: they gave land. That's why it was such a shock like years later, even less, no, years later approximately, the land was taken away from them. So another point about October Revolution. When you mention this the power of one and so on, where I like Hegel here was that he tried to—but not in the simple legal way, separation of powers—to draw a distinction between the one, the King, who should, as Hegel puts it, just sign the name. The empty
we need this. years later, you know, maybe your time will come." And the same as an old Maoist, you know they do in China every years when there is an anniversary of '49 victory, they do a new movie of the Chinese victory. And in the last version, which is very Hollywood-made, you have Mao pointing towards Deng Xiaoping. You have a famous scene: Mao with a couple of guards walks around Beijing, Peking, and says, "Oh my god, I don't have my cigarettes. There is a traffic there, let's go there and buy a cigarette." And his companion tells him, "Sorry President, but you know the owner of the traffic escaped as revolutionaries, I cannot." And you know what Mao says? "My god, I cannot even buy my cigarettes. You know what? In some time, even if it takes decades, we will have to bring capitalism back, you know?" Now, I love this because as you know, that's the highest semiotic hermeneutic pleasure of reading communist documents. How when you have some new movement, change of line, first it's usually hinted by: "Oh, you take an author years old, we have to change, he's not good, or all of a sudden he is good." You know, for example, in China, I think that one of the signs of Cultural Revolution was that Mao all of a sudden was for legalists and so on. It was apparently a debate about the First Emperor and so on. But let's go on so that I don't get lost in this pure pleasure. I will of course, it's my duty, but I will try not to totally convert you, but just to complicate a little bit. Isn't the paradox nonetheless of October Revolution that, you can say it was all a manipulation, but Lenin was aware that they won with the slogan "Land and Peace"? It's October Revolution at the beginning, they did in a way something similar to French Revolution: they gave land. That's why it was such a shock like years later, even less, no, years later approximately, the land was taken away from them. So another point about October Revolution. When you mention this the power of one and so on, where I like Hegel here was that he tried to—but not in the simple legal way, separation of powers—to draw a distinction between the one, the King, who should, as Hegel puts it, just sign the name. The empty
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one, the empty
one, the empty
Slavoj Žižek
master. Hegel says it doesn't matter if he is an idiot or this, and then the experts. But what Hegel saw very well is that
master. Hegel says it doesn't matter if he is an idiot or this, and then the experts. But what Hegel saw very well is that
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you have to have a gap; experts should not have direct power. There must be a gap. And here I see a problem with Stalinism. Stalin did not pretend to be this empty master. He really pretended... so here, I'm referring unfortunately to a book which most of you do not know, Relire la Révolution, when you develop also in some other texts of you how, you know, we shouldn't dismiss Stalin as "this is the dream of some liberal communist, everything was perfect in the 20s, Bukharin, blah blah blah, and then idiot Stalin comes and says why don't we kill a couple of millions." No, Stalin did intervene at a certain point of serious deadlock of the Leninist vision. And I agree with you how he brought in the real and all that. But my point would just be this one. I would emphasize at the same time another point which I developed already many times. Nonetheless, in terms of Lacan, was not Stalinism in a way university discourse at its purest? Stalin always presented himself as instrument of the people, expert knowledge. You know where you can find this? Maybe just to amuse you I will give two examples that I often refer to. When I watch old documentaries—you find them now all on YouTube—and you compare big speeches (I'm sorry some of you know this detail) by Stalin and by Hitler. It's typical how in, when Hitler or fascist leader speaks, at the end the crowd applauds and the leader just receives the applause. A Stalinist leader always stands up and joins the applause, like "I'm just one of you" and so on and so on. This is also why we don't have time to go into it, something like the Stalinist show trials, monster trials, is unthinkable in Nazism. It's not because they were better, but it's unthinkable for the Nazis, for example, to organize a big trial against the leading Jews and accuse them of Jewish plot or what. It didn't work that way. Why? Because I think that another thing, you should read them, it's very powerful reading, now they are sometimes republished, these minutes published of the big Stalinist trials like
you have to have a gap; experts should not have direct power. There must be a gap. And here I see a problem with Stalinism. Stalin did not pretend to be this empty master. He really pretended... so here, I'm referring unfortunately to a book which most of you do not know, Relire la Révolution, when you develop also in some other texts of you how, you know, we shouldn't dismiss Stalin as "this is the dream of some liberal communist, everything was perfect in the 20s, Bukharin, blah blah blah, and then idiot Stalin comes and says why don't we kill a couple of millions." No, Stalin did intervene at a certain point of serious deadlock of the Leninist vision. And I agree with you how he brought in the real and all that. But my point would just be this one. I would emphasize at the same time another point which I developed already many times. Nonetheless, in terms of Lacan, was not Stalinism in a way university discourse at its purest? Stalin always presented himself as instrument of the people, expert knowledge. You know where you can find this? Maybe just to amuse you I will give two examples that I often refer to. When I watch old documentaries—you find them now all on YouTube—and you compare big speeches (I'm sorry some of you know this detail) by Stalin and by Hitler. It's typical how in, when Hitler or fascist leader speaks, at the end the crowd applauds and the leader just receives the applause. A Stalinist leader always stands up and joins the applause, like "I'm just one of you" and so on and so on. This is also why we don't have time to go into it, something like the Stalinist show trials, monster trials, is unthinkable in Nazism. It's not because they were better, but it's unthinkable for the Nazis, for example, to organize a big trial against the leading Jews and accuse them of Jewish plot or what. It didn't work that way. Why? Because I think that another thing, you should read them, it's very powerful reading, now they are sometimes republished, these minutes published of the big Stalinist trials like
