RFE/RL interview with Slavoj Žižek
Interview · რადიო თავისუფლება ·
2016-07-09 · 0:54:16 · 7,309 words
with Co-Panelist
geopolitics-warcommunism-socialismideologyfascism-populismcapitalismhistorytechnology-ai-cyberspacesexuality-genderdemocracyeveryday-lifephilosophy-general
Žižek analyzes the trajectory of Russian and Soviet history, arguing that Stalin’s nationalist rewriting of history paved the way for Putin’s current regime. He critiques the contemporary Left’s failure to move beyond street protests (citing the 'V for Vendetta' joke) and argues that 'really existing socialism' failed because it could not adapt to decentralized digital capitalism. Finally, he explores the paradox of post-communist nationalism, suggesting that for some, fascism offers a perverse sense of 'freedom' from liberal regulation, a phenomenon evident in the rise of religious fundamentalism in Eastern Europe. Žižek argues that 20th-century communism is over, with current regimes like China and Vietnam managing wild capitalism more efficiently than the West. He critiques the 'pseudo-radical' leftist obsession with moral superiority and refugee policies, arguing instead for precise, symbolic reforms (like universal healthcare) and a strong, intelligent state role within capitalism. He highlights the rise of right-wing populism and religious conservatism as responses to global chaos, urging a focus on everyday ideological struggles rather than abstract revolutionary fantasies.
every located moment in this recording, click one to read it
The ideas in it 16
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
The Stalinist revision of Soviet history to frame tsarist expansion as 'progressive bourgeois development' rather than colonialism, creating a continuity between the Tsars and the Soviet state.
Žižek’s term for the authoritarian, non-democratic model of capitalism (China, Russia, Turkey) that is replacing democratic capitalism, characterized by secret commercial agreements like TTIP that bypass democratic consultation.
The material basis of society; Žižek argues socialism succeeded in heavy industry but failed in the 'postmodern, decentralized, digital' era because its centralized planning paradigm was incompatible with digital logic.
Žižek’s label for the new stage of capitalism (from the 60s/70s) characterized by local interaction and media, which 'really existing socialism' could not cope with because it tried to computerize central planning rather than embrace decentralized logic.
Žižek’s description of the Soviet system under Gorbachev: so 'falsely stable' and immobilized that it could not survive even a limited opening, collapsing rather than reforming.
as “nationalist passions”
The underlying force that explodes when the unifying political vision (socialism) collapses, serving as a substitute legitimacy for the nomenclatura.
The space of private life and stability allowed in late socialism (unlike Stalinism), which became the regime's primary legitimation: 'maybe we don't have political freedom, but look, you have this safe life.'
The paradoxical perception by some post-communist subjects that Western liberal order is 'over-regulated' (political correctness, laws against violence), making nationalism a space of 'filthy freedom' to commit acts previously forbidden.
as “objective function of the Cultural Revolution”
The paradoxical claim that Mao's Cultural Revolution was not a failure of communism but a necessary preparatory phase for Deng Xiaoping's capitalist reforms, with no inherent tension between the two.
as “pseudo-radical leftist mantra”
The leftist tendency to focus on moral superiority and cultural critique (e.g., attacking ordinary people as racists) while failing to address concrete economic and political problems, resulting in a narcissistic 'moral extravaganza'.
The psychological drive of leftists to feel morally superior ('I am the only pure one') by attacking others, which is counterproductive and ignores their own complicity in the system's madness.
The strategy of fighting for specific, universalizable issues (like healthcare or education) that have high symbolic impact, rather than engaging in abstract ideological debates or waiting for total revolution.
as “neoliberalism as ideology”
The argument that neoliberalism is not a natural reality or 'the market' but an ideology that obscures the crucial, ongoing role of the state and large organizations (like Google/NSA) in managing the economy.
The paradoxical observation that advocating for moderate social democracy (as Syriza did) is now perceived as 'radical' by the global capitalist order, which finds even basic welfare intolerable.
The current global dynamic where capitalism generates chaos, prompting a reactionary need for traditional/religious control (e.g., Confucianism in China, religious conservatism in Russia) to maintain order.
as “ideology of the toilet”
Žižek's definition of ideology as residing not in grand theories but in everyday, mundane behaviors and social norms (how one speaks, treats others, or uses the toilet) that fascinate and structure social reality.
Stories he reaches for 5
Žižek jokes that he would sell his mother into slavery for 'V for Vendetta Part Two,' highlighting the Left's failure to organize life after occupying the parliament, as the film ends with the crowd dispersing without a plan.
“my joke is always that i'm ready to sell my mother into slavery for a film called v for vendetta part two.”
Žižek argues Syriza's demands were merely moderate social democracy from 56 years ago, yet are perceived as 'radical' today, illustrating how global capitalism has shifted so far right that basic welfare is intolerable.
“if you look closely at what shiriza demanded. 56 years ago. this would have been moderate social democracy... you are perceived as a radical leftist today.”
Žižek cites friends describing Google as 'private NSA' to illustrate that neoliberalism is an ideology masking the reality of strong state-capitalist integration.
“google is closely connected to us state establishment. some people, my friends, describe google as private nsa”
Žižek contrasts Trump (a 'pig' but potentially half-liberal) with Ted Cruz ('real horror'), arguing that the breakdown of unwritten democratic rules between parties leads to chaos and opens space for fascists.
“listen listen to ted cruz and you will see what real horror is... this pattern is now ruined by sanders... it can be totally chaotic”
An East German computer genius explained that the leadership tried to 'computerize' central planning (a big central computer controlling shoe production) rather than understanding the decentralized logic of digital civilization, leading to their demise.
“their model of computerization was big central computers control everything.”
Works invoked 4
V for Vendetta film
Used as a joke to illustrate the Left's failure: the film ends with occupying parliament but no plan to 'effectively reorganize life,' leading to the 'great failure of the left today.'
TTIP other
Cited as an example of 'capitalism with asian values' where commercial agreements are half-secret and set the frame for government action without democratic consultation.
Used as an example of 'good socialism' and intelligent state intervention in capitalism, where a small investment created a globally successful TV series.
Cited for the 2014 victory of Conchita Wurst, which triggered Russia's traditionalist backlash and symbolized Europe's gender confusion.
People invoked 29
Polish president who won against Wałęsa, partly because the Church's arrogance in seeking to reclaim all historical lands was seen as a catastrophe.
Conchita Wurst positive
The Eurovision winner (bearded lady) used as a symbol of Europe that triggered Russia's traditionalist backlash.
Slobodan Milošević positive
Žižek credits Milošević with the 'genius' of openly playing the nationalist card to legitimize power when socialism failed, combining it with multi-party democracy as a threat.
Vladimir Lenin positive
Žižek defends the October Revolution as authentic (not just a coup) and contrasts Lenin/Trotsky with Stalin's nationalist deviation.
Theodor W. Adorno positive
Cited for his late 30s analysis that Nazism offered 'filthy freedom' (to kill, rape) as a perverse liberation from discipline.
Deng Xiaoping positive
Cited as the beneficiary of the Cultural Revolution's conditions, representing the efficient management of wild capitalism in China.
Referenced as a historical figure who recently ranked above Stalin in polls of 'greatest Russians.'
Mentioned in the context of an alternate history debate, as a hardline Bolshevik open to a market economy, similar to Rykov.
Ted Cruz negative
Cited as 'real horror' representing the extreme right-wing horror that Trump masks, illustrating the dangerous breakdown of democratic rules.
A historian with whom Žižek debated alternate history, specifically regarding whether a Trotskyist or democratic Soviet Union was possible.
John le Carré positive
Cited for the quote that 'one real reformist in central committee... means more than 1000 dissidents outside,' explaining the collapse of communism.
Boko Haram positive
Described as 'the ultimate horror' and a 'crazy thing' that claims to solve crisis by prohibiting women's education and fixing sexual identity, serving as a parallel to Putin's traditionalism.
Donald Trump negative
Called a 'pig' and 'clown,' but noted as potentially 'half a liberal' compared to the 'real horror' of Republicans like Ted Cruz.
Identified as the Prime Minister in an alternate history scenario, described as a hardline Bolshevik open to a market economy.
Mikhail Gorbachev positive
Žižek defends Gorbachev against charges of stupidity, arguing he was 'naive' in thinking he could open the 'immobilized' system without it collapsing.
Alain Badiou positive
Žižek 'celebrates' his friend Badiou, a 'crazy maoist,' for correctly identifying early on that Latin American populist left projects (like Lula's Brazil) were 'nothing' new.
Alexis Tsipras positive
Used as a tragic example of how even moderate social democracy is perceived as radical; Žižek agrees with Varoufakis's critique of Syriza's 'naive state socialist' Grexit plan.
Mentioned alongside Lenin as 'bad guys' in Stalin's nationalist narrative; Žižek speculates on an alternate history where Trotsky might have led a democratic Soviet Union.
