Slavoj Žižek Masterclass: Jacques Lacan: A Lateral Introduction. Part 2
Žižek opens with a self-deprecating anecdote about a visit to Athens, where he provocatively argues that modern Greeks have no claim to ancient heritage because ancient Greece was an 18th-century British and German invention. He uses this 'anti-Greek' fantasy to illustrate the primacy of fantasy over reality, suggesting that since the British invented the concept of Greece, they are entitled to the artifacts, and modern Greeks should be grateful rather than demanding restitution. Žižek analyzes the Lacanian Big Other as functioning ironically and through prosopopoeia, arguing that truth resides in the surface of appearance rather than private intent. He distinguishes between the mask of the speaking subject and the symptom where the truth interrupts, using examples from Marx, Freud, and Darian Leader. The excerpt concludes by applying this gap between enunciation and enunciated to political discourse, critiquing both the hypocrisy of the Bush administration and the 'ethical masochism' of political correctness. Žižek critiques the liberal tendency to deny the Other’s autonomy through excessive political correctness, using the example of Soviet 'Kremlinology' to show how ideological shifts are encoded in philosophical texts. He analyzes The Da Vinci Code through a Freudian lens, arguing its plot masks a lack of sexual desire, and contrasts this with an anecdote about a Chinese philosophical institute to illustrate the liberating function of bureaucracy. Finally, he interprets Lacan’s ethical maxim 'do not compromise your desire' against hedonism and Rawlsian justice, invoking Hayek, resentment, and Jean Améry’s post-Holocaust writings to define the traumatic nature of true desire. Žižek analyzes the limits of reconciliation and forgiveness in the face of extreme crimes like the Holocaust, arguing for a 'heroic resentment' that refuses to normalize evil. He then distinguishes Lacanian ethics from Stalinist 'immoral ethics' by examining the role of the Big Other, before deconstructing Freud’s ethical agencies (Ideal ego, Ego ideal, Superego) to introduce the concept of 'institutional unconscious' and the paradoxical nature of modern atheism. Žižek contrasts Protestant and Catholic forms of atheism, using Diderot’s ‘atheist wager’ to define a radical ethical stance. He reinterprets Levinas’s ‘neighbor’ as the inhuman abyss, illustrated by Primo Levi’s account of Auschwitz selections and a Stalinist show trial. He critiques Sam Harris’s justification of torture in The End of Faith as an attempt to erase the neighbor’s proximity, then presents Sophia Karpay’s stubborn refusal to confess as an ethical act of the death drive, paralleling Beckett’s The Unnamable and Lacan’s reading of Antigone. Žižek argues that Lacan reverses the common view by reading Sade as a rigorous Kantian, where ethical duty manifests as pure, mathematical jouissance rather than pleasure. He critiques the cynical 'play the game' attitude in modern psychoanalysis, advocating instead for a Leninist-style collective fidelity to the Big Other. Finally, he defines the 'event' structurally rather than by its content, using a film example to distinguish genuine ethical intervention from fascist pseudo-events that merely mobilize existing obscene backgrounds.
The ideas in it 45
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
Stories he reaches for 9
Works invoked 32
People invoked 59
Transcript 12 turns
Good evening everyone, welcome to Parallel Zero and can I just remind you, those who are not registered for Slavoj's lectures tomorrow and for the next four weeks, the registration is now closed because it is fully booked and there will be a much stricter door policy tomorrow than we have in this series of lectures. So you'll have Slavoj for the next four weeks. If you haven't registered tomorrow, please do not turn up. So, Slavoj.
Thank you very much. Ah, it works. I'm sorry, last time I was a little bit jet-lagged, confused, and so on and so on. Now
it's okay. Sorry?
I will not make my usual bad taste anti-Greek remarks, you know, like and so on. I will just tell you, when I visited Athens, I did something. I was, out of friendship, in a very anti-Greek mood. So we were in a restaurant beneath Acropolis and they were saying how Greece is also in a deep economic crisis and I said, you really must be to let that wonderful old building, you even don't have money to repair that one, no, on the hill. Then I defended a thesis which I think is true. You know all that Greek stuff about you British and the Germans stealing from the Greeks, these old stones and so on, no? I mean every normal person knows that the recent Greeks are kind of a peasant Orthodox nation which has nothing whatsoever to do with the ancient Greece. Ancient Greece is an invention of the British and the German from 18th century onwards, no? So my idea is, not only, I mean they invented the Greeks, so not only Greeks do not have the right to demand back from British Museum, they should give freely even all they have to England and so on, no? I mean the right of fantasy is stronger than reality and so on. So, but it was a nice visit nonetheless, I wasn't immediately
arrested and so on. Okay, so let me do now,
let's go on. I will first try just with two, with a couple of remarks to wrap up things about the Big Other and then go on about ethics. Next week, not next week even, my god, next every week here, next Thursday, two days from now, then we move for about three lectures, three meetings more theory, Hegel and dialectics, trying to save Hegel for today. Let me start with something which tells a lot about how I think the Lacanian Big Other functions, namely my thesis is that it functions in an ironic mode. Irony for me is something very specific. It's precisely the opposite of cynicism. Irony means, it doesn't mean you pretend to take it seriously but in reality you mock it. It means, and it's a much more interesting ideological phenomenon I think, it means you privately mock it, you think I'm just making fun of it, but you are not aware that in reality you are taking it seriously, that it's much more serious than it appears to be. I mean you find, I always quote it, the big model for me of this kind of analysis is a wonderful short remarks by Marx when in his *Class Struggles in France* about the revolution when the so-called Party of Order took over and they were secretly royalists. So all the time they mocked in the debates in French parliament, Republic, but Marx's idea is that the truth was nonetheless in the form. The job they objectively did was to install a bourgeois republic. So although privately they thought they were royalists and they made fun of republic and so on, the truth was in what they did, the truth was at the surface, as it were. So I made a test to see if even my friends understand me. In my book, maybe some of you know it, *The Fright of Real Tears* about cinema, about Kieślowski, I did something quite on purpose to see what the reaction will be. Namely, in the introduction, I invoke a certain experience of mine which of course was a fake, it never happened, but I like the example. That's how it starts: Some months ago at an art round table, I was asked to comment on a painting I saw there for the first time. I did not have any idea about it, so I engaged in total bluff which went on somehow like this: The frame of the painting is in front of us, is not its true frame. There is another invisible frame implied by the structure of the painting, the frame that enframes our perception of the painting. And these two frames, the empirical frame and the true frame, are not the same and all that really happens in the painting, it happens in between the two frames. And I engaged... and then I mock it, I said this is the sad state of theory today, how you can totally bluff and it's taken seriously and so on. Then, pages later, I invoke in the same terms the same example of which I make fun in the introduction but in a serious way. I say: One of the minimal definitions of a modern painting concerns the function of its frame. The frame of the painting in front of us is not its true frame, there is another invisible frame, and so on and so on. And I wonder what would it happen. It was very interesting. Many of my friends noticed this, that my god, in the middle of the book I refer seriously to a term, the gap between the empirical frame of a painting and its structurally implied frame, with the idea what really happens in the painting is in between the two frames. And I mock it, but then pages later, later, not earlier, so you cannot even say first I introduce something and then I make fun of it. I first make fun of it then I treat it seriously. And interestingly, now there were two reactions to it. One was okay, the usual one, I'm getting old, senile, and so on, simply I forgot. The second one was this is the signal to my readers, I'm really a clown, don't take me seriously, no, and so on. But I was really deeply hurt by the fact that nobody got it how I really meant it as a lesson in my own theory, my god, which is: it works. It doesn't matter if I make fun of it. There is truth in it. It doesn't matter how I relate to it. It doesn't matter if I meant it as a bluff. What matters is how it works. And I was repeating this lesson again and again, it was relatively sad again that nobody got it. So that would be my first point. The Big Other is not the depth, it's the surface, it's the order of appearances where the truth is not in how you relate to it, you may have your inner distances, mock it, laugh at it, what matters is appearance, how it functions. The second feature of the Big Other and I mentioned this notion the last time, I want to elaborate it a little bit, is that its structure is, we may put it in this way, that of prosopopoeia. You know what this is? A figure of speech in which an absent or imaginary person is represented as speaking or acting. That is to say, it is the attribution of speech to an entity that is commonly perceived as unable to speak: nature, truth itself, music, and so on. For example, I don't know, many patriotic speakers like the nation to speak to address you, no, the nation itself or Marx, I will not go into it now but probably you know in that famous chapter on fetishism in, towards the end of, sorry, subdivision towards the end of the chapter one of *Capital*, Marx there, Marx there commodities themselves start to speak. My idea is that it is at this level that the Big Other works. That is to say, for Lacan, prosopopoeia is the condition of speech as such. When