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recently I read the one from '49-'50, László Rajk and all those. What fascinates me so much is that even the lowest trash—and they use all this anal terminology "you are trash," "vermin," whatever "shit"—nonetheless at the same time you are able to assume the position of pure metalanguage and explain how did you become that. Like in László Rajk trial, the prosecutor (some big democrat like Vyshinsky or who I don't know) asks him "How did you become a traitor?" and as if from some objective knowledge László Rajk says "Already when I was a young boy my parents taught me to hate the working class or whatever," you know. My god, where does he talk from? And this goes to the end. In a book, I don't otherwise like it very much, Anne Applebaum's Gulag, I read how in the worst years of Gulag every year on Stalin's birthday all inmates were gathered and they had to sign each of them a telegram to Stalin wishing him all the best and so on. In Nazism this is unthinkable: collect all the Jews in Auschwitz to send a telegram to Hitler or whatever. So what I'm saying is that even if you are the lowest trash, you, Stalinism unfortunately in this sense is still part of Enlightenment; you may be trash but there is some neutral knowledge, which is why remember Stalin's great text is that philosophy chapter which is not even attributed to... so I would, so that I don't get lost, I would maybe emphasize a little bit more that the madness of Stalinism is nonetheless that it's university discourse brought to madness. More this. Second thing, when you said this three phases revolution and so on and so on. Maybe I'm a naive here, I don't try to save Lenin, I'm not one of those crazy Trotskyists who think if Lenin were only to survive three years longer he would have made a pact with Trotsky and we would have a wonderful flowering Soviet Union. No, as you pointed out convincingly, Stalin intervened by proposing a certain formula in a deadlock. But nonetheless what I would add is that wasn't this, in this strict sense, revolutionary belief, in spite of what Trotsky said and so on... I think that in the same way as
recently I read the one from '49-'50, László Rajk and all those. What fascinates me so much is that even the lowest trash—and they use all this anal terminology "you are trash," "vermin," whatever "shit"—nonetheless at the same time you are able to assume the position of pure metalanguage and explain how did you become that. Like in László Rajk trial, the prosecutor (some big democrat like Vyshinsky or who I don't know) asks him "How did you become a traitor?" and as if from some objective knowledge László Rajk says "Already when I was a young boy my parents taught me to hate the working class or whatever," you know. My god, where does he talk from? And this goes to the end. In a book, I don't otherwise like it very much, Anne Applebaum's Gulag, I read how in the worst years of Gulag every year on Stalin's birthday all inmates were gathered and they had to sign each of them a telegram to Stalin wishing him all the best and so on. In Nazism this is unthinkable: collect all the Jews in Auschwitz to send a telegram to Hitler or whatever. So what I'm saying is that even if you are the lowest trash, you, Stalinism unfortunately in this sense is still part of Enlightenment; you may be trash but there is some neutral knowledge, which is why remember Stalin's great text is that philosophy chapter which is not even attributed to... so I would, so that I don't get lost, I would maybe emphasize a little bit more that the madness of Stalinism is nonetheless that it's university discourse brought to madness. More this. Second thing, when you said this three phases revolution and so on and so on. Maybe I'm a naive here, I don't try to save Lenin, I'm not one of those crazy Trotskyists who think if Lenin were only to survive three years longer he would have made a pact with Trotsky and we would have a wonderful flowering Soviet Union. No, as you pointed out convincingly, Stalin intervened by proposing a certain formula in a deadlock. But nonetheless what I would add is that wasn't this, in this strict sense, revolutionary belief, in spite of what Trotsky said and so on... I think that in the same way as
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Leninism itself it was a Stalinist product. I think that only at that point this revolution... with Lenin it's still all much more ambiguous, he is not sure and so on, because we shouldn't forget that Leninism itself is a Stalinist term. It was codified at that point. Let me go quickly so that we don't lose time. Next point, what you say about, I love
Leninism itself it was a Stalinist product. I think that only at that point this revolution... with Lenin it's still all much more ambiguous, he is not sure and so on, because we shouldn't forget that Leninism itself is a Stalinist term. It was codified at that point. Let me go quickly so that we don't lose time. Next point, what you say about, I love
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those parts of his book, where he goes into how in spite
those parts of his book, where he goes into how in spite
Slavoj Žižek
of all these problematic points, the French Revolution is the only one with a truly universal appeal. In contrast, you do a very nice critique of Hannah Arendt who idealized too much the American Revolution. And you point out very nicely that in a way it's only Lincoln, with Lincoln, with Civil War, that revolution is over, maybe even in the 1960s, and as the last stupid events in United States show, maybe it's not over even now, you know. So what I'm trying to say is: why don't you mention, you know, the biggest event which made empirically French Revolution a world historical event is for me Haiti Revolution? It was something absolutely extraordinary. You have there half-illiterate, if they were, they were not as primitive as they claimed, slaves and so on wanting just to become like French. You know, if you look at some revolutionary scene which makes me cry, it really makes me cry. You know what happened when Napoleon sent an army there to crush them? But he made a mistake, a strong presence in that army were Polish soldiers. And this is a legendary scene: they approached the slave army, French army, and then this is a historical fact, they heard some singing and they said, "Oh, probably some stupid African tribal songs." When they come closer they saw they were singing Marseillaise, the slaves. And that's the magic moment then, especially Polish but also some French soldiers said, "Wait a minute, what if we are on the wrong side?" and changed sides. And Napoleon, this was his first, maybe in Spain, defeat and so on. And so this, this is I think part of your argument for the universal appeal and it's again the glory to Jacobins. They immediately accepted it, they are our equal, while even American Revolution, even its most liberal radical Thomas Jefferson, they considered Toussaint Louverture a monster and so on. Now just if you allow me to finish with two further remarks. One is this one. I agree with you that we, that this type of revolution, what you call revolutionary belief, is over. But where I remain, pardon, it's meaningless today, not revolutionary, it's in a very naive pessimistic way. I nonetheless think that we are approaching on many levels—refugees, ecology, intellectual property—a certain deadlock and something will have to happen. I am not ready to engage in any easy predictions in what way. In this totally formal way I remain not a revolutionary but like something will have to change because if it will not change then it will change nonetheless but in a much worse