Mentioned as the last leader whose era (until early 60s) still believed in 'overcoming the United States' via Sputnik and space flight.
Bernie Sanders positive
Seen as benefiting from Obama's groundwork, representing the push for universal healthcare and challenging right-wing reactions.
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva negative
Badiou's example of a Latin American populist leader who developed the country but did not offer a 'new model' of socialism.
Yanis Varoufakis positive
Debated with Žižek on refugees; Žižek agrees with Varoufakis's line with Syriza, criticizing the 'naive state socialist version' of Grexit.
Mentioned as the president who defeated the communists in Poland, followed by the 'shock' of their successor returning to power.
Angela Merkel positive
Cited for her 'radical geopolitical gesture' of inviting refugees, which Žižek uses to debate democratic legitimacy and the will of the majority.
Mao Zedong positive
Žižek analyzes Mao's Cultural Revolution not as a failure but as having the 'objective function' of preparing for Deng Xiaoping's capitalism, seeing no tension between the two.
Barack Obama positive
Described as a 'disappointment' but credited with laying the foundation for Bernie Sanders and the debate on universal healthcare.
The Austrian Emperor who nationalized church lands; the Slovenian Church's desire to reclaim these lands (not just communist confiscations) made them unpopular.
Vladimir Putin negative
Žižek locates Putin in a 'russian nationalist line' that plays Stalin against Lenin, celebrating Stalin as a patriot while continuing a nationalist rewriting of history.
Joseph Stalin negative
Mentioned in the context of 'stalinist' regimes that are now efficient managers of capitalism, with Cuba and North Korea excluded as 'freaks.'
Transcript 9 turns
Slavoj Žižek
i think at least that it's crucial, it's very simple what i will say, to locate putin. into that, how should i call it, russian nationalist line, which was active all the time, which played stalin against lenin. the idea was this one. lenin and trotsky bad guys. they didn't care about russia, they gave too many rights to other nationalityities. and all this liked what stalin did in the early 30s. rewriting the entire history. for example, you know that in the 20s, the soviet history of russia was, as every marxist should do, condemning the expansion on russia to the south, gria, whatever, the tsarist russia or to siberia as clear great power colonialism. no. from early 30s onwards, stalin's histor totally changed the line and it became progressive bourgeois development, like bringing civilization to primitive countries. and also all the great tsars, peter the great, even the terrible catherine and so on, were no longer just feudal despots but progressive enlightenment figures and so on and so on. it was a total nationalist rewriting. that is why even if he shows a little bit understanding for these humanitarian problems of stalinism. he nonetheless putin always. celebrates moderately stalin as a figure of patriotic war a great russian patriot. and do you see those catastrophic opinion polls that they make every couple of years where among thousands of academics where stalin usually finishes quite at the top like recently i think it was after alexander nevsky i don't know whom is the third of the greatest russians of all the time. so i think i am not in any way trying to rehabilitate learning. no, i think. october, the only authentic tragedy was october revolution. in the sense of i don't buy this story that it was just a bolshevik coup d'etat because whatever lenin thought, there was public unrest, support and so on. but then i think it i don't think october revolution was lost really in the civil war. there you have to be brutal. but the most tragic period is for me early 20s when bolsheviks won and then they encountered the real task. now we have power. how we will change everyday life? they have these wonderful problems, you know. if you are an atheist country, how will we do burials or marriages, all these there it was clear that the game is over. this is why, just to make a detour, i think it's a big lesson for today. this is why i get so many enemies, one of the reasons, you know, i hate those left in europe, western especially, who like this big public events. it's wonderful. one million people in tahrir square, one million people in sintagma square. and maybe you know my joke. i always like to refer here to that film. did you see it? was it popular with you? v for vendetta. all radical leftists, oh it's multitude, it's not alienated party structure, it's multitude people, self-organized we. but my joke is always, you know how the film ends? people break the police cordon, occupy the parliament and then the end of the film. my joke is always that i'm ready to sell my mother into slavery for a film called v for vendetta part two. what happened the next day? how will they effectively reorganize life? i think this is the great failure of the left today. even when capitalism obviously is more and more in some kind of a crisis. i mean, i remember all the time when i was young, when welfare state capitalism, at least in western europe and united states was functioning relatively well, the left was saying, you know, wait a minute. there will be crisis. we just should like lenin in switzerland to wait and prepare. okay, then there was a crisis and what happened? nothing. the left was not able to offer not even a minimal serious proposal. that's, i think. that's the truth and i don't blame syriza in greece what happened. the left always thought the big leftist argument against parliamentarian democracy was it's not enough, it gets alienated, we should have social movements from below. yeah, but you could see the impotence of this in the case of greece. and i think i'm sick and tired of this idea of popular self-organization. no, we need another global large scale or the problem is how to change the state, not just supplemented popular movements. look at this fiasco which was previsible. here i celebrate my friend alain badiou, who although he's a crazy maoist still, but from the very beginning, you know when it was so popular the left in this new latino- american populist left from the very beginning he said this is nothing. okay, it's nice, maybe they do some good things like lula presidency in brazil he did develop the country. i mean, i don't know how many people he left them poverty, but it's not a new model and one should say this openly. like for example with cuba. i'm sick and tired of these stories of those who defend cuba. okay, they have economic trouble, but nonetheless, and they also mentioned education and health, you know, but they did that. no, it's a model which doesn't work. and this is a tremendous problem because again, i always repeat this. democratic capitalism is in crisis and we are slowly approaching an alternative. what is poetically called capitalism with asian values, which has nothing to do with asia, but this more authoritarian one. and again, it's not just china, singapore, it's russia, it's turkey, and even in places where democracy is still formally alive, it's becoming more and more irrelevant as we see with this ttip and other commercial agreements which are incredibly important. they set the frame for what government can do, but without any democratic consultation, they are half secret and so on. so back to my point. i think that from the very beginning... october revolution unfortunately was doomed. i'm not saying here i'm more open into, you know this, i like to play this alternate history games, you know like let us say that stalin were to have in 1925 or 6 a car accident, really without any plot. what would have happened? maybe it wouldn't have been as bad as it was. but i don't think there would have been like some trotskyist thing, some kind of a thriving democratic soviet union. it's a very interesting debate. i debated it with that, how is he called, kotkin or what, who wrote his, and his idea is that crucial person, rykov, who was the prime minister, he was... still a hardline bolshevik, but very open, almost like bukharin towards more freedom market economy and so on. so it would have so again. this is all interesting, but you know... that's our tragedy today and that's for me unfortunately the main lesson of october revolution. you know this stupid marxist theory that the development of the forces of production determines relationship. when forces of production get too developed, you need a new maybe it doesn't hold generally, but it certainly holds for soviet union. i simply think and's pretty it's very primitive theory, you can correct me if you know more. that insofar as progress, industrial and so on, was based on this heavy industry, large production, socialist countries somehow managed it. but then when from the 60s, 70s, there was this shift of capitalism towards what we call, i don't even know how to call it, postmodern, decentralized, digital, new media and so on, stalinism or really existing socialism couldn't cope with it. it didn't you think literally that new means forces of production the old because you know i had a this interview i had recently a conversation with a guy who is a little bit shady but interesting. he was in east germany a wunderkind, bright one of their top stars in informatics. he was a member of the privileged circle because he was a computer genius. they were not allowed to travel to the west, but they were allowed to get all the journals from and he said it was so tragic. where east german their leadership saw clearly the problem that they will enter this digital civilization or they will dis. but their paradigm was the old one. they thought wonderful computerization, which means we will perfect the planning in this way. big central computer will be able to control in detail they need more shoes there. you know, their paradigm was still the old communist one, just before some sorry, in spite of some stupid inefficient planning committees. you computerize it, it will work. so their model of computerization was big central computers control everything. and they didn't read enough marxism to know it that no. the whole logic of computerization was this local interaction and so on and so on. i mean, it tragically misfired. so i don't believe i'm here a pessimist. i don't believe simply, i don't know, the awareness of the sense of freedom and so on and so on. no, like revolutions never happen. here i'm more of a pessimist because people want freedom and so on. they happen when... two much more important things happened. john le carré, d. detective writer said something very nice. he said that one real reformist in central committee or politburo means more than 1000 dissidents outside politburo. that is to say, the problem was this one. and this was ultimately the tragedy of gorbachev. i'm still asking myself maybe also a very stupid question. was he naive and plainly stupid or did he know what he was doing? because the problem was a simple one. the soviet system was so immobilized, so falsely stable that it didn't sustain, it wasn't able to survive even a very limited opening. the dream of gorbachev, i think, from what i know from people who knew him, is that he was rather naive and stupid. he thought that he can make it. open the regime a little bit. so that you will have more opening blah blah blah blah no, it didn't work. it was too immobilized. so again, i don't believe in this soin ruined apart from this general problem that. real communists, real socialist countries simply were not able. look, you have now this ridiculous problem in north korea. they try to control internet even in china and so on. so it's this problem, a new stage of development, i'm consciously here talking in about forces of production, cannot do it. that's one problem. another problem is especially in multinational countries like soviet union and yugoslavia, the problem is that the