Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbors
Talk · zizekpodcast.com ·
2016-11-15 · 1:22:05 · 12,376 words
with Norman Finkelstein
ideologyliberalism-political-correctnessfascism-populismdemocracygeopolitics-warrace-antisemitismreligion-theologycapitalismrevolution-violence
Žižek discusses his book on the refugee crisis, arguing that open-borders advocacy is a hypocritical 'beautiful soul' position and that organized, state-managed reception is necessary precisely to prevent a right-wing nationalist backlash in Europe. He defends his ambivalence about Trump's election as a Leninist wager that Clinton's centrist consensus was more dangerous than a rupture, while rejecting the label of fascism for Trump, calling him a symptom of liberal Democratic failure rather than a new Hitler. The talk also addresses identity politics and political correctness as middle-class displacement strategies that suppress class antagonism, and closes with audience Q&A on Black Lives Matter, Ferguson, and the impotence of the post-ideological left.
every located moment in this recording, click one to read it
The ideas in it 16
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
The political trap in which one is told either to accept liberal multiculturalism uncritically or to be complicit with the far right, Žižek's book title names this as the false choice he refuses.
The open-borders advocate who performs moral superiority while secretly participating in the corrupt world they claim to oppose.
Žižek's self-described position: a left that accepts top-down state organisation and acknowledges the limits of bottom-up democratic spontaneity in crises like the refugee situation.
as “neighbour (as monstrous other)”
Against liberal empathy, Žižek uses the biblical concept of the neighbour to mean precisely the uncanny, unknowable other with whom one cannot simply identify, the true test of solidarity.
Benjaminian concept Žižek applies to desperate, apparently irrational social violence (e.g. some aspects of Ferguson protests) that cannot simply be condemned as crime because it carries a kernel of demand for social justice.
The contemporary condition in which protests (especially in Europe) cannot formulate a coherent positive political vision and dissolve into looting or pure negation.
Žižek uses this ironically for Hillary's all-encompassing electoral coalition (Wall Street + Occupy Wall Street + Saudi money + LGBTQ+) whose very breadth required excluding the harder left of Sanders.
as “democratic fascism”
A novel form of right-wing authoritarianism that is not classical fascism; it can even use the language of multiculturalism and identity politics (e.g. Pim Fortuyn) while advancing anti-immigrant racism.
as “Trump as symptom”
Trump is not the disease but a symptom of what is wrong with liberal centrism and the Democratic establishment; fighting only Trump is mere symptomatic healing.
Treating a political symptom (Trump) without diagnosing or curing the underlying disease (liberal-centrist consensus failure), a medical metaphor for the inadequacy of pure anti-Trump activism.
Žižek (via Chomsky/Lippmann) uses this to name the breakdown of the hegemonic mechanisms that produce democratic consensus, of which Trump is a sign.
as “ideology as inscribed in social practice”
Ideology is not mere false consciousness or illusion floating above reality; it is a lie embodied in social practices themselves.
Implicit in Žižek's account of ideology: the illusion is operative in material social reality itself, not merely in the heads of agents.
Via Sloterdijk: the subject knows very well what it is doing and does it anyway, ideology in its contemporary, post-naïve form.
Žižek treats trigger warnings and safe-space culture as a middle-class strategy of putting a screen between oneself and the brutality of reality, antithetical to genuine education.
The identity-political framework in which each group seeks acknowledgement; Žižek contrasts it unfavourably with class struggle, whose logic is antagonism and the annihilation of class power, not recognition.
Stories he reaches for 4
Bohr has a horseshoe on his door; a friend asks how a scientist can believe in superstition; Bohr replies he doesn't believe in it, 'but I was told it works even if you don't believe in it.'
“Of course I don't believe in it, I'm a scientist, but I have it there because I was told that it works even if you don't believe in it.”
The film ends with joyful crowds storming Parliament and the screen goes dark, Žižek says he would sell his mother into slavery to see the sequel showing what the victors actually do with power.
“I'm ready to sell my mother into slavery if in order to see a movie called V for Vendetta part two. The governing years. What do they do then?”
When accused of hypocrisy between theory and practice, Lacan replied: 'A good psychoanalyst always answers: don't look at me what I'm doing, look at what I'm saying. The truth is there.'
“A good psychoanalyst answer is always: don't look at me what I'm doing, look at what I'm saying. The truth is there.”
The Dutch right-wing anti-immigration politician was himself gay and justified his xenophobia on grounds of protecting multicultural tolerance, illustrating how the new right has absorbed identity-political language.
“we have racists who were anti-immigrant racists who were almost Left-wing multicultural racists... Pim Fortuyn... was absolutely anti-immigrant, but his anti-immigration was based on tolerance”
Works invoked 11
Antigone book
Described as a small book but 'maybe my favourite one', Žižek's own rewriting of Sophocles' Antigone.
V for Vendetta film
Used to illustrate the post-ideological left's inability to formulate a positive governing vision: the film ends with the crowd's triumph and goes dark before the hard work begins.
Elysium film
Paired with Hunger Games as a dystopian anticipation of extreme class segregation approaching biological speciation.
The Hunger Games film
Invoked alongside Elysium as Hollywood's anticipation of a biogenetically stratified future class society.
Referenced by a questioner for Žižek's reformulation of Marx's false consciousness as 'they know very well what they are doing but they are doing it anyway.'
Violence book
Žižek's own book, mentioned when a questioner raises the chapter on Divine Violence; Žižek admits he copy-pasted the chapter into his refugee book.
Žižek's post-9/11 book, cited as having been attacked simultaneously as Zionist propaganda (Al-Ahram) and antisemitism (Jerusalem Post), proof of his Sartrean heuristic.
Disparities book
Mentioned as one of two other books Žižek published at the same time; his 'eternal topic' of Hegel and Heidegger.
Žižek's own book, the occasion of the talk; he defends it throughout while occasionally admitting it is quickly composed and provocative.
Chomsky's book (citing Lippmann's original term) used by Žižek to describe the current breakdown of hegemonic consensus-manufacturing mechanisms.
The Time Machine book
H.G. Wells' Morlocks and Eloi are cited as a prior anticipation of the biogenetic speciation Žižek fears is now becoming reality.
People invoked 23
Vladimir Lenin positive
Invoked for the 'sharpen the contradictions' logic behind Žižek's Trump wager, and noted that Lenin too was safe in Switzerland while others bore the revolutionary risk.
Jacques Lacan positive
Cited for the formula 'don't look at what I do, look at what I say, the truth is there,' which Žižek deploys in his own defence against hypocrisy charges.
The Croatian authoritarian is the butt of a Hegelian joke in which his grandson suggests he jump out of the plane to make all Croats happy.
Used as evidence that Cold War hawks endorsed Clinton, reinforcing Žižek's view that she was the more geopolitically dangerous candidate.
Described as 'absolutely disgusting opportunist' and 'almost subhuman' but not a fascist; treated analytically as a symptom of liberal-Democratic failure rather than a sui generis danger.
Alain Badiou positive
Žižek draws on Badiou's schema of the genesis of terrorism to explain how Islamist violence is a postmodern reaction to Western modernity.
Cited as an example of 'democratic fascism': a gay, right-wing Dutch politician whose anti-immigration stance was framed through multicultural tolerance, showing how the new right appropriates identity-political language.
Identified as the original source of 'manufacturing consent,' used it positively; Žižek notes this with mild irony.
Bob Avakian negative
Žižek dismisses a questioner promoting Avakian's 'new communism' as someone who has spoken like 'a liberal in despair' rather than producing genuine structural analysis.
Bernie Sanders positive
Žižek holds Sanders as the only Democrat capable of winning both left voters and anti-establishment working-class Trump voters; calls his constituency a 'true miracle.'
Yanis Varoufakis negative
Described as 'otherwise good friend' but Žižek disagrees with his DiEM25 'More Democracy in Europe' slogan, arguing it is naïve given what majorities currently want.
H. G. Wells positive
The Morlocks and Eloi from The Time Machine are invoked to describe the biogenetic speciation of a future ruling caste from the rest of humanity.
Peter Sloterdijk positive
Cited for the formula of 'cynical reason': knowing well what one is doing and doing it anyway, which Žižek uses to describe contemporary ideology.
Angela Merkel positive
Žižek praises her refugee policy as exemplary political courage: acting against majority will in order to create conditions that retroactively legitimate the action.
Walter Benjamin positive
Concept of 'divine violence' is Benjaminian; Žižek applies it to Ferguson-style protests to argue they cannot simply be condemned as crime.
Hillary Clinton negative
Žižek blames her centrist move, exclusion of Sanders, and 'rainbow coalition' strategy for enabling Trump's victory; also describes her as more hawkish than Trump on geopolitics.
Niels Bohr positive
The horseshoe anecdote is used to illustrate how ideology functions when one knows it is false but acts as if it is true.
Mentioned as the leader of Alternative für Deutschland, cited as an example of the new nationalist right gaining electoral ground in Germany.
Winston Churchill positive
Cited as an example of someone who genuinely listened to Hitler's story while still recognising him as an enemy, against the naive multiculturalist idea that enemies just need to be heard.
Noam Chomsky positive
Žižek cites 'Manufacturing Consent' (noting Chomsky took it from Lippmann) to describe the current breakdown of hegemonic consensus mechanisms.
Karl Marx positive
Invoked on ideology (not mere epiphenomenon but inscribed in social practice) and gently mocked for retreating first class to Karlsbad during the Paris Commune.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel positive
The Tuđman joke is described as 'deeply Hegelian'; Žižek also mentions writing on why Hegel is more actual today than Marx.
Jean-Paul Sartre positive
Quoted on being attacked by both sides simultaneously as a sign of being on the right path; Žižek notes he doesn't always agree with him politically.
What it argues
refugee crisis and the limits of open-borders liberalismTrump as symptom of liberal-democratic failureidentity politics versus class antagonismauthoritarian leftism and the need for top-down state interventionpolitical correctness as middle-class ideological screenthe post-ideological left's inability to formulate a positive visionEuropean values, Enlightenment legacy, and multiculturalism
Dialectical moves 9
“The true enemy of European identity is not the migrants but those who present themselves as defenders of Europe.”
The nationalist 'defenders' are themselves the greatest threat to what they claim to protect, the inversion of defender and destroyer.
“When we criticize Europe, we always criticize it from within the European tradition — that's what is nonetheless great about European legacy.”
Europe's capacity for self-critique is itself a European value, making any radical critique of Eurocentrism paradoxically European.
“It is terribly racist to say we need to have empathy with refugees — the true test is solidarity with those with whom empathy is impossible.”
Empathy-based solidarity is an inverted form of racism that privileges those already similar to us; real solidarity must begin where empathy fails.
“Trump is a symptom; fighting Trump without asking what we did wrong is symptomatic healing — it removes the pain but leaves the disease.”
Pure anti-Trump mobilisation, by treating him as the disease rather than the symptom, ensures the underlying liberal-centrist pathology is never cured.
“The rule of law is undermined far more by a policeman committing a crime than by a desperate civilian shooting a policeman.”
Law-breaking by the guardians of the law is the true destruction of legal order; the lawbreaker outside the law is less dangerous than the lawbreaker inside it.
“Ideology today works even when you don't believe in it — 'I know it's a lie, but I still follow it.'”
The modern form of ideology does not require subjective belief; the illusion is operative in practice regardless of conscious knowledge.
“In ex-Yugoslavia the positive condition for remaining inside the system was NOT taking the official ideology seriously — taking it literally made you a dissident.”
The most subversive act in a cynical ideological regime is sincere belief in its own professed values, cynicism becomes the condition of loyalty.
“Brexit leftists who call the EU an organ of international capital and want to return to sovereign welfare states are crazy — Brexit simply means selling yourself to global capitalism without even the minimal EU protections.”
The nationalist-left Brexit position is the opposite of what it claims: not greater sovereignty, but accelerated exposure to global capital.
“Class struggle is not a politics of recognition — its goal is not to be more recognised, but to annihilate the enemy as a class.”
Identity politics' logic of recognition is structurally incompatible with class struggle, whose logic is antagonism, not accommodation.
Claims 18
asserts
Advocates of open borders are hypocrites playing the 'beautiful soul' role because open borders is an unworkable utopia that in practice fuels right-wing nationalist backlash.open-borders liberalism
asserts
The main danger to European identity today is precisely those who present themselves as defenders of Europe (nationalists/right-wingers), not migrants.European identity and nationalism
asserts
Angela Merkel's refugee policy was an example of genuine political leadership: doing something you know the majority opposes in order to create conditions that will retroactively legitimate it.democratic leadership and popular will
asserts
The left should reject the seduction of bottom-up local democracy and instead embrace top-down statist organisation to manage crises like mass migration.left strategy and democracy
rejects
Brexit, including left-wing Brexit advocacy, is not a path to socialism but an accelerated surrender to global finance capital without the minimal protections of EU regulation.Brexit and left sovereigntism
asserts
Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE) bear major responsibility for the refugee crisis but cynically absorb none of the refugees, a fact the left ignores.Gulf states and the refugee crisis
asserts
Clinton's defeat was caused by her move to the centre and the exclusion of Sanders — she failed to capture the anti-establishment rage that Trump harnessed.2016 US election and Democratic failure
rejects
Trump is not a fascist but a disgusting opportunist who is a symptom of liberal-Democratic failure; calling him simply a fascist is ideologically lazy and prevents structural analysis.Trump as fascist
rejects
Basing refugee solidarity on empathy is implicitly racist because it favours those similar to us; true solidarity requires helping even those with whom identification is impossible.empathy as basis of refugee politics
asserts
Identity politics and political correctness are middle-class displacement strategies that suppress class antagonism and contributed to Trump's election.identity politics and political correctness
asserts
Class struggle operates on a logic of antagonism and annihilation of class power, not recognition — identity politics' framework of mutual recognition is therefore antithetical to genuine left politics.class struggle vs. politics of recognition
asserts
A policeman shooting a civilian is infinitely more dangerous than a desperate civilian shooting a policeman, because the former undermines the rule of law from within.police violence and Black Lives Matter
asserts
The post-ideological era means that even legitimate social protest (e.g. UK riots) cannot formulate a positive political vision and collapses into mere looting or acting-out.post-ideological protest and the left's incapacity
asserts
Capitalism is approaching an absolute limit and only a left vision can address it, but the left currently lacks any such vision.capitalism and the left
asserts
Second-generation Islamist terrorists are a strictly postmodern reaction to the West, not a return to pre-modern fundamentalism; ISIS is in many ways a post-Leninist organisation.Islamist terrorism and modernity
asserts
Ideology is not merely false consciousness but is inscribed in social reality and practices themselves — it is a lie that works even when everyone knows it is a lie.ideology and false consciousness
asserts
When you are attacked for the same text by both the right and the left simultaneously, it is one of the few reliable signs that you are on the right path.intellectual positioning and political correctness
asserts
The UK will end up as 'the Cayman Islands with worse weather' — a platform for global finance capital stripped of even the minimal EU protections.Brexit consequences
Quotes 15
“The majority of people are always slightly — not just refugees, my god, of you here, whoever, I don't like them.”Slavoj Žižek · anti-empathy materialism
“Neighbour is the biblical way to say monstrous other. Neighbour is someone precisely with whom you cannot identify.”Slavoj Žižek · neighbour as monstrous other
“An enemy is only someone whose story we were not ready to hear — one of the greatest bullshit statements in the known universe.”Slavoj Žižek · rejection of naive multiculturalist empathy
“University studies should traumatize you, shock you, my god. They are not safe places, they are places where you should be horrified.”Slavoj Žižek · against trigger warnings and safe spaces
“Trump is the symptom. So if you just fight Trump, you do what doctors call symptomatic healing — you feel no pain, but you don't cure the disease.”Slavoj Žižek · Trump as symptom of liberal failure
“Brexit not only will not enhance British sovereignty, it simply means 'we want to sell ourselves to global capitalism totally directly even without these minimal protections of Europe.'”Slavoj Žižek · Brexit as surrender to capital
“It's going to end up as the Cayman Islands with worse weather.”Slavoj Žižek · Brexit outcome
“Class struggle is not politics of recognition. Our goal is not to be more recognized. Our goal is, of course not physically but as a class, to annihilate the enemy.”Slavoj Žižek · class struggle versus identity politics
“Of course I don't believe in it, I'm a scientist, but I have it there because I was told that it works even if you don't believe in it. That's ideology today.”Slavoj Žižek · cynical ideology works without belief
“I see political correctness with all those trigger warnings as typical middle-class strategy of putting a screen between you and reality.”Slavoj Žižek · political correctness as middle-class avoidance
“Why is political correctness in the sense of controlling speech, trigger warning and that — why is this even accepted as a leftist position? What has this to do with Marx?”Slavoj Žižek · political correctness is not Marxism
“I believe more and more in superficial kindness, manners — we are kind to each other and then yes, miracles happen.”Slavoj Žižek · superficial kindness over deep multicultural understanding
“There are real enemies. The greatness of Winston Churchill was that he precisely was reading, listening to Hitler's story.”Slavoj Žižek · against 'hear the enemy's story' naive multiculturalism
“Even if ideology means 'they don't know what they're doing' and so on, ideology is never simply an epiphenomenon. It's an illusion, but an illusion inscribed into social reality itself.”Slavoj Žižek · ideology as social practice not mere false consciousness
“It was Wall Street and Occupy Wall Street, it was Saudi Arabian money and LGBTQ+ and so on. The first question: what had to be excluded in order to get this coalition?”Slavoj Žižek · Hillary's rainbow coalition excluded the real left
Transcript 118 turns
unknown
Good evening. So the occasion that brings us here is your new work, Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbors: Against the Double Blackmail. And in this book, you put yourself in what I suppose is rather an unusual position for a leftist intellectual, which is that of the border policeman. I mean, I say this in a provocative way because it's a book that says at the outset that there has to be some kind of border control. I mean, the question at hand is how we, and the we in your book is broadly a European we, how we should behave towards our non-European neighbor who is migrating and who wishes to settle within our borders. And you say that the greatest hypocrites are those who advocate open borders. You quote, the quote is: "They play the beautiful soul which feels superior to the corrupted world while secretly participating in it." I mean, as I'm sure you know, this no-borders position has been at the center of anti-racist organizing and immigrant organizing in Europe for at least years, and you dismiss it out of hand as the most morally corrupt position there could be. Could you say why you take this stance?
