Slavoj Zizek - Buddhism, happiness and sacrifice day 02 audience questions
Lecture · John Hillman ·
published 2023-04-23 · 0:49:52 · 5,945 words
with Cathy Newman, Bernard-Henri Lévy
the date above is when the video was uploaded, no recording date was found
religion-theologypsychoanalysishegel-dialecticsideologyphilosophy-generalsubjectivitycapitalismconsciousness-mindhistory
In an extended Q&A at Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, Žižek defends a 'third way' between pure immanence (Deleuze) and classical transcendence, reading Buddhist śūnyatā as the inconsistency or gap internal to immanence itself rather than a transcendent beyond. He connects this to Hegel's formula that truth equals the path towards truth, discusses Althusser's Christian origins and betrayal by his followers, critiques Lacan's opportunistic references to Eastern wisdom, argues that Lacanian desire and narcissism are mutually exclusive, and warns against corporate pseudo-Buddhism as ideological cover for financial capitalism.
every located moment in this recording, click one to read it
The ideas in it 14
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
Adorno's precise term for dialectics that refuses to sublate negation into positive synthesis; Žižek insists Adorno misreads Hegel and distinguishes his own use of negativity sharply from this framework.
as “gap of reality”
Žižek's 'third way': reality is neither complete pure immanence nor does it point to a higher realm; it contains an irreducible internal inconsistency, the gap is within reality, not between reality and something beyond.
A strand of Tibetan Buddhism, typified by its horrifying ritual music, where Nirvana is not peaceful but an unbearable tension, analogous to European mystics' (Eckhart, Böhme) accounts of self-division and pain within God.
as “the fall retroactively creates what it is the fall from”
Žižek's reformulation of the Judeo-Christian fall: there is no pre-lapsarian origin; the fall retroactively constitutes the ground it appears to have fallen from; everything begins with a fall.
as “happiness as necessary byproduct”
Drawing on Elster's rational-choice theory and Hegel, Žižek argues happiness is structurally missed when aimed at directly; it arises only as a byproduct of doing one's duty without thinking about happiness.
Žižek warns that when suffering is equated with happiness it can become ideologically dangerous: people use their suffering as a certificate of their own authenticity, giving totalitarian movements a handle.
Žižek's citation of Hegel's formula from the Phenomenology of Spirit: at the end of Hegel's Logic one receives not an ultimate Absolute Idea but a description of the method/path itself, the path is already the goal.
as “śūnyatā (emptiness / nothingness)”
Buddhist concept of absolute emptiness; Žižek argues against reading it as a transcendent category and sides with Suzuki that it names the absence of any substantial ground in the phenomenal flux, phenomena are all there is.
Žižek's reading of Buddhist śūnyatā: nothingness does not name a transcendent beyond but the absence of any ultimate ground in the immanent flux of phenomena, nothingness and immanence overlap.
as “community of fatherless orphans”
Žižek's characterisation of Islam's founding community as paradoxically fatherless, Mohammad an orphan, Bilal/Hagar's son as co-founding figure, subverting Islam's reputation as the paradigmatic religion of patriarchy.
In Žižek's Lacanian usage, desire is decentering and throws the subject out of itself (vulnerability, openness); narcissism is precisely a defense against desire, not its intensification, the two are mutually exclusive.
as “retroactive causality”
An effect that retroactively posits or reposits its own cause; Žižek treats this as the key dialectical form of causation, exemplified by the self that treats itself as the origin of the experiential flux it is actually an effect of.
The self is a secondary effect of experiential flux that mistakes itself for the origin of what it is in fact an effect of, the paradigm case of false retroactive causality, which Žižek links to Buddhist critique of the substantial self.
as “pseudo-Buddhism”
Corporate-capitalist appropriation of Buddhist ideas about appearances and non-attachment as ideological self-justification, executives earn billions yet tell themselves 'this doesn't really matter, only my inner truth counts.'
Stories he reaches for 4
Žižek cites Eliot's argument that each new work of art retroactively changes how the entire past appears, the positive mode of retroactive causality, showing the past is not fixed but altered by new events.
“each new work of art changes the entire past also. The past appears in a different way.”
Lévi-Strauss writes that Western Christianity and Eastern spirituality form an ideal complementary couple, but Arabs/Islam ruin this by serving as mere intermediaries; Žižek calls this the most racist notion of Arabs possible.
“Western Christianity, Judaism, whatever, and Eastern spirituality would be an ideal couple... But then this fucking Arabs enter with their Islam”
At the end of his foundational Rapport de Rome, Lacan quotes an ancient Indian text; Žižek interprets this as mere opportunistic fashionable flirtation, like Lacan's earlier pro-structuralist self-proclamation, not genuine engagement with Eastern thought.
“there is a quote from some India ancient... writing. I think he was flirting there. He simply opportunistically referred to it.”
After learning that Greek influence gave the Buddha a representational form, Žižek jokes that the Taliban were almost right to bomb those statues because 'negativity should remain pure', immediately clarifying that pure negativity means nothing behind the phenomena, not higher spirituality.
“That now you almost convinced me the Taliban were right to bomb those statues. Because the negativity should remain pure.”
Works invoked 14
Source of Hegel's formula 'truth equals the path towards truth', which Žižek calls the key to Hegel and connects to Buddhist ideas about path and destination being identical.
Less Than Nothing book
Self-reference: Žižek mentions quoting a radical Japanese Buddhist who read Buddhist experience as pure immanence in Less Than Nothing, though he cannot recall exactly where.
Science of Logic book
Its ending is discussed: rather than arriving at an ultimate Absolute Idea one gets a description of procedure/method, cited via Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks.
Žižek calls the passage where Eliot argues each new work of art changes the entire past 'for me the biggest passage'. Not named explicitly; identified as Eliot's essay on tradition from 1919 based on content.
Tristes Tropiques book
Contains what Žižek calls 'an incredible outburst' of anti-Arabism: Arabs are presented as mere disruptive intermediaries between an ideal Western-Eastern complementary couple.
Used as a warning example: its reception in Cultural Revolution China and Japanese mass-stadium performances illustrates how 'happiness in suffering' can be given a totalitarian twist.
Cited alongside Pour Marx as a key Althusserian text; notable precisely because Althusser admitted he never read Marx's Capital in full despite writing this book.
Negative Dialectics book
Source of Adorno's precise term 'negative dialectics'; Žižek distances his own use of negativity from this framework and implies Adorno misreads Hegel.
Lenin's notes on Hegel cited approvingly: Lenin feared the end of Hegel's Logic would be 'ultimate bullshit' but found it yields a description of method.
Cited as ideologically fake: its form presents Tibet as a distant exotic authenticity one must struggle to reach, the opposite of the Buddhist insight that the path is already the goal. Brad Pitt film.
Mentioned at the close as what Žižek wants to go watch, a self-deprecating joke ending the session, and an embodiment of the 'happiness as necessary byproduct' point.
Žižek dislikes it for 'scandalous reasons' (presumably Althusser's killing of his wife) but finds intellectually interesting Althusser's self-assessment, including his Capital admission.
Cited alongside Lire le Capital; the same observation about Althusser never reading Capital applies.
Lacan's foundational text ends with an opportunistic quote from ancient Indian writing; Žižek uses this as evidence of Lacan's fashionable flirtation with Eastern thought rather than genuine engagement.
People invoked 30
Agon Hamza positive
Žižek's Kosovo-Albanian friend; wrote a thesis on Althusser's Christian origins, which Žižek calls fascinating and regrets is not better known.
Claude Lévi-Strauss negative
Žižek calls a passage in Tristes Tropiques 'the most racist notion of Arab': Lévi-Strauss presents Arabs/Islam as mere disruptive intermediaries between an ideal Western-Eastern couple.
John Clark positive
Cited for arguing reification/objectivisation is a product of modern society; Žižek agrees but notes this insight is then appropriated and distorted by pseudo-Buddhist capitalists.
Plotinus negative
Represents neoplatonism, which Žižek dislikes: the schema of original divinity followed by fall/emanation, which Žižek opposes with his claim that everything begins with the fall.
Vladimir Lenin positive
Philosophical Notebooks cited: Lenin was fascinated by and afraid Hegel's Logic would end in 'ultimate bullshit', but found it yields a method, supporting Žižek's reading of Hegel.
Theodor W. Adorno negative
Introduced 'negative dialectics' as a precise term; Žižek insists Adorno's reading of Hegel, that negation ultimately serves positive reason, is wrong, and distinguishes his own use of negativity from it.