whole unity of a country was based on a certain political vision. like in yugoslavia also, you know, when things were going bad. there were desperate attempts, especially by some serps. and i'm not blaming them for it. it's logical to claim but yugoslavia is not just tito's socialism. yugoslavia is also brotherhood, unity of all balkan slavs here and so on. this didn't work. yugoslavia was to such an extent identified. the whole strength of yugoslavia was what? strength, if you can call it like that, was we are communist, but not in the same way as soviet union. our communism is different, which was like, i would say, i like these games, you know, when they say in china, mao was 70% good and 30% bad,. this was like 30% true and 70% not true. that is to say, it was much better. we were allowed all the time from early 60s to travel abroad and so on. by abroad i mean the west, of course. he didn't survive this test and i think it's the same problem with with with russia the problem putin is facing on. russians were not able to offer other nations, ukrainians, baltic states and so on, an alternate vision. so why are we together if it's not on ground of building socialism and so on and so on? it's very primitive what i'm saying, i know, but i'm a common sense guy here. again, i'm here, i like to be a little bit of a vulgar marxist. you know, nationalism is always in the background, nationalist passions, but that's why the question to be asked is, why did nationalism explode exactly at this moment? and one aspect which we should not underestimate absolutely is that at least in ex-yugoslavia. nationalism was a way for the ex-communist nomenclatura to survive. when yugoslavia entered its mortal crisis in early 80s, which was a much worse crisis economically than in other communist countries, do you know that according to official statistics throughout the early 80s, in those six, seven years, how do you call it, real purchase power, what you can buy, you know how much it fell for 40%. that's what i call crisis, not when they say today, o, you can buy 3% less, 40%. and i think that's... the way socialist nomenclatura in each of the republics tried to redeem itself is to play nationalist cards, because you could no longer legitimize yourself as. we guarantee that we follow the socialist road. that was over. so this was the genius of Milošević, which i claim. he was the first one to do this step not implicitly but openly. his true legitization was national identity and then if you were good politician you could either combine this with multi-party democracy or, on the contrary, present multi-party democracy as a threat to your nation. like in the sense that if we just allow multi-party elections, our nation will be exploited again. this was, for example, big argument of slovene right-wing nationalist intellectuals, you know, that if we remain in yugoslavia, we will be outvoted by serbs and so on and so on. so this is one argument. the second argument, much more sad and tragic. is that. you know, when people asked me, people asked me, everyone was asking this, in london, it wasn't even in poland, i think at some stupid round table in mid-90s in london, we debated poland and somebody said, what miracles are happening? is this a miracle that uh you know, like, who would have imagined five, ten years ago that in free election communists will be defeated and wałęsa president? but now we have it. then i said something with which i still agree. but isn't, okay, it's difficult to imagine that. but wouldn't it have been in that ecstasy of first free elections if somebody were to tell you, wait a minute, in four years in the same free elections the successor of the commun will return to power. that was the true shock. i think that people really didn't want free market. people are afraid of these dangers, uncertainties that come with free market. so i think that that i think that in a way the same, okay, i'll put it like this, i will try to be very short. commun new, even if you read the communist state propaganda. already somewhere in, i would say in brezhnev era, at least from mid-70s. they no longer really talked about we will overcome the west. that game was over. and here i found almost, although he was also. a weird person of its own. you know what's so interesting about khrushchev? khrushchev's era, till early sixties, was the last epoch when nomenclatura and even many ordinary people still think we are active, we can overcome the united states. they somehow believed, you know, and sputnik and all that flight into space bullshit. but then from mid-70s at least, i spoke this with some east german friends who confirmed this. if you really look at how, not the official propaganda, but how the regime effectively legitimized itself, it was not history is on our side. no, it is. look, let's be frank. you live better in the west. but you have uncertainty, competition, it's horrible here. you live more modestly, but it's stability, you don't have to worry. it's this very and i think that this was the secret. don't underestimate the relative success of it. the problem with stalinism is they didn't even allow you, or in a very limited way, this, how do you call it, private niche. you know you go on the 1st of may the the leader but then you are free to enjoy your small life. and in east germany in czechoslovakia and so on. they not only allowed it, but this was their legitization. okay, maybe we don't have political freedom, but look, you have this safe life and so on and so on. so the problem with dissident critical movement is... they wanted the party rule to be over, but they still wanted this safety. and then they were looking for other names, nationalism or whatever. and there is a third aspect then, which may surprise you. i've written about this. we... maybe you know the story. once i was, it's a real story, in mid--90s, i was in belgrade, half illegally. i just visited a friend there, and we went to a restaurant, and there were some people there who were obviously involved with ethnic slaughtering, killing in bosnia. and i got a wonderful lesson from them. because i was a little bit arrogant and i said, you know, all this western bullshit, you primitive balkan people, you're afraid of too much freedom. certainty, you want some stability. and they told me something wonderful. they told me no, it's the opposite for us. your western liberal order appears to be the order of freedom, but it's really so over-regulated. and they made these cynical remarks like i cannot even beat and rape a woman if i like her. you have to be respectful towards women. you cannot make racist jokes. you cannot steal in peace. everything is regulated. and one of them told me, listen, i become a nationalist, i go to bosnia, i can kill, rape. you know, it's wonderful how they experience their nationalism as a space of freedom. in the sense of, oh, we can do all the dirty things, murdering, killing. you should also not underestimate this aspect. i always quote here adorno, who already in late 30s wrote about it. how? nazism is not just discipline. sacrifice for the country, but pretend to do this and you will have your filthy freedom. you can kill the jews, beat them, rape whatever you want and so on. with this so-called post-communist visegrad, whatever if you're from baltic states, poland, czech republic, slovak republic, hungary and slovenia and croatia, this i cannot but call it a rise of a christian fundamentalism which is more and more even directly playing with fascism and so on. it's something totally crazy. a new conspiracy theory is emerging now. i see already its outline, which is incredible. they combine western liberalism, politically correct multiculturalism and islamism, claiming they are really two sides of the same. to ruin christian civilization and so on and so on. for them they are the same. so again, this is what i would have worried about. i mean, if it's simply, now you will say, okay, it's because of economic disappointment. it's not as simple as that. this is really mysterious. i don't have a good theory. but listen, poland is for me the enigma. i know how we should point out how ordinary people are disappointed with democracy. they didn't get economically what they expected. but at least in poland, in poland, in the last 20 years 25 now. there was a kind of a genuine economic success. my god, according to statistics, the standard of, okay, you have rich and poor, but nonetheless, average standard of living went up for almost 100%. why then this totally crazy nationalist religious twist? this is for me the proof that we have many things to understand that we that we don't understand and that this simplistic marxist theory all people are disappointed by capitalism and so on and so on it doesn't work. i think that and the problem is precisely why does capitalism itself. generate these new forms of fundamentalism. why is capitalism losing? because till now, in spite of what marxists were saying, till i would say 10 years ago, it was basically true that capitalism sooner or later brought democracy. capitalism did allow a dictatorship. a little bit of fascism here in philippines, in south korea, in chile, in brazil. but when things start moving after 10, 15 years, democracy returns. in the long term, capitalism did imply democracy. my thesis is that this game is over. . i will be very cynical now. this is one of the best definitions of really existing socialism. that in some countries where it brought industrialization, it was the best intermediate stage from one to the next stage of capitalism. you know that isn't it clear in china? don't underestimate communism. people, my chinese friends are telling me, with all the horrors of maoism, it did bring universal education, maoism it ruined traditional family, it brought again a uk and so on. and all this created the base for today's explosive capital is. because you know, before china was very traditional kon frian. cultural revolution for me but you were so mad at me when i told him this. the objective function of chinese cultural revolution was to prepare the conditions for deng xiaoping. there is no tension there. you know, that's the tragedy. that's the tragedy. and as alain badiou who, my god, is still even a maoist, repeats. if we still want to talk about communism, we really have to accept, really, 20th century is over. in all figururations of the left. of course, stalinist, communist, left over, it's the greatest irony of history that where the communists are still in power. if you abstract from freaks like cuba and north korea. they are usually now the most efficient managers of wild capitalism in china, in vietnam and so on. so that's over. especially i think the danger that is today, this idea of a new populist left, you know, like we need stronger nation-state populism, i think also it's a catastrophe. so often i'm then asked, but fuck you, why don't you then say the game is over. here i'm unfortunately a pessimist. i think, as i always repeat in my books, we are approaching so many problems which i'm a pessimist, it will not be able to solve them within global capitalism the way we have it. from ecology to refugees, international capital and so on. and it's a pretty desperate situation. i'm a pessimist. we have problems. but we don't have even a general view of how to. i am totally opposed to this pseudo-radical leftist mantra. we have it also in slovenia. western europe is a fake. where is now our opening and freedom and universalism? we are treating refugees like dogs. we are putting them in concentration camps and so on and so on. my god, this is for me just the leftist extravaganza of, you know, you feel your moral superiority. it doesn't address the right problems, it doesn't solve any problems. you see this absolute scandal in austria, where now they are in a total panic, where the first and the second were right-w and the second green party, and there is a serious danger that they will have a right-wing