way. So this, but now the final point which may surprise you that I mention it, my final point. I like very much in another text where you said something about what repelled you from Maoism when you got it that—I'm sorry if I simplify you—what when you said that like you noticed that in Mao and so on, I'm simplifying you now, you should find it, human lives don't count, to put it survival doesn't count. It's not only this, it's another thing I'm sorry if some of you already know it which shocked me. Do you know Mao's speech, I think it's '59, at Lushan conference, which shocked me with its obscenity? It was after the obvious failure of the Great Leap Forward. It was a moment of self-criticism. Mao said, "We have openly to admit, me the first, thousands of people died, we made horrible mistakes." And then, this is not hidden in, it's the final paragraph of the text, that metaphors are never neutral, that shocked me. You know what Mao—maybe you know—what Mao says there? I mean I'm ashamed to pronounce these words here. He makes a comparison between this self-criticism and what's the vulgar word for flatulence, farting? He said, "If you want to shit, shit. If you feel a need to fart, fart. You will feel better. That's how we should do our critique here." Now, you know, he is talking about confessing openly guilt about an immense catastrophe. And in what sense does he use this as a metaphor? Like this throws a totally new light on this self-criticism if you compare it with these activities and so on. But the very last thing to provoke you about Cultural Revolution. You know where I'm... would you agree? and this brought me a violent reply from Badiou, of course. I said that I'm here very Hegelian like List der Vernunft, cunning of reason into what things turn. I think that in the way that you said that the Chinese reproach to Soviet Union was you brought revisionism, Khrushchev, and so on. But isn't, can't we say retroactively that the actual result of Cultural Revolution is Deng Xiaoping? It erased tradition, it emptied the slate, and it created these disoriented individuals, the ideal playground for let's introduce the market now and so on. So that's what hardline Maoists who still are cannot accept, that Deng Xiaoping was not simply a betrayal; in some deeper Hegelian sense he is maybe even the result of it. But okay, you can choose whatever of my confused ramblings. I would just like if you just give, where do you stand? am I a pessimist too much? Do you agree that at some level we are approaching some critical point? and that, I'm not saying now we need that revolution, definitely not. I'm just saying that in some way things will happen if we want it or not. My pessimism is that the true utopia is that our relative welfare, the way we have it now can go on indefinitely, you know, we should just be silent, modest, sacrifice. No, it will not go on. We are approaching serious times. This is the only reason that I remain not leftist, in I even don't know what will it be, but like things will have to change radically, for good or for bad. I'm sorry if I was too long, please. I shall begin by the end. What you were saying about the result of Cultural Revolution, I hold the same point of view. It seems to me that what the Cultural Revolution in some way proved is that it's very easy to destroy a class. While the same was not true for French Revolution. French Revolution did not really think in terms of destroying a class. Well, of course, the noblemen were deprived of their privileges and so on and so on, but the idea of killing all the noblemen was never was never considered. The only moment where the question may have been raised is with the question of the priests, which is a dramatic question. But nevertheless, the idea, and for instance Robespierre never thought that priests should disappear completely. While in China, in Chinese revolution, the Cultural Revolution, the idea, which is quite different from what happened in the first part of the Chinese revolution, was that a whole class, namely the class of the intellectuals, of the students, well let's say, well yes, people who had nothing else—property had disappeared but what remained was intellectual property, I mean the property of its own talent. This should disappear. And Cultural Revolution tried to do so and in fact achieved that. For instance, it's clear, you all the documents are there, people died, but also books were burned, it was impossible to study anything, the notion of talent was completely erased. The fact that it's very easy to obtain to get such a result proved that it should be done with another class. And it's in fact what happened to peasantry after that. So to me, I wouldn't say exactly, but it's the same thing, that Cultural Revolution prepared Deng Xiaoping. It prepared what is happening now: that is a China with capitalism and without peasants. Which is exactly the contrary of what the Cultural Revolution explicitly stated: the ideal being a China with peasants, everyone being a peasant, and without capitalists. But in fact, the practice of the Cultural Revolution showed that it's very easy to make a whole social class disappear. In fact, it's very easy because the existence of a class is connected with the existence of the bodies that compose that class. And so once the question of survival is reduced to an ideology—the expression was "the ideology of survival" is to be fought against—the idea that survival is an ideology was to me when I was a Maoist and when I discovered this expression, was to me the point I could not... But Lin Biao put this even more radically than Mao, I think it was Lin Biao. Well, the idea that what happened after Mao's death must have an explanation. Well, why did Lin Biao and four of his friends disappear in an accident? Well, that must be at least a political struggle. And if there is a political struggle, it cannot be reduced to the result of the death of Mao's death; it must have begun before that. It seems that the use of the Little Red Book as a sort of fetish was an invention of Lin Biao. So for instance Badiou thinks that there was one Cultural Revolution that was bad, which was Lin Biao's Cultural Revolution, and one Cultural Revolution that was good, that was represented by the Shanghai Commune. Well, I've read the documents. What it means that at least the "bad" Cultural Revolution held the power during because Lin Biao was in power, not the Shanghai Commune. So it's to me it's sort of frivolous to think that a historical event should be analyzed from the point of view of those who have no power on it rather than from the point of view of those who have the power. Of course, in Nazi Germany you had, for instance, the White Rose; they fought, but you cannot judge Nazi Germany from the point of view of the White Rose; you have to judge Nazi Germany from the point of view of those who had the power. So, well, that's another question. But I would like to answer to another point. It's well, the question of what will happen now is deeply connected with the determination of the zones where stability is at its lowest point. And in my mind, the part of the world where the stability is at its lowest point is Western Europe. Because the solution it has found, which is solve the outcome of the Second World War in terms of peace, prosperity, and a sort of multi-side alliance where each government guarantees the stability of the others—so for instance if there is something that would happen in France, it's clear that Germany would do what it's necessary for some stability to be restored—I think that this system of reciprocity of stabilization is now reaching its end or its limit. What is happening in Spain, in Catalonia, is it seems to me much more important than it seems. Because if the European Union shows itself to