Jacques Lacan positive
Central theoretical framework (Lacanian desire vs. narcissism); Žižek says something 'critical about Lacan' regarding his opportunistic, fashionable references to Eastern wisdom in the Rapport de Rome, but otherwise follows him closely.
Tenzin Gyatso negative
Žižek is politically sympathetic to the Dalai Lama's situation and understands his happiness messaging, but critiques it as a 'recruitment device' that conceals authentic Buddhism's embrace of suffering as its real subject.
Louis Althusser positive
Žižek finds Althusser's Christian origins fascinating; compares him to Christ betrayed by all his followers; finds his autobiography interesting on his own theory despite personal scandals; credibly admits to never having read Capital in full.
Gilles Deleuze negative
Represents the position of pure immanence that Žižek rejects as his own; Žižek also dislikes Deleuze's Spinoza-influenced notion of God. Has a friendly conflict with Agamben who shares this Deleuzian position.
Mulla Sadra positive
16th-century Iranian philosopher (Žižek forgot the name initially, audience supplied it); being rediscovered as a 'mega figure'; Žižek warns against simply re-appropriating him into the 'oriental tradition.' ASR: name confirmed by audience prompt.
Étienne Balibar negative
Became angry when Žižek linked him to Althusser; Balibar himself rejected his own Althusserian phase.
Giorgio Agamben negative
Žižek had a 'friendly conflict' with Agamben, who claims in Deleuzian fashion that every image of transcendence is an illusory projection of immanence; Žižek disagrees, positing an irreducible gap within immanence itself.
His 1930s Paris lectures attended by Lacan, Corbin, and Breton, mentioned as a possible transmission nexus for Eastern thought into European philosophy.
Benedictus de Spinoza negative
Mentioned as the philosopher Deleuze admires; Spinoza's non-personal God (God as nature) is the model for the pure immanence position Žižek rejects.
T. S. Eliot positive
Conservative 'but not a total idiot'; Žižek calls the passage on each new work changing the entire past 'for me the biggest passage', using it as the positive mode of retroactive causality.
Averroes positive
Referred to by Aquinas as 'the Commentator'; cited as evidence that Arabs were creative transformers of philosophical tradition, not mere intermediaries. Transcript has 'Avicenna'; context confirms.
Mladen Dolar positive
Cited as having written on Democritus, specifically the reading that nothingness is the very core of the atom, not an empty void surrounding it.
Democritus positive
Pre-Socratic; his atoms-and-nothingness read by Žižek (via Dolar) as nothingness being the core of the atom rather than empty surrounding space, cited to support Buddhist nothingness as immanent.
D. T. Suzuki positive
Žižek agrees with Suzuki's interpretation of śūnyatā as the absence of any substantial ground in phenomena, not a transcendent category beyond phenomena.
Islamic mystic whose doctrines on the world of imagination were made widely known by Henry Corbin; Lacan mentioned him in a seminar. Cited in context of possible Eastern roots of Lacanian thought.
Attended Kojève's 1930s Paris lectures; made Ibn Arabi's doctrines widely known in the West.
Jacques Rancière negative
Identified as the first to betray Althusser, via 'The Lesson of Althusser'.
Jon Elster positive
Invoked via rational choice theory's concept of 'necessary byproduct' to explain why directly aiming at happiness causes you to miss it.
Joan Copjec positive
Mentioned as writing a long-in-progress book on Mulla Sadra, the rediscovered 16th-century Iranian philosopher.
Meister Eckhart positive
Among the European mystics Žižek 'likes'; cited for talking about endless self-division and pain within God himself, paralleling the dark undercurrent Žižek identifies in Tibetan Buddhism.
Jakob Böhme positive
European mystic cited alongside Eckhart for the idea that the true gap is not between God and man but within God itself.
Warren Montag positive
Žižek sincerely admires Montag for attempting the 'impossible', bringing together Deleuze, Althusser and Hegel, refusing their mutual incompatibility. Calls it fascinating.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel positive
Central throughout: Hegel's formula 'truth = path toward truth', his Logic ending in method not Absolute, retroactive causality. Žižek consistently defends Hegel against misreadings.
Mentioned to illustrate Arab philosophers as more than intermediaries: Aquinas calls Aristotle 'the Philosopher' and Avicenna 'the Commentator', showing Arabs transformed rather than merely transmitted philosophical tradition.
Transcript 47 turns
Slavoj Žižek
Okay, first, just to emphasize this, negative dialectics is a precise term introduced by Adorno. And when I speak about negativity, I don’t mean that negative dialectics. The whole frame of Adorno, which goes in this, that with Hegel you have all the negation but at the end it serves positive reason and so on. They are... I think this is a wrong reading of Hegel. But let me go on with this positivity and so on, Deleuze. First this link is established by some of my Buddhist critics themselves. And in an abstract sense, I think they are right. I think that the reading of Buddhism as a negative experience, negative in the sense of you renounce reality, you you enter another higher spiritual domain and so on, is precisely a wrong reading of authentic Buddhism. I believe in such a thing as authentic Buddhism. You know, we already project, I think, our Western notion of transcendence as higher spiritual experience, there is another realm and so on into Buddhism. No, they are right, those of my critics, where they claim that Buddhism just phenomenalizes the world, inclusive of ourselves, deprives all objects of their substantial identity. And for a radical Buddhist, this idea of spiritual discipline where you exempt yourself from external reality is precisely the worst egotism. It’s precisely you exempt yourself as something unique. So again, as I quote this in some of my books, I forgot which one, I think Less Than Nothing, there is for example, a Japanese friend drew my attention to it, and I forgot his name, a radical Japanese Buddhist from the early 20th century, who read Buddhist experience not as detaching yourself from the world, but as pure immanence. For a true Buddhist, when you try to dominate the world, you do this always from this distance, Cartesian distance: I am here, at a distance, reality is out there waiting for me to be dominated, mediated by my concepts and so on and so on. Buddhism means on the contrary full immersion into the world. It tries to abolish the gap. But I think that precisely this gap is irreducible. So my position is not that of absolute immanence. This is the position not so much of Buddhism but most of Deleuze, and some I had a friendly conflict once with Giorgio Agamben about this. Agamben claimed that in a Deleuzian way, that every image of transcendence is an illusory projection of immanence. Something is wrong here immanently and you, to account for this, you project it into an external cause. That’s also basically, that’s why Deleuze likes Spinoza, Spinoza's notion of God, not God as nature, but God as the personal transcendent God. So what I think is not that there is another transcendent reality. I try to find a third way here: not pure immanence and not everything that we experience is obviously not all there is. But this doesn’t mean that there is somewhere else a higher reality. It means just that there is a gap of this reality, that this reality has a gap, is inconsistent and so on. That would be my simple answer, that we have to undermine this very opposition between immanence and transcendence. And some Tibetan friends, this may interest you, claimed to me that there is a dark undercurrent even in Buddhist experience, where what needs to be done is done. Which means that Nirvana is not conceived as a state of eternal peace, but an incredibly, at the same time an incredibly brutal unbearable tension. They almost speak like those European mystics that I like, from Meister Eckhart to Jakob Böhme, who talk about an endless self-division and pain in God himself. So that the true gap is not between God and man but within God itself. And you know what was my nice surprise: we all know those, for me at least, I thought this is my European Eurocentric misperception. If you listen to those dark dark Tibetan Buddhist instrumental pieces, those trumpets and basses, and my idea was always: [unintelligible], this is not a sublime experience, this is the utmost horror. And they told me: yes, it is. Ah, if this is true, then I’m for Buddhism. I just want to put it in very Eurocentric terms: to posit the origin of evil, split and so on into the very heart of so-called divinity itself. There already things go wrong. Okay, can I bring Lawrence in? I’m going to try making presenter, I don’t know if that opens the mic. He’s got a question about Greco-Buddhism. Sounds interesting, because I didn’t hear about it. I’m not sure if you can hear me. Yeah, we do. Hello, thank you so much. I’ve been trying to revise this question as you were speaking because you were touching on it then. You mentioned it as a Eurocentric answer, and I was sort of touching on the notion of Greco-Buddhism and how... What is Greco-Buddhism? Teach me, please. I don’t know, I’m an idiot here. Well, you know, after Alexander the Great found his way towards the Indus or whatever, he left a diaspora of people and they sort of ended up being a solvent almost for early Buddhist missionaries. So they sort of carried with them a Hellenic influence, you know, and had Hellenic artwork and iconography. But then... And where did this take place? In India or in Greece? In Taxila, in Bactria, so Afghanistan, modern-day Afghanistan. Oh my God, that’s interesting. Yes, go on please. And through this sort of process of osmosis, for instance, one of the first Buddhist missionaries to China, who then kind of led onto Zen Buddhism, was a Greek ethnic... ethnic Greek Buddhist from Afghanistan who was, you know, left behind in the diaspora. And around this time Greek sculpture art came into