president. or the example that i always use from germany when i debated refugees, a guy, probably you know the story. a winger ask me a wonderful question. he said you talk about democracy blah blah blah. but listen, where is then when angela merkel said come, we'll do it. call for to come. she did a very radical geopolitical gesture, inviting millions to come to germany. where is her democratic legitization? in any referendum, the majority would have been against that. so even with varoufakis, when i debated this a couple of times with him, he squeezes out. he says, yeah, this is because people are manipulated. if we had just two weeks of real debate, no, it would have been even worse, i claim. we have to accept this paradox and confront it somehow. the majority. and here the so-called lower class people are even worse. that's the paradox. the west. big capital is always politically correct, open, multicultural and so on. and what i'm fighting for is of course, i don't in any way support racism and so on. but obviously this work of just attacking ordinary people, racists and so on and playing, this obviously is extremely counterproductive. leftists who play this game just they're doing it for it's extremely narcissistic economy. they want to feel well, you know, oh my god, i'm the only pure one. look, the country is falling apart into madness, but i am. no, what did you do? you are part of this madness and so on. i mean, i really think that, for example, i hate this humanitarian version of you know, as if the problem of refugees is that first thing i would have done. it's not a humanitarian problem, it's a big economic and political problem and cultural where we have to raise all different questions like for example first, it's obvious, and i was almost ex for saying this. wait a minute, there are just beneath the crisis region, south of syria and iraq. saudi arabia, kuwait, emirates, extremely rich arab countries. they simply don't accept any refugees. although they are mostly sunnis, religiously speak the same language and so on. so it is as if europe nonetheless accepted millions of them and now we are guilty for not accepting even more of them. there is a certain totally catastrophic game going on here. also with putin. i understand him because it's the old story, don't you think that? uh. he still needs a certain genuine legitimacy he is not just simply a dictator in the stalinist sense and i think that it's the old story, when the economy is not doing too good, you go into, our nation is in danger and all that stuff and so on. but it's very important what you mentioned of this new cultural. conservatism. i even put, you know, what is for me the symbol. i used this a couple of times in my text. you remember that eurovision competition where that austrian beard lady won and how russia all of a sudden started to talk this traditional language, which is for me already on the way towards boko haram. and it's very interesting phenomenon, boko haram. i love them. it's the ultimate horror. are you aware what a crazy thing boko haram is? we have a large political movement which claims that we are in a crisis and that to get out of the crisis we should reorganize totally our society, how? to prohibit education to women, to re-establish a fixed sexual identity. it was the same in panic. putin said after that conchita wurst victory. in the bible it says there are men and women. what do we have now? one of those cultural theorists of putin said, a bearded lady, if this is a symbol of europe, then no thanks. so it's absolutely crucial to understand why. this new way that sexual is becoming political today and i think that. this western obsession with minorities' rights, all this transgender business that you get now in the united states, it's also a false issue. it's the political reasoning which will horribly misfire. and it's a very dangerous phenomenon, this new cultural struggle that is emerging. you know, the good thing about being a small country. is almost the same as the bad one. the bad thing is that you are there and who cares ultimately probably let's say if russia decides to occupy you simply all it. it could mean terrible tensions, but i don't think the west would have risked a new world war. so you are vulnerable. on the other hand, you know, if you exploit your position intelligently, i always use here as an example korea. they suffer terribly because they are in a horrible situation. three superpowers, russia, china, japan. south korea at least, let's forget the monster up there. south korea is, you should visit it. it's incredible. it's a new economic. it is what japan was 20, 30 years ago. it's incredibly developed, exploding and so on. my son admires them. you know why? he is... is this still his map? plays like crazy games. you know that south koreans are in all those games with the top of the world. whenever you have these international competitions, at least half of the winners are... but it's not only this. south korea is almost our future. the whole country is crazy. they are absolute record holders of the suicide rate among the young. young people are obsessed with two ideas. success business and enjoy fully and this is why they are but what i'm saying is that that's the tragedy of small countries. on the one hand, even when there is a crisis, you can find your niche not being so affected by a crisis, but on the second hand, if things go catastrophically for you, there can be an outcry, whatever, you know but but i think that with a little bit of luck, you can survive, don't you think? like, i don't know enough. do you think it's enough for russians to get that? those shitty two parts abkhazia or do they, who knows? for example, we in slovenia were very lucky here. because the church played in the whole dissident critical movement an extremely marginal role. so in no way was the church perceived as... the fight was among secular intellectuals, more heideggerarian, conservative, nationalist one, more open one, but church was never this. in these desperate times where it's crazy to talk socialist revolution or whatever, you should focus on this. it's very important, which, how should i call it, ideological atmosphere predominates. in the society. i agree with you, it's very dangerous if this will become the hegemonic attitude because this is what the church tries to achieve here, claiming, okay, we have our differences, but basically the church is the ultimate guarantee of the slovene nation. now, with us, hopefully it doesn't work. how did you solve this problem? because there are even three arguments working against this. first, we have mega sexual pedophilia scandals. and the way the church reacted to them was scandalous. you know. no priest was punished by the church and so on. they just trans. so this second thing. after independence, way too aggressively, they tried to penetrate the public sphere of education and so on, and they did it in such an aggressive way that even many religious people were opposed to it. so they, they are not perceived at all as an authentic ethical force. but that's another big corrupted organization which just wants more public power and so on. and maybe this is what we secular intellectuals achieved here, that even when they talk about religion, spirituality, it's almost generally achieved that they don't really care about this. this means for them just another tool, you know, to occupy the public space of education and so on. so this is the second the third thing is that. i don't know how it was with you, but it was a little bit like in poland. uh now it's returning church, but after, why did kwaśniewski who won against wałęsa, it's that the church became so arrogant in the process of denationalization. they wanted just back everything. in slovenia, the church tried the same. it didn't work and it was a catastrophe for their popularity because they were perceived as just. to give you an example, you know what they wanted back? you know a little bit of european sister, the son of maria teria, joseph ii, the reformer. he nationalized, he took many lands and monasteries from the church in austrian empire. the church wanted back not just what communists took from them in 19445, but even what joseph ii took from them. and this was too much for people. then a liberal government here. did something ingenious which hurt church. okay if the people want so they said that when you do your text when you have to call it fill-in text form, you have for a certain percentage you can choose. where will it go? you can have church, healthcare, charity organizations, culture. you know how many people have chosen church, like 1,-2%, nothing and so on. and then of course church claim this is because secretly we are still occupied by communists or whatever. no, they are not popular. they have no chance in slovenia. that's at least one good thing. but it's never clear to me for those want revolution. what do they think? that if we organize some revolutionary movement, there will be some crisis when we will take over? isn't it more and more clear, and this makes me very sad, that whenever the situation gets tough, it's as a rule conservatives or fascists or whatever who win. i mean, i don't even see. many you know, many ordinary people would. react to this with this type of basic skepticism, you know, like revolution, okay, but like my vendetta part two question but how will you organize society in what way how? and what can you answer them? okay, people will be empowered. fuck you what does this mean people will be empowered how? elections who and so even isn't this the clear sign that, again, in spite of all these economic troubles in western europe latin countries. shiriza went the farthest. not direct revolution, but and even they had to compromise. i think they need my line with syriza is varoufakis. that is to say, neither left platform, which is not revolution, but this naive state socialist version. grexit out of europe, we print our own money, we invest, well, good idea, but 100 years too late. you know like the problem is the global market, you know the problem is that in order to make this efficient, you have to cut off yourself from international financial resource and in greece this is you know greece is a very non-productive country. they have tourism, they have feta cheese and that olives, whatever bullshit and that's it. they import all of their medicines, most of their food, all the technical stuff and so on. we cannot just say we isolate ourselves, then we invest, print our. so again, i would have said that this conflict ist for me this choice is for me too abstract because i don't even see a chance for anything like revolution in the near future to succeed. i think the way to do it now is specifically in these times. it's first to be ready for crisis approaching. i think, unfortunately, i'm not glad about it, but we don't live in happy times where we go on and on. there will be new explosions, new crises, new tensions, who knows what and so on. we should always be aware with part of our mind in the background that. to be ready for emergency or whatever. but second thing, i think we should not be afraid of. small, precise battles, apparently small steps, but which have a great symbolic meaning. look, we all know obama disappointment, but i think that in a way obama laid the foundation for bernie sanders. for example, it was incredibly important, the big debate they had on universal healthcare. nobody could accuse him, although some idiots did, this is a communist measure. not all the countries around, canada has it still some kind of you but you see in american context. you give people to think. universal healthcare, why not? an important thing. but at the same time, all the right-wingers went crazy. they denounced obama to supreme court and so on. so i think that more important than the big. worldview debates, are we socialists not, is to fight for this type of particular problems, but which