of all these problematic points, the French Revolution is the only one with a truly universal appeal. In contrast, you do a very nice critique of Hannah Arendt who idealized too much the American Revolution. And you point out very nicely that in a way it's only Lincoln, with Lincoln, with Civil War, that revolution is over, maybe even in the 1960s, and as the last stupid events in United States show, maybe it's not over even now, you know. So what I'm trying to say is: why don't you mention, you know, the biggest event which made empirically French Revolution a world historical event is for me Haiti Revolution? It was something absolutely extraordinary. You have there half-illiterate, if they were, they were not as primitive as they claimed, slaves and so on wanting just to become like French. You know, if you look at some revolutionary scene which makes me cry, it really makes me cry. You know what happened when Napoleon sent an army there to crush them? But he made a mistake, a strong presence in that army were Polish soldiers. And this is a legendary scene: they approached the slave army, French army, and then this is a historical fact, they heard some singing and they said, "Oh, probably some stupid African tribal songs." When they come closer they saw they were singing Marseillaise, the slaves. And that's the magic moment then, especially Polish but also some French soldiers said, "Wait a minute, what if we are on the wrong side?" and changed sides. And Napoleon, this was his first, maybe in Spain, defeat and so on. And so this, this is I think part of your argument for the universal appeal and it's again the glory to Jacobins. They immediately accepted it, they are our equal, while even American Revolution, even its most liberal radical Thomas Jefferson, they considered Toussaint Louverture a monster and so on. Now just if you allow me to finish with two further remarks. One is this one. I agree with you that we, that this type of revolution, what you call revolutionary belief, is over. But where I remain, pardon, it's meaningless today, not revolutionary, it's in a very naive pessimistic way. I nonetheless think that we are approaching on many levels—refugees, ecology, intellectual property—a certain deadlock and something will have to happen. I am not ready to engage in any easy predictions in what way. In this totally formal way I remain not a revolutionary but like something will have to change because if it will not change then it will change nonetheless but in a much worse way. So this, but now the final point which may surprise you that I mention it, my final point. I like very much in another text where you said something about what repelled you from Maoism when you got it that—I'm sorry if I simplify you—what when you said that like you noticed that in Mao and so on, I'm simplifying you now, you should find it, human lives don't count, to put it survival doesn't count. It's not only this, it's another thing I'm sorry if some of you already know it which shocked me. Do you know Mao's speech, I think it's '59, at Lushan conference, which shocked me with its obscenity? It was after the obvious failure of the Great Leap Forward. It was a moment of self-criticism. Mao said, "We have openly to admit, me the first, thousands of people died, we made horrible mistakes." And then, this is not hidden in, it's the final paragraph of the text, that metaphors are never neutral, that shocked me. You know what Mao—maybe you know—what Mao says there? I mean I'm ashamed to pronounce these words here. He makes a comparison between this self-criticism and what's the vulgar word for flatulence, farting? He said, "If you want to shit, shit. If you feel a need to fart, fart. You will feel better. That's how we should do our critique here." Now, you know, he is talking about confessing openly guilt about an immense catastrophe. And in what sense does he use this as a metaphor? Like this throws a totally new light on this self-criticism if you compare it with these activities and so on. But the very last thing to provoke you about Cultural Revolution. You know where I'm... would you agree? and this brought me a violent reply from Badiou, of course. I said that I'm here very Hegelian like List der Vernunft, cunning of reason into what things turn. I think that in the way that you said that the Chinese reproach to Soviet Union was you brought revisionism, Khrushchev, and so on. But isn't, can't we say retroactively that the actual result of Cultural Revolution is Deng Xiaoping? It erased tradition, it emptied the slate, and it created these disoriented individuals, the ideal playground for let's introduce the market now and so on. So that's what hardline Maoists who still are cannot accept, that Deng Xiaoping was not simply a betrayal; in some deeper Hegelian sense he is maybe even the result of it. But okay, you can choose whatever of my confused ramblings. I would just like if you just give, where do you stand? am I a pessimist too much? Do you agree that at some level we are approaching some critical point? and that, I'm not saying now we need that revolution, definitely not. I'm just saying that in some way things will happen if we want it or not. My pessimism is that the true utopia is that our relative welfare, the way we have it now can go on indefinitely, you know, we should just be silent, modest, sacrifice. No, it will not go on. We are approaching serious times. This is the only reason that I remain not leftist, in I even don't know what will it be, but like things will have to change radically, for good or for bad. I'm sorry if I was too long, please. I shall begin by the end. What you were saying about the result of Cultural Revolution, I hold the same point of view. It seems to me that what the Cultural Revolution in some way proved is that it's very easy to destroy a class. While the same was not true for French Revolution. French Revolution did not really think in terms of destroying a class. Well, of course, the noblemen were deprived of their privileges and so on and so on, but the idea of killing all the noblemen was never was never considered. The only moment where the question may have been raised is with the question of the priests, which is a dramatic question. But nevertheless, the idea, and for instance Robespierre never thought that priests should disappear completely. While in China, in Chinese revolution, the Cultural Revolution, the idea, which is quite different from what happened in the first part of the Chinese revolution, was that a whole class, namely the class of the intellectuals, of the students, well let's say, well yes, people who had nothing else—property had disappeared but what remained was intellectual property, I mean the property of its own talent. This should disappear. And Cultural Revolution tried to do so and in fact achieved that. For instance, it's clear, you all the documents are there, people died, but also books were burned, it was impossible to study anything, the notion