Okay, first, just to emphasize this, negative dialectics is a precise term introduced by Adorno. And when I speak about negativity, I don’t mean that negative dialectics. The whole frame of Adorno, which goes in this, that with Hegel you have all the negation but at the end it serves positive reason and so on. They are... I think this is a wrong reading of Hegel. But let me go on with this positivity and so on, Deleuze. First this link is established by some of my Buddhist critics themselves. And in an abstract sense, I think they are right. I think that the reading of Buddhism as a negative experience, negative in the sense of you renounce reality, you you enter another higher spiritual domain and so on, is precisely a wrong reading of authentic Buddhism. I believe in such a thing as authentic Buddhism. You know, we already project, I think, our Western notion of transcendence as higher spiritual experience, there is another realm and so on into Buddhism. No, they are right, those of my critics, where they claim that Buddhism just phenomenalizes the world, inclusive of ourselves, deprives all objects of their substantial identity. And for a radical Buddhist, this idea of spiritual discipline where you exempt yourself from external reality is precisely the worst egotism. It’s precisely you exempt yourself as something unique. So again, as I quote this in some of my books, I forgot which one, I think Less Than Nothing, there is for example, a Japanese friend drew my attention to it, and I forgot his name, a radical Japanese Buddhist from the early 20th century, who read Buddhist experience not as detaching yourself from the world, but as pure immanence. For a true Buddhist, when you try to dominate the world, you do this always from this distance, Cartesian distance: I am here, at a distance, reality is out there waiting for me to be dominated, mediated by my concepts and so on and so on. Buddhism means on the contrary full immersion into the world. It tries to abolish the gap. But I think that precisely this gap is irreducible. So my position is not that of absolute immanence. This is the position not so much of Buddhism but most of Deleuze, and some I had a friendly conflict once with Giorgio Agamben about this. Agamben claimed that in a Deleuzian way, that every image of transcendence is an illusory projection of immanence. Something is wrong here immanently and you, to account for this, you project it into an external cause. That’s also basically, that’s why Deleuze likes Spinoza, Spinoza's notion of God, not God as nature, but God as the personal transcendent God. So what I think is not that there is another transcendent reality. I try to find a third way here: not pure immanence and not everything that we experience is obviously not all there is. But this doesn’t mean that there is somewhere else a higher reality. It means just that there is a gap of this reality, that this reality has a gap, is inconsistent and so on. That would be my simple answer, that we have to undermine this very opposition between immanence and transcendence. And some Tibetan friends, this may interest you, claimed to me that there is a dark undercurrent even in Buddhist experience, where what needs to be done is done. Which means that Nirvana is not conceived as a state of eternal peace, but an incredibly, at the same time an incredibly brutal unbearable tension. They almost speak like those European mystics that I like, from Meister Eckhart to Jakob Böhme, who talk about an endless self-division and pain in God himself. So that the true gap is not between God and man but within God itself. And you know what was my nice surprise: we all know those, for me at least, I thought this is my European Eurocentric misperception. If you listen to those dark dark Tibetan Buddhist instrumental pieces, those trumpets and basses, and my idea was always: [unintelligible], this is not a sublime experience, this is the utmost horror. And they told me: yes, it is. Ah, if this is true, then I’m for Buddhism. I just want to put it in very Eurocentric terms: to posit the origin of evil, split and so on into the very heart of so-called divinity itself. There already things go wrong. Okay, can I bring Lawrence in? I’m going to try making presenter, I don’t know if that opens the mic. He’s got a question about Greco-Buddhism. Sounds interesting, because I didn’t hear about it. I’m not sure if you can hear me. Yeah, we do. Hello, thank you so much. I’ve been trying to revise this question as you were speaking because you were touching on it then. You mentioned it as a Eurocentric answer, and I was sort of touching on the notion of Greco-Buddhism and how... What is Greco-Buddhism? Teach me, please. I don’t know, I’m an idiot here. Well, you know, after Alexander the Great found his way towards the Indus or whatever, he left a diaspora of people and they sort of ended up being a solvent almost for early Buddhist missionaries. So they sort of carried with them a Hellenic influence, you know, and had Hellenic artwork and iconography. But then... And where did this take place? In India or in Greece? In Taxila, in Bactria, so Afghanistan, modern-day Afghanistan. Oh my God, that’s interesting. Yes, go on please. And through this sort of process of osmosis, for instance, one of the first Buddhist missionaries to China, who then kind of led onto Zen Buddhism, was a Greek ethnic... ethnic Greek Buddhist from Afghanistan who was, you know, left behind in the diaspora. And around this time Greek sculpture art came into
Cathy Newman
contact with India, and in India at this time the Buddhists
contact with India, and in India at this time the Buddhists
Slavoj Žižek
weren't representing the Buddha in a pictorial
weren't representing the Buddha in a pictorial
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form in any of their artwork.
form in any of their artwork.
Cathy Newman
And it's argued
And it's argued
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that it was this influence of the Greeks with their notion of form and, you know, sculpture who sort of convinced the Buddhists that they might want to start, you know, employing this as an ideological tool or as a map. So you are here empirically claiming it's very interesting that all these wonderful statues, Buddha sitting down with this benevolent smile, that this came after the Greek influence? Yes, this is what is argued for, and for instance in Afghanistan, those two huge statues of the Buddha that were exploded by the Taliban in I think it was, inside of them you could get inside of them and, a bit like the Statue of Liberty, and they contained iconography, Buddhist art, Buddhist kind of stories, but in the Greek artistic style. What interests me a lot about this is this
that it was this influence of the Greeks with their notion of form and, you know, sculpture who sort of convinced the Buddhists that they might want to start, you know, employing this as an ideological tool or as a map. So you are here empirically claiming it's very interesting that all these wonderful statues, Buddha sitting down with this benevolent smile, that this came after the Greek influence? Yes, this is what is argued for, and for instance in Afghanistan, those two huge statues of the Buddha that were exploded by the Taliban in I think it was, inside of them you could get inside of them and, a bit like the Statue of Liberty, and they contained iconography, Buddhist art, Buddhist kind of stories, but in the Greek artistic style. What interests me a lot about this is this
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notion of the Greeks talking to
notion of the Greeks talking to
Slavoj Žižek
these Indians
these Indians
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about this notion of negativity, this notion of not representing the Buddha, not representing that idol, and how perhaps this could be one of the early kind of communication points of negative theology. You spoke about that term before. Wait, wait, let me clarify something because you are confusing me. Why isn't it, why, but didn't the Greeks precisely do the opposite to obfuscate the negativity in some sense? Why do you think the Greeks brought negativity? Well, no, not so much, I think perhaps it was the opposite direction. I believe perhaps the Greeks were moving sculpture and form kind of one way and perhaps the Eastern thought was moving negativity the other way. And it finds maybe expression in Plotinus or Maimonides, you know, some of these
about this notion of negativity, this notion of not representing the Buddha, not representing that idol, and how perhaps this could be one of the early kind of communication points of negative theology. You spoke about that term before. Wait, wait, let me clarify something because you are confusing me. Why isn't it, why, but didn't the Greeks precisely do the opposite to obfuscate the negativity in some sense? Why do you think the Greeks brought negativity? Well, no, not so much, I think perhaps it was the opposite direction. I believe perhaps the Greeks were moving sculpture and form kind of one way and perhaps the Eastern thought was moving negativity the other way. And it finds maybe expression in Plotinus or Maimonides, you know, some of these
Slavoj Žižek
people who end up being important in Judeo-Christian thought. And that made me ask the question whether or not this collapses
people who end up being important in Judeo-Christian thought. And that made me ask the question whether or not this collapses
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the distance between Buddhism and psychoanalysis somewhat given that... Yeah, but you know what would be my basic point here: that's why I don’t like neoplatonism and so on. I think to put it in very simple terms that all this... I will simplify to the zero level: all this point of, you know, some original divinity and then you have the fall. My point in a very simplistic way is that everything begins with a fall. There is nothing before the fall. The fall retroactively creates what it is the fall from. And I think this came out only with Judeo-Christian tradition. I never... if I were to make a choice here, I would... now I will say something horrible, I hope you will get my joke. Please do. That now you almost convinced me the Taliban were right to bomb those statues. Because, you know, the
the distance between Buddhism and psychoanalysis somewhat given that... Yeah, but you know what would be my basic point here: that's why I don’t like neoplatonism and so on. I think to put it in very simple terms that all this... I will simplify to the zero level: all this point of, you know, some original divinity and then you have the fall. My point in a very simplistic way is that everything begins with a fall. There is nothing before the fall. The fall retroactively creates what it is the fall from. And I think this came out only with Judeo-Christian tradition. I never... if I were to make a choice here, I would... now I will say something horrible, I hope you will get my joke. Please do. That now you almost convinced me the Taliban were right to bomb those statues. Because, you know, the