I speak, it is never directly myself who speaks. I have to have recourse to a fiction which is my symbolic identity. In this sense, all speech is indirect. "I love you" implies the structure of my identity as lover, which is not directly me, but one of my symbolic identities is telling you that it loves you and so on and so on. But let me be precise here. There are two traps to be avoided here. The first one of course is this simply, is to apply to prosopopoeia the simplified logic of alienation, as if prosopopoeia means that there is always some kind of self-alienation which I should strive to abolish. That is to say, at the end of psychoanalysis or of honest self-confrontation, I should be able to affirm, to assert in the first person what I'm only able usually to speak, to formulate insofar as it is attributed to another entity. What this version misses is how prosopopoeia is more radical, in the sense that there are things which, maybe that's Freud's hypothesis, we can never assume in the first person. We can only, precisely not because they are not ours, but they are too intimately ours, so that precisely because they concern me too directly, I cannot directly assume them. I cannot say "I think this." In order to articulate them, it has to be through a distance. It's something like one of my old examples, you know the proverbial impotent or shy person who while playing the cyber-space interactive game adopts the screen identity of a, I don't know, irresistible seducer, sadistic murderer, whatever. It is too simple to say that this identity is just an imaginary supplement or a temporary escape from his real-life impotence. What if it is the opposite? What if he is at the very core of his personality a brutal sadist or whatever and it's simply because of social oppression and so on, social constraints, he is not able to realize this, to act like that in his real life, so that it's only under the guise of a fiction, "Oh, it's only a game, it's not really me," that he can articulate the innermost truth about himself. As I often emphasize in my books, this is what Lacan meant with this famous "Truth has a structure of a fiction." Sometimes you can only articulate truth on condition that it's not you directly who is talking, that it's even in this fictive mode. So again, one of the lessons of psychoanalysis is that this gap is constitutive, radical. We shouldn't have, even to put it in Habermasian terms, even as a normative ideal, we shouldn't have it that ideally I should be able to tell all about myself in the first person. The idea is that, and this is the Lacanian reading of Freud's notion of fundamental fantasy, that the fundamental fantasy is something with which I am too intensely identified to be able to formulate it directly. You know the famous Freudian example, "Ein Kind wird geschlagen," a child is being beaten. And Freud's thesis that the middle form of this fantasy, "Father is beating me," Freud says it wasn't even repressed. Repressed already implies that it was at some point directly experienced and then repressed. According to Freud, the subject never consciously, even not unconsciously, fantasized this scene. It's just you can reconstruct it retroactively as precisely the real, the real in the sense of the absent point of reference. But again, according to Lacan, you cannot assume it directly in the sense that at the end you should be able to say "I am having this fantasy." You cannot. Of course you can formulate it, but you cannot really subjectively identify with it. So again, it's not simply the structure of prosopopoeia is not simply that of alienation. Alienation is, or rather alienation is constitutive. It's not if we are not strong enough to confront ourselves directly we let other entities, other people or things, animals, whatever speak for us, while if we are heroic enough we can assume it in the first person. It's that in order to emerge as a person at all, something has to be, as it were, minimally objectified. This in this sense, this would be maybe the best definition of the Lacanian *objet petit a*, object small a, as the object cause of desire. It's precisely that part of me which has to be objectified in order for me to emerge as a subject. It's that which I cannot subjectify in order to be a subject. That's the core of Lacanian notion of subjectivity, that there is something which is too strong to be subjectified, subjectified in this pathetic sense of assuming me, "It's me who is talking, I am that." So again, here we see a difference between Lacanian psychoanalysis and the standard, at least predominant version where the goal is simply to subjectively assume a truth. For Lacan, there are some, maybe not the order, in the order of truth, but some statements, fantasies which are again too strong to be subjectively assumed. If you confront them directly, you disintegrate. So that, that would be again the first thing to avoid, the conclusion that prosopopoeia is just a temporary delay, as it were, or postponement, compromise, a sign of weakness. I cannot say directly so I make the other tell the bitter truth. The opposite trap, I think it's even more dangerous, is to elevate that through which I speak, this other agency, into an authentic site of truth, so that you can say, you know all this poetic rambling, "It's not me who is really talking, something in me deeper than myself, the truth itself speaks through me." This would be a more mystical, in some versions at least, Jungian version. You find it in many New Age books in the guise of the distinction between my ego and the self. The idea is that the self is a much broader ground of my subjectivity and that's the whole Jungian or New Age idea, to progress from this narrow ego, the way you perceive yourself, to your true self. Against this version, one should assert that that which speaks through me for Lacan at least is fundamentally a fantasy. That is to say, let me elaborate here things a little bit. Of course we have a fundamental dialectical movement here. We begin with the fact that I am speaking through others, that is to say the truth which is too intense, my own truth which I cannot formulate directly, I transfer it in prosopopoeia, I make other, either other persons or objects whatever, tell it for me. Then the reversal: it is not that I speak through others but it's the other itself who speaks through me. The ultimate prosopopoeia is the one in which I myself am the other, the means used by another agency to speak. So the shift is the shift from me speaking through some figure of the other to the me, I itself as prosopopoeia, from "I cannot tell the truth about myself directly, this most intimate truth is so painful that I can only articulate it through another by adopting the mask, talking through the mask of another entity" to "The truth itself is talking through me." So again, the reversal from predicate to subject, from "What I'm telling you is true" to "The truth itself is talking through me." Of course, in psychoanalytic terms, this moment of the truth itself is talking through me is of course the moment of symptom. Symptom or slips of tongue, whatever, is the moment where when in a way it's no longer I speak the truth but truth itself interrupts me. Of course, the primordial prosopopoeia if you want is for Lacan the symbolic order, the Big Other itself. Its functioning involves the structure of what Freud called fetishist disavowal. You know the logic of "I know very well that things are the way I see them, that the person in front of me is a corrupted weakling, but nonetheless I treat him respectfully." For example, when you confront a judge, you may know, this was Socrates' experience, that he is a corrupted nobody, but you respect him because it is the law itself which speaks through this person. This is how, as we all know, the cynic who believes only hard facts falls short. When a judge speaks, there is in a way more truth in his words, the words of the institution of the law, than in the direct reality of the person of the judge. Okay, that is known. But nonetheless, we must here make some things clear. For Lacan, so the opposition is not simply that of when I speak, that of me speaking directly or the Big Other an institution speaking through me. For Lacan, the paradox is much more refined here. What he means, Lacan, when he says in his *La chose freudienne*, the Freudian thing, he uses this famous term "I, the truth, speak." He doesn't mean this Jungian wisdom, "All of a sudden I was taken over by some mystical power in me stronger than myself and it's no longer me, I just became an instrument of this truth." No, Lacan's idea would be rather that the truth that I can really speak in the sense of I myself articulate my authentic position, only in the guise of being surprised by a symptom or whatever. That is to say, where it's not me as an agent who is talking. The paradox is that whenever I talk directly as an agent, so that I experience myself, "Yes, it's me who is spontaneously speaking," at that point it's truly the Big Other who talks through me. In the sense that every position that I experience as my self-identity is already a mask organized by the Big Other. Precisely when you experience yourself as you directly are speaking, you are, if you want, manipulated by the Big Other, the Big Other speaks through you. For example, to have a pathetic example, you are in love and you passionately make an outburst and so on and so on, "That's really me." That's not really you, that's an imaginary identity speaking through you. But when then you make a mistake, when something goes wrong in this pathetic speech and you are surprised, at that point you really speak. Like the wonderful example from Darian Leader, which is I think again also a wonderful Freudian reading of, in his first book I think, *Why Do Women Write Letters They Don't Post?