of talent was completely erased. The fact that it's very easy to obtain to get such a result proved that it should be done with another class. And it's in fact what happened to peasantry after that. So to me, I wouldn't say exactly, but it's the same thing, that Cultural Revolution prepared Deng Xiaoping. It prepared what is happening now: that is a China with capitalism and without peasants. Which is exactly the contrary of what the Cultural Revolution explicitly stated: the ideal being a China with peasants, everyone being a peasant, and without capitalists. But in fact, the practice of the Cultural Revolution showed that it's very easy to make a whole social class disappear. In fact, it's very easy because the existence of a class is connected with the existence of the bodies that compose that class. And so once the question of survival is reduced to an ideology—the expression was "the ideology of survival" is to be fought against—the idea that survival is an ideology was to me when I was a Maoist and when I discovered this expression, was to me the point I could not... But Lin Biao put this even more radically than Mao, I think it was Lin Biao. Well, the idea that what happened after Mao's death must have an explanation. Well, why did Lin Biao and four of his friends disappear in an accident? Well, that must be at least a political struggle. And if there is a political struggle, it cannot be reduced to the result of the death of Mao's death; it must have begun before that. It seems that the use of the Little Red Book as a sort of fetish was an invention of Lin Biao. So for instance Badiou thinks that there was one Cultural Revolution that was bad, which was Lin Biao's Cultural Revolution, and one Cultural Revolution that was good, that was represented by the Shanghai Commune. Well, I've read the documents. What it means that at least the "bad" Cultural Revolution held the power during because Lin Biao was in power, not the Shanghai Commune. So it's to me it's sort of frivolous to think that a historical event should be analyzed from the point of view of those who have no power on it rather than from the point of view of those who have the power. Of course, in Nazi Germany you had, for instance, the White Rose; they fought, but you cannot judge Nazi Germany from the point of view of the White Rose; you have to judge Nazi Germany from the point of view of those who had the power. So, well, that's another question. But I would like to answer to another point. It's well, the question of what will happen now is deeply connected with the determination of the zones where stability is at its lowest point. And in my mind, the part of the world where the stability is at its lowest point is Western Europe. Because the solution it has found, which is solve the outcome of the Second World War in terms of peace, prosperity, and a sort of multi-side alliance where each government guarantees the stability of the others—so for instance if there is something that would happen in France, it's clear that Germany would do what it's necessary for some stability to be restored—I think that this system of reciprocity of stabilization is now reaching its end or its limit. What is happening in Spain, in Catalonia, is it seems to me much more important than it seems. Because if the European Union shows itself to
unknown
be unable
be unable
Slavoj Žižek
to stabilize this situation, that proves that its reason for existing, I mean Europe, have disappeared. And so what it may not be a revolution, but it may be serious events that prove the in fact the great discovery of the end of the 20th century is that the state is not stable by itself. In the 19th century, in the beginning of the 20th century, people thought that—it's true even of Lenin in State and Revolution—that the state was the stabilizer. In favor of the bourgeoisie or in favor of the people, that was another question, but the state was stable by itself. So if you had factor of destabilization, the state was there to stabilize. It seems to me that the great discovery at the end of the 20th century is that the state is not stable by itself. It needs other stabilizers. One stabilizer was, is—but for a certain time it seemed to be sufficient—is what was called generally the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie is the stabilizing class. It's not
to stabilize this situation, that proves that its reason for existing, I mean Europe, have disappeared. And so what it may not be a revolution, but it may be serious events that prove the in fact the great discovery of the end of the 20th century is that the state is not stable by itself. In the 19th century, in the beginning of the 20th century, people thought that—it's true even of Lenin in State and Revolution—that the state was the stabilizer. In favor of the bourgeoisie or in favor of the people, that was another question, but the state was stable by itself. So if you had factor of destabilization, the state was there to stabilize. It seems to me that the great discovery at the end of the 20th century is that the state is not stable by itself. It needs other stabilizers. One stabilizer was, is—but for a certain time it seemed to be sufficient—is what was called generally the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie is the stabilizing class. It's not
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class dominante, dominating class... ruling class. That's
class dominante, dominating class... ruling class. That's
Slavoj Žižek
not true. The bourgeoisie doesn't rule,
not true. The bourgeoisie doesn't rule,
unknown
in fact, a small sub-group of bourgeoisie is ruling. No, but bourgeoisie as a whole is stabilizing, was till recently necessary and sufficient. Now it's still necessary, but it's not sufficient. And the role of the European Union is that the European Union supplements, in fact, the bourgeoisie and stabilizes various
in fact, a small sub-group of bourgeoisie is ruling. No, but bourgeoisie as a whole is stabilizing, was till recently necessary and sufficient. Now it's still necessary, but it's not sufficient. And the role of the European Union is that the European Union supplements, in fact, the bourgeoisie and stabilizes various
unknown
countries, each country is stabilized by the other. If it happens that in Spain this system fails, well, it will fail everywhere. So maybe Great Britain was right to go out. But of course, the stabilizing factor of Great Britain would be the United States in that case, which may be not so... yeah, yeah, yeah. I will add, don't be afraid, one sentence. Did you or somebody else introduce here what you said about bourgeoisie no longer being able to play this role? Yes, I did. Yeah, there is a wonderful term that this new bourgeoisie emerging in post-communist Europe, they are what we should call following Lumpenproletariat: Lumpenbourgeoisie they are. They are not yet this... okay, I don't admire bourgeoisie, but they are not... it's so clear they are not ready to play this role. They are Lumpenbourgeoisie, that's the... that's it, exactly. I shut up now, I'm sorry. No, not at all, I'm just really grateful to both of you and to the audience. It's almost o’clock and they haven't