Slavoj Žižek
negativity should remain pure. But again, the point is what is in negativity? Not because it’s too pure a spirituality, a spirituality that we cannot ever approach, but because negativity means for me that there is nothing
negativity should remain pure. But again, the point is what is in negativity? Not because it’s too pure a spirituality, a spirituality that we cannot ever approach, but because negativity means for me that there is nothing
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behind it. Buddhism here had the right insight: Nirvana is not like a veil hiding some even higher divinity beyond our representation and so on and so on. There are phenomena and there is nothing behind, beneath, whatever, the phenomena. My problem is only: is this nothing a peaceful nothing or is this nothing the nothing of a self-split divided horror? I see, I see. Another quick question to add on, thank you for that: is you mentioned Althusser towards the end and I'm influenced
behind it. Buddhism here had the right insight: Nirvana is not like a veil hiding some even higher divinity beyond our representation and so on and so on. There are phenomena and there is nothing behind, beneath, whatever, the phenomena. My problem is only: is this nothing a peaceful nothing or is this nothing the nothing of a self-split divided horror? I see, I see. Another quick question to add on, thank you for that: is you mentioned Althusser towards the end and I'm influenced
Slavoj Žižek
a lot by Warren Montag and his take on Althusser and he... You know why I admired Warren Montag? You talk about him, no? Warren Montag. You know why? Because he didn’t yet convince me but I follow his work. He is observed by my KGB secret agents here, because he tries to do the impossible, and this always fascinates me. Montag tries to bring together, to cut a long story short, Deleuze, Althusser and Hegel. He doesn’t accept this incompatibility, you know. Yes. That’s what I sincerely admire in his work. Well, what I thought was really fascinating and sort of analogous to what you’re talking about was how he describes Althusser’s sort of forgetting, unremembering of his Judeo-Christian background as an early... Who? Whom? Whom? Louis Althusser as he... Yeah, yeah, this is very interesting because you know that it’s literally forgetting. Because do you know that Althusser began as a Christian, almost theologist? Yes, and he was getting rejected from Christian journals and wondering why that was. But my... my Kosovo-Albanian friend Agon Hamza, I’m sorry it’s not better known, wrote a thesis precisely on this, on Althusserian Christian origins. I mean it’s fascinating, but just to round off... You know what makes me so sad? How Althusser was really like Christ,
a lot by Warren Montag and his take on Althusser and he... You know why I admired Warren Montag? You talk about him, no? Warren Montag. You know why? Because he didn’t yet convince me but I follow his work. He is observed by my KGB secret agents here, because he tries to do the impossible, and this always fascinates me. Montag tries to bring together, to cut a long story short, Deleuze, Althusser and Hegel. He doesn’t accept this incompatibility, you know. Yes. That’s what I sincerely admire in his work. Well, what I thought was really fascinating and sort of analogous to what you’re talking about was how he describes Althusser’s sort of forgetting, unremembering of his Judeo-Christian background as an early... Who? Whom? Whom? Louis Althusser as he... Yeah, yeah, this is very interesting because you know that it’s literally forgetting. Because do you know that Althusser began as a Christian, almost theologist? Yes, and he was getting rejected from Christian journals and wondering why that was. But my... my Kosovo-Albanian friend Agon Hamza, I’m sorry it’s not better known, wrote a thesis precisely on this, on Althusserian Christian origins. I mean it’s fascinating, but just to round off... You know what makes me so sad? How Althusser was really like Christ,
unknown
betrayed practically by all his followers. It began with Rancière, the lesson of Althusser. Then now, I mentioned Althusser the last time I met him years ago to Balibar, and he was quite angry at me. Like, why do you link me with
betrayed practically by all his followers. It began with Rancière, the lesson of Althusser. Then now, I mentioned Althusser the last time I met him years ago to Balibar, and he was quite angry at me. Like, why do you link me with
Slavoj Žižek
that? Why do you reduce me to that Marxist phase and so on? Balibar by himself, he even rejected himself, did he not? Althusser, and said, denied it was his own work and... Yes, his although I don’t like them for scandalous reasons, his autobiography book, but it’s very interesting what he says there about his theory, Althusser. You know that he admits, which is obvious to anyone who reads his Lire le Capital and Pour Marx, to cut a long story short, Althusser never read The Capital of Marx in its entirety. You believe him, you believe him when he says that? Absolutely! Could I
that? Why do you reduce me to that Marxist phase and so on? Balibar by himself, he even rejected himself, did he not? Althusser, and said, denied it was his own work and... Yes, his although I don’t like them for scandalous reasons, his autobiography book, but it’s very interesting what he says there about his theory, Althusser. You know that he admits, which is obvious to anyone who reads his Lire le Capital and Pour Marx, to cut a long story short, Althusser never read The Capital of Marx in its entirety. You believe him, you believe him when he says that? Absolutely! Could I
unknown
hear from... okay, you’re right. Esther, let’s not lose time. Yes, can I bring Victoria in? Who’s had her hand up for a while. My apologies, yeah. Please, yes. Victoria? Are you there? Is she still there? Okay, in the meantime, I’ve got two questions. So, Casper Dylan asks... oh Casper, did you want to come in on the microphone? I can try and
hear from... okay, you’re right. Esther, let’s not lose time. Yes, can I bring Victoria in? Who’s had her hand up for a while. My apologies, yeah. Please, yes. Victoria? Are you there? Is she still there? Okay, in the meantime, I’ve got two questions. So, Casper Dylan asks... oh Casper, did you want to come in on the microphone? I can try and
Slavoj Žižek
enable that. Ah yes please. Can you hear me? Yes. Yeah, I have a question about the Dalai Lama quotes about happiness because I think that they are perhaps not fully... there’s several
enable that. Ah yes please. Can you hear me? Yes. Yeah, I have a question about the Dalai Lama quotes about happiness because I think that they are perhaps not fully... there’s several
unknown
interpretations but the first interpretation is that it’s not maybe authentic Buddhism,
interpretations but the first interpretation is that it’s not maybe authentic Buddhism,
Slavoj Žižek
although okay, it’s coming from Dalai Lama. But that in some sense these quotes are a little bit to... let’s say recruit people to Buddhism but they are not what
although okay, it’s coming from Dalai Lama. But that in some sense these quotes are a little bit to... let’s say recruit people to Buddhism but they are not what
unknown
you will actually... I had the same suspicion. Because, you know,
you will actually... I had the same suspicion. Because, you know,
Slavoj Žižek
I noticed in a couple of his books that it’s as if to attract people he usually begins, not even the main text, the foreword or whatever, with this. It’s like saying: guys, don’t be afraid, I don’t want to spoil your life, you know. But nonetheless, I go here to the end and I claim my definition of life is pursuit of unhappiness. Why do we... this is... and I think I agree with you here: if your point is that I can well
I noticed in a couple of his books that it’s as if to attract people he usually begins, not even the main text, the foreword or whatever, with this. It’s like saying: guys, don’t be afraid, I don’t want to spoil your life, you know. But nonetheless, I go here to the end and I claim my definition of life is pursuit of unhappiness. Why do we... this is... and I think I agree with you here: if your point is that I can well
unknown
imagine a certain kind of radical Buddhism which would accept this. That precisely the biggest illusion of our life, of this common will of desire logic, is not that we always
imagine a certain kind of radical Buddhism which would accept this. That precisely the biggest illusion of our life, of this common will of desire logic, is not that we always
Slavoj Žižek
miss happiness, but the mistake is already the search for happiness itself. And I can even put it in more Western... Jon Elster, rational choice theory or even in Hegelian terms: that happiness is what some theories of action define as a necessary byproduct. In the sense that if you aim at it you will miss it. If you search... it’s like dignity. If you ask yourself I want to act in a dignified life, you will appear an idiot who is desperately trying to act with dignity. So that
miss happiness, but the mistake is already the search for happiness itself. And I can even put it in more Western... Jon Elster, rational choice theory or even in Hegelian terms: that happiness is what some theories of action define as a necessary byproduct. In the sense that if you aim at it you will miss it. If you search... it’s like dignity. If you ask yourself I want to act in a dignified life, you will appear an idiot who is desperately trying to act with dignity. So that
unknown
this is for me the truth of it: that you begin with saying yeah, yeah, happiness, but then
this is for me the truth of it: that you begin with saying yeah, yeah, happiness, but then
Slavoj Žižek
the conclusion should be that the only way to be moderately happy is to do your duty and don’t think about happiness. Exactly. I mean even I don’t mean this
the conclusion should be that the only way to be moderately happy is to do your duty and don’t think about happiness. Exactly. I mean even I don’t mean this
unknown
any high beauty, but listen to... I go back to my now to my tasteless example of being in love and so on. Achieving what you want: intense sex with the beloved person and so on. It’s very intense, beautiful.
any high beauty, but listen to... I go back to my now to my tasteless example of being in love and so on. Achieving what you want: intense sex with the beloved person and so on. It’s very intense, beautiful.