* when he... this wonderful example of somebody, one of his patients he claims, maybe he also invents symptoms like me, I'm not sure, who invited a girl to a restaurant of course with the intention of later seducing her. And the, okay, the Freudian slip of tongue was that when they entered the restaurant, instead of saying, instead of saying a table for two, he said a bed for two, please. Now here comes the true Lacanian genius of Darian Leader. As he makes it clear, the meaning of this is not the vulgar Freudian meaning which is of course he was for him the meal was only a means to seduce her so he was already thinking about what hopefully will happen later. Darian Leader's reading of this scene is much nicer. It's that this slip was a defensive gesture. What he was afraid of was the fact that he would really enjoy the meal more than the sex later and that it was a kind of a defense to assure himself, you know, no no it's really justified and so on. The fear was that, to put it in naive Freudian terms, that this immediate oral pleasure would overcome the official genital goal afterwards. It was as if to assure himself "no it's not that I'm a pig who will now eat, it's really just justified by later" and so on and so on. But you see my point. The paradox of Lacan is that when Lacan says the truth, I the truth speak, this does not mean that truth is elevated into some mythical agency which magically takes over and speaks through you. It's literally I. When the truth itself speaks, that interruption like in a symptom that you produce, where it's not your... you are where you are not telling the truth but truth itself intervenes in a way, at that point you really speak. And this precisely for Lacan is not the point where the Big Other speaks, the symbolic order itself, but no, the Big Other speaks precisely when you speak fluently experiencing yourself as a free agent. You really speak when you are surprised by it. So in other words, this gap inherent, this gap defines the functioning of the Big Other, the gap precisely to put it in another way, between the enunciated, your explicit symbolic identity, and what Lacan calls the subject of the enunciation, the place from which you speak. And I think that one of the interesting symptomatic signs of the decadence of the political discourse is when this gap is becoming in a way directly palpable as it were. For example, I remember in November half a year ago, or yes, half a year, in November I forgot the date, President Bush pathetically proclaimed: "We do not torture in the United States." Nice, but on the same day or maybe a day earlier or later, he vetoed the bill which only, I think it was a bill proposed by John McCain, which only explicitly prohibited the torture of prisoners. So this open inconsistency of political discourse is where we can detect this kind of a gap. Or another way, more problematic, what I find suspicious in the so-called politically correct vision is the weird reversal of the racist hatred of the otherness. Some kind of political correctness for me stages a mockingly Hegelian negation of direct racist dismissal of the other, of the perception of the other as the enemy who poses a threat to our way of life. In this politically correct vision, the other's violence against us, deplorable and cruel as it may be, is always a reaction against the original sin which is our sin: white man's imperialism, colonialism, etc., rejection and oppression of others. We white men are responsible and guilty, the other, blacks, Arabs, whatever, just react as victims. We are to be condemned, the other is to be understood. Ours is a domain of morals, moral condemnation, others belong to the domain of sociology, social explanation. When a white guy rapes a woman it's morally condemned, when a black guy does it's to be understood as horrible social circumstances, whatever. It is easy to discern how beneath the mask of extreme self-humiliation and self-culpabilization of the white man, such a stance of, let's call it ethical masochism I claim, repeats racism in its very form. Although negative, the proverbial white man's burden is still here. We white men are the subjects of history, others ultimately only react to our misdeeds. In other words, it is as if the true message of this politically correct self-culpabilization is: if we can no longer be the model of democracy and civilization for the rest of the world, we can at least remain the model of evil. You see my point. Here I think we have this here, although at the explicit level it's self-condemnation, you know like this is why politically correct white guys, for example whenever you have a cruel dictatorship by a black government in, in Africa, they always feel this pressure to explain "no it's not as simple as that, this is ultimately the result of the neo-colonialist manipulations," as if they cannot do it by themselves, it must be traced back to us. Now let me be here very precise. I'm not saying that there are elements of truth in it. I'm just very suspicious of this general model where in the guise or in the guise of respect for the other, you really deprive the other even of elementary autonomy and agency. And basically use again in the description different categories, my god, at the very level of hermeneutic description you cheat. Again, the other is to be understood which means causally explained, we are morally responsible. Another way to detect this gap would be, you remember the last time I gave you the example of this Kremlinology, how the positive content of terms, like I gave you that example of burying a corpse in the Kremlin wall, the positive reference is suspended. All that matters is the political meaning, the true message. I remembered afterwards an even nicer example. I remember when I was young I read a reprint of, after the situation is a little bit in Soviet Union in the late 40s, early 50s, already instigated, that's the ultimate paradox, the first de-Stalinizer was Stalin himself in late 50s, sorry, late 40s, early 50s, with his two texts on economy and on linguistics, where he asserted the possibility of even economy but especially linguistics as a simple objective science not to be directly controlled by Marxism, not claiming that language is a neutral human phenomenon, not a class phenomenon, and so on. Okay, what I want to say is that then the first philosophical, because you know true Stalinism was truly a catastrophe, from till practically no philosophy was published in Soviet Union. Only one history of philosophy which was immediately prohibited. Okay, then the first books were published, introductions of course to dialectic materialism, the classical one is the one by Mark Rosenthal. The title is *The Marxist Dialectic Method*. You know why this book is interesting? Because it's just of course in its form it's just a detailed commentary on that short Stalin's text on dialectic and historical materialism. It's extremely interesting and I have a Slovene edition of this book from where they in the footnotes they give all the variations of how this book was a standard textbook in the early 50s in the Soviet Union, reprinted every year. But every year there were changes. And this... what's so fascinating is that we have apparently, at least it looks like, a pure philosophical book. It debates what? The fundamental ontological structure of reality. But all the changes that you find there have nothing to do with how this guy Rosenthal, you know, he was thinking further, thinking no, they are strictly signs of political shifts, shifts in ideological political situation. For example, in the edition, you know that Stalin enumerates four features of dialectical method. First, the unity interconnectedness of all phenomena, point two it's, uh, no first it's the unity, then it's the, then it's I think the evolution, things develop and then things develop qualitatively, quantitatively, whatever. But significantly, Stalin excluded the dialectical law of negation of negation. You don't find it. So in the edition of you do find negation of negation all of a sudden, smuggled in as the subdivision of the law of... then in it disappears, in it reappears. Now this has nothing to do with this guy thinking, changing his position. It was, it's so crazy for me that in a treatise about objective structure of reality, you find the most precise indicator, very refined, of ideological constellation. The point was to what extent did they move slowly towards de-Stalinization, pro-Stalin, no? Because precisely negation of negation was the nodal point. Are we allowed to read Hegel, is there at least a little bit of opening? So it's interesting how when Stalin was in a relatively liberal mood, it was possible to smuggle in negation of negation but claiming it's just a subdivision of the last law of development through contradiction. you know doctors' plot, Stalin getting paranoid, it disappeared. when things got better, again negation... in the last edition, negation of negation appeared even as its own fifth law, which means we are even allowed to move outside Stalin. And that was the meaning of it. I found again this fascinating, how it's a treatise on nature but absolutely to be read as Kremlinologically, no? All, every detail, every... and what I like is precisely that it's all masked as a debate about facts, you know, nature teaches us, this is how nature develops, and so on and so on. But it's all not only generally about politics but it's very concrete, it's about politics there in that constellation. Here a Freudian reading works because what we should never forget is that, that's what we learned from Freud. The true Freudian reading is not, look at your everyday experience and to interpret them you need to go back to mythology, archetypes, this is Jung. Freud is the opposite, you invent mythology to account for your private deadlock. Which is why I must tell you yesterday I watched and I was my god, with all the bad publicity it is getting, and now you will kill me for this, it's not as bad as I thought, *The Da Vinci Code*. I mean yesterday, no, I did the ethical thing. I bought three days ago at Petticoat Lane Market from a nice Indian girl for four pounds the DVD, illegal. And I must say it's a perfect copy, I was quite surprised, perfect copy. Okay, you know what surprised me? Maybe some commentators didn't notice it, but what surprised me, okay I hope you know the story, it is as if it has a little bit of the structure of *X-Files* where, you remember *X-Files*, where the crucial thing is, as many psychoanalysts noted, why do so many things happen up there all around, you know all these aliens, to cover up that nothing happens here, that is to say there is no sex between the two agents, no, Mulder or whatever, the two of them, no? And it's the same here. I think that the fact that up there gods were screwing, that is to say Mary Magdalene, Jesus, is strictly correlative to the fact that the woman Sophie is a virgin. She is totally asexual. Nothing happens between her and Tom Hanks. I think this is strictly to be read as: no, don't be fascinated by up there, it can be read even in a very naive Freudian way as a trauma of her, what's her trauma? You know the guy who is found dead at the beginning and who she thought was the hero, no, was her hero of the movie, novel, was on non-speaking terms with him because she witnessed something. My god, it's the