have, how put it, a universal connotation attached to them. like healthcare, like and you can argue in a very efficient way, like, i don't know, education and so on. it is so clear, for example i was in denmark. for some stupid colloquium, but then i met some people from tv there. they told me, are they also popular with you? you know, these new tv series they had, which are b, the bridge and so on. this was the best of socialism. this was not spontaneous market. there were a couple of bosses who said, this is our unique chance. so they established with a relatively small investment a group, they established the rules. people compete, different groups, you get three years, and it's a worldwide success. but you see, this is a good example of how even a mark, that's the mystery of today's capitalism. i would have used this. if you look at countries like, forget china, singapore, south korea. this is not simple wild market liberal capitalism. this is capitalism combined with an extremely strong, intelligent role of the state. so i think that should be our message to people that stronger role of the state is a reality today and the point is how to do it intelligently. people say united states, let's be serious. there was never a stronger state in the world than united states today with all the security. so what i'm saying is that it's more important to... convince people how? good social interventions are not just this stupid socialist way you ruin everything, but can be extremely efficient. and just to pursue this, apart from the usual stuff that we are also doing, these gay rights or whatever you want there,, to somehow convince people to see reality. first, neoliberalism. it's not a reality. i always emphasize it's an ideology. state interventions, state help, state organizations are absolutely crucial today. for example, i learned, i met some guys at some stupid round table. google, my god, google is closely connected to us state establishment. some people, my friends, describe google as private nsa, you know. so what i'm saying is that . here is how i would proceed. not big ideological debates, but first this awareness of a crisis. it's absolutely crucial to always bear in mind this today, especially small nations like yours and mine. you know, we live in dangerous times and we are negligible. like nothing will change if we disappear. but and the second point, this... precise struggles, you know, whatever, education, this, that or whatever to convince people this is so true. for example, i don't know how it is with you, but here again, it's interesting how some populist leftists but also conservatives hate. humanities and this general social education claiming this is totally useless and so on it means nothing no we should insist more and more that in today's dynamic capitalism more general education is needed and there are even statistical data confirming it so nicely like my son who now dreams of going to united states to study everybody is dreaming found some data where they claim that even in this more technological from economy to i don't know what, okay non non-human faculties. if you have some kind of general education, mathematics, more abstract, you are usually much better in your particular field than those who were directly educated in that field. this is, i think, one of the most important struggles today. like in europe we have now a catastrophe that bologna reform. when they we to streamline education towards what society really needs. but society doesn't know what it needs. it's changing so fast and so on, you know. so i'm here. it's a pretty desperate situation, no? but that's all we can do now, i think. the true revolution today would have been just to be a really efficient reformist. because even this you cannot do it today. that's the tragedy. this was for me the big lesson of syriza. i've written about it and people know it, but it's so tragic and important. do you remember? if you look closely at what shiriza demanded. 56 years ago. this would have been moderate social democracy, not even a radical social democracy, but moderate one. so don't we live in strange times in which when you advocate the same thing as... fifty years ago moderate democracy deed, you are perceived as a radical leftist today. so this is why i think that again we live in much more perverted, paradoxical times that to be again an authentic moderate reformist today is is already intolerable for global economy global capitalism but that's why i'm saying that the problems that we face are two today. it's global capital, open irrationalities and so on. and at the same time, again, all this what you mentioned, religious, ethnic reactions, because that's the global formula today. capitalism brings chaos, so we need the chinese are doing this. confucius is now a big hero. some kind of traditional wisdom to keep control. and the point is how to undermine this. what matters for me, when i say culture, i don't mean this sublime culture. i mean, and this is so important, this everyday thing, how women are effectively treated. how, you know, this everyday culture. this is where ideology is happening today and where ideology fascinates me. who cares about this big ideology? no, ideology is for me even how you go to the toilet, my boring example. you know, how you... treat others or what is considered acceptable or not how you speak and so on that's why although i almost sometimes don't think that i met have sympathized with donald trump. no, no, no, he is pig. but others are worse republicans. i claim that it's clear. did you see what he is recently saying? he was for higher minimal wage and so on and so on. now he i think he plays this clown to mask up the fact that he is almost half a liberal there. disgusting, i know, but listen listen to ted cruz and you will see what real horror is and all those other rep. and this is, i think, an extremely dangerous phenomenon because, you know, every democracy functions always when it's based on some unwritten rules which are not explicitly like in the united states you have democracy, but all of it was based on the you have two parties in a certain way you respect how you it was a well-known pattern and this pattern is now ruined by sanders and even more maybe in what will happen now with republican party and so on it can be totally chaotic the same thing is happening in the west you have till now what i described you know this moderate left moderate right exchanging this h put it, normal way for political regime to reproduce itself is disintegrating. and these moments are dangerous. they can give hope to us, but they can also. well, give hope to them, no
i think at least that it's crucial, it's very simple what i will say, to locate putin. into that, how should i call it, russian nationalist line, which was active all the time, which played stalin against lenin. the idea was this one. lenin and trotsky bad guys. they didn't care about russia, they gave too many rights to other nationalityities. and all this liked what stalin did in the early 30s. rewriting the entire history. for example, you know that in the 20s, the soviet history of russia was, as every marxist should do, condemning the expansion on russia to the south, gria, whatever, the tsarist russia or to siberia as clear great power colonialism. no. from early 30s onwards, stalin's histor totally changed the line and it became progressive bourgeois development, like bringing civilization to primitive countries. and also all the great tsars, peter the great, even the terrible catherine and so on, were no longer just feudal despots but progressive enlightenment figures and so on and so on. it was a total nationalist rewriting. that is why even if he shows a little bit understanding for these humanitarian problems of stalinism. he nonetheless putin always. celebrates moderately stalin as a figure of patriotic war a great russian patriot. and do you see those catastrophic opinion polls that they make every couple of years where among thousands of academics where stalin usually finishes quite at the top like recently i think it was after alexander nevsky i don't know whom is the third of the greatest russians of all the time. so i think i am not in any way trying to rehabilitate learning. no, i think. october, the only authentic tragedy was october revolution. in the sense of i don't buy this story that it was just a bolshevik coup d'etat because whatever lenin thought, there was public unrest, support and so on. but then i think it i don't think october revolution was lost really in the civil war. there you have to be brutal. but the most tragic period is for me early 20s when bolsheviks won and then they encountered the real task. now we have power. how we will change everyday life? they have these wonderful problems, you know. if you are an atheist country, how will we do burials or marriages, all these there it was clear that the game is over. this is why, just to make a detour, i think it's a big lesson for today. this is why i get so many enemies, one of the reasons, you know, i hate those left in europe, western especially, who like this big public events. it's wonderful. one million people in tahrir square, one million people in sintagma square. and maybe you know my joke. i always like to refer here to that film. did you see it? was it popular with you? v for vendetta. all radical leftists, oh it's multitude, it's not alienated party structure, it's multitude people, self-organized we. but my joke is always, you know how the film ends? people break the police cordon, occupy the parliament and then the end of the film. my joke is always that i'm ready to sell my mother into slavery for a film called v for vendetta part two. what happened the next day? how will they effectively reorganize life? i think this is the great failure of the left today. even when capitalism obviously is more and more in some kind of a crisis. i mean, i remember all the time when i was young, when welfare state capitalism, at least in western europe and united states was functioning relatively well, the left was saying, you know, wait a minute. there will be crisis. we just should like lenin in switzerland to wait and prepare. okay, then there was a crisis and what happened? nothing. the left was not able to offer not even a minimal serious proposal. that's, i think. that's the truth and i don't blame syriza in greece what happened. the left always thought the big leftist argument against parliamentarian democracy was it's not enough, it gets alienated, we should have social movements from below. yeah, but you could see the impotence of this in the case of greece. and i think i'm sick and tired of this idea of popular self-organization. no, we need another global large scale or the problem is how to change the state, not just supplemented popular movements. look at this fiasco which was previsible. here i celebrate my friend alain badiou, who although he's a crazy maoist still, but from the very beginning, you know when it was so popular the left in this new latino- american populist left from the very beginning he said this is nothing. okay, it's nice, maybe they do some good things like lula presidency in brazil he did develop the country. i mean, i don't know how many people he left them poverty, but it's not a new model and one should say this openly. like for example with cuba. i'm sick and tired of these stories of those who defend cuba. okay, they have economic trouble, but nonetheless, and they also mentioned education and health, you know, but they did that. no, it's a model which doesn't work. and this is a tremendous problem because again, i always repeat this. democratic capitalism is in crisis and we are slowly approaching an alternative. what is poetically called capitalism with asian values, which has nothing to do with asia, but this more authoritarian one. and again, it's not just china, singapore, it's russia, it's turkey, and even in places where democracy is still