Bernard-Henri Lévy
But can
But can
unknown
you
you
Bernard-Henri Lévy
really call it happiness? It’s something incredibly intense and from the standpoint of happiness, the nice moment is afterwards when you can say okay, I did it, now I can take a rest, you know what I mean? Here I think an intelligent, really radical Buddhist would take this path. I tend to, so then, I tend to agree with you. And I don’t... and this is not a criticism of Dalai Lama. I understand him. That’s why I talked yesterday, you remember, so much about this showing the tongue and so on, you know. Because what I really worry is that this will be terribly exploited by the enemies of Tibet. Probably
really call it happiness? It’s something incredibly intense and from the standpoint of happiness, the nice moment is afterwards when you can say okay, I did it, now I can take a rest, you know what I mean? Here I think an intelligent, really radical Buddhist would take this path. I tend to, so then, I tend to agree with you. And I don’t... and this is not a criticism of Dalai Lama. I understand him. That’s why I talked yesterday, you remember, so much about this showing the tongue and so on, you know. Because what I really worry is that this will be terribly exploited by the enemies of Tibet. Probably
Slavoj Žižek
the Chinese planted it. We are all aware that Tibetan resistance is embodied in Dalai Lama. If you erase from the picture Dalai Lama, it’s... it’s over, it’s all based on it. So I... I totally agree with you here. And I even suspect that within this happiness that he says, it’s actually suffering hidden as happiness because if you go back to the original Buddha, right? The Buddha was someone who was a prince, who was happy, and then when he started seeing suffering he got interested in suffering, he got curious about suffering, he started to investigate suffering and the whole journey of the Buddha is finding the right kind of suffering, but this suffering is called happiness. Like, it’s precisely this [unintelligible] that the greatest suffering is to be happy or with Buddha. Yeah, here I get it. But here I would say we are come... they at least in the West, I don’t know how this economy works within... if there is a difference, I don’t know if there is a difference between our typical and so-called oriental typical psychic attitude. But you know, for us in the West, celebrating suffering as happiness can also be read in an extremely dangerous totalitarian way. For example, I read a wonderful analysis of the universal international impact of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. Especially the last fourth part with those... that song and so on. And it’s interesting that even some extreme left-wingers liked it. For example, did you know that Beethoven's Ninth was the only piece of Western classical music that was performed in China, so I read, even in the time of Cultural Revolution? But at the same time Japanese were obsessed by it. So there’s even, you can find it on YouTube I think, a version at a stadium people or even I don’t know, singing it. But they liked precisely this idea of happiness in suffering, in pain. You know, they give it this, as it were, totalitarian twist. Yes, there is always pain, suffering in happiness, but still don’t identify them in the sense that suffering is in itself the proof of happiness. Because as I quoted that example, many people give their suffering as a proof that they are authentic in some sense, no? So things get complex, you know. Victoria, are you able to come in? I know you've been waiting for a while. Yeah, I think there is a problem connection because I hear from time to time some moaning. Okay, while we wait, I'll put a question
the Chinese planted it. We are all aware that Tibetan resistance is embodied in Dalai Lama. If you erase from the picture Dalai Lama, it’s... it’s over, it’s all based on it. So I... I totally agree with you here. And I even suspect that within this happiness that he says, it’s actually suffering hidden as happiness because if you go back to the original Buddha, right? The Buddha was someone who was a prince, who was happy, and then when he started seeing suffering he got interested in suffering, he got curious about suffering, he started to investigate suffering and the whole journey of the Buddha is finding the right kind of suffering, but this suffering is called happiness. Like, it’s precisely this [unintelligible] that the greatest suffering is to be happy or with Buddha. Yeah, here I get it. But here I would say we are come... they at least in the West, I don’t know how this economy works within... if there is a difference, I don’t know if there is a difference between our typical and so-called oriental typical psychic attitude. But you know, for us in the West, celebrating suffering as happiness can also be read in an extremely dangerous totalitarian way. For example, I read a wonderful analysis of the universal international impact of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. Especially the last fourth part with those... that song and so on. And it’s interesting that even some extreme left-wingers liked it. For example, did you know that Beethoven's Ninth was the only piece of Western classical music that was performed in China, so I read, even in the time of Cultural Revolution? But at the same time Japanese were obsessed by it. So there’s even, you can find it on YouTube I think, a version at a stadium people or even I don’t know, singing it. But they liked precisely this idea of happiness in suffering, in pain. You know, they give it this, as it were, totalitarian twist. Yes, there is always pain, suffering in happiness, but still don’t identify them in the sense that suffering is in itself the proof of happiness. Because as I quoted that example, many people give their suffering as a proof that they are authentic in some sense, no? So things get complex, you know. Victoria, are you able to come in? I know you've been waiting for a while. Yeah, I think there is a problem connection because I hear from time to time some moaning. Okay, while we wait, I'll put a question
Bernard-Henri Lévy
from the chat. Fabian Lawrence says, isn't there a notion in Buddhism where true X, love etc. can only emerge through incessant practice? In a way the gap is always there but it is mediated through practice, not intellectually. What do you think of that? I see what this is aiming at, but I'm just afraid now I try to be anti-Eurocentric, you know. Because for... what I am, I think if there is a great thing in Buddhism, it is precisely that it opposes this typical Western logic of the goal as something out
from the chat. Fabian Lawrence says, isn't there a notion in Buddhism where true X, love etc. can only emerge through incessant practice? In a way the gap is always there but it is mediated through practice, not intellectually. What do you think of that? I see what this is aiming at, but I'm just afraid now I try to be anti-Eurocentric, you know. Because for... what I am, I think if there is a great thing in Buddhism, it is precisely that it opposes this typical Western logic of the goal as something out
Slavoj Žižek
there difficult to access, you are never there and so on and so on. That’s why I quoted this in one of my books: I read a wonderful from a Tibetan Buddhist critique of the Western obsession with Buddhism. We talked about kitsch, about that Brad Pitt movie Seven Years in Tibet or what. And he said the form of the movie is a fake because insofar as Buddhism, sorry, Tibet is presented as an authentic country and so on, it’s something that you have to difficult to reach, cross Himalaya, it’s out there hidden, you know. And he said that this my Tibetan friend, that this is a total fake. For them, ultimate wisdom is not something out there you are never sure you can reach it or not. This idea of hard road to paradise or whatever, it’s very foreign to them. This is also opposite already to Buddha’s insight. His point, maybe even not so good, was never: so let’s radically change society. No, it’s always you have to change. Don’t go into external causes and so on and so on. So that’s maybe I misunderstand it and don’t know enough about it. But I think that the more proper Buddhist answer, even authentic, would have been: okay, we are never there, we approach endlessly. But then in some sense you have to add that: but this path towards the ideal already is the ideal. Don’t expect any big change at the end. This echoes in some way, I cannot elaborate it now, even with Hegel’s big formula from Phenomenology of Spirit how truth equals the path towards truth. Truth is not something elusive that you are trying to arrive at. That’s why quite logically, this is for me the key to Hegel: at the end of Hegel’s
there difficult to access, you are never there and so on and so on. That’s why I quoted this in one of my books: I read a wonderful from a Tibetan Buddhist critique of the Western obsession with Buddhism. We talked about kitsch, about that Brad Pitt movie Seven Years in Tibet or what. And he said the form of the movie is a fake because insofar as Buddhism, sorry, Tibet is presented as an authentic country and so on, it’s something that you have to difficult to reach, cross Himalaya, it’s out there hidden, you know. And he said that this my Tibetan friend, that this is a total fake. For them, ultimate wisdom is not something out there you are never sure you can reach it or not. This idea of hard road to paradise or whatever, it’s very foreign to them. This is also opposite already to Buddha’s insight. His point, maybe even not so good, was never: so let’s radically change society. No, it’s always you have to change. Don’t go into external causes and so on and so on. So that’s maybe I misunderstand it and don’t know enough about it. But I think that the more proper Buddhist answer, even authentic, would have been: okay, we are never there, we approach endlessly. But then in some sense you have to add that: but this path towards the ideal already is the ideal. Don’t expect any big change at the end. This echoes in some way, I cannot elaborate it now, even with Hegel’s big formula from Phenomenology of Spirit how truth equals the path towards truth. Truth is not something elusive that you are trying to arrive at. That’s why quite logically, this is for me the key to Hegel: at the end of Hegel’s