Good evening. So the occasion that brings us here is your new work, Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbors: Against the Double Blackmail. And in this book, you put yourself in what I suppose is rather an unusual position for a leftist intellectual, which is that of the border policeman. I mean, I say this in a provocative way because it's a book that says at the outset that there has to be some kind of border control. I mean, the question at hand is how we, and the we in your book is broadly a European we, how we should behave towards our non-European neighbor who is migrating and who wishes to settle within our borders. And you say that the greatest hypocrites are those who advocate open borders. You quote, the quote is: "They play the beautiful soul which feels superior to the corrupted world while secretly participating in it." I mean, as I'm sure you know, this no-borders position has been at the center of anti-racist organizing and immigrant organizing in Europe for at least years, and you dismiss it out of hand as the most morally corrupt position there could be. Could you say why you take this stance?
Slavoj Žižek
I wonder if we'll have time to clarify all this. But first, thanks to you, my thanks to you and to all of you, although if you allow me in my twisted, corrupted style, a small remark. I love reserved seats which remain empty because this reminds me of in GDR, DDR, ex-East Germany, of the most beautiful ritual that they had till '56, at every meeting even of—oh my god, now they will no longer be free—ah, but one still is. And I will tell you immediately for whom this chair is. On every party, Communist Party meeting in East Germany, from Congress, Politburo, Central Committee, up to the smallest in a factory Communist Party cell meeting, they had this ritual. They always, they began with voting that Comrade Stalin will preside this meeting. This was ritualized. Then the one who really run the meeting said that it's not sure if Comrade Stalin will be able to come, but that if by a miracle he will drop by, there has to be one chair
I wonder if we'll have time to clarify all this. But first, thanks to you, my thanks to you and to all of you, although if you allow me in my twisted, corrupted style, a small remark. I love reserved seats which remain empty because this reminds me of in GDR, DDR, ex-East Germany, of the most beautiful ritual that they had till '56, at every meeting even of—oh my god, now they will no longer be free—ah, but one still is. And I will tell you immediately for whom this chair is. On every party, Communist Party meeting in East Germany, from Congress, Politburo, Central Committee, up to the smallest in a factory Communist Party cell meeting, they had this ritual. They always, they began with voting that Comrade Stalin will preside this meeting. This was ritualized. Then the one who really run the meeting said that it's not sure if Comrade Stalin will be able to come, but that if by a miracle he will drop by, there has to be one chair
unknown
empty for him. And this
empty for him. And this
Slavoj Žižek
went to the end. So, here it is. Okay, I couldn't resist doing this. Now seriously, because this book is meant in a very serious way. I will be very brutal, not towards the poor refugees. Let me make one thing clear. The reason I even called for the intervention of the army and so on and so on is not to protect, I emphasize this, the borders, control, but on the contrary, the way it was done in this chaotic way, first, it evolved an immense corruption, its principal victims were refugees themselves. It's counted that at least eight, nine billions of dollars was the profit of smugglers. Second thing, the way it was done in this chaotic way was a catastrophe for refugees themselves, because of this chaotic way, it arose, generated a terrible popular unease. So that, you know, like, okay, I will directly go provoking you. Are you for democracy? I hope you will say yes. Let's say yes. Let's go for yes. How then—but I am for refugees—how then can you be for the refugees in any, I doubt if there is an exception, European country at this moment, if there were to be a referendum, the majority would have been against. And this is not, I'm very cynical here, this is not an argument against the refugees, this is an argument for Angela Merkel and an argument about the limits of democracy. I even had here a conflict with my otherwise good friend, Yanis Varoufakis, who now heads, you know, this movement DiEM25, More Democracy in Europe. And I told him, are you crazy? Like, democracy, look in France, in Germany. Now you have democracy in this vulgar sense of what the majority thinks. And it's maybe, how is it called, it's no longer PEGIDA, Frauke Petry, that woman, that populist Alternative for Germany. Yeah, that, yes. You know that in some local elections, they already—this is the voice of the innocent. And this joke—sorry, I hope you allow me a dirty, I cannot resist it. One of the excellent jokes what this innocence of a child can say. It's a deeply Hegelian joke. In ex-Yugoslavia, in Croatia, there was a pretty dark leader, not directly dictator but authoritarian, Franjo Tuđman. And he was not very popular in the nineties. And there is a—maybe if you know some of my books, once I already quote this joke, but it's irresistible for me. It goes on like this. That he is on a plane above Croatia and his hypocritical servant or secretary told him, "Mr. President, why don't you throw through the window one check for a million dollars and to make at least one Croat happy?" Then all these hypocrites around him, his—I don't know—another young supporter says, "But Mr. President, why don't you throw out two checks for half a million and make two Croats happy?" and so on and so on till the innocent voice of a young kid, his grandson, says, "But Grandpa, why don't you throw out of the window yourself and make all the Croats happy?" you know, and this—okay, I'm so sorry, we don't have time for this, let's go back. No, democracy. We need to talk about democracy and why. Yeah, yeah. No, I am, I am not against democracy. I'm not saying there is some higher body like Communist Party, historical avant-garde, which knows better than ordinary people. For me, the model, although I'm of course generally politically not on her side, but a good politician should done what Angela Merkel did. And I know some people who know some people, a couple of degrees of separation, who know her. And I was told that she did it consciously. She knew that the majority will be against. And I think that is the greatness of her position. You risk, you do something although you know that the majority is against, hoping that your enacting this problematic measure will create new conditions which will retroactively legitimate it. So that's my first problem: do you dare to go into this direction? The second problem—ah, what I, sorry, what I meant by this darkest part of my position, by the army and so on. I just think that if they were to organize it in a useful way—and people tell me, "But army, you know what is army?" Well, all I can tell you is without army, mostly when they were passing through different countries, it was police which was taking care of the refugees. And if you don't trust the army, trust even less police. Police is much more to the right. But so you have a position that says there must be some action by the state, it must—it's not something that's going to come bottom-up from the will of the European people. No, absolutely not. But you definitely in this book identify firstly as an enemy, let's say, those who try and base their politics on a position of open borders. Because I think they are bluffing. Right. Why is that? Why is that? Because—because there is a left position that says that one ought to make solidarity with the migrants, one ought to be an internationalist, and one ought to oppose the border in this— Okay, I ask you then, what, can you define it? I'm not provoking you now, but a general question. People all the time talk about open borders. Define open borders for me. Well, it's clearly a utopian notion as soon as you open a border and there's any— Are you—you are squeezing now. How would you—okay, then I ask you concretely, what would, should it mean for you open borders at this particular moment in Europe? At this particular moment in Europe, it should surely mean that you assert the freedom of movement of people rather than just the freedom of movement of capital. I'm actually not defending this position because I think it is, as you point out in your book, it becomes— But what do we mean by freedom of the people? Well, it effectively becomes—it becomes impossible for any state to kind of deal with the influx unless there are some criteria by which people are—which people are admitted or not admitted. And this, this is the position that you start from, and I want to work forward to say, to ask in your book, what criteria do you think emerge from this situation? Because you propose that there ought to be some, let's say sort of axiomatic criteria. They have to be open, they have to be clear. And here I must oppose
went to the end. So, here it is. Okay, I couldn't resist doing this. Now seriously, because this book is meant in a very serious way. I will be very brutal, not towards the poor refugees. Let me make one thing clear. The reason I even called for the intervention of the army and so on and so on is not to protect, I emphasize this, the borders, control, but on the contrary, the way it was done in this chaotic way, first, it evolved an immense corruption, its principal victims were refugees themselves. It's counted that at least eight, nine billions of dollars was the profit of smugglers. Second thing, the way it was done in this chaotic way was a catastrophe for refugees themselves, because of this chaotic way, it arose, generated a terrible popular unease. So that, you know, like, okay, I will directly go provoking you. Are you for democracy? I hope you will say yes. Let's say yes. Let's go for yes. How then—but I am for refugees—how then can you be for the refugees in any, I doubt if there is an exception, European country at this moment, if there were to be a referendum, the majority would have been against. And this is not, I'm very cynical here, this is not an argument against the refugees, this is an argument for Angela Merkel and an argument about the limits of democracy. I even had here a conflict with my otherwise good friend, Yanis Varoufakis, who now heads, you know, this movement DiEM25, More Democracy in Europe. And I told him, are you crazy? Like, democracy, look in France, in Germany. Now you have democracy in this vulgar sense of what the majority thinks. And it's maybe, how is it called, it's no longer PEGIDA, Frauke Petry, that woman, that populist Alternative for Germany. Yeah, that, yes. You know that in some local elections, they already—this is the voice of the innocent. And this joke—sorry, I hope you allow me a dirty, I cannot resist it. One of the excellent jokes what this innocence of a child can say. It's a deeply Hegelian joke. In ex-Yugoslavia, in Croatia, there was a pretty dark leader, not directly dictator but authoritarian, Franjo Tuđman. And he was not very popular in the nineties. And there is a—maybe if you know some of my books, once I already quote this joke, but it's irresistible for me. It goes on like this. That he is on a plane above Croatia and his hypocritical servant or secretary told him, "Mr. President, why don't you throw through the window one check for a million dollars and to make at least one Croat happy?" Then all these hypocrites around him, his—I don't know—another young supporter says, "But Mr. President, why don't you throw out two checks for half a million and make two Croats happy?" and so on and so on till the innocent voice of a young kid, his grandson, says, "But Grandpa, why don't you throw out of the window yourself and make all the Croats happy?" you know, and this—okay, I'm so sorry, we don't have time for this, let's go back. No, democracy. We need to talk about democracy and why. Yeah, yeah. No, I am, I am not against democracy. I'm not saying there is some higher body like Communist Party, historical avant-garde, which knows better than ordinary people. For me, the model, although I'm of course generally politically not on her side, but a good politician should done what Angela Merkel did. And I know some people who know some people, a couple of degrees of separation, who know her. And I was told that she did it consciously. She knew that the majority will be against. And I think that is the greatness of her position. You risk, you do something although you know that the majority is against, hoping that your enacting this problematic measure will create new conditions which will retroactively legitimate it. So that's my first problem: do you dare to go into this direction? The second problem—ah, what I, sorry, what I meant by this darkest part of my position, by the army and so on. I just think that if they were to organize it in a useful way—and people tell me, "But army, you know what is army?" Well, all I can tell you is without army, mostly when they were passing through different countries, it was police which was taking care of the refugees. And if you don't trust the army, trust even less police. Police is much more to the right. But so you have a position that says there must be some action by the state, it must—it's not something that's going to come bottom-up from the will of the European people. No, absolutely not. But you definitely in this book identify firstly as an enemy, let's say, those who try and base their politics on a position of open borders. Because I think they are bluffing. Right. Why is that? Why is that? Because—because there is a left position that says that one ought to make solidarity with the migrants, one ought to be an internationalist, and one ought to oppose the border in this— Okay, I ask you then, what, can you define it? I'm not provoking you now, but a general question. People all the time talk about open borders. Define open borders for me. Well, it's clearly a utopian notion as soon as you open a border and there's any— Are you—you are squeezing now. How would you—okay, then I ask you concretely, what would, should it mean for you open borders at this particular moment in Europe? At this particular moment in Europe, it should surely mean that you assert the freedom of movement of people rather than just the freedom of movement of capital. I'm actually not defending this position because I think it is, as you point out in your book, it becomes— But what do we mean by freedom of the people? Well, it effectively becomes—it becomes impossible for any state to kind of deal with the influx unless there are some criteria by which people are—which people are admitted or not admitted. And this, this is the position that you start from, and I want to work forward to say, to ask in your book, what criteria do you think emerge from this situation? Because you propose that there ought to be some, let's say sort of axiomatic criteria. They have to be open, they have to be clear. And here I must oppose
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your Eurocentrism and so on. But you also are not afraid to say that you believe that there are such a thing as European cultural values that are not the values of the majority of the incoming
your Eurocentrism and so on. But you also are not afraid to say that you believe that there are such a thing as European cultural values that are not the values of the majority of the incoming
Slavoj Žižek
migrants and that political and social problems
migrants and that political and social problems
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stem from—stem from those things. No, no, first, so first, okay, first let's be honest. I explicitly emphasized a couple of times, three, four other crucial points. First, it's not just a catastrophe out there and we Europeans now, out of our goodness, will maybe receive some refugees. Western powers are deeply involved, responsible for the crisis out of which refugees are coming. I give the a little bit of a history, like the way international
stem from—stem from those things. No, no, first, so first, okay, first let's be honest. I explicitly emphasized a couple of times, three, four other crucial points. First, it's not just a catastrophe out there and we Europeans now, out of our goodness, will maybe receive some refugees. Western powers are deeply involved, responsible for the crisis out of which refugees are coming. I give the a little bit of a history, like the way international
Slavoj Žižek
capitalism exploiting economically
capitalism exploiting economically
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these
these
Slavoj Žižek
third world countries, like from Congo and so on, neocolonialism economic which is a reality, geopolitical games, Libya. Like, it's clearly, to everyone, I'm almost feel stupid to repeat that without
third world countries, like from Congo and so on, neocolonialism economic which is a reality, geopolitical games, Libya. Like, it's clearly, to everyone, I'm almost feel stupid to repeat that without
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American invasion of Iraq, there wouldn't have been no ISIS and so on. So I admit all
American invasion of Iraq, there wouldn't have been no ISIS and so on. So I admit all
Slavoj Žižek