formally alive, it's becoming more and more irrelevant as we see with this ttip and other commercial agreements which are incredibly important. they set the frame for what government can do, but without any democratic consultation, they are half secret and so on. so back to my point. i think that from the very beginning... october revolution unfortunately was doomed. i'm not saying here i'm more open into, you know this, i like to play this alternate history games, you know like let us say that stalin were to have in 1925 or 6 a car accident, really without any plot. what would have happened? maybe it wouldn't have been as bad as it was. but i don't think there would have been like some trotskyist thing, some kind of a thriving democratic soviet union. it's a very interesting debate. i debated it with that, how is he called, kotkin or what, who wrote his, and his idea is that crucial person, rykov, who was the prime minister, he was... still a hardline bolshevik, but very open, almost like bukharin towards more freedom market economy and so on. so it would have so again. this is all interesting, but you know... that's our tragedy today and that's for me unfortunately the main lesson of october revolution. you know this stupid marxist theory that the development of the forces of production determines relationship. when forces of production get too developed, you need a new maybe it doesn't hold generally, but it certainly holds for soviet union. i simply think and's pretty it's very primitive theory, you can correct me if you know more. that insofar as progress, industrial and so on, was based on this heavy industry, large production, socialist countries somehow managed it. but then when from the 60s, 70s, there was this shift of capitalism towards what we call, i don't even know how to call it, postmodern, decentralized, digital, new media and so on, stalinism or really existing socialism couldn't cope with it. it didn't you think literally that new means forces of production the old because you know i had a this interview i had recently a conversation with a guy who is a little bit shady but interesting. he was in east germany a wunderkind, bright one of their top stars in informatics. he was a member of the privileged circle because he was a computer genius. they were not allowed to travel to the west, but they were allowed to get all the journals from and he said it was so tragic. where east german their leadership saw clearly the problem that they will enter this digital civilization or they will dis. but their paradigm was the old one. they thought wonderful computerization, which means we will perfect the planning in this way. big central computer will be able to control in detail they need more shoes there. you know, their paradigm was still the old communist one, just before some sorry, in spite of some stupid inefficient planning committees. you computerize it, it will work. so their model of computerization was big central computers control everything. and they didn't read enough marxism to know it that no. the whole logic of computerization was this local interaction and so on and so on. i mean, it tragically misfired. so i don't believe i'm here a pessimist. i don't believe simply, i don't know, the awareness of the sense of freedom and so on and so on. no, like revolutions never happen. here i'm more of a pessimist because people want freedom and so on. they happen when... two much more important things happened. john le carré, d. detective writer said something very nice. he said that one real reformist in central committee or politburo means more than 1000 dissidents outside politburo. that is to say, the problem was this one. and this was ultimately the tragedy of gorbachev. i'm still asking myself maybe also a very stupid question. was he naive and plainly stupid or did he know what he was doing? because the problem was a simple one. the soviet system was so immobilized, so falsely stable that it didn't sustain, it wasn't able to survive even a very limited opening. the dream of gorbachev, i think, from what i know from people who knew him, is that he was rather naive and stupid. he thought that he can make it. open the regime a little bit. so that you will have more opening blah blah blah blah no, it didn't work. it was too immobilized. so again, i don't believe in this soin ruined apart from this general problem that. real communists, real socialist countries simply were not able. look, you have now this ridiculous problem in north korea. they try to control internet even in china and so on. so it's this problem, a new stage of development, i'm consciously here talking in about forces of production, cannot do it. that's one problem. another problem is especially in multinational countries like soviet union and yugoslavia, the problem is that the whole unity of a country was based on a certain political vision. like in yugoslavia also, you know, when things were going bad. there were desperate attempts, especially by some serps. and i'm not blaming them for it. it's logical to claim but yugoslavia is not just tito's socialism. yugoslavia is also brotherhood, unity of all balkan slavs here and so on. this didn't work. yugoslavia was to such an extent identified. the whole strength of yugoslavia was what? strength, if you can call it like that, was we are communist, but not in the same way as soviet union. our communism is different, which was like, i would say, i like these games, you know, when they say in china, mao was 70% good and 30% bad,. this was like 30% true and 70% not true. that is to say, it was much better. we were allowed all the time from early 60s to travel abroad and so on. by abroad i mean the west, of course. he didn't survive this test and i think it's the same problem with with with russia the problem putin is facing on. russians were not able to offer other nations, ukrainians, baltic states and so on, an alternate vision. so why are we together if it's not on ground of building socialism and so on and so on? it's very primitive what i'm saying, i know, but i'm a common sense guy here. again, i'm here, i like to be a little bit of a vulgar marxist. you know, nationalism is always in the background, nationalist passions, but that's why the question to be asked is, why did nationalism explode exactly at this moment? and one aspect which we should not underestimate absolutely is that at least in ex-yugoslavia. nationalism was a way for the ex-communist nomenclatura to survive. when yugoslavia entered its mortal crisis in early 80s, which was a much worse crisis economically than in other communist countries, do you know that according to official statistics throughout the early 80s, in those six, seven years, how do you call it, real purchase power, what you can buy, you know how much it fell for 40%. that's what i call crisis, not when they say today, o, you can buy 3% less, 40%. and i think that's... the way socialist nomenclatura in each of the republics tried to redeem itself is to play nationalist cards, because you could no longer legitimize yourself as. we guarantee that we follow the socialist road. that was over. so this was the genius of Milošević, which i claim. he was the first one to do this step not implicitly but openly. his true legitization was national identity and then if you were good politician you could either combine this with multi-party democracy or, on the contrary, present multi-party democracy as a threat to your nation. like in the sense that if we just allow multi-party elections, our nation will be exploited again. this was, for example, big argument of slovene right-wing nationalist intellectuals, you know, that if we remain in yugoslavia, we will be outvoted by serbs and so on and so on. so this is one argument. the second argument, much more sad and tragic. is that. you know, when people asked me, people asked me, everyone was asking this, in london, it wasn't even in poland, i think at some stupid round table in mid-90s in london, we debated poland and somebody said, what miracles are happening? is this a miracle that uh you know, like, who would have imagined five, ten years ago that in free election communists will be defeated and wałęsa president? but now we have it. then i said something with which i still agree. but isn't, okay, it's difficult to imagine that. but wouldn't it have been in that ecstasy of first free elections if somebody were to tell you, wait a minute, in four years in the same free elections the successor of the commun will return to power. that was the true shock. i think that people really didn't want free market. people are afraid of these dangers, uncertainties that come with free market. so i think that that i think that in a way the same, okay, i'll put it like this, i will try to be very short. commun new, even if you read the communist state propaganda. already somewhere in, i would say in brezhnev era, at least from mid-70s. they no longer really talked about we will overcome the west. that game was over. and here i found almost, although he was also. a weird person of its own. you know what's so interesting about khrushchev? khrushchev's era, till early sixties, was the last epoch when nomenclatura and even many ordinary people still think we are active, we can overcome the united states. they somehow believed, you know, and sputnik and all that flight into space bullshit. but then from mid-70s at least, i spoke this with some east german friends who confirmed this. if you really look at how, not the official propaganda, but how the regime effectively legitimized itself, it was not history is on our side. no, it is. look, let's be frank. you live better in the west. but you have uncertainty, competition, it's horrible here. you live more modestly, but it's stability, you don't have to worry. it's this very and i think that this was the secret. don't underestimate the relative success of it. the problem with stalinism is they didn't even allow you, or in a very limited way, this, how do you call it, private niche. you know you go on the 1st of may the the leader but then you are free to enjoy your small life. and in east germany in czechoslovakia and so on. they not only allowed it, but this was their legitization. okay, maybe we don't have political freedom, but look, you have this safe life and so on and so on. so the problem with dissident critical movement is... they wanted the party rule to be over, but they still wanted this safety. and then they were looking for other names, nationalism or whatever. and there is a third aspect then, which may surprise you. i've written about this. we... maybe you know the story. once i was, it's a real story, in mid--90s, i was in belgrade, half illegally. i just visited a friend there, and we went to a restaurant, and there were some people there who were obviously involved with ethnic slaughtering, killing in bosnia. and i got a wonderful lesson from them. because i was a little bit arrogant and i said, you know, all this western bullshit, you primitive balkan people, you're afraid of too much freedom. certainty, you want some stability. and they told me something wonderful. they told me no, it's the opposite for us. your western liberal order appears to be the order of freedom, but it's really so over-regulated. and they made these cynical remarks like i cannot even beat and rape a woman if i like her. you have to be respectful towards women. you cannot make racist jokes. you cannot steal in peace. everything is regulated. and one of them told me, listen, i become a nationalist, i go to bosnia, i can kill, rape. you know, it's wonderful how they experience their nationalism as a space of freedom. in the sense of, oh, we can do all the dirty things, murdering, killing. you should also not underestimate this aspect. i always quote here adorno, who already in late 30s wrote about it. how? nazism is not just discipline. sacrifice for the country, but pretend to do this and you will have your filthy