Cathy Newman
logic, you think you will get some ultimate adequate absolute idea. No, what
logic, you think you will get some ultimate adequate absolute idea. No, what
Slavoj Žižek
you get is just the description of the path, a kind of a method. This Lenin was already fascinated by this. Lenin admits in his Philosophical
you get is just the description of the path, a kind of a method. This Lenin was already fascinated by this. Lenin admits in his Philosophical
Cathy Newman
Notebooks or whatever, he was afraid that you will get some ultimate bullshit at the end of logic, you know. But no, you get just that description of a procedure. So the ultimate again Buddhist point is to see that you think you
Notebooks or whatever, he was afraid that you will get some ultimate bullshit at the end of logic, you know. But no, you get just that description of a procedure. So the ultimate again Buddhist point is to see that you think you
Slavoj Žižek
are still on the way, but you are in reality already there. That’s all I can say now. Yeah. SARB has has made a point. So, to clarify the notion of Buddhism as pure immanence: how is this reconcilable with Sunyata, absolute nothingness? I believe Suzuki suggested that absolute nothingness is the true nature of all things and the ultimate reality. And it seems to be that this is something of a transcendental category since it has to be understood relative to... I'm sorry. Here I agree with precisely Suzuki that I quoted. This I think is close to probably Western misreading of Buddhism. Because we have this gap: immanence, transcendence, and then, you know, even if it's nothing there’s something beyond. I am tempted to be more convinced by passages that I quoted from Suzuki, from that guy Clark and so on, John Clark and so on, that nothingness is the very nothingness means no absolute substantial entity. There is no ultimate ground and so on. There is no foundation of it. Nothingness means that we have this interrelational flux of phenomena and they are the only reality we have. So that I I think it would be very nice to read nothingness as... Ah, Victoria is now here. Sorry. Can you get or I will back to answering this question. Nothingness is for me the how should I put it, the nothingness of immanence itself. It's that, it's this phenomenon, that phenomenon, and there is no ultimate ground. The nothingness is the ground in which every... you know who already knew this in Europe, in totally different context: Mladen Dolar and some French guys also wrote about this: readers of Democritus. When Democritus speaks about nothingness and atoms. For Hegel knew this: we shouldn’t read this as empty space and then small balls of atoms jumping there. No, nothingness is the very core of atom. Atom is a form of nothingness. It's it's much it gets much more paradoxical here. So it's absolutely crucial again not to mis- to read nothingness as as negative category, otherness, transcendence and so on. Nothingness and immanence overlap, but sense. Immanence is the immanence of fleeting non-substantial phenomena. And naturally you ask: but these phenomena must be grounded in something more stable, deeper. No, they are not and this is nothingness. In this way you don't lose phenomena for a higher reality. You accept phenomena as such. I tend to give this reading which is why incidentally Buddhism feels very... Buddhism it's not just a fake. It's easy for Buddhism to accept even fake books were written, new age bullshit. But nonetheless for Buddhists quantum physics is not a problem with all this void which is not an empty void and so on. I'm going to read Victoria's question and then I will go to Makyum Chung. My apologies to her, my God, yes. Okay, so it’s a long question. Lawrence
are still on the way, but you are in reality already there. That’s all I can say now. Yeah. SARB has has made a point. So, to clarify the notion of Buddhism as pure immanence: how is this reconcilable with Sunyata, absolute nothingness? I believe Suzuki suggested that absolute nothingness is the true nature of all things and the ultimate reality. And it seems to be that this is something of a transcendental category since it has to be understood relative to... I'm sorry. Here I agree with precisely Suzuki that I quoted. This I think is close to probably Western misreading of Buddhism. Because we have this gap: immanence, transcendence, and then, you know, even if it's nothing there’s something beyond. I am tempted to be more convinced by passages that I quoted from Suzuki, from that guy Clark and so on, John Clark and so on, that nothingness is the very nothingness means no absolute substantial entity. There is no ultimate ground and so on. There is no foundation of it. Nothingness means that we have this interrelational flux of phenomena and they are the only reality we have. So that I I think it would be very nice to read nothingness as... Ah, Victoria is now here. Sorry. Can you get or I will back to answering this question. Nothingness is for me the how should I put it, the nothingness of immanence itself. It's that, it's this phenomenon, that phenomenon, and there is no ultimate ground. The nothingness is the ground in which every... you know who already knew this in Europe, in totally different context: Mladen Dolar and some French guys also wrote about this: readers of Democritus. When Democritus speaks about nothingness and atoms. For Hegel knew this: we shouldn’t read this as empty space and then small balls of atoms jumping there. No, nothingness is the very core of atom. Atom is a form of nothingness. It's it's much it gets much more paradoxical here. So it's absolutely crucial again not to mis- to read nothingness as as negative category, otherness, transcendence and so on. Nothingness and immanence overlap, but sense. Immanence is the immanence of fleeting non-substantial phenomena. And naturally you ask: but these phenomena must be grounded in something more stable, deeper. No, they are not and this is nothingness. In this way you don't lose phenomena for a higher reality. You accept phenomena as such. I tend to give this reading which is why incidentally Buddhism feels very... Buddhism it's not just a fake. It's easy for Buddhism to accept even fake books were written, new age bullshit. But nonetheless for Buddhists quantum physics is not a problem with all this void which is not an empty void and so on. I'm going to read Victoria's question and then I will go to Makyum Chung. My apologies to her, my God, yes. Okay, so it’s a long question. Lawrence
Cathy Newman
laid the ground for the first part of the question. In your new research, have you run across possible roots for Lacan in Eastern philosophy? I mean philological trails, not just parallels or similarities. After Alexander, there was the Greek-to-Arabic translation movement, then the Arabic-to-Latin and by the 1700s we find that John
laid the ground for the first part of the question. In your new research, have you run across possible roots for Lacan in Eastern philosophy? I mean philological trails, not just parallels or similarities. After Alexander, there was the Greek-to-Arabic translation movement, then the Arabic-to-Latin and by the 1700s we find that John
Slavoj Žižek
Locke is studying Arabic. Among the German Romantics, Schlegel was an expert Arabist, but most relevant here is the 1930s lectures of Kojève in Paris. There we find among the attendees: philosophy, psychoanalysis, Lacan, Henry Corbin who made widely known Ibn Arabi’s doctrines about the world of imagination and also André Breton representing surrealism. Lacan’s imaginary seems to owe something to Ibn Arabi, whom Lacan explicitly mentions in one of his seminars. But the question is more about what Euro-American forms these inheritances took. What prevents the law of desire from becoming narcissism? What prevents the rule of law, justice is blind, no respecter of persons, from degenerating into an impersonal nightmare? Perfect question, thanks but it’s a question for a new talk so I will just try to be very short. First now I will say as a Lacanian something critical about Lacan. There is a sad deplorable aspect of opportunistic behavior in Lacan. When something is in fashion, he tries to refer to it. Like all his flirting with Heidegger in the 50s, and it’s the same with the two references that I know to one to Eastern wisdom, at the end of his first long foundational Écrits writing, the the place of word in psych- his Lacan’s so-called Rapport de Rome, Report for the Rome Meeting where he founded his society, at the very end if you check it, there is a quote from some India ancient, I don’t know if it’s Buddhist or Hinduism, you know, writing. I think he was flirting there. He simply opportunistically referred to it. Like Lacan, you know, when structuralism was fashionable, he pro-claimed himself as structuralist and so on and so on. As for I don’t... I am now as for mediation of Arabic, I... the key person is I forgot his name, I’m old and senile, isn’t there an Iranian philosopher from 16th century? Joan Copjec is now writing a book on him already for years, who is now rediscovered as a mega figure. Mulla Sadra. Yeah, yeah, yeah, him. But I don’t think he can be in any way re-appropriated or re- into simply the oriental tradition. I think that the danger with Arabs is to reduce them to intermediary figure. For example, this is a shock: the most racist notion of Arab, of Islam, Arabs generally, it’s not the same I know, you find it in Claude Lévi-Strauss I think, Tristes Tropiques, where he has an incredible outburst at the beginning I think, introduction of anti-Arabism. He makes such a horrible pagan sexual comparison. He says East and West: Western Christianity, Judaism, whatever, and Eastern spirituality would be an