countries, each country is stabilized by the other. If it happens that in Spain this system fails, well, it will fail everywhere. So maybe Great Britain was right to go out. But of course, the stabilizing factor of Great Britain would be the United States in that case, which may be not so... yeah, yeah, yeah. I will add, don't be afraid, one sentence. Did you or somebody else introduce here what you said about bourgeoisie no longer being able to play this role? Yes, I did. Yeah, there is a wonderful term that this new bourgeoisie emerging in post-communist Europe, they are what we should call following Lumpenproletariat: Lumpenbourgeoisie they are. They are not yet this... okay, I don't admire bourgeoisie, but they are not... it's so clear they are not ready to play this role. They are Lumpenbourgeoisie, that's the... that's it, exactly. I shut up now, I'm sorry. No, not at all, I'm just really grateful to both of you and to the audience. It's almost o’clock and they haven't
Slavoj Žižek
shown any signs
shown any signs
unknown
of throwing us out. That's what I wanted, now we have one minute for debate. No, no, you'll be so lucky. I'm going to pass the microphone to people who do want to ask the question. If you don't mind, we can take them all together. Is that alright? I'm getting senile, if there are more than three I forget them then. I'll stick with three, but yeah, can we do that? so and you're okay answering a few questions. But please, he is our guest. Anyone who wants to? There's one over there. You said before about the Haitian Revolution. Where do you stand on the Haitian Revolution? and the Black Jacobins, C.L.R. James. Do you want me to answer that? Yeah. It's a tragedy because it was not understood completely.
of throwing us out. That's what I wanted, now we have one minute for debate. No, no, you'll be so lucky. I'm going to pass the microphone to people who do want to ask the question. If you don't mind, we can take them all together. Is that alright? I'm getting senile, if there are more than three I forget them then. I'll stick with three, but yeah, can we do that? so and you're okay answering a few questions. But please, he is our guest. Anyone who wants to? There's one over there. You said before about the Haitian Revolution. Where do you stand on the Haitian Revolution? and the Black Jacobins, C.L.R. James. Do you want me to answer that? Yeah. It's a tragedy because it was not understood completely.
Slavoj Žižek
It was abstractly understood by certain part of the revolutionaries,
It was abstractly understood by certain part of the revolutionaries,
unknown
but it was not completely understood. There is a great difference
but it was not completely understood. There is a great difference
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between slavery in France and in slavery in United States. Slavery was not something that people knew. It was an abstract notion. They knew it existed, of course, some people made money by selling, by trading... Voltaire, for instance, made it seems a lot of money... but I don't think he ever saw a slave. That's a big difference with United States where slavery was something that could be seen every day, at least in some in some states. So the position about slavery and the rights of slaves was an abstraction. And people who sided with the Haitian Revolution sided with it for abstract reasons. And in fact, for abstract reasons, Hannah Arendt would say with a sort of very haughtily that they were moved by compassion. It was more than pure compassion; it was also a political argument. But it was abstract. So when the lobby—because there was a lobby of slave owners—spoke in terms that were, let's say, quote-marks, concrete, saying, "Well, prosperity is based on slavery," and things like that, well, there was no answer. So. Two more last questions, should we take them together or one by one? Three. No, three together. This is directed at both Slavoj and Monsieur Milner. In regards what he was talking about the reciprocity between the states, that the stability of one is always thought of as guaranteeing its safety and so on, and the European Union. And I know how dangerous comparisons are, but I don't want to make them; it's just food for thought, thinking about Yugoslavia as well and Slovenia and leaving and I don't want to make but this what what can they throw back in relation to this and where we think things were and how things are now and so on? You touched a very sensitive point, because I will very briefly tell, did you notice this
between slavery in France and in slavery in United States. Slavery was not something that people knew. It was an abstract notion. They knew it existed, of course, some people made money by selling, by trading... Voltaire, for instance, made it seems a lot of money... but I don't think he ever saw a slave. That's a big difference with United States where slavery was something that could be seen every day, at least in some in some states. So the position about slavery and the rights of slaves was an abstraction. And people who sided with the Haitian Revolution sided with it for abstract reasons. And in fact, for abstract reasons, Hannah Arendt would say with a sort of very haughtily that they were moved by compassion. It was more than pure compassion; it was also a political argument. But it was abstract. So when the lobby—because there was a lobby of slave owners—spoke in terms that were, let's say, quote-marks, concrete, saying, "Well, prosperity is based on slavery," and things like that, well, there was no answer. So. Two more last questions, should we take them together or one by one? Three. No, three together. This is directed at both Slavoj and Monsieur Milner. In regards what he was talking about the reciprocity between the states, that the stability of one is always thought of as guaranteeing its safety and so on, and the European Union. And I know how dangerous comparisons are, but I don't want to make them; it's just food for thought, thinking about Yugoslavia as well and Slovenia and leaving and I don't want to make but this what what can they throw back in relation to this and where we think things were and how things are now and so on? You touched a very sensitive point, because I will very briefly tell, did you notice this
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absolutely disgusting hypocrisy that the same leftists who at that point when Yugoslavia was falling apart had "no, this is some dark, I don't know, neo-Nazi Vatican plot," which were absolutely for Yugoslav unity are now fully for Catalonia... no, sorry, yes, for Catalonian autonomy? and the other way around, those many right-wingers in Europe who supported the dispersal of Yugoslavia are now absolutely supporting the unity of Spain and so on. It's clear that there are some other geopolitical problems here. But I would like to ask you something else which just brought me... don't you see that this already with the problem about which you wrote some wonderful lines of refugees, this fiasco of Europe began? that there was no united politics and the worst possible thing happened: this totally chaotic situation, then what is emerging now what I'm almost tempted to call the new axis of evil—Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland—those countries who even they pretend they are, they are... that's the beautiful paradox that I like: they are at the same time anti-Semitic and anti-Arab, you know. That's a true axis of evil. And again this total disorientation of Europe, at the end my god, how is it, my god, the Hungarian guy, the... Orbán. Yeah, Orbán. I always confuse him, I always like this "Urbi et Orbi," we had Urbi, now we have Orbi. That Orbán will win, silently he is already winning. So the fiasco that you are mentioning began there already if not earlier. Well, I wouldn't disagree necessarily with with you because if you look closely on the question of refugees, something that that is not always mentioned is the fact that France, for instance, was very parsimonious. Well, why? Because in fact the question of refugees was connected with the question of