this. Problems begin at what level? My big fear is how to prevent that the result of the influx of refugees will be a Europe which will be even much worse than what you fear now with Trump's presidency here. A new nationalist, racist Europe. And I must openly admit
this. Problems begin at what level? My big fear is how to prevent that the result of the influx of refugees will be a Europe which will be even much worse than what you fear now with Trump's presidency here. A new nationalist, racist Europe. And I must openly admit
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that the worst part of this new Europe are countries to which my own country belong, so-called post-communist East European countries. That vertical line from Baltic countries, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia
that the worst part of this new Europe are countries to which my own country belong, so-called post-communist East European countries. That vertical line from Baltic countries, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia
Slavoj Žižek
and so on. It's incredible what type of an open
and so on. It's incredible what type of an open
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brutal, brutal, incredibly brutal racist discourse is all of a sudden publicly acceptable there. So the mistakes of the left are for me not to propose a specific politics. I think, as I said it clearly a couple of times in the book, that first, the main danger to European identity are those who present themselves as defenders of Europe today. This, of course, implies that I see something good worth fighting for in European legacy. I do, very simply. The legacy of Enlightenment,
brutal, brutal, incredibly brutal racist discourse is all of a sudden publicly acceptable there. So the mistakes of the left are for me not to propose a specific politics. I think, as I said it clearly a couple of times in the book, that first, the main danger to European identity are those who present themselves as defenders of Europe today. This, of course, implies that I see something good worth fighting for in European legacy. I do, very simply. The legacy of Enlightenment,
Slavoj Žižek
Human Rights—although I have great doubts
Human Rights—although I have great doubts
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about Human Rights—Women's Rights, Welfare State, Solidarity and so on. All that, you know, we tend to forget that—and here I provoke you consciously—that even when we criticize Europe, we as a rule criticize it from the European tradition. That's for me
about Human Rights—Women's Rights, Welfare State, Solidarity and so on. All that, you know, we tend to forget that—and here I provoke you consciously—that even when we criticize Europe, we as a rule criticize it from the European tradition. That's for me
Slavoj Žižek
nonetheless great about European legacy. It provides excellent intellectual tools also to criticize itself. So what is my position here? Bring even more refugees, but in an organized way. Not organize in the sense that they—as some of my friends attacked me ironically—that you establish some cultural police outposts and if they don't know the basic of European civilization, they don't come in. But in a kind of a broad social pact. First, also, it goes without saying we have our own violences and so on, but against Islamophobia and so on and so on. But the first thing I would have said is that there should be some kind of—I put it in very naive terms, but I think it should be put openly, clearly—a kind of a general, that's the only big frame that I would impose on everyone, a general pact on some basic rules, like tolerating each other's culture and so on, which should be simply respected by everyone. And this would have affected all sides. On the one hand, I would strictly prosecute mercilessly with police all European nationalist outbursts against immigrants. On the other hand—and here I see one of the catastrophes—you know some, I underline three times, some of the immigrants, for example in which countries—I know examples of Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Netherlands—for example, every year when they have Gay Pride or whatever, there are Muslim groups which attack them. This also—how should I put it—I consider it so wrong if we—the tendency among liberal left in Europe is not to talk about it, "we just help the enemy," and so on and so on. At the end then, you have this impression, which is a false one exploding, that "Oh, liberals want to Islamize Europe, they don't want us to talk about it, so what? Right-wingers..." The trouble is on the basis, what basis does one talk about it? Because I mean you've—you've stated that there are such things as European cultural values that are worth defending, you've named some of those—some of those values. And in this book you do talk about culture in quite a loose way frequently. I mean you say—you say of—of the refugees, that they are part of a culture that cannot accept many of the features we perceive as such. But what's so horrible about that? But why—I mean you—it often—it often seems that they're presented in your work as very wholly determined by their culture and unable to adapt. I mean there's a—the gap in your book for me—let me—let me finish my point—is that there's this European subject position, the liberal Western subject who is decided choosing where, who to let in and who to keep out. There are these migrants who, in this formulation that you borrow from Badiou, are either possessed of a desire for the West or are possessed of this desire for the West that has kind of curdled into hatred and dislike hatred. But it's—but what do you do about people like me, for example, who I am—I'm a European in a basic way but I'm the child of a migrant. My—my—my relationship to the neighbors is not as you describe in your book as a relationship with a spooky uncanny other who is ultimately unknowable. The neighbors are my cousins. The neighbors are in my—in my family. And it feels very problematic some of the ways that you slide from talking about—I can fully support the idea of an open set of axioms by which people participate in the society. I mean, we're—we're speaking in the United States, that's essentially the basis on which this nation of immigrants is founded. Europe has this problem with the question of culture and—and—and how one accommodates a pre-existing culture and history with—with new migrants. And, you know, as you've—as you've alluded, you can very easily get into trouble as soon as you start defending European culture on certain grounds. And this book seems to—seems to not acknowledge that there are that people change, that migrants come, they have children, second generation, second-generation people like me turn up who have much more complicated relationships to— But wait a minute, wait a minute, I'm not throwing you out, I'm not throwing you out. That's a beginning, that's a start of a civilization. Okay, perfect. No problem. But where do things get complicated? First, I don't know if I was clear enough, maybe it was a quickly composed book, what I mean by culture. No, no, no, I'm not trying to squeeze out. I'm not making any, I'm not like Trump, I'm not telling you it will not be a wall but just a fence or whatever, you know. No, no, no. Although people accused me that I was for Trump, which I was not because I secretly hope that I will be invited to White House. We will talk about that. Yeah, yeah. No, no, more seriously. Sorry, sorry, it's not fair what I'm doing now, turning into joke. But I will say this: what I mean by culture are these daily practices of how you make fun, family relations, sexual relations and so on, which you never should underestimate their power. And at that level, there are, to say modestly, some cultural differences. I'm not saying they should change. What I
nonetheless great about European legacy. It provides excellent intellectual tools also to criticize itself. So what is my position here? Bring even more refugees, but in an organized way. Not organize in the sense that they—as some of my friends attacked me ironically—that you establish some cultural police outposts and if they don't know the basic of European civilization, they don't come in. But in a kind of a broad social pact. First, also, it goes without saying we have our own violences and so on, but against Islamophobia and so on and so on. But the first thing I would have said is that there should be some kind of—I put it in very naive terms, but I think it should be put openly, clearly—a kind of a general, that's the only big frame that I would impose on everyone, a general pact on some basic rules, like tolerating each other's culture and so on, which should be simply respected by everyone. And this would have affected all sides. On the one hand, I would strictly prosecute mercilessly with police all European nationalist outbursts against immigrants. On the other hand—and here I see one of the catastrophes—you know some, I underline three times, some of the immigrants, for example in which countries—I know examples of Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Netherlands—for example, every year when they have Gay Pride or whatever, there are Muslim groups which attack them. This also—how should I put it—I consider it so wrong if we—the tendency among liberal left in Europe is not to talk about it, "we just help the enemy," and so on and so on. At the end then, you have this impression, which is a false one exploding, that "Oh, liberals want to Islamize Europe, they don't want us to talk about it, so what? Right-wingers..." The trouble is on the basis, what basis does one talk about it? Because I mean you've—you've stated that there are such things as European cultural values that are worth defending, you've named some of those—some of those values. And in this book you do talk about culture in quite a loose way frequently. I mean you say—you say of—of the refugees, that they are part of a culture that cannot accept many of the features we perceive as such. But what's so horrible about that? But why—I mean you—it often—it often seems that they're presented in your work as very wholly determined by their culture and unable to adapt. I mean there's a—the gap in your book for me—let me—let me finish my point—is that there's this European subject position, the liberal Western subject who is decided choosing where, who to let in and who to keep out. There are these migrants who, in this formulation that you borrow from Badiou, are either possessed of a desire for the West or are possessed of this desire for the West that has kind of curdled into hatred and dislike hatred. But it's—but what do you do about people like me, for example, who I am—I'm a European in a basic way but I'm the child of a migrant. My—my—my relationship to the neighbors is not as you describe in your book as a relationship with a spooky uncanny other who is ultimately unknowable. The neighbors are my cousins. The neighbors are in my—in my family. And it feels very problematic some of the ways that you slide from talking about—I can fully support the idea of an open set of axioms by which people participate in the society. I mean, we're—we're speaking in the United States, that's essentially the basis on which this nation of immigrants is founded. Europe has this problem with the question of culture and—and—and how one accommodates a pre-existing culture and history with—with new migrants. And, you know, as you've—as you've alluded, you can very easily get into trouble as soon as you start defending European culture on certain grounds. And this book seems to—seems to not acknowledge that there are that people change, that migrants come, they have children, second generation, second-generation people like me turn up who have much more complicated relationships to— But wait a minute, wait a minute, I'm not throwing you out, I'm not throwing you out. That's a beginning, that's a start of a civilization. Okay, perfect. No problem. But where do things get complicated? First, I don't know if I was clear enough, maybe it was a quickly composed book, what I mean by culture. No, no, no, I'm not trying to squeeze out. I'm not making any, I'm not like Trump, I'm not telling you it will not be a wall but just a fence or whatever, you know. No, no, no. Although people accused me that I was for Trump, which I was not because I secretly hope that I will be invited to White House. We will talk about that. Yeah, yeah. No, no, more seriously. Sorry, sorry, it's not fair what I'm doing now, turning into joke. But I will say this: what I mean by culture are these daily practices of how you make fun, family relations, sexual relations and so on, which you never should underestimate their power. And at that level, there are, to say modestly, some cultural differences. I'm not saying they should change. What I
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think is that first, this base, two sets of problems I see which are not—ah, first about when you said accommodations and so on. But you know what makes me skeptic? If you look—I don't trust the media and so on, but from what we can nonetheless guess of so-called—I underline so-called—terrorists who did the bombing in Brussels, in Paris. You know what's so interesting? They are practically all of them second-generation immigrants. Their parents
think is that first, this base, two sets of problems I see which are not—ah, first about when you said accommodations and so on. But you know what makes me skeptic? If you look—I don't trust the media and so on, but from what we can nonetheless guess of so-called—I underline so-called—terrorists who did the bombing in Brussels, in Paris. You know what's so interesting? They are practically all of them second-generation immigrants. Their parents
Slavoj Žižek
were already much
were already much
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more integrated. So the question is, they—we cannot preach integration. They are a reaction to what they see as a false integration. So
more integrated. So the question is, they—we cannot preach integration. They are a reaction to what they see as a false integration. So
Slavoj Žižek
it gets complicated. But what I want to
it gets complicated. But what I want to
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say is here: one rule we said, this mutual tolerance. The other rule brutally is the limits of this mutual tolerance. I don't believe in this liberal formula: to each of us our own way of life. Let me, and I mention this example in the book—and don't tell me it's marginal because it's not marginal, there are every year thousands of just registered examples—let's say in Germany you have a Muslim girl, immigrant, who gets in love with a German guy, wants to live Western world, family puts terrible pressure on her, she goes to the police, demands protection. Don't tell me this is marginal. In the last couple of years—I got this from my leftist friends—German police had to establish over safe houses, I would almost call them. Okay, now the limit is here. Then her family or community claims, "By protecting the girl, you are destroying our way of life." Clearly—clearly this formulation of liberal multiculturalism where you leave everybody alone in the sanctity of their culture is not functional and I'm very happy to abandon it. So all I demand, and that's the maximum, is that—and it holds also for us—that we establish how to deal, and there is no easy solution. I'm definitely not saying we should simply impose our values and so on. I suppose—I suppose my query about the whole book is the question of non-white agency. It's, you know, there's—there's a lot of—there's a lot of sort of full possessors of the European tradition who have this problem on their plates, you know, and either "Wir schaffen das" or we won't—we won't deal with it. And there are these migrants who are defined almost totally by their relationship to European culture.
say is here: one rule we said, this mutual tolerance. The other rule brutally is the limits of this mutual tolerance. I don't believe in this liberal formula: to each of us our own way of life. Let me, and I mention this example in the book—and don't tell me it's marginal because it's not marginal, there are every year thousands of just registered examples—let's say in Germany you have a Muslim girl, immigrant, who gets in love with a German guy, wants to live Western world, family puts terrible pressure on her, she goes to the police, demands protection. Don't tell me this is marginal. In the last couple of years—I got this from my leftist friends—German police had to establish over safe houses, I would almost call them. Okay, now the limit is here. Then her family or community claims, "By protecting the girl, you are destroying our way of life." Clearly—clearly this formulation of liberal multiculturalism where you leave everybody alone in the sanctity of their culture is not functional and I'm very happy to abandon it. So all I demand, and that's the maximum, is that—and it holds also for us—that we establish how to deal, and there is no easy solution. I'm definitely not saying we should simply impose our values and so on. I suppose—I suppose my query about the whole book is the question of non-white agency. It's, you know, there's—there's a lot of—there's a lot of sort of full possessors of the European tradition who have this problem on their plates, you know, and either "Wir schaffen das" or we won't—we won't deal with it. And there are these migrants who are defined almost totally by their relationship to European culture.