Freudian primordial scene. She witnessed parents copulating basically, and that's what she couldn't expect, it totally de-sexualized her. So it's not as, I mean it's so strange that everybody focuses just on those commonly known facts about and so on and so on, but how much more plastic it becomes when you correlate all this mystery, thousands years ago discovered, with what goes on here. No sex between the two of them, how she reinvents herself at the end, it's the same reversal. Okay, I hope these things made it a little bit clear, the Big Other. Now I will keep my promise, we go to ethics. Because the point is the following one. From what I, ah, another example that I cannot restrain from telling you about this gap, gap of the Big Other. Is a friend of mine recently visited China. Oh my god, I love this, and told me he visited in one of these cities which have four, five million but we don't even know that they exist, a philosophical institute. And he loved it and I love it what he told me. He told me that like in good old social even if now they study Habermas, Adorno, Heidegger, whatever you want, but nonetheless it's still organized in the good old way. At the entrance hall, you have a big panel "Report on Five Years Plan." I liked it, you know, like these epistemological questions we'll, you know like they do it and what I loved, and this my friend told me he asked them a question there and I love the answer. The question was, okay, but forget this plan, what do you think like epistemologically, does this table really exist independently of mind? You know what answer he got? Sorry, this is part of our plan for you know we cannot yet give you the answer. I love this idea of this most intimate existential... you know this would be for me the true Kierkegaard. You ask him what about anxiety and God? Sorry, that's my plan for I don't know Now we are not yet. This, and I think that this is my admiration for so-called oriental spirit, that you, you know that this bureaucracy, that there is something extremely liberating in assuming the external bureaucratic form, how should I put it, it sets you free. Okay, but let's return to our topic. Which is, already from what I was telling you, you could have gotten, you got I hope the point that there are in what I was saying different ethics implied. Like it may appear, but it's not, that the ethical implication of what I was saying was against Kremlinology in the sense of forget about these secret messages, what fact means, we should learn simply to talk directly about the facts. Like with philosophy, poor times when you have to use ontological structure of the world to give signals about the latest political shifts, let's simply when you talk about reality you talk about reality, this how should I put it, ethics of simple reality, like focus on what you are talking about and get rid of prosopopoeia, of these detours. Or is it that in psychoanalysis we have a kind of ethics of prosopopoeia, like forget about what words immediately mean, focus only on their Kremlinological meaning, like as if psychoanalysis is the ultimate Kremlinology how should I put it, no? I think it's another ethics implied. Which ones? Okay, let me quote you from as Costas was kind to remind us, Seminar on the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, the last chapter. Here is Lacan's formulation of the ethical motto of psychoanalysis, and I will try to explain it. Quote, page "It is because we know better than those who went before how to recognize the nature of desire which is at the heart of our experience, psychoanalytic experience, that a reconsideration of ethics is possible, that a form of ethical judgment is possible of a kind that gives this question the force of a last judgment: Have you acted in conformity with the desire that is in you?" Or as Lacan puts it five pages, no sorry five pages later: "The only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground or compromising given ground relative to one's desire." This maxim, simple and clear as it appears, don't compromise your desire, becomes elusive the moment we try to specify its meaning. How does it stand with regard to the panoply of today's ethical options? The problem is that it seems to fit almost all its main options. Liberal tolerant hedonism where "be faithful to your desire" means enjoy as much as possible, or what I will immediately develop what I mean by it, what we may call immoral ethics, or what I call Western Buddhism, or Levinasian-Derridean ethics or whatever. I mean it's really incredible how almost all the main ethical options that we find today, at least in popular ethics or among us academics, can be covered by psychoanalysis, even more specifically by Lacanians. Like we have conservative Lacanians, they are in France, Pierre Legendre and so on, who claim today all these gay marriage stuff it's a catastrophe, we need symbolic authority, we need return to a strong figure of the law, otherwise there will be decadence which will bring us new racism, fascism, whatever. So it's the return to paternal authority. Then we have the Levinasian-Derridean ethics of responsibility to otherness. That's another version of psychoanalytic ethics. Then we have again, we do have hedonists, we have Lacanian Nietzscheans where be faithful to your desire means what I call immoral ethics, just follow ruthlessly your desire and so on and so on. So where does Lacan stand with regard to all these options? The first thing to state categorically is that Lacanian ethics is not an ethics of hedonism. Whatever "do not compromise your desire" means, it does not mean the unrestrained rule of what Freud called the pleasure principle. For Lacan, hedonism is on the contrary the model of postponing desire on behalf of realistic compromises. To cut a long story short, *jouissance*, extreme enjoyment as the result of being faithful to your desire, *jouissance* hurts. So pleasure principle precisely tells you to compromise your desire in order to attain the greatest amount of pleasure, you have to calculate, economize, you have to sacrifice short-term pleasures for the more intense long-term pleasures. That's Lacan's view. So that the paradox is that even at least Western Buddhism is not immune to this trap. Dalai Lama itself wrote in the introduction of one of his books the first sentence: "The purpose of life is to be happy." Well not for psychoanalysis one should add. Why? You know how in Kant's description, Immanuel Kant, ethical duty functions like a foreign traumatic intruder that from outside disturbs our subject's homeostatic balance. For Kant, the moral law is something, it's a kind of foreign intruder, something that from outside with its uncompromising pressure terrorizes you. You must do your duty, account for some kind of a terrorizing agency which beyond the pleasure principle, irrespective of your pleasure, forces you to do, to do it. And for Lacan, desire has exactly the same status. Desire is the agency which is opposed to pleasure principle. Desire, which is why Lacan identifies desire with the Kantian moral law. For Lacan, desire is not balanced life, desire is something traumatic which disturbs your balance. So again, be faithful to your desire is not hedonism. And it's not only hedonism that we should render problematic here but all versions of at least simplistic utilitarian or even apparently more refined but nonetheless basically utilitarian approaches like those of distributive justice. For example, from this standpoint, I think we could we should criticize John Rawls' theory of justice. In the Rawls model of a just society, you know what's its main feature? Social inequalities are tolerated only insofar as they also help those at the bottom of the social ladder and insofar as they are not based on inherited hierarchies but on natural inequalities which are considered contingent not merits. That is to say, to simplify it, in a Rawlsian society, I... it would be justified for me to be richer than you if A) my wealth compared to you is the result of my hard work, blah blah blah, not of me inheriting it or whatever and B) if by me being richer than you, you would also be a little bit better. What I claim is that what Rawls doesn't see is how such a society would have created the conditions for an uncontrolled explosion of resentment. Why? In it, I would know that my lower status is fully justified. I would thus be deprived of excusing my failure as the result of social injustice. Namely, here I'm even ready to say I will invoke a horrible name for some of you that Friedrich Hayek saw something that Rawls ignores here. Namely when Friedrich Hayek wrote that what we perceive as the irrationality or injustice of capitalism, which is that we experience ultimately our failure or success on the market, at least up to a point, as something which depends on luck, fate, it's not, it doesn't really depend on me or you, this fundamental injustice, one guy worked like crazy but because of some totally contingent market fluctuation he failed or she failed and so on. But for Hayek, far from rendering capitalism non-operative, how should I put it, this is what makes it livable. Because Hayek's idea is that without this awareness, it would be, for example let's say you are much richer than me, you succeed on the market, I fail. If the market were to be experienced as just, then I would have to swallow this utter humiliation that you are really better than me. But if I can play "Oh it's only fate," then I can still sustain my narcissistic illusion, "I'm really a genius, you are an idiot, you were just lucky, it's market irrationality" and so on and so on. In other words, the very what Rawls doesn't take into account, and at some points of his work, if you read in detail *Theory of Justice*, he notices it but he simply dismisses it. He says, it's a crucial formula which for me is a terrible lack, he says: "My idea of just society ignores envy, resentment." No, it would have worked only in a society where resentment, envy doesn't play a fundamental role. What I claim is it does. As Gore Vidal put it nicely: "It is not enough for me to win, the other guy must lose." That's it. Or as we in Slovenia, we are the people of resentment I think, the Slovenians. We have all these nice examples saying, like: a fairy comes to a poor farmer and tells him "Okay, I will grant you a wish, I will do to you whatever you want on condition that beware that I will do to your neighbor twice I will do to you or give to you." You know what's the farmer's immediate answer? "No problem, take one eye." That's how... I mean we should never