absolutely disgusting hypocrisy that the same leftists who at that point when Yugoslavia was falling apart had "no, this is some dark, I don't know, neo-Nazi Vatican plot," which were absolutely for Yugoslav unity are now fully for Catalonia... no, sorry, yes, for Catalonian autonomy? and the other way around, those many right-wingers in Europe who supported the dispersal of Yugoslavia are now absolutely supporting the unity of Spain and so on. It's clear that there are some other geopolitical problems here. But I would like to ask you something else which just brought me... don't you see that this already with the problem about which you wrote some wonderful lines of refugees, this fiasco of Europe began? that there was no united politics and the worst possible thing happened: this totally chaotic situation, then what is emerging now what I'm almost tempted to call the new axis of evil—Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland—those countries who even they pretend they are, they are... that's the beautiful paradox that I like: they are at the same time anti-Semitic and anti-Arab, you know. That's a true axis of evil. And again this total disorientation of Europe, at the end my god, how is it, my god, the Hungarian guy, the... Orbán. Yeah, Orbán. I always confuse him, I always like this "Urbi et Orbi," we had Urbi, now we have Orbi. That Orbán will win, silently he is already winning. So the fiasco that you are mentioning began there already if not earlier. Well, I wouldn't disagree necessarily with with you because if you look closely on the question of refugees, something that that is not always mentioned is the fact that France, for instance, was very parsimonious. Well, why? Because in fact the question of refugees was connected with the question of
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immigration, which is completely different. Immigration in France, immigration is connected with the fact that people are living
immigration, which is completely different. Immigration in France, immigration is connected with the fact that people are living
Slavoj Žižek
definitely or for a long period of time on the French soil. Some of them become French citizens or are already French citizens because in the term immigré people include very easily children of immigré, children who are legally French citizens. So the question of refugees is quite different, because refugees in France generally do not want to become French and do not want to live in France. That's... so what appeared is
definitely or for a long period of time on the French soil. Some of them become French citizens or are already French citizens because in the term immigré people include very easily children of immigré, children who are legally French citizens. So the question of refugees is quite different, because refugees in France generally do not want to become French and do not want to live in France. That's... so what appeared is
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that according to the various countries, Germany, for instance, has a big problem which is the fact that its population is declining in number, is growing old and so the question of retirement pensions is
that according to the various countries, Germany, for instance, has a big problem which is the fact that its population is declining in number, is growing old and so the question of retirement pensions is
Slavoj Žižek
becoming difficult—well, not very
becoming difficult—well, not very
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difficult, but it will become difficult. So the possibility of
difficult, but it will become difficult. So the possibility of
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having a certain
having a certain
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number of refugees solves a question or problem while in France it would not solve the same problem, it will in fact make it more difficult. So what appeared is that what had functioned in a sort of system that was like let's say a physical system, must be stable in itself because, well, it may be stable because it is protected from the outside. Well, the question was Europe is not it is not anymore protected from the outside. It was a new fact. It is completely different from the fact that Turks were arriving in Germany or North Africans were arriving in France. That was part of the stabilization, that's not that was not a problem, while what was happening there was a destabilization. And it was a destabilization that affected the main
number of refugees solves a question or problem while in France it would not solve the same problem, it will in fact make it more difficult. So what appeared is that what had functioned in a sort of system that was like let's say a physical system, must be stable in itself because, well, it may be stable because it is protected from the outside. Well, the question was Europe is not it is not anymore protected from the outside. It was a new fact. It is completely different from the fact that Turks were arriving in Germany or North Africans were arriving in France. That was part of the stabilization, that's not that was not a problem, while what was happening there was a destabilization. And it was a destabilization that affected the main
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countries of Europe. If Europe is destabilized, well, it doesn't it has no use. So people like Orbán will be quite easy for him to say, "Well, Europe is
countries of Europe. If Europe is destabilized, well, it doesn't it has no use. So people like Orbán will be quite easy for him to say, "Well, Europe is
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useless, so let's go out out of Europe or let's treat Europe as a milking cow, just for the milk it gives." Just two more last questions. We take together and then you can answer both of you. We are supposed to leave this room at eight. So you mentioned in your talk a cycle of
useless, so let's go out out of Europe or let's treat Europe as a milking cow, just for the milk it gives." Just two more last questions. We take together and then you can answer both of you. We are supposed to leave this room at eight. So you mentioned in your talk a cycle of
Slavoj Žižek
different kinds of governments decaying from one to the next and you described democracy as decaying into rule by crowd, which some people would describe as populism. I wonder if you think that's an accurate description of this rule by crowd, if you see that as what's happening now with populism in the United States, here, Spain and elsewhere, and if that's the case, do you think populism is always negative? Well, your question and the preceding question are somehow connected in my mind. The new technologies, new technologies have defined a new type of crowd. There is a formula that was used these last three days in France about the formula that was used by President Macron, "la démocratie, ce n'est pas la rue" ("democracy is not street"). And I was struck by the fact