Slavoj Žižek
They're either desirous of the West or they are—they are angry at the West. I mean—and you
They're either desirous of the West or they are—they are angry at the West. I mean—and you
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fall—you fall into saying things like, you know, the ones—the ones who desire the West but who don't migrate make these kind of
fall—you fall into saying things like, you know, the ones—the ones who desire the West but who don't migrate make these kind of
Slavoj Žižek
pathetic simulacra of Western things like shopping malls in their benighted Third World cities. It's—wait a minute, wait a minute, but— I should here, I refer there, when I say this, I try to give following Alain Badiou some kind of a what I see as a genesis—it's a schema, it's a specific schema of so-called
pathetic simulacra of Western things like shopping malls in their benighted Third World cities. It's—wait a minute, wait a minute, but— I should here, I refer there, when I say this, I try to give following Alain Badiou some kind of a what I see as a genesis—it's a schema, it's a specific schema of so-called
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terrorism
terrorism
Slavoj Žižek
with a clear critical edge also towards us. My point is that terrorists are strictly a postmodern phenomenon of reacting to the West. Like, can you imagine—forget about ideology—a more modern, flexible, efficient organization than ISIS then? No. It's—clear, a post-1789 organization. Yes, this aspect of ISIS is certain. They're even post-Leninist, I mean— Yeah, yeah, it's not this—all so we agree with this, nothing but—just this, a certain—put them publicly minimal rights and also not just patronize them, involve them, let them say their side. Like, I didn't like after that Cologne train station, it's not clear I admit what happened there—one thing I'm sure of, you remember, New Year's Eve, thousands of blah blah people there harassed a little bit women. But now I only got it what really happened. It was absolutely not a serious attempt at raping or whatever. Friends told me from Egypt, from Ramallah where I was, "Listen, this is our common ritual. Young men go out and just play a little—no rape, this is just their way of carnival." In the same way I'm first to admit it, we have our own vulgar carnivals. Go to October beerfest or whatever in Munich and so on. So I'm not saying this—all I'm saying is all this should be brought out. When there was that Munich—sorry, Cologne carnival—nobody even inquired, "But what happened? What did it mean to them?" And then they speculated, was it a gang rape or not. It was just—I'm not saying we should accept that carnival, but you know, that's the problem. Each culture has its own, how should I call it, half-illegal obscenities which are really part of that culture. I mean, you Americans are maybe even the worst here. Just go to any campus and you have that horror—my European morality shocked—that you call here fraternities and sororities. Like, I rather don't even think what happens there and so on. So again, the second problem I'm ready to raise up here is: there is nonetheless—so again, my position is absolutely clear, I said it: more refugees in Europe, but let's do it in a way that would prevent right-wingers' takeover. Of course, not in the simple sense
with a clear critical edge also towards us. My point is that terrorists are strictly a postmodern phenomenon of reacting to the West. Like, can you imagine—forget about ideology—a more modern, flexible, efficient organization than ISIS then? No. It's—clear, a post-1789 organization. Yes, this aspect of ISIS is certain. They're even post-Leninist, I mean— Yeah, yeah, it's not this—all so we agree with this, nothing but—just this, a certain—put them publicly minimal rights and also not just patronize them, involve them, let them say their side. Like, I didn't like after that Cologne train station, it's not clear I admit what happened there—one thing I'm sure of, you remember, New Year's Eve, thousands of blah blah people there harassed a little bit women. But now I only got it what really happened. It was absolutely not a serious attempt at raping or whatever. Friends told me from Egypt, from Ramallah where I was, "Listen, this is our common ritual. Young men go out and just play a little—no rape, this is just their way of carnival." In the same way I'm first to admit it, we have our own vulgar carnivals. Go to October beerfest or whatever in Munich and so on. So I'm not saying this—all I'm saying is all this should be brought out. When there was that Munich—sorry, Cologne carnival—nobody even inquired, "But what happened? What did it mean to them?" And then they speculated, was it a gang rape or not. It was just—I'm not saying we should accept that carnival, but you know, that's the problem. Each culture has its own, how should I call it, half-illegal obscenities which are really part of that culture. I mean, you Americans are maybe even the worst here. Just go to any campus and you have that horror—my European morality shocked—that you call here fraternities and sororities. Like, I rather don't even think what happens there and so on. So again, the second problem I'm ready to raise up here is: there is nonetheless—so again, my position is absolutely clear, I said it: more refugees in Europe, but let's do it in a way that would prevent right-wingers' takeover. Of course, not in the simple sense
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"let's concede to the right-wingers," no, they will be—but second point, which is more crucial for me, is that we should also raise some of these questions,
"let's concede to the right-wingers," no, they will be—but second point, which is more crucial for me, is that we should also raise some of these questions,
Slavoj Žižek
and I had many debates with my Arab friends about this, like: Why is it all of a sudden Middle East versus Europe? Why is it—and I find this a little bit ironic—all the time we hear there are new
and I had many debates with my Arab friends about this, like: Why is it all of a sudden Middle East versus Europe? Why is it—and I find this a little bit ironic—all the time we hear there are new
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centers of power, China, India, United States, Pacific Rim, whatever, Europe is out. Yeah, but obviously many people still want to go to Europe. Now you will say because Europe can be reached by feet, it's close there. Ah, this is for me the biggest enigma. Why do we talk so little about it? Listen, just beneath, below the crisis region, which means Iraq, Syria, there are a couple of Arab countries which are very wealthy to put it mildly.
centers of power, China, India, United States, Pacific Rim, whatever, Europe is out. Yeah, but obviously many people still want to go to Europe. Now you will say because Europe can be reached by feet, it's close there. Ah, this is for me the biggest enigma. Why do we talk so little about it? Listen, just beneath, below the crisis region, which means Iraq, Syria, there are a couple of Arab countries which are very wealthy to put it mildly.
Slavoj Žižek
And why don't they—why do you think, why do you think they
And why don't they—why do you think, why do you think they
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don't take refugees? Why don't Saudi and Qatar and— Because they are not crazy! Because they are afraid of unrest, because they are mafia states. I claim that Saudi Arabia is not even, that's why it is such a good ally
don't take refugees? Why don't Saudi and Qatar and— Because they are not crazy! Because they are afraid of unrest, because they are mafia states. I claim that Saudi Arabia is not even, that's why it is such a good ally
Slavoj Žižek
of the United States. Saudi Arabia is not even a normal—think of Saudi Arabia as a big banking corrupted empire where a big family is in power. What about Qatar? Qatar, I exploded when I had a talk at Al Jazeera, very polemic talk, like: they say all the time, "Ooh, how brutal Europe is," and so on and so on. Fuck you, how many refugees did Qatar take? Qatar, which usually competes with Liechtenstein and Singapore as the per capita wealthiest country in the world. None. Kuwait? None. Arab Emirates? None. So from—from a right-wing point of view they've had a very successful strategy. They've managed to—they've managed to maintain social order and deny the problematic influx of refugees. And the—the issues that— They go only to poor Arab countries. They—they who are in Lebanon, who are in Jordan, the even Egypt, yeah. So the draw for refugees is, under this narrative, it's European social democracy, precisely the thing that you wish to preserve as, you know, part of the suite of European values that must be—must be defended if Europe is to have meaning. Um, and the right answer to this is well, dismantle social democracy and they won't come. We'll make it as vicious and brutal and dog-dog as possible. No, but that's why, this is what I want to prevent. And the only way out I see is: organize, large organization, state and so on. Here we come to my authoritarian leftism, I openly admit it. I see limits in democracy and I don't think that the left should follow this eternal seduction with, you know, multitude, local democracy, people should organize from themselves from below and so on. It's a bit of old-fashioned top-down statism. Why old-fashioned? But how—but how—European governments don't feel that they have the mandate to do that. Brexit has got everybody on the run in Britain. Everybody's now out trying to outdo themselves in being as harsh as they can. The French are looking very nervously towards a Marine Le Pen Front National victory in April. Then we've got the Dutch elections coming, we've got Merkel is going to take a beating in the November German elections. How is this uh coordinated state action in favor of the refugees possibly going to function? How's it going to happen? No, no, here I am simply a pessimist. It will not happen, which means maybe that it is the end of Europe the way we know it. The only conclusion that I take from this—then we will say so what—no, no, it's that I reject, and this brought me also many enemies, I reject what I call very ironically the Brexit-Trump leftists in Europe, those who think European Union is an organ of international capital, forget it, we should all do our own Brexit, Grexit, we should establish stronger nation states which will be able in their sovereignty to preserve more of the welfare state and so on. And—and be protectionist, economically protectionist. I totally disagree with this. Listen, when some leftists in Britain were for Brexit as a chance for a new social democracy, I told them are they crazy? Listen, a friend provided me with a list of all big conflicts in the last years between British government and European Union. Sorry, with this terrifying European bureaucracy, sorry, but almost in all the cases I am for Europe. For example, years ago, a little bit less, when Blair was president around that time, European Union wanted to impose in all Europe these basic, at least minimum welfare state provisions, like the maximum of hours you work per week, the minimum of holidays you get per free time that you get per year, even some ecological standards. British government rejected them all, claiming they limit their—their competitiveness and so on and so on. So I claim Brexit not only will not enhance British sovereignty, it simply means "we want to sell ourselves to global capitalism totally directly even without these
of the United States. Saudi Arabia is not even a normal—think of Saudi Arabia as a big banking corrupted empire where a big family is in power. What about Qatar? Qatar, I exploded when I had a talk at Al Jazeera, very polemic talk, like: they say all the time, "Ooh, how brutal Europe is," and so on and so on. Fuck you, how many refugees did Qatar take? Qatar, which usually competes with Liechtenstein and Singapore as the per capita wealthiest country in the world. None. Kuwait? None. Arab Emirates? None. So from—from a right-wing point of view they've had a very successful strategy. They've managed to—they've managed to maintain social order and deny the problematic influx of refugees. And the—the issues that— They go only to poor Arab countries. They—they who are in Lebanon, who are in Jordan, the even Egypt, yeah. So the draw for refugees is, under this narrative, it's European social democracy, precisely the thing that you wish to preserve as, you know, part of the suite of European values that must be—must be defended if Europe is to have meaning. Um, and the right answer to this is well, dismantle social democracy and they won't come. We'll make it as vicious and brutal and dog-dog as possible. No, but that's why, this is what I want to prevent. And the only way out I see is: organize, large organization, state and so on. Here we come to my authoritarian leftism, I openly admit it. I see limits in democracy and I don't think that the left should follow this eternal seduction with, you know, multitude, local democracy, people should organize from themselves from below and so on. It's a bit of old-fashioned top-down statism. Why old-fashioned? But how—but how—European governments don't feel that they have the mandate to do that. Brexit has got everybody on the run in Britain. Everybody's now out trying to outdo themselves in being as harsh as they can. The French are looking very nervously towards a Marine Le Pen Front National victory in April. Then we've got the Dutch elections coming, we've got Merkel is going to take a beating in the November German elections. How is this uh coordinated state action in favor of the refugees possibly going to function? How's it going to happen? No, no, here I am simply a pessimist. It will not happen, which means maybe that it is the end of Europe the way we know it. The only conclusion that I take from this—then we will say so what—no, no, it's that I reject, and this brought me also many enemies, I reject what I call very ironically the Brexit-Trump leftists in Europe, those who think European Union is an organ of international capital, forget it, we should all do our own Brexit, Grexit, we should establish stronger nation states which will be able in their sovereignty to preserve more of the welfare state and so on. And—and be protectionist, economically protectionist. I totally disagree with this. Listen, when some leftists in Britain were for Brexit as a chance for a new social democracy, I told them are they crazy? Listen, a friend provided me with a list of all big conflicts in the last years between British government and European Union. Sorry, with this terrifying European bureaucracy, sorry, but almost in all the cases I am for Europe. For example, years ago, a little bit less, when Blair was president around that time, European Union wanted to impose in all Europe these basic, at least minimum welfare state provisions, like the maximum of hours you work per week, the minimum of holidays you get per free time that you get per year, even some ecological standards. British government rejected them all, claiming they limit their—their competitiveness and so on and so on. So I claim Brexit not only will not enhance British sovereignty, it simply means "we want to sell ourselves to global capitalism totally directly even without these
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moderate as it is
moderate as it is
Slavoj Žižek
protection of Europe." It's going to end up as the Cayman Islands with worse weather, I think, that's the— It's going to become a—it's going to become a platform for wandering finance capital. It's— This is why—I said this—but this is the most wonderful definition that I heard, yes, of United Kingdom. So now I'm going to be nasty to you. Um, you brought up the T-word, you brought up the Trump word. You before the election, uh— It's no longer the F-word but the T-word. Yeah, the T-word. Yeah, the great euphemism of Brooklyn. Um, you, if not endorsed Trump, you said that Trump was the preferable candidate to Clinton. And as you know, in—in making that judgment, you put yourself on the other side to the vast majority of non-white people voting in this country. Your—and as far as I understand it, your position was basically a
protection of Europe." It's going to end up as the Cayman Islands with worse weather, I think, that's the— It's going to become a—it's going to become a platform for wandering finance capital. It's— This is why—I said this—but this is the most wonderful definition that I heard, yes, of United Kingdom. So now I'm going to be nasty to you. Um, you brought up the T-word, you brought up the Trump word. You before the election, uh— It's no longer the F-word but the T-word. Yeah, the T-word. Yeah, the great euphemism of Brooklyn. Um, you, if not endorsed Trump, you said that Trump was the preferable candidate to Clinton. And as you know, in—in making that judgment, you put yourself on the other side to the vast majority of non-white people voting in this country. Your—and as far as I understand it, your position was basically a
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sort of Leninist position that we sharpen the contradictions and there might be some interesting revolutionary possibilities that could come out of a—of a Trump win. But I say
sort of Leninist position that we sharpen the contradictions and there might be some interesting revolutionary possibilities that could come out of a—of a Trump win. But I say
Slavoj Žižek
to you that that calculation of risk and opportunity, you—you came out
to you that that calculation of risk and opportunity, you—you came out
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with a very different answer from most of—most of my friends, especially the non-white friends. I mean because it's—it's immigrants, it's undocumented, it's LGBTQ, it's people of color who are going to bear the brunt of—of what you were hoping for. And so I say to you, weren't you just throwing—throwing the queers and the immigrants under the bus in the hope that the bus skids in an interesting revolutionary direction? No, no, no, no. Okay, okay.
with a very different answer from most of—most of my friends, especially the non-white friends. I mean because it's—it's immigrants, it's undocumented, it's LGBTQ, it's people of color who are going to bear the brunt of—of what you were hoping for. And so I say to you, weren't you just throwing—throwing the queers and the immigrants under the bus in the hope that the bus skids in an interesting revolutionary direction? No, no, no, no. Okay, okay.
Slavoj Žižek
No, no, no, I am here—I thought about it and I totally allow for the possibility that I am wrong. But I nonetheless think that, first, this absolute liberal scare of Trump is part of this liberal blackmail: "We are the only chance." No, the election was screwed up the moment Hillary got rid of—got rid of Bernie Sanders. And it was a catastrophic, mega-catastrophic mistake to think that she had—she has to move more to the center. What she didn't take into account that a very strong percentage of Trump votes, as far as I can judge, were people who were genuinely
No, no, no, I am here—I thought about it and I totally allow for the possibility that I am wrong. But I nonetheless think that, first, this absolute liberal scare of Trump is part of this liberal blackmail: "We are the only chance." No, the election was screwed up the moment Hillary got rid of—got rid of Bernie Sanders. And it was a catastrophic, mega-catastrophic mistake to think that she had—she has to move more to the center. What she didn't take into account that a very strong percentage of Trump votes, as far as I can judge, were people who were genuinely
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sustained by some kind of an abstract, of course not directly leftist, but nonetheless anti-establishment rage. So that Hillary's politics enabled them to sustain the vision that the only anti-establishment candidate is Trump. And also many Sanders voters were disappointed. I think that if Hillary were to take the risk to move a little bit more to the left, then she would have had much greater chances to get even some of the Trump votes. But actually, if you look at the Democrat platform, it was one of the most progressive Democrat platforms that anyone has fought
sustained by some kind of an abstract, of course not directly leftist, but nonetheless anti-establishment rage. So that Hillary's politics enabled them to sustain the vision that the only anti-establishment candidate is Trump. And also many Sanders voters were disappointed. I think that if Hillary were to take the risk to move a little bit more to the left, then she would have had much greater chances to get even some of the Trump votes. But actually, if you look at the Democrat platform, it was one of the most progressive Democrat platforms that anyone has fought
Slavoj Žižek
on for many, many years. Yeah, but it's very contradictory. Be serious. I mean, look at the end how even the Cold Warriors like Paul Wolfowitz and so on, they all went to Hillary basically and so on. Hillary is the Cold War—is much more—when they say, "Ooh, Trump is a madman, new—new—new atomic war," I fear much more Hillary here. Okay, well, we don't have Hillary. We have Trump, so the madman is in charge and— Yeah, but he is not a direct menace. I see him, I will put it like this, I see him as a disgusting, almost subhuman—not totally subhuman, as I wrote— You're sounding like a territory latte-drinking liberal there with your—this—this disgust at the blond beast of Trump. No, no, no, no. Wait a minute. Yeah, yeah, yeah. No, no, I totally agree with you here what you are implying, that if I hate something is this liberal, as if in front of a snake, total fear, Trump and so on and so on. Let's be brutally, coldly realistic. Trump is an absolutely disgusting opportunist. He is obviously now looking for his way. As I already mentioned, I think, did you notice, in last three days, if I follow the media correctly, he changed three times his position of first, it is a wall, then it's not a wall, then it's just a fence and so on. And then no Obamacare, then there are some good elements in Obamacare. But he was always doing this. At some point he said we should have more understanding for Palestinians. Then the Zionist backlash, two days later he said Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel, whatever. I don't fear Trump, I fear much more the—you know, all those Republicans for whom Trump was too much are now, now that Trump is power, coming back and I fear of their influence on Trump's politics. But don't you—but okay, I— nonetheless, that's my big fear. Of course, what I was afraid—and I must say, I'm not kidding,
on for many, many years. Yeah, but it's very contradictory. Be serious. I mean, look at the end how even the Cold Warriors like Paul Wolfowitz and so on, they all went to Hillary basically and so on. Hillary is the Cold War—is much more—when they say, "Ooh, Trump is a madman, new—new—new atomic war," I fear much more Hillary here. Okay, well, we don't have Hillary. We have Trump, so the madman is in charge and— Yeah, but he is not a direct menace. I see him, I will put it like this, I see him as a disgusting, almost subhuman—not totally subhuman, as I wrote— You're sounding like a territory latte-drinking liberal there with your—this—this disgust at the blond beast of Trump. No, no, no, no. Wait a minute. Yeah, yeah, yeah. No, no, I totally agree with you here what you are implying, that if I hate something is this liberal, as if in front of a snake, total fear, Trump and so on and so on. Let's be brutally, coldly realistic. Trump is an absolutely disgusting opportunist. He is obviously now looking for his way. As I already mentioned, I think, did you notice, in last three days, if I follow the media correctly, he changed three times his position of first, it is a wall, then it's not a wall, then it's just a fence and so on. And then no Obamacare, then there are some good elements in Obamacare. But he was always doing this. At some point he said we should have more understanding for Palestinians. Then the Zionist backlash, two days later he said Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel, whatever. I don't fear Trump, I fear much more the—you know, all those Republicans for whom Trump was too much are now, now that Trump is power, coming back and I fear of their influence on Trump's politics. But don't you—but okay, I— nonetheless, that's my big fear. Of course, what I was afraid—and I must say, I'm not kidding,
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that I was, let's put it slightly surprised with Trump's victory, no? I was afraid, I already could have heard those signs of relief: "Oh my god, the worst is over" and so on and so on. No, I sincerely think that all humanity is slowly approaching some abyss. Ecology,
that I was, let's put it slightly surprised with Trump's victory, no? I was afraid, I already could have heard those signs of relief: "Oh my god, the worst is over" and so on and so on. No, I sincerely think that all humanity is slowly approaching some abyss. Ecology,
Slavoj Žižek
new racial tensions, what will happen in economy. Capitalism
new racial tensions, what will happen in economy. Capitalism
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is approaching clearly a limit, now everybody knows it. Look at the problems of—of intellectual
is approaching clearly a limit, now everybody knows it. Look at the problems of—of intellectual
Slavoj Žižek
property,
property,
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cooperative commons and so on. And these points are extremely dangerous. And what I was so afraid of in Hillary's position was this: "Okay, we are not as bad as Trump, we played safely." No, that's not enough. We need a brutal awakening. So I'm sincerely
cooperative commons and so on. And these points are extremely dangerous. And what I was so afraid of in Hillary's position was this: "Okay, we are not as bad as Trump, we played safely." No, that's not enough. We need a brutal awakening. So I'm sincerely
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ready to apologize, to apologize, maybe I—under—I'm well aware of all those horrors around Trump. Even more than on all those, how do you call them, white supremacists and so on. I mean, but you're making the calculation that for you this is the—this is the better route. And I'm—and I'm saying, you know, you're getting other people to do your revolutionary dirty work because you won't be at the front of the—the front of the lines. Wait—wait, okay. I will put it like this. It will sound ironic, but I mean it pretty literally. You can apply this criticism to all revolutionaries.