underestimate, we should never underestimate this aspect. So again, what I was shocked is that here in United Kingdom, no wonder then that even neo-conservatives accept this Rawlsian principle. Look what in December David Cameron, you know the new neo-conservative boss, said. I quote: "I think the test of all our conservative policies should be: what does it do for the people who have the least, the people on the bottom rung of the ladder?" No problem, even for them. So again, even these more refined versions of hedonism where there are differences, justice and so on, should be rejected. One should never underestimate the power of resentment. But now another ethical complication. Nonetheless, I have problems with Nietzschean critique of resentment. I claim that there are extreme situations. I wonder if you agree with me. The idea came to me from, you know, Sebald. Sebald, German writer who died recently, I love him. In his *On the Natural History of Destruction*, he has a wonderful passage on, you know who Jean Améry was? Améry is Mayer, traumatized surviving Auschwitz, he changed the name and all. And here is how Sebald interprets Améry's writings. Quote: "The energy behind Améry's polemics derived from implacable resentment. A large number of his essays are concerned with justifying this emotion, commonly regarded as a warped need for revenge. Justifying this emotion as essential to a truly critical view of the past. Resentment, writes Améry in full awareness of the illogicality of his attempt at a definition, resentment nails everyone of us onto the cross of his ruined past. Absurdly it demands that the irreversible be turned around, that the event be undone. The issue then is not to resolve but to reveal the conflict. The spur of resentment which Améry conveys to us in his polemic demands recognition of the right to resentment, entailing no less than a programmatic attempt to sensitize the consciousness of a people already rehabilitated by time" and so on and so on. What... how do I read this? When a subject is hurt in such a devastating way that the very idea of revenge, according to *lex talionis*, eye for an eye and so on, is no less ridiculous than the promise of the reconciliation with the perpetrator after the perpetrator's atonement, the only thing that remains is to persist in the what Sebald calls unremitting denunciation of injustice. Again, okay in South Africa they had that Truth and Reconciliation Committee, but nonetheless I think this only works because everybody admitted that South African regime was a nightmare, but it wasn't quite Nazism. I mean just try to imagine if somebody were to say in in Germany: listen, we shouldn't pursue any revenge, let's establish a Truth and Reconciliation Committee, and every Nazi who comes, he admits it publicly and he is pardoned. And then, perfectly, Eichmann comes and says "I admit it, horrible, I did all those plans," "Nice, I shake your hand, I regret it." It doesn't work. Admit it, also all ideas of punishment are a little bit ridiculous. What would be the punishment for? And I think Améry is here simply right to say, you know, all these formulas, when you have such an extreme thing as Holocaust or Gulag, whatever, all things like all these big humanist formulas, "Truth and Reconciliation," "We will forgive you but we will not forget it," why should I forgive a Nazi who... isn't it that the only properly ethical thing here is not, it's not even a revenge, it's just for me what he means, Améry here by resentment, is still this insistence, this shouldn't have happened, I'm not ready to forget it, the memory in me survives to the end. You know it's just this insistence on, okay you can give me all these historical reasons, German history, all those stupid... no wonder he is, she was such a hit in Germany, Goldhagen. He delivered the best justification to render Germans happy, because isn't the best message that the Germans could have gotten: it's part of your collective ideology, which means it has nothing to do with me. Here I even prefer *Schindler's List*, I mean because the only good thing that I read about the film *Schindler's List* is that the true way to criticize the Germans is to show one German who did something good. In this way, the message to the others is: you see, you could have done it, it wasn't simply part of your collective ideology or what. Okay, so what I'm saying, and I like this idea, is that if in such a case you insist in this resentment attitude, "I'm not ready to forget it, the memory in me survives to the end," I think this is not the resentment of proper to the slave morality against which Nietzsche was writing. It rather stands for a refusal to normalize the crime, to make it part of the normal, explainable, accountable history. After all possible explanations, the question returns: yes, I got it all, but nonetheless, how could you have done it? This resentment is precisely almost I'm tempted to say a kind of a heroic Nietzschean resentment, a refusal to compromise, an insistence against all odds. So again, I think that there is more to resentment than that than some pseudo-Nietzscheans would claim. Okay, so much just to conclude this part. So hedonism or any kind of utilitarian calculus of pleasure or even in a broader way ethics of distributive justice, whatever, this doesn't work for Lacan. So if hedonism is to be rejected, is then Lacanian ethics a version of the heroic immoral ethics enjoining us to remain faithful to oneself, to persist on our chosen way beyond good and evil? Is this it? This kind of a radical ethics of fidelity to yourself, not morality in the sense of concern for others' good but be what you are, be faithful to what you want? Of course, my favorite example which I often quote, here is Don Giovanni at the end of Mozart's opera, you know, when the Stone Guest arrives and tells him "repent." What's the situation of Don Giovanni there? He knows that he will die. So if he renounces his past sinful life, he will still be redeemed, maybe even paradise whatever, that's the choice. If he remains faithful to himself, he goes to hell. And he insists, "no I don't repent." It's a kind of ethical act, fidelity to because he doesn't have anything to profit. He knows that the only thing he has to profit he earns eternal damnation. He does it. So in other words, is it this then simply, this kind of fidelity? Incidentally, there is an interesting book recently published, maybe some of you know it, Lee Edelman's *No Future*, Duke University Press, Which is it develops the notion of homosexuality as involving the ethics of now, unconditional fidelity to enjoyment, of following the death drive by way of totally ignoring all references to future. According to Edelman, homosexuality stands for the radical assumption of the negativity of death drive, of withdrawing from reality into the abyss of excessive enjoyment. And along these lines Edelman opposes this radical ethics of homosexuality to the predominant obsession with posterity, either ecological or children. Children are for Edelman, and I love this idea, the pathological moment which binds us to pragmatic considerations like what will happen in the future and thus betrays, makes us betray the radical ethics of enjoyment. So the figure for Edelman, the figure of an innocent helpless child, this ultimate victim, is the highest ethical trap, the fetish of betraying the ethics of enjoyment. This would be again what I call immoral ethics. We should always remember here that Nietzsche's masterpiece is *Genealogy of Morals*, not of ethics. The two for Nietzsche are not the same. Morality is concerned with the symmetry of my relations to other humans. The zero level of morality is "do not do to me what you would not want me to do to you." Ethics on the contrary deals with my consistency with myself, my fidelity to my own desire. No wonder that one of the most succinct formulations of this immoral ethics is found in Stalin. You know where? It's incredible. It was recently published in a book on Stalin, it was found only afterwards in Stalin's private copy of Lenin's works, where on the cover Stalin wrote in late 30s they think the following comment he made. This is quoted from Stalin, but it's private, he made this on his copy of work by Lenin, I think it's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. I quote: "One, three items, one weakness, two idleness, three stupidity. These are the only things that can be called vices. Everything else in the absence of the aforementioned is undoubtedly virtue. If a man is one strong spiritually, two active, three clever or capable, then he is good regardless of any other vices" and so on. This is immoral ethics at its purest. So again, is this the Lacanian ethics? This kind of immoral ethics, ethics beyond the good and evil as opposed to unethical morality? As I already hinted at or developed the last time, I think the answer is no. The reason the answer is no is that the Stalinist universe still mobilizes a figure of the Big Other. In what sense? Let me develop it a little bit more. You know probably the most intelligent justification of Stalinism, Merleau-Ponty's *Humanism and Terror* from where Stalinist terror is justified as a kind of way Pascalian almost wager on the future. If the final result of today's horrors will be the bright communist future, then this outcome will retroactively redeem the terrible things a revolutionary has to do today. And incidentally, it would be interesting to develop how this is maybe the best example of the ethical shift in the last years. How with Merleau-Ponty it was still humanism and terror. For him there was no opposition here. Humanism must take if you want to be actual humanist the wager, the risk of terror. Today we have exactly the opposite: humanism versus terror. And again along similar lines, Stalinist like to imagine a future moment of final victory at which all the necessary victims will be given their due, when the accounts will be settled. This is to what Lacan refers as to the perspective of the last judgment, a perspective clearly discernible in one of the key terms of the Stalinist discourse, that of objective guilt or objective meaning of your acts. While you can be an honest individual who is acting with most sincere intentions, you are nonetheless objectively guilty if your acts serve reactionary forces and so on and so on. And as I developed the last time, I wouldn't like to repeat it too much, the point is that for Lacan, Lacanian ethics is precisely an ethics of a radical responsibility, a radically atheist ethics, an ethics where you are not allowed to smuggle in even