freedom. you can kill the jews, beat them, rape whatever you want and so on. with this so-called post-communist visegrad, whatever if you're from baltic states, poland, czech republic, slovak republic, hungary and slovenia and croatia, this i cannot but call it a rise of a christian fundamentalism which is more and more even directly playing with fascism and so on. it's something totally crazy. a new conspiracy theory is emerging now. i see already its outline, which is incredible. they combine western liberalism, politically correct multiculturalism and islamism, claiming they are really two sides of the same. to ruin christian civilization and so on and so on. for them they are the same. so again, this is what i would have worried about. i mean, if it's simply, now you will say, okay, it's because of economic disappointment. it's not as simple as that. this is really mysterious. i don't have a good theory. but listen, poland is for me the enigma. i know how we should point out how ordinary people are disappointed with democracy. they didn't get economically what they expected. but at least in poland, in poland, in the last 20 years 25 now. there was a kind of a genuine economic success. my god, according to statistics, the standard of, okay, you have rich and poor, but nonetheless, average standard of living went up for almost 100%. why then this totally crazy nationalist religious twist? this is for me the proof that we have many things to understand that we that we don't understand and that this simplistic marxist theory all people are disappointed by capitalism and so on and so on it doesn't work. i think that and the problem is precisely why does capitalism itself. generate these new forms of fundamentalism. why is capitalism losing? because till now, in spite of what marxists were saying, till i would say 10 years ago, it was basically true that capitalism sooner or later brought democracy. capitalism did allow a dictatorship. a little bit of fascism here in philippines, in south korea, in chile, in brazil. but when things start moving after 10, 15 years, democracy returns. in the long term, capitalism did imply democracy. my thesis is that this game is over. . i will be very cynical now. this is one of the best definitions of really existing socialism. that in some countries where it brought industrialization, it was the best intermediate stage from one to the next stage of capitalism. you know that isn't it clear in china? don't underestimate communism. people, my chinese friends are telling me, with all the horrors of maoism, it did bring universal education, maoism it ruined traditional family, it brought again a uk and so on. and all this created the base for today's explosive capital is. because you know, before china was very traditional kon frian. cultural revolution for me but you were so mad at me when i told him this. the objective function of chinese cultural revolution was to prepare the conditions for deng xiaoping. there is no tension there. you know, that's the tragedy. that's the tragedy. and as alain badiou who, my god, is still even a maoist, repeats. if we still want to talk about communism, we really have to accept, really, 20th century is over. in all figururations of the left. of course, stalinist, communist, left over, it's the greatest irony of history that where the communists are still in power. if you abstract from freaks like cuba and north korea. they are usually now the most efficient managers of wild capitalism in china, in vietnam and so on. so that's over. especially i think the danger that is today, this idea of a new populist left, you know, like we need stronger nation-state populism, i think also it's a catastrophe. so often i'm then asked, but fuck you, why don't you then say the game is over. here i'm unfortunately a pessimist. i think, as i always repeat in my books, we are approaching so many problems which i'm a pessimist, it will not be able to solve them within global capitalism the way we have it. from ecology to refugees, international capital and so on. and it's a pretty desperate situation. i'm a pessimist. we have problems. but we don't have even a general view of how to. i am totally opposed to this pseudo-radical leftist mantra. we have it also in slovenia. western europe is a fake. where is now our opening and freedom and universalism? we are treating refugees like dogs. we are putting them in concentration camps and so on and so on. my god, this is for me just the leftist extravaganza of, you know, you feel your moral superiority. it doesn't address the right problems, it doesn't solve any problems. you see this absolute scandal in austria, where now they are in a total panic, where the first and the second were right-w and the second green party, and there is a serious danger that they will have a right-wing president. or the example that i always use from germany when i debated refugees, a guy, probably you know the story. a winger ask me a wonderful question. he said you talk about democracy blah blah blah. but listen, where is then when angela merkel said come, we'll do it. call for to come. she did a very radical geopolitical gesture, inviting millions to come to germany. where is her democratic legitization? in any referendum, the majority would have been against that. so even with varoufakis, when i debated this a couple of times with him, he squeezes out. he says, yeah, this is because people are manipulated. if we had just two weeks of real debate, no, it would have been even worse, i claim. we have to accept this paradox and confront it somehow. the majority. and here the so-called lower class people are even worse. that's the paradox. the west. big capital is always politically correct, open, multicultural and so on. and what i'm fighting for is of course, i don't in any way support racism and so on. but obviously this work of just attacking ordinary people, racists and so on and playing, this obviously is extremely counterproductive. leftists who play this game just they're doing it for it's extremely narcissistic economy. they want to feel well, you know, oh my god, i'm the only pure one. look, the country is falling apart into madness, but i am. no, what did you do? you are part of this madness and so on. i mean, i really think that, for example, i hate this humanitarian version of you know, as if the problem of refugees is that first thing i would have done. it's not a humanitarian problem, it's a big economic and political problem and cultural where we have to raise all different questions like for example first, it's obvious, and i was almost ex for saying this. wait a minute, there are just beneath the crisis region, south of syria and iraq. saudi arabia, kuwait, emirates, extremely rich arab countries. they simply don't accept any refugees. although they are mostly sunnis, religiously speak the same language and so on. so it is as if europe nonetheless accepted millions of them and now we are guilty for not accepting even more of them. there is a certain totally catastrophic game going on here. also with putin. i understand him because it's the old story, don't you think that? uh. he still needs a certain genuine legitimacy he is not just simply a dictator in the stalinist sense and i think that it's the old story, when the economy is not doing too good, you go into, our nation is in danger and all that stuff and so on. but it's very important what you mentioned of this new cultural. conservatism. i even put, you know, what is for me the symbol. i used this a couple of times in my text. you remember that eurovision competition where that austrian beard lady won and how russia all of a sudden started to talk this traditional language, which is for me already on the way towards boko haram. and it's very interesting phenomenon, boko haram. i love them. it's the ultimate horror. are you aware what a crazy thing boko haram is? we have a large political movement which claims that we are in a crisis and that to get out of the crisis we should reorganize totally our society, how? to prohibit education to women, to re-establish a fixed sexual identity. it was the same in panic. putin said after that conchita wurst victory. in the bible it says there are men and women. what do we have now? one of those cultural theorists of putin said, a bearded lady, if this is a symbol of europe, then no thanks. so it's absolutely crucial to understand why. this new way that sexual is becoming political today and i think that. this western obsession with minorities' rights, all this transgender business that you get now in the united states, it's also a false issue. it's the political reasoning which will horribly misfire. and it's a very dangerous phenomenon, this new cultural struggle that is emerging. you know, the good thing about being a small country. is almost the same as the bad one. the bad thing is that you are there and who cares ultimately probably let's say if russia decides to occupy you simply all it. it could mean terrible tensions, but i don't think the west would have risked a new world war. so you are vulnerable. on the other hand, you know, if you exploit your position intelligently, i always use here as an example korea. they suffer terribly because they are in a horrible situation. three superpowers, russia, china, japan. south korea at least, let's forget the monster up there. south korea is, you should visit it. it's incredible. it's a new economic. it is what japan was 20, 30 years ago. it's incredibly developed, exploding and so on. my son admires them. you know why? he is... is this still his map? plays like crazy games. you know that south koreans are in all those games with the top of the world. whenever you have these international competitions, at least half of the winners are... but it's not only this. south korea is almost our future. the whole country is crazy. they are absolute record holders of the suicide rate among the young. young people are obsessed with two ideas. success business and enjoy fully and this is why they are but what i'm saying is that that's the tragedy of small countries. on the one hand, even when there is a crisis, you can find your niche not being so affected by a crisis, but on the second hand, if things go catastrophically for you, there can be an outcry, whatever, you know but but i think that with a little bit of luck, you can survive, don't you think? like, i don't know enough. do you think it's enough for russians to get that? those shitty two parts abkhazia or do they, who knows? for example, we in slovenia were very lucky here. because the church played in the whole dissident critical movement an extremely marginal role. so in no way was the church perceived as... the fight was among secular intellectuals, more heideggerarian, conservative, nationalist one, more open one, but church was never this. in these desperate times where it's crazy to talk socialist revolution or whatever, you should focus on this. it's very important, which, how should i call it, ideological atmosphere predominates. in the society. i agree with you, it's very dangerous if this will become the hegemonic attitude because this is what the church tries to achieve here, claiming, okay, we have our differences, but basically the church is the ultimate guarantee of the slovene nation. now, with us, hopefully it doesn't work. how did you solve this problem? because there are even three arguments working against this. first, we have mega sexual pedophilia scandals. and the way the church reacted to them was scandalous. you know. no priest was punished by the church and so on. they just trans. so this second thing. after independence, way too aggressively, they tried to penetrate the public sphere of education and so on, and they did it in such an aggressive way that even many religious people were opposed to it. so they, they are not perceived at all as an authentic ethical force. but that's another big corrupted organization which just wants more public power