ready to apologize, to apologize, maybe I—under—I'm well aware of all those horrors around Trump. Even more than on all those, how do you call them, white supremacists and so on. I mean, but you're making the calculation that for you this is the—this is the better route. And I'm—and I'm saying, you know, you're getting other people to do your revolutionary dirty work because you won't be at the front of the—the front of the lines. Wait—wait, okay. I will put it like this. It will sound ironic, but I mean it pretty literally. You can apply this criticism to all revolutionaries.
Slavoj Žižek
You know that Lenin was ever really risking his life? No, he was in safety in Switzerland. You know what was Marx doing when there was Paris Commune? He went on a first-class train to Karlovy Vary, Karlsbad and so on. So I—I think that—don't—now I will say something very brutal. Don't look from us theorists this type of—okay, I got confused, not really, but I will give you a clear answer. Jacques Lacan once provided a perfect formula when somebody accused him, "But you are preaching in your theory one thing, but you are doing a different thing." He said, "A good psychoanalyst answer is always: don't look at me what I'm doing, look at what I'm saying. The truth is there." In—even—so what I'm saying is this. I mean it very seriously. Let's say I'm a hypocrite who care more for the honoraria that I get or whatever. It doesn't matter. What matters is the social effect of our words. And believe me, even at that private level, I could defend myself. I appeal to you, to some of you who read your newspapers. Didn't you notice that up till like three years ago, I—I published a co-ed in New York Times every two, three months. Now I'm prohibited. Till two, a half a year ago, from time to
You know that Lenin was ever really risking his life? No, he was in safety in Switzerland. You know what was Marx doing when there was Paris Commune? He went on a first-class train to Karlovy Vary, Karlsbad and so on. So I—I think that—don't—now I will say something very brutal. Don't look from us theorists this type of—okay, I got confused, not really, but I will give you a clear answer. Jacques Lacan once provided a perfect formula when somebody accused him, "But you are preaching in your theory one thing, but you are doing a different thing." He said, "A good psychoanalyst answer is always: don't look at me what I'm doing, look at what I'm saying. The truth is there." In—even—so what I'm saying is this. I mean it very seriously. Let's say I'm a hypocrite who care more for the honoraria that I get or whatever. It doesn't matter. What matters is the social effect of our words. And believe me, even at that private level, I could defend myself. I appeal to you, to some of you who read your newspapers. Didn't you notice that up till like three years ago, I—I published a co-ed in New York Times every two, three months. Now I'm prohibited. Till two, a half a year ago, from time to
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time I published at least online in Newsweek. I'm out. In England, I'm already for two years prohibited. Three, did you find anything by me in London Review of Books? I'm out. So there's a backlash against you. Why—why, why is that? Because I think I
time I published at least online in Newsweek. I'm out. In England, I'm already for two years prohibited. Three, did you find anything by me in London Review of Books? I'm out. So there's a backlash against you. Why—why, why is that? Because I think I
Slavoj Žižek
disturb—uh, I because I am a disturbance to both sides. And I think right-wingers are even more right here. They still perceive me as a danger. While leftists think I'm some kind of a, I don't know, fake or whatever and so on. But it's very interesting how this works. You know how all of a sudden, the more some crazy left-wingers
disturb—uh, I because I am a disturbance to both sides. And I think right-wingers are even more right here. They still perceive me as a danger. While leftists think I'm some kind of a, I don't know, fake or whatever and so on. But it's very interesting how this works. You know how all of a sudden, the more some crazy left-wingers
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claim that I am, I don't know, there were even truths like I'm obviously CIA agent. Yeah, Trump of theory,
claim that I am, I don't know, there were even truths like I'm obviously CIA agent. Yeah, Trump of theory,
Slavoj Žižek
yeah. No longer Elvis of theory, but Trump of theory. Okay, but I'm almost tempted to say cynically, if I'm Trump of theory, where are my billions, my god, you know what I mean? Like,
yeah. No longer Elvis of theory, but Trump of theory. Okay, but I'm almost tempted to say cynically, if I'm Trump of theory, where are my billions, my god, you know what I mean? Like,
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I'm more and more excluded. Now the only place where I can publish in the
I'm more and more excluded. Now the only place where I can publish in the
Slavoj Žižek
United
United
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States is *In These Times*. And even there, it's mostly online. And
States is *In These Times*. And even there, it's mostly online. And
Slavoj Žižek
even, for example, I published that, I know, very problematic text for some people, I stand by it totally, in *Philosophical Salon* on LGBTQ. Can you imagine the backlash? The guy who runs the *Philosophical Salon* was almost fired and so on. And all of a sudden, the liberalism of liberals ended. They claimed, "No debate with me, it's a shame that such a text was even published" and so on and so on. So don't—don't—how should I put it, I like this ingenious new concept by the great American intellectual George Bush the younger. You know, when he said, "Don't misunderestimate," he said this "my influence," you know. You know like I am a problem for all. And you know why I can endure it? Because I'm old enough, I have these relatively safe jobs in London, in my country, so up yours. I—I don't care, I don't care. I'm free. But on the other hand, I must say how many of my friends get into panic. And all I can tell you is, I don't always agree politically with Sartre, but after the war, for some time he was attacked by the left and by the right. And he said something that I love: "In our confused times, if you are attacked for the same text by both sides, it's one of the few reliable signs that you are on the right path." And it happened to me with my book—I will finish then, sorry—that on September 11th, *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*. I'm sorry I cannot show you, friends sent it to me. In *Al-Ahram*, it was criticized as the most perfidious Zionist propaganda. In *Jerusalem Post*, it was criticized as the most brutal antisemitism and so on. Eh, if this happens, maybe I— But you know, on the other hand, I don't provide answers. One should—I totally agree with you, I'm walking on very, very thin ice in this book. But don't you think that one has to shock people today, even when we are dealing with problems today's academic left? They like to change confronting problem into yet another moralizing
even, for example, I published that, I know, very problematic text for some people, I stand by it totally, in *Philosophical Salon* on LGBTQ. Can you imagine the backlash? The guy who runs the *Philosophical Salon* was almost fired and so on. And all of a sudden, the liberalism of liberals ended. They claimed, "No debate with me, it's a shame that such a text was even published" and so on and so on. So don't—don't—how should I put it, I like this ingenious new concept by the great American intellectual George Bush the younger. You know, when he said, "Don't misunderestimate," he said this "my influence," you know. You know like I am a problem for all. And you know why I can endure it? Because I'm old enough, I have these relatively safe jobs in London, in my country, so up yours. I—I don't care, I don't care. I'm free. But on the other hand, I must say how many of my friends get into panic. And all I can tell you is, I don't always agree politically with Sartre, but after the war, for some time he was attacked by the left and by the right. And he said something that I love: "In our confused times, if you are attacked for the same text by both sides, it's one of the few reliable signs that you are on the right path." And it happened to me with my book—I will finish then, sorry—that on September 11th, *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*. I'm sorry I cannot show you, friends sent it to me. In *Al-Ahram*, it was criticized as the most perfidious Zionist propaganda. In *Jerusalem Post*, it was criticized as the most brutal antisemitism and so on. Eh, if this happens, maybe I— But you know, on the other hand, I don't provide answers. One should—I totally agree with you, I'm walking on very, very thin ice in this book. But don't you think that one has to shock people today, even when we are dealing with problems today's academic left? They like to change confronting problem into yet another moralizing
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self-satisfying reflection. There is no real sense of urgency. I mean, we're sort of running out of time for my questions, but there is a whole kind of strand to your book that is against empathy as the ground for a politics.
self-satisfying reflection. There is no real sense of urgency. I mean, we're sort of running out of time for my questions, but there is a whole kind of strand to your book that is against empathy as the ground for a politics.
Slavoj Žižek
That's the only proper, you know why? I will tell you why. For me, it's terribly racist to say we need to have empathy to with refugees. Let me be brutal. The majority of people are always slightly—not just refugees, my god, of you here, whoever, I don't like them. So for me, when somebody said, "I sympathize, I had—I met a nice..." For example, in Europe, they play such a dirty game. Empathy, and then when you ask them, "Okay, but show me with whom you have empathy," they all mention some highly educated Syrian refugee. Of course, it's one of their own. And my argument is: if you base helping refugees of empathy, what about all those with whom it's almost impossible for us to have empathy? And here I'm a materialist Christian. True love for the neighbor. Neighbor is the biblical way to say monstrous other. Neighbor is someone precisely with whom you cannot identify. Neighbor is not the fellow man, "Oh, he is one of us" and so on. And the true test with refugees is not "we pick up the good guys," you know, those who are almost like us. Look, they read Joyce, "Oh my god," and Beckett and so on. No, what about those who didn't read it and so on and so on? That's why I also don't like, and this is a problematic part of the book I know, this idea of—my god, I—this is the part of which I'm very proud although provocative. You know, like deep multiculturalists like to say this, one of the greatest bullshit statements in the known universe, as they say in Star Wars or where, that "an enemy is only someone whose story we were not ready to hear" or something like this. Are you crazy? So would you say that the problem with Hitler was he was our enemy because we didn't—were not open enough to hear his story? No, there are real enemies. The greatness of Winston Churchill was that he precisely was reading, listening to Hitler's story. So for me, the point is not this: "we get to know them" and so on. We cannot get to know them, we don't even know ourselves and so on. True multicultural tolerance is: there is an Arab there, a Jew there, a Latino American there, an African there, and we don't know each other but we are kind—I believe more and more in superficial kindness, manners—we are kind to each other and then yes, miracles happen. From time to time all of a sudden, you know, there is an authentic contact and so on. But I don't like this pressure on, you know, which is always secretly racist. I really hate, for example, in my own country, when somebody comes from United States and said, "Oh, what a different country, could you tell me something about your history, your food, your poetry?" and I explode. I tell you you want to learn our identity? I can tell you a dirty joke. That's the only thing, and it really works. That's my experience. It worked in every country. I was in China. We were just polite. Then they told me a dirty joke which is so dirty that with all my bad taste it involves sperm, urine, shit at the same time and we become—you know what I mean? Like, real opening, breaking the ice, how do you call it, to another has nothing to do with this trying to understand the other. No, I mean, true communication happens in this freedom—magic moment where simply: here we are, we have solidarity. You know, without those multicultural or relativist even worse games like "how do we know that when we say culture we mean the same thing as they do?" No, the only thing that resolves this dilemma is a shared battle. When there was, with all its limitations, Tahrir Square demonstrations, we all of a sudden knew that we are all at the same time without all the multiculturalist problem. I talk too much, I'm sorry. No, before I—before I throw it open—I'm aware that there must be a lot of people who want to say a lot of things—is that, I mean, on this question of shared battles, there was just one point in the book where I have to take you to task because you have a chapter on Divine Violence, the Benjaminian concept of Divine Violence. In this book or in *Violence*? This—this book as well. So you've copy and pasted it from another— Absolutely, all the time, all the time. I plead guilty, yeah. And under this heading, you—you discuss the—the—the Ferguson uprising. But you characterize that in a very strange way to me as a—apparently irrational, a blind acting-out. You say the protesters have an inability to locate the experience of their situation within a meaningful whole. And this is—I think you're misrecognizing your friends here. I mean, this is one of the most significant and important civil rights movements to have emerged since the 1960s. And if you feel it's insufficiently directed and political I should—I should give you the link to the movement for—the platform of the movement for Black
That's the only proper, you know why? I will tell you why. For me, it's terribly racist to say we need to have empathy to with refugees. Let me be brutal. The majority of people are always slightly—not just refugees, my god, of you here, whoever, I don't like them. So for me, when somebody said, "I sympathize, I had—I met a nice..." For example, in Europe, they play such a dirty game. Empathy, and then when you ask them, "Okay, but show me with whom you have empathy," they all mention some highly educated Syrian refugee. Of course, it's one of their own. And my argument is: if you base helping refugees of empathy, what about all those with whom it's almost impossible for us to have empathy? And here I'm a materialist Christian. True love for the neighbor. Neighbor is the biblical way to say monstrous other. Neighbor is someone precisely with whom you cannot identify. Neighbor is not the fellow man, "Oh, he is one of us" and so on. And the true test with refugees is not "we pick up the good guys," you know, those who are almost like us. Look, they read Joyce, "Oh my god," and Beckett and so on. No, what about those who didn't read it and so on and so on? That's why I also don't like, and this is a problematic part of the book I know, this idea of—my god, I—this is the part of which I'm very proud although provocative. You know, like deep multiculturalists like to say this, one of the greatest bullshit statements in the known universe, as they say in Star Wars or where, that "an enemy is only someone whose story we were not ready to hear" or something like this. Are you crazy? So would you say that the problem with Hitler was he was our enemy because we didn't—were not open enough to hear his story? No, there are real enemies. The greatness of Winston Churchill was that he precisely was reading, listening to Hitler's story. So for me, the point is not this: "we get to know them" and so on. We cannot get to know them, we don't even know ourselves and so on. True multicultural tolerance is: there is an Arab there, a Jew there, a Latino American there, an African there, and we don't know each other but we are kind—I believe more and more in superficial kindness, manners—we are kind to each other and then yes, miracles happen. From time to time all of a sudden, you know, there is an authentic contact and so on. But I don't like this pressure on, you know, which is always secretly racist. I really hate, for example, in my own country, when somebody comes from United States and said, "Oh, what a different country, could you tell me something about your history, your food, your poetry?" and I explode. I tell you you want to learn our identity? I can tell you a dirty joke. That's the only thing, and it really works. That's my experience. It worked in every country. I was in China. We were just polite. Then they told me a dirty joke which is so dirty that with all my bad taste it involves sperm, urine, shit at the same time and we become—you know what I mean? Like, real opening, breaking the ice, how do you call it, to another has nothing to do with this trying to understand the other. No, I mean, true communication happens in this freedom—magic moment where simply: here we are, we have solidarity. You know, without those multicultural or relativist even worse games like "how do we know that when we say culture we mean the same thing as they do?" No, the only thing that resolves this dilemma is a shared battle. When there was, with all its limitations, Tahrir Square demonstrations, we all of a sudden knew that we are all at the same time without all the multiculturalist problem. I talk too much, I'm sorry. No, before I—before I throw it open—I'm aware that there must be a lot of people who want to say a lot of things—is that, I mean, on this question of shared battles, there was just one point in the book where I have to take you to task because you have a chapter on Divine Violence, the Benjaminian concept of Divine Violence. In this book or in *Violence*? This—this book as well. So you've copy and pasted it from another— Absolutely, all the time, all the time. I plead guilty, yeah. And under this heading, you—you discuss the—the—the Ferguson uprising. But you characterize that in a very strange way to me as a—apparently irrational, a blind acting-out. You say the protesters have an inability to locate the experience of their situation within a meaningful whole. And this is—I think you're misrecognizing your friends here. I mean, this is one of the most significant and important civil rights movements to have emerged since the 1960s. And if you feel it's insufficiently directed and political I should—I should give you the link to the movement for—the platform of the movement for Black
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Lives. It—I thought it was strange that you didn't ascribe agency or productivity to that. Okay, no, let me make my position here.