in a disavowed way, in a masked way attributed to other or whatever any kind of this normative reference of any kind of Big Other which as it were guarantees it. And this is why Lacan, in a mocking way this is not his kind of atheism, this is why Lacan says that, I quote now from *Fundamental Concepts*, the English translation page that the true formula of atheism is not God is dead, the true formula of atheism is God is unconscious. What he meant is that we may be consciously atheists today but we have we rely on unconsciously or we make another one believe for us. You remember you all know I was using this times, I will not repeat here, you know that joke that I repeat all the time you know it of a patient who escapes from the asylum, he knows he's not a chicken he's not a grain, the chicken knows it and so on. That's how we are officially atheists but the other doesn't know it. We let the other believe, we let the other believe for us. So for Lacan again effectively not relying on other, to be effectively an atheist is a difficult thing where again it's easy for you not to believe. What is much more difficult is not to make another believe on you, not to have another subject supposed to believe. It's incredible how we may accept of being atheists whatever, but we need a kind of there must be another guy who is naive either just a social order whatever. And this precisely is all present in Stalinism. In what way? Not only at this deep at this deepest level of objective meaning of your acts but even in a much more superficial way. Depth and surface always overlap here. Like, did you notice how Stalinism with all its terror and so on, it's and this is crucial I think, it's one of the orders, political orders most sensitive, arguably the most sensitive to the power of appearances? Like the ultimate horror in Stalinism is that the appearances will be disturbed in some way. For example even, let me give you a ridiculous example. I read recently in a book on everyday life in Soviet Union how did you wonder if you saw some old documentaries how never on the first of May and for the October Revolution the two big military parades, did you notice that it never rained on them? Because they did something horrible it was now revealed, they they sprayed all about through planes some kind of a drops which prevented clouds forming, which were ecologically catastrophic but they did the work. The idea was it would be nightmare, it would have been subconsciously experienced by people as the sign of impotence if the rain were to ruin the May parade. It was absolute obsession, it had to it had to be perfect and so on and so on. So here again unfortunately if you want Stalinism doesn't do the job. So how what then would have been psychoanalytic ethics if it's also not this immoral ethics? Let's go further. Usually we identify in Freud three ethical agencies. Or two different terms, like *Idealich* which means ideal ego, *Ich-Ideal*, ego ideal, and *Über-Ich*, super-ego. As we all know Freud tended to identify them. For example in *Das Ich und das Es*, the ego and the id, he uses ego ideal and ideal ego as the same term, at some point he even I think the title of one of the chapters even is ego ideal or super-ego, even the two of them. But I think what Lacan does here is very productive. Lacan introduces here this distinction between the three of them which exactly fits the distinction Imaginary, Symbolic, Real. That is to say, ideal ego is imaginary, the ideal image of myself, what I want to be, the way I want to appear. Ego ideal is something different. It's the normative order, the agency if you want the normative agency which I want to impress, the gaze that I want to fascinate, the third gaze. Ego ideal is the Big Other. And super-ego is something different. It's an obscene agency, an agency of obscene enjoyment. And the basic thesis of Lacan is that precisely ego ideal and super-ego are complementary. That is to say every social, every explicit social normativity needs its super-ego obscene supplement. A supplement which of course is not explicitly acknowledged as such but which is implied. What do I mean by this? I mean all those motives which we are never ready to admit them publicly but from time to time they nonetheless pop up in our public space in a censored form. In the form of denegation. Recall for example what you know who William Bennett is, the author of the book of virtue, virtues, the great American neo-conservative moralist and it was a nice surprise when they discovered that he is a compulsive gambler. On I remember I was in the States all the media reported as a scandal when on September now half a year ago, on his calling program *Morning in America*, here is what Bennett said, listen: "But I do know that it's true that if you wanted to reduce crime, you could, if that were your sole purpose, you could abort every black baby in this country and your crime rate would go down. That would be an impossibly ridiculous and morally reprehensible thing to do, but your crime rate would go down." Of course, two days later Bennett immediately qualified his statement: "I was putting a hypothetical proposition and then said about it it was morally reprehensible to recommend abortion of an entire group of people. But this is what happens when you argue that ends can justify the means" and so on and so on. No, I think this is what happens when, this is what Freud meant when he wrote that the unconscious knows no negation. That you know he may have denied it afterwards but the example invoked is his super-ego at its purest. It's the fantasy which is this dream of "oh let's abort all blacks." You can recognize it only in the form of denegation. Okay, I will not bore you about how this is not only an individual structure but how the example that I know relatively well how I'm more and more convinced how this same gap between ego ideal in the sense of explicit normative structure and super-ego as its obscene supplement, super-ego supplement, how this duality is clearly operative even at the institutional level. I'm more and more convinced that one should introduce the term of institutional unconscious. Let me be precise here, not collective unconscious, not any Jungian obscurantism, but institutional unconscious in the sense of social practices which are not publicly recognized, kind of obscene secret, but nonetheless as such part of the institutional logic, not simply psychological individual aberrations. For example the obvious example, it's probably the same in other religions, I don't know, because of my background and what I read in newspapers that's the only reason I focus on Catholic, of course to me the first example that comes to mind is this Catholic pedophilia. I've spoken with some people, Catholics themselves, who analyzed this examples. And they told me that what shocked them is that you cannot simply say as the church tries to say, "Okay what can we do, we don't have enough priests, we have to accept different people to be ordained, some of them are pedophilia, okay we will screen them out." No, this guy told me that he analyzed cases and arrived at the strange conclusion how many cases were the guy when he started his theological studies and was ordained as a priest was straight heterosexual and then literally as the result of being as it were coloured, co-opted, integrated into the institution he became pedophiliac. That is to say it's as if pedophilia is the obscene supplement, something involved in the very logic of the institution. It's not personal psychological, it's not "oh my god sorry we didn't know he as a private person is that." It's literally part of the institutional unconscious. I think this would be again a nice topic of possible studies, this notion of this notion of institutional unconscious. Which is why I think today it's difficult to be an atheist. Because again, it's easy to disavow it publicly, I'm cynical, ruthless, and so on. But unconsciously we believe, not unconsciously even in the sense of deep in ourselves, for me unconscious is at the surface, unconsciously in the sense of at the level of the rituals that we follow and so on and so on. Let me give you again a couple of examples like where do we stand with belief? I remember how often when I encounter a somebody who really literally believes, I'm shocked, "My God how can he really believe in God, in heaven" and so on. But if you look at it closely, don't you think that it's shocking to believe but it's also how should I put it, it's also shocking not to believe? In the sense that what's the attitude of all of us? I don't like Arthur Clarke, the science fiction writer, but he said one nice thing. He says there are two possibilities: that there is no God we are alone and that there is God. And we find both possibilities intolerable, nightmarish. We secretly don't want really to accept that we are alone, but to really encounter, to have the proof that there is a God or what would be also traumatic. So we are all in this obscure in-between state. It would be shocking to learn absolutely that there is no God, but for the majority of people I claim it would be maybe even more shocking to learn that there is God. This is what I like in this intelligent conservative writers, Catholic no he wasn't a conservative my god he was leftist but writers like you know the big topic of Graham Greene, *The End of the Affair* and so on. The trauma not of discovering that there is no God but that there is God, the trauma of discovering a miracle and so on. So again, it's along these lines that I claim that we have today a kind of ironic asymmetry. It's almost as if in order to be truly, that the true atheists are afraid to admit it. It's only if you are superficially a believer that you can truly be an atheist. Umberto Eco wrote recently a column where he would put it nicely. A quote: "I frequently met scientists who outside their own narrow discipline are superstitious, to such an extent that it sometimes seems to me that to be a rigorous unbeliever today you have to be a philosopher or perhaps a priest." And it's also the other way around. I have many friends who appear publicly atheists, scientists, whatever. And then they told me privately they have doubts they have need to believe, but the only way they can believe shamelessly is publicly to act as an atheist. It's a very strange logic. So what I'm saying is that one shouldn't laugh at it. It's very difficult to be truly an atheist. Especially if we take into account another option fact, which is what kind of an atheist? Namely did you notice how there are atheisms and atheisms? Every