and so on. and maybe this is what we secular intellectuals achieved here, that even when they talk about religion, spirituality, it's almost generally achieved that they don't really care about this. this means for them just another tool, you know, to occupy the public space of education and so on. so this is the second the third thing is that. i don't know how it was with you, but it was a little bit like in poland. uh now it's returning church, but after, why did kwaśniewski who won against wałęsa, it's that the church became so arrogant in the process of denationalization. they wanted just back everything. in slovenia, the church tried the same. it didn't work and it was a catastrophe for their popularity because they were perceived as just. to give you an example, you know what they wanted back? you know a little bit of european sister, the son of maria teria, joseph ii, the reformer. he nationalized, he took many lands and monasteries from the church in austrian empire. the church wanted back not just what communists took from them in 19445, but even what joseph ii took from them. and this was too much for people. then a liberal government here. did something ingenious which hurt church. okay if the people want so they said that when you do your text when you have to call it fill-in text form, you have for a certain percentage you can choose. where will it go? you can have church, healthcare, charity organizations, culture. you know how many people have chosen church, like 1,-2%, nothing and so on. and then of course church claim this is because secretly we are still occupied by communists or whatever. no, they are not popular. they have no chance in slovenia. that's at least one good thing. but it's never clear to me for those want revolution. what do they think? that if we organize some revolutionary movement, there will be some crisis when we will take over? isn't it more and more clear, and this makes me very sad, that whenever the situation gets tough, it's as a rule conservatives or fascists or whatever who win. i mean, i don't even see. many you know, many ordinary people would. react to this with this type of basic skepticism, you know, like revolution, okay, but like my vendetta part two question but how will you organize society in what way how? and what can you answer them? okay, people will be empowered. fuck you what does this mean people will be empowered how? elections who and so even isn't this the clear sign that, again, in spite of all these economic troubles in western europe latin countries. shiriza went the farthest. not direct revolution, but and even they had to compromise. i think they need my line with syriza is varoufakis. that is to say, neither left platform, which is not revolution, but this naive state socialist version. grexit out of europe, we print our own money, we invest, well, good idea, but 100 years too late. you know like the problem is the global market, you know the problem is that in order to make this efficient, you have to cut off yourself from international financial resource and in greece this is you know greece is a very non-productive country. they have tourism, they have feta cheese and that olives, whatever bullshit and that's it. they import all of their medicines, most of their food, all the technical stuff and so on. we cannot just say we isolate ourselves, then we invest, print our. so again, i would have said that this conflict ist for me this choice is for me too abstract because i don't even see a chance for anything like revolution in the near future to succeed. i think the way to do it now is specifically in these times. it's first to be ready for crisis approaching. i think, unfortunately, i'm not glad about it, but we don't live in happy times where we go on and on. there will be new explosions, new crises, new tensions, who knows what and so on. we should always be aware with part of our mind in the background that. to be ready for emergency or whatever. but second thing, i think we should not be afraid of. small, precise battles, apparently small steps, but which have a great symbolic meaning. look, we all know obama disappointment, but i think that in a way obama laid the foundation for bernie sanders. for example, it was incredibly important, the big debate they had on universal healthcare. nobody could accuse him, although some idiots did, this is a communist measure. not all the countries around, canada has it still some kind of you but you see in american context. you give people to think. universal healthcare, why not? an important thing. but at the same time, all the right-wingers went crazy. they denounced obama to supreme court and so on. so i think that more important than the big. worldview debates, are we socialists not, is to fight for this type of particular problems, but which have, how put it, a universal connotation attached to them. like healthcare, like and you can argue in a very efficient way, like, i don't know, education and so on. it is so clear, for example i was in denmark. for some stupid colloquium, but then i met some people from tv there. they told me, are they also popular with you? you know, these new tv series they had, which are b, the bridge and so on. this was the best of socialism. this was not spontaneous market. there were a couple of bosses who said, this is our unique chance. so they established with a relatively small investment a group, they established the rules. people compete, different groups, you get three years, and it's a worldwide success. but you see, this is a good example of how even a mark, that's the mystery of today's capitalism. i would have used this. if you look at countries like, forget china, singapore, south korea. this is not simple wild market liberal capitalism. this is capitalism combined with an extremely strong, intelligent role of the state. so i think that should be our message to people that stronger role of the state is a reality today and the point is how to do it intelligently. people say united states, let's be serious. there was never a stronger state in the world than united states today with all the security. so what i'm saying is that it's more important to... convince people how? good social interventions are not just this stupid socialist way you ruin everything, but can be extremely efficient. and just to pursue this, apart from the usual stuff that we are also doing, these gay rights or whatever you want there,, to somehow convince people to see reality. first, neoliberalism. it's not a reality. i always emphasize it's an ideology. state interventions, state help, state organizations are absolutely crucial today. for example, i learned, i met some guys at some stupid round table. google, my god, google is closely connected to us state establishment. some people, my friends, describe google as private nsa, you know. so what i'm saying is that . here is how i would proceed. not big ideological debates, but first this awareness of a crisis. it's absolutely crucial to always bear in mind this today, especially small nations like yours and mine. you know, we live in dangerous times and we are negligible. like nothing will change if we disappear. but and the second point, this... precise struggles, you know, whatever, education, this, that or whatever to convince people this is so true. for example, i don't know how it is with you, but here again, it's interesting how some populist leftists but also conservatives hate. humanities and this general social education claiming this is totally useless and so on it means nothing no we should insist more and more that in today's dynamic capitalism more general education is needed and there are even statistical data confirming it so nicely like my son who now dreams of going to united states to study everybody is dreaming found some data where they claim that even in this more technological from economy to i don't know what, okay non non-human faculties. if you have some kind of general education, mathematics, more abstract, you are usually much better in your particular field than those who were directly educated in that field. this is, i think, one of the most important struggles today. like in europe we have now a catastrophe that bologna reform. when they we to streamline education towards what society really needs. but society doesn't know what it needs. it's changing so fast and so on, you know. so i'm here. it's a pretty desperate situation, no? but that's all we can do now, i think. the true revolution today would have been just to be a really efficient reformist. because even this you cannot do it today. that's the tragedy. this was for me the big lesson of syriza. i've written about it and people know it, but it's so tragic and important. do you remember? if you look closely at what shiriza demanded. 56 years ago. this would have been moderate social democracy, not even a radical social democracy, but moderate one. so don't we live in strange times in which when you advocate the same thing as... fifty years ago moderate democracy deed, you are perceived as a radical leftist today. so this is why i think that again we live in much more perverted, paradoxical times that to be again an authentic moderate reformist today is is already intolerable for global economy global capitalism but that's why i'm saying that the problems that we face are two today. it's global capital, open irrationalities and so on. and at the same time, again, all this what you mentioned, religious, ethnic reactions, because that's the global formula today. capitalism brings chaos, so we need the chinese are doing this. confucius is now a big hero. some kind of traditional wisdom to keep control. and the point is how to undermine this. what matters for me, when i say culture, i don't mean this sublime culture. i mean, and this is so important, this everyday thing, how women are effectively treated. how, you know, this everyday culture. this is where ideology is happening today and where ideology fascinates me. who cares about this big ideology? no, ideology is for me even how you go to the toilet, my boring example. you know, how you... treat others or what is considered acceptable or not how you speak and so on that's why although i almost sometimes don't think that i met have sympathized with donald trump. no, no, no, he is pig. but others are worse republicans. i claim that it's clear. did you see what he is recently saying? he was for higher minimal wage and so on and so on. now he i think he plays this clown to mask up the fact that he is almost half a liberal there. disgusting, i know, but listen listen to ted cruz and you will see what real horror is and all those other rep. and this is, i think, an extremely dangerous phenomenon because, you know, every democracy functions always when it's based on some unwritten rules which are not explicitly like in the united states you have democracy, but all of it was based on the you have two parties in a certain way you respect how you it was a well-known pattern and this pattern is now ruined by sanders and even more maybe in what will happen now with republican party and so on it can be totally chaotic the same thing is happening in the west you have till now what i described you know this moderate left moderate right exchanging this h put it, normal way for political regime to reproduce itself is disintegrating. and these moments are dangerous. they can give hope to us, but they can also. well, give hope to them, no
Interviewer
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Co-Panelist
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Interviewer
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Co-Panelist
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Interviewer
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Co-Panelist
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Interviewer
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Co-Panelist
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