Lives. It—I thought it was strange that you didn't ascribe agency or productivity to that. Okay, no, let me make my position here.
Slavoj Žižek
I'm radically for Black Lives Matter and so on. I even agree with Black Lives Matter against those liberals—it's totally wrong, non-dialectical—who say, "Why only blacks, why not all lives matter?" and so on, you know. This is a lie, I cannot develop it. And I even wrote, you see, and they didn't want to publish it, neither in *Guardian* because too—another text when I confronted the two positions. You remember a couple of months ago, a black guy shot a couple of white policemen, mostly white, I don't even know if they were all white, and then Trump and all our friends exploded: "No, that's the limit" and so on. No, this is of course a deplorable act and so on. But if we compare these two crimes: a policeman shooting a black guy and a desperate black guy shooting policeman, I think—not morally but immanently even morally, why not, what the hell—the second one, that is to say white policeman shooting a black protester whatever, is infinitely more dangerous. Why? I speak here precisely as a law and order guy. Because in the case of black guy shooting white policeman, it's simply somebody totally desperate, out of law, not a person of law, shoots representatives of the law. That was for our good Donald, wife of the great Slovenian woman and so on. The great crime. But isn't something much more terrifying in a policeman shooting a civilian? Because this means that the rule of law is undermined from within. Who will protect the law when the law itself does the criminal acts and so on and so on? So I'm very clear here. Secondly, I apologize myself. I know what you said about Ferguson and so on. But my point was this one: even if sometimes these demonstrations go violent and so on—and of course, let's say I would have found myself at such a place and some black guys would have been bit me and so on and so on. Of course, I would be scared like shit, trying to run away and so on. I would even not be afraid to call for police. But nonetheless, this is why I call them Divine Violence. We cannot—they may be criminal, whatever— But this just denies political agency for this—this movement. You're reducing it to this sort of unthinking headless— But that's what I'm saying: we—me to the end, that we cannot simply condemn them as a crime. That there was this is what I call Divine Violence. There was an element of twisted as it was demanding social justice because of which even if it appears just as violence, we cannot simply condemn it as crime. That seems to me crucial. Not to—when we are doing with dealing with desperate protest, social protest—of course, I'm not saying you should dare confront them and say, "Oh, please kill us, I'm white guy, I'm guilty for everything." But nonetheless, we don't have the right to simply criminalize them, condemn them. No, but my—my problem is not with your—your— I'm sorry. Yeah. is that you contrasted it to sort of a properly political street riot like Paris and somehow this—these Black-led movements fall short of that, in that I mean these are theorized, they have— Wait a minute. No, no. Here I was wrong. I agree, but I was more thinking, I must say, I was a little bit confused then. I was more thinking about banlieue in Paris, which were for me a true tragedy. And also you remember in London— I think you should absolutely separate them and I think you have a definite intellectual state— I apologize, I agree. But you know also, and also that English-British riots two years, three ago, which were triggered by when Indian-Pakistani, I don't know what guy was shot by police, but then it turned out into just looting the stores and so on and so on. And it shocked me how—and this is the sad predicament indication of where we are. We claim we are in a post-ideological era. Yeah, but this means that even the protests, at least in Europe, cannot build a proper positive
I'm radically for Black Lives Matter and so on. I even agree with Black Lives Matter against those liberals—it's totally wrong, non-dialectical—who say, "Why only blacks, why not all lives matter?" and so on, you know. This is a lie, I cannot develop it. And I even wrote, you see, and they didn't want to publish it, neither in *Guardian* because too—another text when I confronted the two positions. You remember a couple of months ago, a black guy shot a couple of white policemen, mostly white, I don't even know if they were all white, and then Trump and all our friends exploded: "No, that's the limit" and so on. No, this is of course a deplorable act and so on. But if we compare these two crimes: a policeman shooting a black guy and a desperate black guy shooting policeman, I think—not morally but immanently even morally, why not, what the hell—the second one, that is to say white policeman shooting a black protester whatever, is infinitely more dangerous. Why? I speak here precisely as a law and order guy. Because in the case of black guy shooting white policeman, it's simply somebody totally desperate, out of law, not a person of law, shoots representatives of the law. That was for our good Donald, wife of the great Slovenian woman and so on. The great crime. But isn't something much more terrifying in a policeman shooting a civilian? Because this means that the rule of law is undermined from within. Who will protect the law when the law itself does the criminal acts and so on and so on? So I'm very clear here. Secondly, I apologize myself. I know what you said about Ferguson and so on. But my point was this one: even if sometimes these demonstrations go violent and so on—and of course, let's say I would have found myself at such a place and some black guys would have been bit me and so on and so on. Of course, I would be scared like shit, trying to run away and so on. I would even not be afraid to call for police. But nonetheless, this is why I call them Divine Violence. We cannot—they may be criminal, whatever— But this just denies political agency for this—this movement. You're reducing it to this sort of unthinking headless— But that's what I'm saying: we—me to the end, that we cannot simply condemn them as a crime. That there was this is what I call Divine Violence. There was an element of twisted as it was demanding social justice because of which even if it appears just as violence, we cannot simply condemn it as crime. That seems to me crucial. Not to—when we are doing with dealing with desperate protest, social protest—of course, I'm not saying you should dare confront them and say, "Oh, please kill us, I'm white guy, I'm guilty for everything." But nonetheless, we don't have the right to simply criminalize them, condemn them. No, but my—my problem is not with your—your— I'm sorry. Yeah. is that you contrasted it to sort of a properly political street riot like Paris and somehow this—these Black-led movements fall short of that, in that I mean these are theorized, they have— Wait a minute. No, no. Here I was wrong. I agree, but I was more thinking, I must say, I was a little bit confused then. I was more thinking about banlieue in Paris, which were for me a true tragedy. And also you remember in London— I think you should absolutely separate them and I think you have a definite intellectual state— I apologize, I agree. But you know also, and also that English-British riots two years, three ago, which were triggered by when Indian-Pakistani, I don't know what guy was shot by police, but then it turned out into just looting the stores and so on and so on. And it shocked me how—and this is the sad predicament indication of where we are. We claim we are in a post-ideological era. Yeah, but this means that even the protests, at least in Europe, cannot build a proper positive
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political vision. And that's for me, if I may conclude by this,
political vision. And that's for me, if I may conclude by this,
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for me—you can go on—the ultimate horror. That's my horror. Look, I'm absolutely a leftist. I think that capitalism is approaching a limit and only a leftist vision can save it. But will there be this vision? Can I—can I sell to you again my old line that I've
for me—you can go on—the ultimate horror. That's my horror. Look, I'm absolutely a leftist. I think that capitalism is approaching a limit and only a leftist vision can save it. But will there be this vision? Can I—can I sell to you again my old line that I've
Slavoj Žižek
sold in last days in New York five times, but I love it. Did you see
sold in last days in New York five times, but I love it. Did you see
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the movie *V for Vendetta*? You remember how the movie ends? The crowd breaks through police cordon, enters the Parliament, everybody is full of joy, and then the end. I'm ready to sell my mother into slavery—I can say this because she's dead, no—if for in order to see a movie called *V for Vendetta* part two. The governing years. Yeah, but what do they do then? Do they nationalize industry or what? They don't look. Syriza, it seemed that they have a vision. And this is the mini tragedy of our politics. What did Syriza do? Won heroically the referendum, next day capitulation. And I don't blame on them, "Oh
the movie *V for Vendetta*? You remember how the movie ends? The crowd breaks through police cordon, enters the Parliament, everybody is full of joy, and then the end. I'm ready to sell my mother into slavery—I can say this because she's dead, no—if for in order to see a movie called *V for Vendetta* part two. The governing years. Yeah, but what do they do then? Do they nationalize industry or what? They don't look. Syriza, it seemed that they have a vision. And this is the mini tragedy of our politics. What did Syriza do? Won heroically the referendum, next day capitulation. And I don't blame on them, "Oh
Slavoj Žižek
betrayal," this is the deadlock of politics today. Look at Podemos in Spain. All the point, "Yeah,
betrayal," this is the deadlock of politics today. Look at Podemos in Spain. All the point, "Yeah,
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government by the people for the people." Then if you look closely at their electoral
government by the people for the people." Then if you look closely at their electoral
Slavoj Žižek
program, it's just a tiny little bit, even very modest social democracy. We will slightly raise the taxes like this. Does the left have a vision or not? It doesn't have. And that makes me really sad. This is why I claim there is a serious option. That's my pessimism, that what if something doesn't happen—not Donald Trump but leftist alternative to him—what we are approaching is what? Well, as always when you are at a loss, Hollywood has the answer. By this I mean movies like *Hunger Games*, *Elysium*. We are approaching a new class society which will be potentially even stronger than the old ones. I claim even that with all the biogenetic medicine and so on, more and more a new ruling caste will even biologically be more and more distinct than ordinary people. I mean, the prospect is horrible, I claim. Morlocks and the Eloi from H.G. Wells, the speciation of— Yeah, yeah, speciation. We should open this up. We've— Really, we had such a nice time and now you want some people to— I know. But listen, I will tell you as a Stalinist, but we are the top representatives of the people. We know better than them what they really want. Okay, well, you can now have an opportunity to tell them one by one. So there's a microphone just on—on—on that side and if you—if you want to try and ask a question please line up there where Joel in the pink shirt is and you'll be told whether you're valid or not. Oh, what would be my ideal debate? That we give an answer and then they should raise guess to what question this was an answer. That would be my ideal debate. All right. Please, I'm sorry for—you can see that I'm like that scorpion from that old Orson Welles story, scorpion and a frog, no. Even if I drown, I will bite you, you know. It's my nature, sorry. So we—we have a lucky winner. Hello. Oh, hi. Thank you for coming in. I really enjoyed the talk. My question is you said that Hillary lost because there was a anti-establishment trend. But I mean if Joe Biden ran, I mean he probably would have won,
program, it's just a tiny little bit, even very modest social democracy. We will slightly raise the taxes like this. Does the left have a vision or not? It doesn't have. And that makes me really sad. This is why I claim there is a serious option. That's my pessimism, that what if something doesn't happen—not Donald Trump but leftist alternative to him—what we are approaching is what? Well, as always when you are at a loss, Hollywood has the answer. By this I mean movies like *Hunger Games*, *Elysium*. We are approaching a new class society which will be potentially even stronger than the old ones. I claim even that with all the biogenetic medicine and so on, more and more a new ruling caste will even biologically be more and more distinct than ordinary people. I mean, the prospect is horrible, I claim. Morlocks and the Eloi from H.G. Wells, the speciation of— Yeah, yeah, speciation. We should open this up. We've— Really, we had such a nice time and now you want some people to— I know. But listen, I will tell you as a Stalinist, but we are the top representatives of the people. We know better than them what they really want. Okay, well, you can now have an opportunity to tell them one by one. So there's a microphone just on—on—on that side and if you—if you want to try and ask a question please line up there where Joel in the pink shirt is and you'll be told whether you're valid or not. Oh, what would be my ideal debate? That we give an answer and then they should raise guess to what question this was an answer. That would be my ideal debate. All right. Please, I'm sorry for—you can see that I'm like that scorpion from that old Orson Welles story, scorpion and a frog, no. Even if I drown, I will bite you, you know. It's my nature, sorry. So we—we have a lucky winner. Hello. Oh, hi. Thank you for coming in. I really enjoyed the talk. My question is you said that Hillary lost because there was a anti-establishment trend. But I mean if Joe Biden ran, I mean he probably would have won,
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right? Off Obama's record? So how true is
right? Off Obama's record? So how true is
Slavoj Žižek
that? I didn't— Biden would have won possibly, so was this really an anti-establishment victory for Trump or—I mean, you know, frankly it was probably white suburban soccer moms who put him in. Of course. No, no, no. I know that this anti-establishment has a certain fascist logic. It's a fake anti-establishment, my god, no. But you know what's my point here? That simply this Left Liberal Democrat consensus, it terrifies me. And I wonder if Biden was the one to break out of it really. I think Sanders was the only one. You know why? I will tell you exactly why. Because—and I'm not bluffing—I was in Vermont, I met with some of his very close people. Look, the—the true miracle as far as I know, maybe I'm wrong again, of—of Sanders is this one. That if you look at his constituency in Vermont,
that? I didn't— Biden would have won possibly, so was this really an anti-establishment victory for Trump or—I mean, you know, frankly it was probably white suburban soccer moms who put him in. Of course. No, no, no. I know that this anti-establishment has a certain fascist logic. It's a fake anti-establishment, my god, no. But you know what's my point here? That simply this Left Liberal Democrat consensus, it terrifies me. And I wonder if Biden was the one to break out of it really. I think Sanders was the only one. You know why? I will tell you exactly why. Because—and I'm not bluffing—I was in Vermont, I met with some of his very close people. Look, the—the true miracle as far as I know, maybe I'm wrong again, of—of Sanders is this one. That if you look at his constituency in Vermont,
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it's precisely those many of them white farmers, half poor people who are usually the ideal ground for Trump voters. And that's the true miracle. The only chance for the left is to get those—those anti-establishment figures—I mean figures, those who experience rage and were seduced into that camp. And that's what Hillary missed when she opted for this consensus. You know, it was
it's precisely those many of them white farmers, half poor people who are usually the ideal ground for Trump voters. And that's the true miracle. The only chance for the left is to get those—those anti-establishment figures—I mean figures, those who experience rage and were seduced into that camp. And that's what Hillary missed when she opted for this consensus. You know, it was
Slavoj Žižek
almost ridiculous,
almost ridiculous,
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I'm sorry if I repeat this, but Hillary tried to cover
I'm sorry if I repeat this, but Hillary tried to cover
Slavoj Žižek
everything. Like, from Wall Street to Occupy Wall
everything. Like, from Wall Street to Occupy Wall
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Street. Incidentally, this is
Street. Incidentally, this is
Slavoj Žižek
the only moment when I authentically sympathize with Trump. You remember after Bernie Sanders supported Hillary, he said, "This is almost like somebody from Occupy Wall Street supporting Lehman Brothers" or whatever. I think that—that's maybe, maybe there is a chance, maybe not the—the opportunity. And again, maybe you know more than me. I'm definitely not dreaming that Sanders is the first step towards some new Communist Party and so on. That game is over. But we need a more still very rational, no crazy things, more radical left. That was my fear of this Hillary consensus. Again, it was Wall Street and Occupy Wall Street, it was, as we all know, Saudi Arabian money and LGBTQ+ and so on. And when you have this all-encompassing in an ironic way, I put it, rainbow coalition, the first question to raise is what had to be excluded in order to get this coalition? And it's clear: those like Sanders who were a little bit too much to the left. And she paid the price for it, I claim. That would be—but it's a very simple answer. Again, don't misunderstand me. I don't pretend that I really know things. I'm even very mad about writing such shitty books, at least against— No, you know why? I'm not kidding. I'm an old guy who wants now to write some big fat philosophical books. And even when I read political stuff like by my friend Jeremiah Glik, I think, who wrote now an excellent book on Haitian Revolution and its echoes in world of art. And he touches there extremely important topic of the genuinely tragic dimension of socialist left revolutions. And he pleads for something with which I deeply agree: that we have to admit that leftist revolutions also are radically tragic, in the simple sense: you want one thing, you get the opposite result, you have to totally redefine your goals and so on and so on. So even this interest is part of my more general how to read Hegel, why Hegel is today more actual than Marx argumentation. My heart is there. Like, let me remind you that I also published now two other books, I'm crazy I know. One, *Disparities*, pages again, my eternal topic: Hegel, Heidegger and so on. And another one which is a small one but maybe my favorite one, my rewriting of *Antigone*, which is the nicest, I love it so much. We've strayed quite far from Joe Biden. Sorry, and we've strayed far from the—from Biden and the question we should— Bring some more interlocutors in. My point is that why am I writing these political shit books? Because I feel some kind of a civic duty. I always have a feeling that other people who know more should have been doing it. I consider myself sovereign enough when I write about Hegel, Heidegger, whatever. But not