political sorry, every... isn't it as if every religion generates its own atheism? And I'm an atheist so my message is not atheism is only secondary a shadow of religion. But nonetheless it's an interest... for example, take somebody like Spinoza or Freud. They were atheists. But isn't it absolutely clear that their atheism is a Jewish atheism? That the whole background is Jewish? They are it's simply clear that this kind of cosmopolitan, enlightened atheism is Jewish atheism. Then take somebody like Heidegger. Not Catholic early, not late, but Heidegger of *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*). This atheism of authentic responsibility, finitude, assuming one's fate through anxiety, anxious awareness that there is no external guarantee of some... this heroic let's meet the abyss take the risk. Isn't it clear that this is Protestant atheism? If there ever was Protestant atheism this is a Protestant atheism. Then coming to my dear, coming to either some even to my dear friends Negri and Hardt. I mean for me it's clear that they are Catholic atheists, the two of them. Sometimes strangely I even doubt if they are atheists at all, if they are not simply Catholics. But you know what I mean? What I mean is that what kind of atheism? That's the first thing to specify. And I think that in contrast to Pascalian wager, which is you know you have nothing to lose if you bet on God, you find in Diderot, Denis Diderot, you know the great French atheist Enlightenment guy, a wonderful I think the most ethically the most daring defense of atheism. Which is, which is that... that's a quote from Diderot observation on a... an an... okay I read it in English: "In a word, it is that the majority of those who deny a remunerating and avenging God has all to lose and nothing to gain." Through this and some other ironic references to Pascal, Diderot develops the idea that the wager of atheist is exactly the opposite one of Pascal. The if the atheist is right, he gains nothing. If he is right there is no God he gains nothing. If he is wrong he loses everything. But nonetheless he should insist. To you know to make a wager not this conformist Pascalian wager, "I wager on God because if I am wrong I lose nothing," but to put a wager to make a wager when if you lose you lose everything if you gain you gain nothing. That would be the true for me if you want atheist wager. So what would be today for me what would be the contours of this atheist position? I think that I tend to agree here with Badiou that it is to to it has something to do with what in Jewish Christian tradition is called neighbor, but not neighbor in this all too noble Levinasian sense: neighbor face staring at us, ethical injunction, unconditional responsibility and so on. But neighbor in a more radical sense. Neighbor as this absolute abyss, the inhuman excess in the other, this absolute abyss of otherness. This abyss where when you encounter face to face another person to cut a long story short beyond goodness, beyond tragedy even, where you encounter the abyss of the other person. Like something like even why not something like in Primo Levi when he describes in his *If This Is a Man*. I'm not talking now generally about those *Muselmann* and Muslims, those who were reduced to mere vegetation no longer humanly engaged subjects. But I was thinking about something else, about when I recently reread *If This Is a Man*. What did strike me in a deepest way was how Levi describes somewhere in the middle of the book the regular process once every three months in Auschwitz which was called *Selekcja*, selections. All the prisoners in Auschwitz were called and then okay in more more groups, they had to enter a room and just run in front for three-four seconds in front of an SS doctor who just barely for a split of a second looked on them and put them either to be left to live or to be gassed to be killed, no? The idea was you know to judge them, are they healthy enough still to work or should they be why wasteful do them should they be dismissed. Okay, should they be killed. What struck me as an incredibly monstrosity is how the way Primo Levi describes this situation is that of a comedy. It's as if there was something comic in it because he reports how the prisoners were getting ready for this and they were teaching each other, you know before you run in front of the prisoners pinch your lips a little bit because then they will be more red you will appear more healthy, or how to put your stomach in or how to gather your... it was really he was describing a comedy but a comedy where of course you don't laugh, but it's a situation beyond dignity, it's a nightmarish situation. And the... this is why I claim Auschwitz or generally concentration camp survivors were such a trauma for Stalinists. We in Slovenia have the most horrible memory of one truly horrible thing that communists did, what in even after Yugoslavia broke from Soviet Union, there was the only true monster show trial that we had. It was called so-called it was the so-called Dachau trial against the survivors, communists who survived Dachau concentration camp. They were accused that they survived because they collaborated with Gestapo there and then worked as imperialist agents blah blah blah. So can you imagine the horror, but then I've spoken with some old communists who unrepentant even now years ago defended this. And I asked them "Okay, but you must know that these guys were innocent, what is it in it?" And I found a strangely displaced version of what many people report when they meet survivors from Auschwitz, that they feel somehow obscene guilty, almost a kind of a shame, like "why am I alive?" This Stalinist old Stalinist gave me a different version. His idea was that our universe is the universe of struggle. For him there is no position where you are so broken down that you no longer can struggle, can have the dignity of a struggle. You are the track, you are a traitor there. So for them they were guilty for accepting to be this impotent whatever beyond dignity and so on. He couldn't accept this old Stalinist that there are these situations of utter terror where how should I put it you can no longer fight. That was too much of him. They were guilty, they had to be liquidated. He said if he literally said if something like this is really possible, this idea of where you are deprived of dignity ability to act, he got almost into a into a panic this old communist. He told me then our fight is utterly ultimately meaningless. They must have been traitors otherwise my life has no sense. It's a horrible statement, like they must be traitors otherwise my life has no sense. And what I'm claiming is that in confronting this totally devastated man, this would be the neighbor. And I think that today although officially we all now comes the true truth to conclude the true horror, although we all talk about neighbor's helping the neighbor's victims and so on and so on, I think that this category of neighbor, and this is for me why we can talk about torture again and so on, is disappearing. How? Ah, let me quote a really depressing horrible book. Nothing obscene although for me it's worse than the worst multiple orgies pornography. Did you read the book, no I don't think it's a bestseller here but it was a big bestseller in the United States, like New York Times bestseller a couple of months ago, Sam Harris, *The End of Faith*? It's a book which precisely argues that in today's world religious fundamentalism is the main source of violence, we should abandon it blah blah, but the more horrible aspect of this book is that it justifies torture. How? Based on the distinction between our immediate being impressed by the suffering of others and our abstract notion of others' suffering. The starting point of Harris's line of argumentation is that of course for most of us it's much easier to push a button where you abstractly know tens of thousand will die as the result of the bomb you trigger in this way than to torture in front of you you see him shouting whatever a person. But for Harris this is a kind of ethical illusion parallel to perceptual illusions. According to Harris this is the same illusion as he says ironically, you know primitive people thought moon is just a small circle. Now we know through astronomy that or sun that sun is larger than earth but it's kind of a perceptual illusion. And he claimed in the same that at the level of our moral development we are still like primitives who think that sun is smaller than earth, that is to say who think that the suffering about which you only know abstractly matters less than your immediate suffering. Again, according to Harris the ultimate cause of this illusion is that although our power of abstract reasoning has developed immensely, our emotional ethical responses remain conditioned by hundreds thousands of years of instinctual reactions of sympathy to suffering and pain which is directly witnessed. This is why shooting someone point blank is for us more repulsive than pressing a button that will kill thousands. Here is a quote: "Given what many of us believe about the exigencies of our war on terrorism, the practice of torture in certain circumstances would seem to be not only permissible but necessary. Still, it does not seem any more acceptable in ethical terms than it did before. The reasons for this are I trust every bit as neurological as those that gives rise to the moon illusion. It may be time to take out our rulers and hold them up to the sky." For me this is I will try to explain why terrifying logic. So in order to suspend this evolutionary condition vulnerability to the physical display of others' suffering, Harris imagines an ideal truth pill, an effective torture device equivalent to decaffeinated coffee or Diet Coke. Listen to this one, this is for me the true horror, page of the book *The End of Faith*: "A drug that would deliver both the instruments of torture and the instruments of the torture's utter concealment. The action of the pill would be to produce transitory paralysis and transitory misery of a kind that no human being would willingly submit to a second time. Imagine how we torturers would feel if, after giving this pill to captive terrorists, each terrorist lay down for what appeared to be an hour's nap, only to arise and immediately confess everything he knows about the workings of his organization. Might we not be tempted to call this a truth pill in the end?" End of quote. So why do I find this quote terrifying ethically? The very first line, "a drug that would deliver both the instrument of torture and the instrument