different kinds of governments decaying from one to the next and you described democracy as decaying into rule by crowd, which some people would describe as populism. I wonder if you think that's an accurate description of this rule by crowd, if you see that as what's happening now with populism in the United States, here, Spain and elsewhere, and if that's the case, do you think populism is always negative? Well, your question and the preceding question are somehow connected in my mind. The new technologies, new technologies have defined a new type of crowd. There is a formula that was used these last three days in France about the formula that was used by President Macron, "la démocratie, ce n'est pas la rue" ("democracy is not street"). And I was struck by the fact
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that
that
Slavoj Žižek
people argued as if the street was still the place for the crowd. But I don't think that's true
people argued as if the street was still the place for the crowd. But I don't think that's true
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anymore. The crowd from the point of view of the new technology is that Facebook, that Twitter, and so on and so on. So
anymore. The crowd from the point of view of the new technology is that Facebook, that Twitter, and so on and so on. So
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when President Trump tweets, it has more to do with ochlocracy in the sense of Polybius than than with a monarchy or tyranny. If you think of Hitler, Hitler made use of the what was a modern technology at his time, that is radio. The voice of Hitler was in fact the basis of his power because the radio was in fact the basis of what it was the place where the crowd was really built. So the idea that crowds are connected with open spaces, that it's Nuremberg, the street, I think that's not true anymore. At some point the crowd was radio or it was the movies. Today, today it's clear that internet is the place for the crowd. So ochlocracy will is taking a new form. And talking about destabilization, it's clear that internet has a power of destabilization that is incomparable with the destabilization that the street could produce. The street is something that could be dominated by pure physical force. The internet is quite different. So I think, yes, the notion, various notions of crowd, of stabilization, of power, are affected by the apparition of new technologies. That's why in my ideal new humanist totalitarian state I would everything prohibit Twitter, prohibit Facebook, that would be my rule.
when President Trump tweets, it has more to do with ochlocracy in the sense of Polybius than than with a monarchy or tyranny. If you think of Hitler, Hitler made use of the what was a modern technology at his time, that is radio. The voice of Hitler was in fact the basis of his power because the radio was in fact the basis of what it was the place where the crowd was really built. So the idea that crowds are connected with open spaces, that it's Nuremberg, the street, I think that's not true anymore. At some point the crowd was radio or it was the movies. Today, today it's clear that internet is the place for the crowd. So ochlocracy will is taking a new form. And talking about destabilization, it's clear that internet has a power of destabilization that is incomparable with the destabilization that the street could produce. The street is something that could be dominated by pure physical force. The internet is quite different. So I think, yes, the notion, various notions of crowd, of stabilization, of power, are affected by the apparition of new technologies. That's why in my ideal new humanist totalitarian state I would everything prohibit Twitter, prohibit Facebook, that would be my rule.
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Sorry, sorry, that's just my small idea, I'm sorry. Didn't Lacan long before Twitter say that he refused to give
Sorry, sorry, that's just my small idea, I'm sorry. Didn't Lacan long before Twitter say that he refused to give
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his teaching in bite-size pieces? It's almost like he predicted Twitter and this is what Twitter is trying to do: give us everything in bite-size chunks. Yeah, but it's not just there; if you look at political debates on American TV, you cannot even develop a basic line of argumentation.
his teaching in bite-size pieces? It's almost like he predicted Twitter and this is what Twitter is trying to do: give us everything in bite-size chunks. Yeah, but it's not just there; if you look at political debates on American TV, you cannot even develop a basic line of argumentation.
Slavoj Žižek
It's just if you get seconds it's
It's just if you get seconds it's
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almost a miracle. So it's just this you should shout
almost a miracle. So it's just this you should shout
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quickly
quickly
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something, you know. Well, I can't imagine a better way to start the weekend. I think we've had so many beautiful ideas to ponder. Rather than choose between the two of you, can I quote from a third person, you know like Balibar who was who's also been talking about revolutions recently in Greece? and he suggests, you know that we are in our
something, you know. Well, I can't imagine a better way to start the weekend. I think we've had so many beautiful ideas to ponder. Rather than choose between the two of you, can I quote from a third person, you know like Balibar who was who's also been talking about revolutions recently in Greece? and he suggests, you know that we are in our
Slavoj Žižek
century is one
century is one
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where the opposite of Rousseau's prophecy seems to be the case. It's not the imminent return of revolutions, but the exhaustion of the idea or at least the failure of revolutions. But also to go back to Beckett that you
where the opposite of Rousseau's prophecy seems to be the case. It's not the imminent return of revolutions, but the exhaustion of the idea or at least the failure of revolutions. But also to go back to Beckett that you
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were... his new book is called "The Incontinence of the Void," that we should be reordering. So if the revolution is going to fail, I guess we can try and fail better each time. No, but I would like to end up if I may with an homage to you. You know Lacanian definition of the
were... his new book is called "The Incontinence of the Void," that we should be reordering. So if the revolution is going to fail, I guess we can try and fail better each time. No, but I would like to end up if I may with an homage to you. You know Lacanian definition of the
Slavoj Žižek
real, at least in early Lacan: that which always returns to the same place. So you are our real, so you will have to come back here again. Thank
real, at least in early Lacan: that which always returns to the same place. So you are our real, so you will have to come back here again. Thank
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you.
you.