the only moment when I authentically sympathize with Trump. You remember after Bernie Sanders supported Hillary, he said, "This is almost like somebody from Occupy Wall Street supporting Lehman Brothers" or whatever. I think that—that's maybe, maybe there is a chance, maybe not the—the opportunity. And again, maybe you know more than me. I'm definitely not dreaming that Sanders is the first step towards some new Communist Party and so on. That game is over. But we need a more still very rational, no crazy things, more radical left. That was my fear of this Hillary consensus. Again, it was Wall Street and Occupy Wall Street, it was, as we all know, Saudi Arabian money and LGBTQ+ and so on. And when you have this all-encompassing in an ironic way, I put it, rainbow coalition, the first question to raise is what had to be excluded in order to get this coalition? And it's clear: those like Sanders who were a little bit too much to the left. And she paid the price for it, I claim. That would be—but it's a very simple answer. Again, don't misunderstand me. I don't pretend that I really know things. I'm even very mad about writing such shitty books, at least against— No, you know why? I'm not kidding. I'm an old guy who wants now to write some big fat philosophical books. And even when I read political stuff like by my friend Jeremiah Glik, I think, who wrote now an excellent book on Haitian Revolution and its echoes in world of art. And he touches there extremely important topic of the genuinely tragic dimension of socialist left revolutions. And he pleads for something with which I deeply agree: that we have to admit that leftist revolutions also are radically tragic, in the simple sense: you want one thing, you get the opposite result, you have to totally redefine your goals and so on and so on. So even this interest is part of my more general how to read Hegel, why Hegel is today more actual than Marx argumentation. My heart is there. Like, let me remind you that I also published now two other books, I'm crazy I know. One, *Disparities*, pages again, my eternal topic: Hegel, Heidegger and so on. And another one which is a small one but maybe my favorite one, my rewriting of *Antigone*, which is the nicest, I love it so much. We've strayed quite far from Joe Biden. Sorry, and we've strayed far from the—from Biden and the question we should— Bring some more interlocutors in. My point is that why am I writing these political shit books? Because I feel some kind of a civic duty. I always have a feeling that other people who know more should have been doing it. I consider myself sovereign enough when I write about Hegel, Heidegger, whatever. But not
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there. I feel a little bit stupid. I don't know enough. But always I ask myself, "But where are
there. I feel a little bit stupid. I don't know enough. But always I ask myself, "But where are
Slavoj Žižek
those others who should have known it better?" you know, in this sense I'm giving you an answer why I don't know. Thank you. Let's grab the mic, say something. I just think we're at a horrific, horrific moment. Donald Trump is a fascist. Professor Žižek's statement that he's
those others who should have known it better?" you know, in this sense I'm giving you an answer why I don't know. Thank you. Let's grab the mic, say something. I just think we're at a horrific, horrific moment. Donald Trump is a fascist. Professor Žižek's statement that he's
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just an opportunist and not a fascist, I think is outrageous and very dangerous. Nothing communist or revolutionary about it. And I feel this is a moment, I'm
just an opportunist and not a fascist, I think is outrageous and very dangerous. Nothing communist or revolutionary about it. And I feel this is a moment, I'm
Slavoj Žižek
speaking to the panel and to everyone here, that we have to, in the name of humanity, refuse to accept a fascist America
speaking to the panel and to everyone here, that we have to, in the name of humanity, refuse to accept a fascist America
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with horrendous impact, not
with horrendous impact, not
Slavoj Žižek
just for Black and brown people and immigrants and women here, but for billions of people around the world. I think this is a moment we have to stay in the streets, we have
just for Black and brown people and immigrants and women here, but for billions of people around the world. I think this is a moment we have to stay in the streets, we have
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to keep resisting, we cannot accommodate with this, we cannot normalize this, we have to fight together and work together to stop this. I encourage—we some of you may have got the flyer—I encourage everyone to get this. I encourage people to go to
to keep resisting, we cannot accommodate with this, we cannot normalize this, we have to fight together and work together to stop this. I encourage—we some of you may have got the flyer—I encourage everyone to get this. I encourage people to go to
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Revolution Books or revcom.us, get into this. But we have to come together and stop this now. And you can go to the website, there's more information on this. You know, I'm sorry, I'm being brief. This is a moment, I'm going to
Revolution Books or revcom.us, get into this. But we have to come together and stop this now. And you can go to the website, there's more information on this. You know, I'm sorry, I'm being brief. This is a moment, I'm going to
Slavoj Žižek
be brief. Just let me finish. I think this is a moment— I didn't interrupt you. I know you didn't. I'm not—I'm appealing to the chair. Make—make—make your point and—and—and move on. I will, I will do that. Uh, come talk to me. And the reason I mentioned the—the website is because there is a deep analysis of where this fascism comes from that Bob Avakian's brought forward as well as— Okay, Bob Avakian—as well as a new communism and a strategy for real revolution. But again, we have to come together to resist and stop this. Thank you. Okay, I would love to answer to this. First, let me go step-by-step. First, something is absolutely missing in what you said. Even if you belong to Bob Avakian, you have spoken now as a liberal in despair. "Oh my god, catastrophe happens." No, Trump is a symptom. He is a symptom of what is wrong with Hillary, with Democratic Party. Our first act should be: what did we do? No, not this moral satisfaction, "Horror, horror, horror." What did we do wrong? We, the moderate left and so on. If we don't do this, you will get another Trump, maybe even worse. Second thing, second thing. You know, again, I wrote this, I—Trump is scum whatever you want, but be careful with these big words. If you want to be a Marxist, you should avoid this—I hate this leftist with some leftist attitude of "you see something disgusting emerging and without proper analysis, which I didn't see, you simply use the old," as the Germans say, *Schimpfwort*, no, like "fascism, fascism." No, it's not simply the old fascism. It's some horror that we may even call democratic fascism. The new right is so perverse. For example, do you know that in Netherlands there were even racists who were anti-immigrant racists who were almost Left-wing multicultural racists? Like, do you remember that guy Pim Fortuyn in Denmark—Netherlands—who was absolutely anti-immigrant, but his anti-immigration was based on—in a disgusting way, I don't support him—on—on—on tolerance. He was himself gay and so on. We have—we have a lot of that on the Alt-Right here, there's the—the language of identity politics is absolutely part of the political rhetoric of the right here, now. You see, yeah. So I think that I agree with you: we should keep the emergency state. But the first task here is to ask: what did we do wrong? That's for me so crucial. If we don't do this, we will just—even if in the next elections Democrats win—we will just slowly be approaching the catastrophe. So my point is not "No, Trump is not so bad" and so on and so on. My point is that—the danger should—okay, I'll put it this way: Trump is the symptom. So if you just fight Trump, you do what doctors call symptomatic healing, you know. For example, you have some disease and you feel pain. Okay, you take a pill so that you will not feel pain, but you don't cure the disease. And this I want— This is a plea for a structural analysis of Trump as a sort of epiphenomenon of—of something— No, but it's much more radical. I think Trump is—if I may use Chomsky's term, who—who—he took it from other of course, but the adopted—no, it's not criticism of Chomsky, it's just it interesting to note, I forgot even from whom that Chomsky took his term "Manufacturing Consent"— Lippmann. Lippmann, from Lippmann, who ironically uses it in a positive way. But in a way what is doing—going on now is the breakdown of the mechanism
be brief. Just let me finish. I think this is a moment— I didn't interrupt you. I know you didn't. I'm not—I'm appealing to the chair. Make—make—make your point and—and—and move on. I will, I will do that. Uh, come talk to me. And the reason I mentioned the—the website is because there is a deep analysis of where this fascism comes from that Bob Avakian's brought forward as well as— Okay, Bob Avakian—as well as a new communism and a strategy for real revolution. But again, we have to come together to resist and stop this. Thank you. Okay, I would love to answer to this. First, let me go step-by-step. First, something is absolutely missing in what you said. Even if you belong to Bob Avakian, you have spoken now as a liberal in despair. "Oh my god, catastrophe happens." No, Trump is a symptom. He is a symptom of what is wrong with Hillary, with Democratic Party. Our first act should be: what did we do? No, not this moral satisfaction, "Horror, horror, horror." What did we do wrong? We, the moderate left and so on. If we don't do this, you will get another Trump, maybe even worse. Second thing, second thing. You know, again, I wrote this, I—Trump is scum whatever you want, but be careful with these big words. If you want to be a Marxist, you should avoid this—I hate this leftist with some leftist attitude of "you see something disgusting emerging and without proper analysis, which I didn't see, you simply use the old," as the Germans say, *Schimpfwort*, no, like "fascism, fascism." No, it's not simply the old fascism. It's some horror that we may even call democratic fascism. The new right is so perverse. For example, do you know that in Netherlands there were even racists who were anti-immigrant racists who were almost Left-wing multicultural racists? Like, do you remember that guy Pim Fortuyn in Denmark—Netherlands—who was absolutely anti-immigrant, but his anti-immigration was based on—in a disgusting way, I don't support him—on—on—on tolerance. He was himself gay and so on. We have—we have a lot of that on the Alt-Right here, there's the—the language of identity politics is absolutely part of the political rhetoric of the right here, now. You see, yeah. So I think that I agree with you: we should keep the emergency state. But the first task here is to ask: what did we do wrong? That's for me so crucial. If we don't do this, we will just—even if in the next elections Democrats win—we will just slowly be approaching the catastrophe. So my point is not "No, Trump is not so bad" and so on and so on. My point is that—the danger should—okay, I'll put it this way: Trump is the symptom. So if you just fight Trump, you do what doctors call symptomatic healing, you know. For example, you have some disease and you feel pain. Okay, you take a pill so that you will not feel pain, but you don't cure the disease. And this I want— This is a plea for a structural analysis of Trump as a sort of epiphenomenon of—of something— No, but it's much more radical. I think Trump is—if I may use Chomsky's term, who—who—he took it from other of course, but the adopted—no, it's not criticism of Chomsky, it's just it interesting to note, I forgot even from whom that Chomsky took his term "Manufacturing Consent"— Lippmann. Lippmann, from Lippmann, who ironically uses it in a positive way. But in a way what is doing—going on now is the breakdown of the mechanism
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of manufacturing consent. And
of manufacturing consent. And
Slavoj Žižek
this is—I mean, you know, every democracy is not just up there in the air. There's a whole thick network of unwritten rules and so on and so on, how does it function. And this is breaking— Let's—let's bring some more people in. Maybe we could take two or three short comments and—and—and you can roll them into a ball. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. Or they will roll me into a ball and one or the other. Hi, this is a more general question, so it's not on the topic of Trump or anything. Um, but it's relating to this contradiction that a lot of guess like intellectuals and
this is—I mean, you know, every democracy is not just up there in the air. There's a whole thick network of unwritten rules and so on and so on, how does it function. And this is breaking— Let's—let's bring some more people in. Maybe we could take two or three short comments and—and—and you can roll them into a ball. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. Or they will roll me into a ball and one or the other. Hi, this is a more general question, so it's not on the topic of Trump or anything. Um, but it's relating to this contradiction that a lot of guess like intellectuals and
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academics have and you
academics have and you
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like sort of mentioned it briefly. It's this sort of like—and you talked about it in your *The Sublime Object of Ideology* where you reformulated Marx's false consciousness, where—where Marx says "they don't know what they're doing but they are doing it," and then you say "they know very well what they are doing but they are doing it anyway," which how I understood that
like sort of mentioned it briefly. It's this sort of like—and you talked about it in your *The Sublime Object of Ideology* where you reformulated Marx's false consciousness, where—where Marx says "they don't know what they're doing but they are doing it," and then you say "they know very well what they are doing but they are doing it anyway," which how I understood that
Norman Finkelstein
is regardless—it doesn't matter what you say or the critical distance that you have, it's what your actions are and what you do. So then just about half an hour ago you were saying that we should judge you on what you say rather than what you're doing. So can you explain this sort of contradiction? And also—let's park this and then let's bring in—let's do a couple more because— No, but if I promise I will short because I'm old, senile, tired, I may forget your point. Right. And so I mean like I'm very sympathetic with that because like I'm looking into academia as a—as a field and so how do you sort of what are the options and opportunities for resistance and critique when we're, you know, like balls deep in neoliberal capitalism and our pleasures are constructed by this hegemonic
is regardless—it doesn't matter what you say or the critical distance that you have, it's what your actions are and what you do. So then just about half an hour ago you were saying that we should judge you on what you say rather than what you're doing. So can you explain this sort of contradiction? And also—let's park this and then let's bring in—let's do a couple more because— No, but if I promise I will short because I'm old, senile, tired, I may forget your point. Right. And so I mean like I'm very sympathetic with that because like I'm looking into academia as a—as a field and so how do you sort of what are the options and opportunities for resistance and critique when we're, you know, like balls deep in neoliberal capitalism and our pleasures are constructed by this hegemonic
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ideology? No, okay,
ideology? No, okay,
Norman Finkelstein
I will—I will try to keep my word and be as short as possible. My answer would be that even if ideology means "they don't know what they're doing" or "they are doing" and so on and so on, it still—and that's what Marx was very clear about ideology. Ideology is never simply an epiphenomenon in the sense that things are really happening out there. It's an illusion, but an illusion
I will—I will try to keep my word and be as short as possible. My answer would be that even if ideology means "they don't know what they're doing" or "they are doing" and so on and so on, it still—and that's what Marx was very clear about ideology. Ideology is never simply an epiphenomenon in the sense that things are really happening out there. It's an illusion, but an illusion
Slavoj Žižek
inscribed into social reality itself. It's a lie, but a lie which is embodied in social practices and so on and so on. So it matters how we talk about it. My theory to give you a concrete example of this: "but we know what we're doing but we're nonetheless doing it," and so incidentally I refer to here to Peter Sloterdijk. That's his formula of cynical reason. But still—so the enigma is this one, and I try to explain it, I will not lose time now. If we are doing something and we know fully that what we are doing, why is this still ideology? Isn't it that words and acts simply overlap? My—my answer, I don't have time to go into it, is no. Because it's not the—there are not only two terms in play: what we are—reality and how we talk about her. Reality may be the same as what we talk about, but in between can be an illusion of which we are not aware. And we know it's an illusion, but we still follow it. If you will permit me, I'm sure you know it, just to give you one formula joke which I used already five times in my books which is for me perfect to render this. Niels Bohr, you know the story, when he was visited in his country house by his friend, the friend noticed there on the entrance of the door a horseshoe, you know, the superstitious item preventing evil spirit and the spirit entering the house. And the friend asked him, "But listen, you're a scientist, why do you have that bullshit there?" and Niels Bohr gave him a perfect