Locke is studying Arabic. Among the German Romantics, Schlegel was an expert Arabist, but most relevant here is the 1930s lectures of Kojève in Paris. There we find among the attendees: philosophy, psychoanalysis, Lacan, Henry Corbin who made widely known Ibn Arabi’s doctrines about the world of imagination and also André Breton representing surrealism. Lacan’s imaginary seems to owe something to Ibn Arabi, whom Lacan explicitly mentions in one of his seminars. But the question is more about what Euro-American forms these inheritances took. What prevents the law of desire from becoming narcissism? What prevents the rule of law, justice is blind, no respecter of persons, from degenerating into an impersonal nightmare? Perfect question, thanks but it’s a question for a new talk so I will just try to be very short. First now I will say as a Lacanian something critical about Lacan. There is a sad deplorable aspect of opportunistic behavior in Lacan. When something is in fashion, he tries to refer to it. Like all his flirting with Heidegger in the 50s, and it’s the same with the two references that I know to one to Eastern wisdom, at the end of his first long foundational Écrits writing, the the place of word in psych- his Lacan’s so-called Rapport de Rome, Report for the Rome Meeting where he founded his society, at the very end if you check it, there is a quote from some India ancient, I don’t know if it’s Buddhist or Hinduism, you know, writing. I think he was flirting there. He simply opportunistically referred to it. Like Lacan, you know, when structuralism was fashionable, he pro-claimed himself as structuralist and so on and so on. As for I don’t... I am now as for mediation of Arabic, I... the key person is I forgot his name, I’m old and senile, isn’t there an Iranian philosopher from 16th century? Joan Copjec is now writing a book on him already for years, who is now rediscovered as a mega figure. Mulla Sadra. Yeah, yeah, yeah, him. But I don’t think he can be in any way re-appropriated or re- into simply the oriental tradition. I think that the danger with Arabs is to reduce them to intermediary figure. For example, this is a shock: the most racist notion of Arab, of Islam, Arabs generally, it’s not the same I know, you find it in Claude Lévi-Strauss I think, Tristes Tropiques, where he has an incredible outburst at the beginning I think, introduction of anti-Arabism. He makes such a horrible pagan sexual comparison. He says East and West: Western Christianity, Judaism, whatever, and Eastern spirituality would be an
Cathy Newman
ideal couple. Well, rational and irrational, masculine and feminine, form a beautiful harmonious totality. But then this fucking Arabs enter with their Islam and they tend to represent the West for the East, because the Eastern people often learned about the West from Muslims, and they tend to represent for us in the West the East. They are this makes for me the Arab Muslims rather sympathetic figures, you know. So my my point is I am not yet spiritually at it to be able to formulate it. But my point would have been: Arabs were definitely not just mediators. Even when they appear to be. For example, the highest proof: Thomas Aquinas. You know that when he says philosopher, he means Aristotle, no? He doesn't even name him. And when, you know, when he argued in this legal form for and... yeah, yeah, yeah, Avicenna, that’s what I wanted to say. And when he means Avicenna, he says commentator I think, commentator as such, you know. So again, things happen there, but unfortunately I haven't yet, to use my tasteless metaphor from yesterday, I haven't yet a ball-clutcher to crack that nut to say more. I've written something about Islam which deeply fascinates me because everybody today dismisses Islamic community, Ummah, as proto-totalitarian and ISIS and so on. No, but
ideal couple. Well, rational and irrational, masculine and feminine, form a beautiful harmonious totality. But then this fucking Arabs enter with their Islam and they tend to represent the West for the East, because the Eastern people often learned about the West from Muslims, and they tend to represent for us in the West the East. They are this makes for me the Arab Muslims rather sympathetic figures, you know. So my my point is I am not yet spiritually at it to be able to formulate it. But my point would have been: Arabs were definitely not just mediators. Even when they appear to be. For example, the highest proof: Thomas Aquinas. You know that when he says philosopher, he means Aristotle, no? He doesn't even name him. And when, you know, when he argued in this legal form for and... yeah, yeah, yeah, Avicenna, that’s what I wanted to say. And when he means Avicenna, he says commentator I think, commentator as such, you know. So again, things happen there, but unfortunately I haven't yet, to use my tasteless metaphor from yesterday, I haven't yet a ball-clutcher to crack that nut to say more. I've written something about Islam which deeply fascinates me because everybody today dismisses Islamic community, Ummah, as proto-totalitarian and ISIS and so on. No, but
Slavoj Žižek
originally it was something fascinating. It was a community of fatherless orphans. There are wonderful books that I read by progressive Islamists, they are privately even not religious, about how crucial it is for Islam orphan, a father- like the origin of Muslims is how is he called, that guy Bilal who was abandoned by who- who is at the origin of that Atwood novel, which great figure, Bil- yeah, I mean the first wife, not Sarah, who was just a slave. Her son, she was then ejected, and her son alone was supposed to be the beginning of it. And even Mohammad himself, he was an orphan, abandoned by and so on. So that is a paradox: usually Islam is identified as the greatest religion of patriarchy, but it’s more ambiguous. You know the crucial role, my God, read sacred texts, when Mohammad got his visions, he first thought this is the devil. And then his first wife confirmed it. No Islam without Mohammad's wife, who told him who told him trust this, this is it, it’s a more controversial entire scene but trust him. So Islam is again a much more complex thing. Don't reduce it to- I think I think that because of precisely because of this political investment of Islam we don't- we are not yet ready to approach it. The last thing: narcissistic desire and so on. In my sense, I may be wrong, but in my sense, and I wonder if you would agree or not, in my Lacanian sense, desire and narcissism are mutually exclusive. Desire is never narcissistic. Desire throws you out of yourself. Narcissism... yeah, that’s true, the it was mediated from the colony- but sorry, what I wanted to say is that narcissism is precisely a defense against desire. Desire is decentering, it throws you out of yourself. In this sense I would have agreed with my Buddhist critics, who claim that in some sense Buddhism accepts this do not compromise your desire. Because in your desire you are not reduced to your ego-self. Desire is precisely a moment of opening onto the world. In desire you are vulnerable, open. So again, narcissism is like hatred, an an defense against desire. Can we just have a... should we go to the final question from Makyum and and a quick answer? So Makyum Chung, if you if you would take the mic and try to be concise on Buddhist causality. Hi! Hi. Um, yeah, I'm in a cafe today, but I don't know whether you... Where are you now? Because yesterday you appeared to me more authentically Tibetan. Now you are definitely not in a Tibetan place, you... Yeah, just moved into a modern space. Yeah, okay, I'll just ask the question, it's quite simple today. It's about what's your view on... I see there's a potential linkage between Deleuzian move to the idea of position and the Buddhist idea of causality about no beginning, no end and this idea about process and there's a... I think there's also the idea of emergence in coming out of Buddhism and what's your view on on this? First I bluff enough so that I must concede now here that I don’t know a lot about Buddhist notion of causality apart from this obvious things I remember when there were debates about science and so on, Buddhist against creationism. Buddhist said very early that creationism, the way Western Christian fundamentalists imagine it, is totally incompatible with Buddhism. That in no way should you refer to Buddhism to to- but but what I would have said is that I wonder, you must know these things better, for me causality becomes really interesting and if I may use this cursed word dialectical, when it becomes retroactive causality. When something that was just an effect originally retroactively posits or reposits its own cause. Something that is an effect becomes a cause of its own cause. And I can well imagine, you should teach me, that in this sense if I were to be Buddhist I would have said that if the self in this not pure subject but the self in this fake sense of self-identity, it’s me substantial, isn’t a self precisely this type of fake secondary cause? We self is really an alienated effect of the flux of experiences and so on. But the mistake of the self which is an effect is to retroactively posit itself as the origin of what it is the effect of. What would interest me is this to locate illusion in this kind of inverted fake causality. And I wonder, you should teach me, if you find something of this order in Buddhist in Buddhist tradition. Because otherwise we are at the level of primitive Marxism: I know the world is complex, phenomena, everything is mediated with everything else and so on. That’s nothing. Things become interested- interesting with this retroactive causality, or even in a more positive mode, changing the past. Not in the sense of recreating its reality, I’m not thinking magically, but when as again, I always quote this for me the biggest passage from T.S. Eliot, conservative but he was not a total idiot, when he says that each new work of art changes the entire