inscribed into social reality itself. It's a lie, but a lie which is embodied in social practices and so on and so on. So it matters how we talk about it. My theory to give you a concrete example of this: "but we know what we're doing but we're nonetheless doing it," and so incidentally I refer to here to Peter Sloterdijk. That's his formula of cynical reason. But still—so the enigma is this one, and I try to explain it, I will not lose time now. If we are doing something and we know fully that what we are doing, why is this still ideology? Isn't it that words and acts simply overlap? My—my answer, I don't have time to go into it, is no. Because it's not the—there are not only two terms in play: what we are—reality and how we talk about her. Reality may be the same as what we talk about, but in between can be an illusion of which we are not aware. And we know it's an illusion, but we still follow it. If you will permit me, I'm sure you know it, just to give you one formula joke which I used already five times in my books which is for me perfect to render this. Niels Bohr, you know the story, when he was visited in his country house by his friend, the friend noticed there on the entrance of the door a horseshoe, you know, the superstitious item preventing evil spirit and the spirit entering the house. And the friend asked him, "But listen, you're a scientist, why do you have that bullshit there?" and Niels Bohr gave him a perfect
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answer. He said, "Of course I don't believe in it, I'm a scientist, but I have it there, horseshoe, because I
answer. He said, "Of course I don't believe in it, I'm a scientist, but I have it there, horseshoe, because I
Slavoj Žižek
was told that it works even if you don't believe in it." That's ideology today. You know, like you know the truth but you act as if it's not true and it works. And the paradox today is that—and that's was my trauma disappointment with Yugoslav self-management capitalism. It's not only that it was an ideology that in the reality didn't work. I experienced it through some of my friends who for example worked in the Central Committee of Slovene Communist Party and they lost their
was told that it works even if you don't believe in it." That's ideology today. You know, like you know the truth but you act as if it's not true and it works. And the paradox today is that—and that's was my trauma disappointment with Yugoslav self-management capitalism. It's not only that it was an ideology that in the reality didn't work. I experienced it through some of my friends who for example worked in the Central Committee of Slovene Communist Party and they lost their
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job, two of them. Why? Because they took the official ideology literally, seriously, and were judged already
job, two of them. Why? Because they took the official ideology literally, seriously, and were judged already
Slavoj Žižek
to be too close to dissidents. So you had in ex-Yugoslavia a paradoxical regime where it was a positive condition to be part of the system of not taking the official ideology seriously. You had to have a cynical ironic stance towards it. If you took it too seriously, you were immediately suspected to be a dissident and so on. Thank you. Next—next victim. Hello. Next victim. Um, I just have a question that and I don't know who else to ask this to, but so New York City was you know mostly almost totally blue, all for Hillary Clinton, but Brighton Beach was totally red, which is where all the, you know, the Russians that
to be too close to dissidents. So you had in ex-Yugoslavia a paradoxical regime where it was a positive condition to be part of the system of not taking the official ideology seriously. You had to have a cynical ironic stance towards it. If you took it too seriously, you were immediately suspected to be a dissident and so on. Thank you. Next—next victim. Hello. Next victim. Um, I just have a question that and I don't know who else to ask this to, but so New York City was you know mostly almost totally blue, all for Hillary Clinton, but Brighton Beach was totally red, which is where all the, you know, the Russians that
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emigrated from the Soviet Union you know post—post-post
emigrated from the Soviet Union you know post—post-post
Slavoj Žižek
the collapse live now. And—and as
the collapse live now. And—and as
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a member of that community, like not a supporter of their beliefs, but listening to the Russian radio one of the big you know points seemed to be that we don't want those you know Muslim refugees coming into America. So how do you kind of reconcile these people who were themselves refugees just years ago being like really staunch anti-next-wave of refugees? But it's always like this. I mean, I experienced the same with some of my relatives who live in California. An uncle of mine was married a girl from Mexico and she was the most staunch supporter of "we have to stop," like, you know, some of the refugees like to be that last
a member of that community, like not a supporter of their beliefs, but listening to the Russian radio one of the big you know points seemed to be that we don't want those you know Muslim refugees coming into America. So how do you kind of reconcile these people who were themselves refugees just years ago being like really staunch anti-next-wave of refugees? But it's always like this. I mean, I experienced the same with some of my relatives who live in California. An uncle of mine was married a girl from Mexico and she was the most staunch supporter of "we have to stop," like, you know, some of the refugees like to be that last
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wave. "It's good that America accepted us, but sorry
wave. "It's good that America accepted us, but sorry
Slavoj Žižek
guys, it's full," like we are, you know.
guys, it's full," like we are, you know.
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And I'm here totally not cynical but cynically realist in the sense that I don't surprise me. What do you expect from them, that they would say "Oh, we Russians were also refugees, we—we know, so all welcome all of you"? No, this is—you see, this is the realism of which I talk.
And I'm here totally not cynical but cynically realist in the sense that I don't surprise me. What do you expect from them, that they would say "Oh, we Russians were also refugees, we—we know, so all welcome all of you"? No, this is—you see, this is the realism of which I talk.
Slavoj Žižek
We have to admit and again in Europe, up to a point in some places I heard Syrian refugees are playing the same game. Like, "We come from relatively non-fundamentalist Syria, we are okay, accept us to Europe, but not those Afghanis" and so on, they are totally—it's—it's—it's that's how ideology functions and so on. I mean, for example when we speak about refugees, another thing: we should never forget that in spite of those couple of terrorist attacks, my god, this is fundamentally the war between Sunnis and Shias, no? That's where hundreds of thousands are dying and we seem totally to forget this and just speak about some general Muslim invasion or whatever. But sorry, I don't have more time to go into it. And we have one more, I think. So Professor, so you mentioned the last three or four years sort of prohibition against your work in certain publications where it had been regular in the past. Do you see a sort of coincidence between the rise of identity politics not only in the American academia but also in the mainstream media and this prohibition against not only your works but also other authors who have similar types of ideas? And do you also see by any chance that there has been an increase not only in leftists with similar positions to your own but centrists who are also mirroring a lot of the anti-identity politics positions and do you see any potential, especially in the context of Trump's winning the election, of a sort of possible coalition with some of those centrists who might be possibly brought into a new type of struggle? Sorry, I did—maybe I missed some—can you give me there's— I mean essentially if I understand you right you're saying identity politics has now become a kind of universal tool in— No, absolutely not. I think identity politics is to a large extent responsible for getting Trump. That's—that's precisely what I'm asking. Ah, yeah, yeah. So I think no, now it's the time to—not of course from the right wing—but one has to say something. You know, I never understood one thing. Why is political correctness in the sense of controlling speech, trigger warning and that, why is this even accepted as a leftist position? I often hear right-wingers when they say, "Marxists in our university..." What has this to do with Marx?
We have to admit and again in Europe, up to a point in some places I heard Syrian refugees are playing the same game. Like, "We come from relatively non-fundamentalist Syria, we are okay, accept us to Europe, but not those Afghanis" and so on, they are totally—it's—it's—it's that's how ideology functions and so on. I mean, for example when we speak about refugees, another thing: we should never forget that in spite of those couple of terrorist attacks, my god, this is fundamentally the war between Sunnis and Shias, no? That's where hundreds of thousands are dying and we seem totally to forget this and just speak about some general Muslim invasion or whatever. But sorry, I don't have more time to go into it. And we have one more, I think. So Professor, so you mentioned the last three or four years sort of prohibition against your work in certain publications where it had been regular in the past. Do you see a sort of coincidence between the rise of identity politics not only in the American academia but also in the mainstream media and this prohibition against not only your works but also other authors who have similar types of ideas? And do you also see by any chance that there has been an increase not only in leftists with similar positions to your own but centrists who are also mirroring a lot of the anti-identity politics positions and do you see any potential, especially in the context of Trump's winning the election, of a sort of possible coalition with some of those centrists who might be possibly brought into a new type of struggle? Sorry, I did—maybe I missed some—can you give me there's— I mean essentially if I understand you right you're saying identity politics has now become a kind of universal tool in— No, absolutely not. I think identity politics is to a large extent responsible for getting Trump. That's—that's precisely what I'm asking. Ah, yeah, yeah. So I think no, now it's the time to—not of course from the right wing—but one has to say something. You know, I never understood one thing. Why is political correctness in the sense of controlling speech, trigger warning and that, why is this even accepted as a leftist position? I often hear right-wingers when they say, "Marxists in our university..." What has this to do with Marx?
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That's—that's precisely what I was saying. I was saying that is there—have you seen a coincidence between the decrease in your publication in certain areas and the rise of identity politics in the American academia and also in the mainstream media? And also at this same period, you see, while the right points at the left and claims that this is the standard Marxist, etc. etc. rhetoric, not only do they employ the same identity politics, but at this same period you see centrist academics in the United States criticizing some of this identity politics mainstream media and do you see a possible coalition between critics such as yourself and those centrist critics? Uh, no. Because the reason because I don't criticize
That's—that's precisely what I was saying. I was saying that is there—have you seen a coincidence between the decrease in your publication in certain areas and the rise of identity politics in the American academia and also in the mainstream media? And also at this same period, you see, while the right points at the left and claims that this is the standard Marxist, etc. etc. rhetoric, not only do they employ the same identity politics, but at this same period you see centrist academics in the United States criticizing some of this identity politics mainstream media and do you see a possible coalition between critics such as yourself and those centrist critics? Uh, no. Because the reason because I don't criticize
Slavoj Žižek
it from as too extreme and so on. I criticized it as a—as a desperate act of impotence. Of trying to regulate speech and so on which in no way changes the actual relations of domination and so on and so on. Because, you know, we even have a right-wing politically correct speech. Like we witnessed it already years ago or when, when instead of saying torture, we now say "enhanced interrogation technique," no? And as I predict in my vicious vulgar way, wait a little bit and in years from now rape will be called "enhanced seduction technique" or whatever, you know. I—I know, I saw your video from two days ago. I'm sorry. My mind is—no, but what I want to say is that I see the despair of political correctness in this sense, that—how should I put it—the limit of political correctness is me at more levels. First, I don't agree with this
it from as too extreme and so on. I criticized it as a—as a desperate act of impotence. Of trying to regulate speech and so on which in no way changes the actual relations of domination and so on and so on. Because, you know, we even have a right-wing politically correct speech. Like we witnessed it already years ago or when, when instead of saying torture, we now say "enhanced interrogation technique," no? And as I predict in my vicious vulgar way, wait a little bit and in years from now rape will be called "enhanced seduction technique" or whatever, you know. I—I know, I saw your video from two days ago. I'm sorry. My mind is—no, but what I want to say is that I see the despair of political correctness in this sense, that—how should I put it—the limit of political correctness is me at more levels. First, I don't agree with this
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basic
basic
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premise—and that's also what brought my conflicts with some of the, although I totally support their goals and so on, LGBTQ+ people, no—the idea is words should not hurt people, people have the right to be called the way they want and so on. Absolutely, at a basic level. But not—this is not for me an absolute value. Like if a millionaire comes to me and says, "I don't want to be called a dirty capitalist, I gave million to New York Public Library" and so on and so on. No, there are enemies who should be called "pigs" or
premise—and that's also what brought my conflicts with some of the, although I totally support their goals and so on, LGBTQ+ people, no—the idea is words should not hurt people, people have the right to be called the way they want and so on. Absolutely, at a basic level. But not—this is not for me an absolute value. Like if a millionaire comes to me and says, "I don't want to be called a dirty capitalist, I gave million to New York Public Library" and so on and so on. No, there are enemies who should be called "pigs" or
Slavoj Žižek
what they are and so on. It has absolute limits. I mean, look, my problem with this identity politics is
what they are and so on. It has absolute limits. I mean, look, my problem with this identity politics is
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this one, that the antagonism is missing.
this one, that the antagonism is missing.
Slavoj Žižek
This is a politics of multiple groups and the vision is "we should all
This is a politics of multiple groups and the vision is "we should all
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ultimately
ultimately
Slavoj Žižek
recognize each other." But I'm sorry to tell you, if I may be excused for using this old-fashioned term, class struggle is not politics of recognition. Our goal is not to be more recognized. Our goal is, of course not physically but as a class as their position of power, to be brutal, to annihilate the enemy.
recognize each other." But I'm sorry to tell you, if I may be excused for using this old-fashioned term, class struggle is not politics of recognition. Our goal is not to be more recognized. Our goal is, of course not physically but as a class as their position of power, to be brutal, to annihilate the enemy.
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It's a totally different logic of political antagonism. So this is what I'm so afraid of. And also at a different level, I'm always very sensitive to what I cannot but call secret class implication of many politically correct—this like if you talk with people then privately who advocate political correctness. It's so clear that those who use male chauvinist
It's a totally different logic of political antagonism. So this is what I'm so afraid of. And also at a different level, I'm always very sensitive to what I cannot but call secret class implication of many politically correct—this like if you talk with people then privately who advocate political correctness. It's so clear that those who use male chauvinist
Slavoj Žižek
language are often, I don't know, Spanish immigrant workers. You know is this hidden class dimension? I see political correctness with all those trigger warnings and so on as typical middle-class strategy of putting a screen between you and reality. Of not confronting the brutality of reality. That's why I am horrified as this latest university fashions of trigger warnings and so on and so on. No, university studies should traumatize you, shock you, my god. They are not safe places, they are places where you should be horrified, no? I mean, horrified not by disgusting professors there like me maybe, but you know what I mean. Yeah, I'm sorry that I didn't properly—I'm tired—grasp your question. I think with that we've run out of time. I've— How much more do I have to bribe you so that you repeat this, you know, like I like this hypocrisy
language are often, I don't know, Spanish immigrant workers. You know is this hidden class dimension? I see political correctness with all those trigger warnings and so on as typical middle-class strategy of putting a screen between you and reality. Of not confronting the brutality of reality. That's why I am horrified as this latest university fashions of trigger warnings and so on and so on. No, university studies should traumatize you, shock you, my god. They are not safe places, they are places where you should be horrified, no? I mean, horrified not by disgusting professors there like me maybe, but you know what I mean. Yeah, I'm sorry that I didn't properly—I'm tired—grasp your question. I think with that we've run out of time. I've— How much more do I have to bribe you so that you repeat this, you know, like I like this hypocrisy
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so
so
Slavoj Žižek
that now, I'm sorry, I'm really tired, that's why I would like to end. But you know so that then when you asked me, I can say "I would love to go on, but you see this guy, he's a madman." Slavoj Žižek, thank
that now, I'm sorry, I'm really tired, that's why I would like to end. But you know so that then when you asked me, I can say "I would love to go on, but you see this guy, he's a madman." Slavoj Žižek, thank
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you very much.
you very much.