originally it was something fascinating. It was a community of fatherless orphans. There are wonderful books that I read by progressive Islamists, they are privately even not religious, about how crucial it is for Islam orphan, a father- like the origin of Muslims is how is he called, that guy Bilal who was abandoned by who- who is at the origin of that Atwood novel, which great figure, Bil- yeah, I mean the first wife, not Sarah, who was just a slave. Her son, she was then ejected, and her son alone was supposed to be the beginning of it. And even Mohammad himself, he was an orphan, abandoned by and so on. So that is a paradox: usually Islam is identified as the greatest religion of patriarchy, but it’s more ambiguous. You know the crucial role, my God, read sacred texts, when Mohammad got his visions, he first thought this is the devil. And then his first wife confirmed it. No Islam without Mohammad's wife, who told him who told him trust this, this is it, it’s a more controversial entire scene but trust him. So Islam is again a much more complex thing. Don't reduce it to- I think I think that because of precisely because of this political investment of Islam we don't- we are not yet ready to approach it. The last thing: narcissistic desire and so on. In my sense, I may be wrong, but in my sense, and I wonder if you would agree or not, in my Lacanian sense, desire and narcissism are mutually exclusive. Desire is never narcissistic. Desire throws you out of yourself. Narcissism... yeah, that’s true, the it was mediated from the colony- but sorry, what I wanted to say is that narcissism is precisely a defense against desire. Desire is decentering, it throws you out of yourself. In this sense I would have agreed with my Buddhist critics, who claim that in some sense Buddhism accepts this do not compromise your desire. Because in your desire you are not reduced to your ego-self. Desire is precisely a moment of opening onto the world. In desire you are vulnerable, open. So again, narcissism is like hatred, an an defense against desire. Can we just have a... should we go to the final question from Makyum and and a quick answer? So Makyum Chung, if you if you would take the mic and try to be concise on Buddhist causality. Hi! Hi. Um, yeah, I'm in a cafe today, but I don't know whether you... Where are you now? Because yesterday you appeared to me more authentically Tibetan. Now you are definitely not in a Tibetan place, you... Yeah, just moved into a modern space. Yeah, okay, I'll just ask the question, it's quite simple today. It's about what's your view on... I see there's a potential linkage between Deleuzian move to the idea of position and the Buddhist idea of causality about no beginning, no end and this idea about process and there's a... I think there's also the idea of emergence in coming out of Buddhism and what's your view on on this? First I bluff enough so that I must concede now here that I don’t know a lot about Buddhist notion of causality apart from this obvious things I remember when there were debates about science and so on, Buddhist against creationism. Buddhist said very early that creationism, the way Western Christian fundamentalists imagine it, is totally incompatible with Buddhism. That in no way should you refer to Buddhism to to- but but what I would have said is that I wonder, you must know these things better, for me causality becomes really interesting and if I may use this cursed word dialectical, when it becomes retroactive causality. When something that was just an effect originally retroactively posits or reposits its own cause. Something that is an effect becomes a cause of its own cause. And I can well imagine, you should teach me, that in this sense if I were to be Buddhist I would have said that if the self in this not pure subject but the self in this fake sense of self-identity, it’s me substantial, isn’t a self precisely this type of fake secondary cause? We self is really an alienated effect of the flux of experiences and so on. But the mistake of the self which is an effect is to retroactively posit itself as the origin of what it is the effect of. What would interest me is this to locate illusion in this kind of inverted fake causality. And I wonder, you should teach me, if you find something of this order in Buddhist in Buddhist tradition. Because otherwise we are at the level of primitive Marxism: I know the world is complex, phenomena, everything is mediated with everything else and so on. That’s nothing. Things become interested- interesting with this retroactive causality, or even in a more positive mode, changing the past. Not in the sense of recreating its reality, I’m not thinking magically, but when as again, I always quote this for me the biggest passage from T.S. Eliot, conservative but he was not a total idiot, when he says that each new work of art changes the entire
unknown
past also. The past appears in a different way. For example, we use the most primitive example, we use the word paganism. Wait a minute,
past also. The past appears in a different way. For example, we use the most primitive example, we use the word paganism. Wait a minute,
Slavoj Žižek
paganism is a Christian term. If you are a non-Christian, none of the three religions of the book, you will never call yourself a
paganism is a Christian term. If you are a non-Christian, none of the three religions of the book, you will never call yourself a
unknown
pagan, it’s stupid, no? So this this would be most interesting most interesting for me. So the conclusion would have been that the big cheat is for me the problem, here I agree with my critics, that a certain kind
pagan, it’s stupid, no? So this this would be most interesting most interesting for me. So the conclusion would have been that the big cheat is for me the problem, here I agree with my critics, that a certain kind
Slavoj Žižek
of pseudo-Buddhism was appropriated by even the corporate elite as the... you know, when that John Clark, when he says that that reification, objectivization is the product of modern society. But I would say that for today’s capitalism with its crazy dynamic, market speculation, blah blah, it fits perfectly a certain version of pseudo-Buddhism, you know. Pseudo, not like... everything is an appearance and so on. And also many capitalists use corporate capitalists use oriental wisdom as a kind of pseudo-justification. You earn billions but then you say to yourself but this doesn’t really matter, all that matters is my inner truth and so on and so on. And it would be- sorry, the guy Thomas, thanks very much, he said something I just want to answer him, he wanted to bring in tantra, no? No, tantra is dirty sex, I’m afraid of tantra at my age. Sorry, just a dirty reply. No, but do you- no, do you see what I do you see what I mean? That it would be in the interest of both sides to get rid of this terrible appropriation of pseudo-oriental thought, it’s not even Buddhism, but it somehow fits the incredible speculative in the financial sense dynamic of today’s corporate capitalism. It’s no longer this old Protestant ethics, me, self, manipulating object. No, no, no, it’s a much more dynamic crazy universe. And that’s the danger today I think. Sorry, I took long. Thank you. Thank you so much. Okay, Esther, you are still there? Okay, bye-bye and hope to see you would be there in the Summer School. Yeah, we have our Summer School, we have the free public lectures, everyone’s invited, please take a look at the other events that the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities are doing and thank you so much, Slavoj, for two very... and I will conclude my study with something, don’t be afraid, not dirty but evil. I will I would say it’s so nice, it was so nice with you to talk, but it’s even nicer now when I know that it’s over and I can go watch and do Basic Instinct. Very much. Thank
of pseudo-Buddhism was appropriated by even the corporate elite as the... you know, when that John Clark, when he says that that reification, objectivization is the product of modern society. But I would say that for today’s capitalism with its crazy dynamic, market speculation, blah blah, it fits perfectly a certain version of pseudo-Buddhism, you know. Pseudo, not like... everything is an appearance and so on. And also many capitalists use corporate capitalists use oriental wisdom as a kind of pseudo-justification. You earn billions but then you say to yourself but this doesn’t really matter, all that matters is my inner truth and so on and so on. And it would be- sorry, the guy Thomas, thanks very much, he said something I just want to answer him, he wanted to bring in tantra, no? No, tantra is dirty sex, I’m afraid of tantra at my age. Sorry, just a dirty reply. No, but do you- no, do you see what I do you see what I mean? That it would be in the interest of both sides to get rid of this terrible appropriation of pseudo-oriental thought, it’s not even Buddhism, but it somehow fits the incredible speculative in the financial sense dynamic of today’s corporate capitalism. It’s no longer this old Protestant ethics, me, self, manipulating object. No, no, no, it’s a much more dynamic crazy universe. And that’s the danger today I think. Sorry, I took long. Thank you. Thank you so much. Okay, Esther, you are still there? Okay, bye-bye and hope to see you would be there in the Summer School. Yeah, we have our Summer School, we have the free public lectures, everyone’s invited, please take a look at the other events that the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities are doing and thank you so much, Slavoj, for two very... and I will conclude my study with something, don’t be afraid, not dirty but evil. I will I would say it’s so nice, it was so nice with you to talk, but it’s even nicer now when I know that it’s over and I can go watch and do Basic Instinct. Very much. Thank
Cathy Newman
you so much. Bye-bye
you so much. Bye-bye
Slavoj Žižek
everyone. Bye. Bye.
everyone. Bye. Bye.