of its utter concealment," introduces this logic of chocolate laxative. The torture is like decaf coffee, you know you have it without unpleasant side effects. My second reaction: my God he is in a strange company. You know I remember when I was young that infamous in Soviet Union Serbsky Institute, which as some of you maybe know was the psychiatric institute of KGB. They already had something like this I read. They had not a pill but an injection into your heart which basically made your breathing very difficult. But to an outside observer it was nothing, you were just dozing. But the idea is that the experience was so worse than painful, so utterly terrifying that everybody confessed and so on and so on. But more radically, my idea is that the dream of this objectivization in the sense of truth pill and so on, proper distance, further if the guy is further away his his or her suffering should matter as much as the the one who is is precisely to cancel to erase the neighbor. The notion of the neighbor. I think that in this view people are no longer neighbors. They are just like abstract entities to be calculated with and so on. That is to say I think that Harris is cheating here when he mentions proximity. You know the neighbor is... the paradox of the neighbor is that no matter how far he or she is, it's always too close. For me the ideal of the neighbor is, you know the neighbor is a little bit like for example Jews were definitely neighbors for Hitler, which is why the more he killed them the more the remainder was dangerous or whatever. Neighbor is always too close in the sense of that in the other, the unpleasant excessive aspect of obscene enjoyment whatever in other that disturbs you. And again what's difficult is to accept that, that dimension of the neighbor. And I think that again all this stuff about... what I claim is that what we have here in Sam Harris his idea of this ideal torturing is exactly the same logic as the logic of why we oppose harassment so much. Harassment is again I think our fear of neighbor. Don't come too close to me. The point is to erase the dimension of the neighbor. Of course in this case the dimension of the neighbor has nothing whatsoever to do with again any Levinasian ethical grandeur. It's rather if you want to put it in this way the the inhuman, not in the sense of terrible crimes but to be human means already to fit certain ideals of certain normative imagined community and so on and so on. A human being is according to Freud and so on at his or her core inhuman. There is an excess, an abyss into the other human being, the core of a human being is an abyss, which is why precisely we are free being and so on. And if there is a lesson of the 20th century is that again the difficult thing to accept is to accept this inhuman core of the other. So after all this talk, let me give you a pathetic example again from Stalinism, history of Stalinism, a very modest example of what would be for me, it has nothing to do with psychoanalysis, a simple ethical act. It's the story of an ordinary girl called Sophia Karpay, who was the head of the cardiographic unit of the Kremlin hospital in the late 40s. Her misfortune was that it was her job to take twice the electrocardiogram of Andrei Zhdanov, you know the top Soviet nomenklatura member who died in early August She took two EKGs of Zhdanov. The first EKG displayed some heart troubles while the second one showed a much better picture. So in Sophia Karpay was arrested with the charge that in conspiracy with other doctors treating Zhdanov she falsified the data, erasing the clear indications that the heart attack did occur. Then after harsh treatment including continuous brutal beatings all other doctors, this was the so-called doctors' plot, confessed. She didn't confess. And it was a totally crazy situation, nobody even her interrogators, her friends were perplexed why is she doing this. They just wanted her to confess that she falsified the data that Zhdanov did get the second attack. Why? Again the construct was the following one. If they were able to prove that Zhdanov did have a heart attack, this meant that the doctors didn't treat him properly and really wanted to kill him. Why did they want to... now just to give you an idea of the immense stakes, ethico-political stakes of this. As it is clear now from the archives, things were much more serious. What Stalin wanted to prove was that through this doctors' plot was that doctors directly connected with British Secret Service and CIA tried to kill Soviet leadership. And they wanted that in the early 50s the moment Soviet Union got the atomic bomb they thought they can risk a limited attack to Western Europe. They were as it is clear now they were doing it very seriously, they already even a comical detail they already printed the medals for their heroes, for their thousands of medals for their even they even took of these things already. Okay, so all they needed to dot the I was the final confession. I mean it's very strange, this were maybe some limits nonetheless of the rationality of Soviet system because the point is why didn't they falsify simply, no? But nonetheless they somehow wanted her to confess so that then and she insisted just long enough so that Stalin died, went into a coma and then of course the case which was Stalin's madness was immediately dismissed. And so it's an unbelievable act. She she didn't know what was at stake, but maybe my god maybe this woman saved the life of hundred of thousands, maybe millions. And there was no big deal in it. She simply insisted. It was this kind of a stubborn attitude she insisted. And she wasn't even anything special. People remembered her as an ordinary modest girl, very petit-bourgeois, prim a little bit and so on. They were beating her, she was nonetheless there shaking all in blood she insisted "no no I didn't falsify it" and so on till it was too late not for her but for Stalin and so on. This I think is what she is for me the best example of what for me is the masterpiece of the 20th century literature, you know Samuel Beckett's *The Unnamable*. Which is I think that Beckett is the great ethical writer. In the sense that I think his motive is not this search of a God or so on. It's precisely this fidelity to insist, go on. You know, isn't this maybe the best way to to a very primitive things thing Hollywood style thing, if we try to imagine her this poor girl's, Sophia Karpay's thoughts while she was beaten there. Maybe she was thinking something like here are, you will know them, the very last lines from Beckett's *Unnamable*: "In the silence you don't know, you must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on." I mean this, this, this is death drive if you want for Lacan. This is death drive, this stubbornness independently of pleasure principle blah blah blah, I go on, I insist, I insist. And I think that so again you see when people ask me "okay what is this ethics of psychoanalysis, something pathetic and so on," no, we don't need any big act, big acts or whatever, it's just this kind of a stubborn attitude. And here what I like about Lacan here, whatever you may have against Lacan, is did you notice how he is very respectful here, Lacan? In the sense that when he deals with this kind of examples like from Antigone to this poor Sophia Karpay, how in a very elegant way I... he apparently renounces psychoanalysis. Namely, it's so strange how many people, even those who criticize Lacan, like Judith Butler in her *Antigone's Claim*, she doesn't notice one obvious thing. Lacan writes a commentary precisely in the ethics seminar on Antigone. Antigone as we all know belongs to a certain well-known family, Oedipus family. In Oedipal families as we know some things happen at the level of sexuality, incest and so on. But if you read Lacan's reading of Antigone, he totally dismisses all these psychoanalytic topics like "why brother," "is it because she wanted to screw brother or whatever." He is all of a sudden Lacan is very conservative even there, no? None of this stuff her Antigone's sacrifice was really a sublimated way of some kind of incestuous desire or whatever. It is as if Lacan knew it what Levi-Strauss knew. You know that Levi-Strauss's joke that Levi-Strauss's reference to some primitive tribe, so-called primitive tribe where they knew that all dreams have a sexual meaning, all dreams except sex explicitly sexual dreams, no? It's as if yes, all other families you always have to look if you sacrifice yourself for a brother or a father, you have to look for a for an incestuous meaning, but not in the Oedipus family because they already were, no? And I think that so I think that this is what I find great in Lacan, far from being this kind of a how should I call it, the primitive psychoanalytic reductionist, you know, beneath every ethical sacrifice there is some kind of I don't know masochism, incestuous wish and so on. On the contrary, Lacanian death drive is the I'm not afraid to use the term, this kind of minimal metaphysical foundation of ethics. And you don't have, you don't have anything behind behind it. The miracle it's... what is traumatic is death drive itself. It's not that how should I put it, the usual idea of psychoanalytic reading is for example let's take Kant. This is how Lacan reads Kant and especially then this will bring us back to this ethical topic, Kant with Sade. What is the primitive reading of Kant with Sade? I mean today almost everybody says "of course we know Kant with Sade means Sade is the truth of Kant" which means forget about Kantian ethical rigorism, it's really just a sublimated mystified expression of some I don't know sadistic masochistic... you know this old idea that ethical rigorism is a repressed pathological expression of some masochism you don't... you know like this proverbial for ordinary people again Kantian Sadean character of Kant. If you say Kant was a Sadean they would say "of course we all know it, when somebody ruthlessly insist on doing your duty for the sake of duty the model is that perverse teacher who beats you but says 'you know I suffer when I see you suffering but I do it for the duty for your own good blah blah blah'." No, but read Lacan. Lacan says the exact opposite. Lacan's thesis is not Kant was a secret sadist. That is to say beneath the universal form of free autonomous ethical act doing duty for the sake of duty we should discover some pathological desire whatever. No, it's the other way around. Sade was a Kantian. According to Lacan, to account for what Marquis de Sade is doing, you should read him as a kind of a Kantian pursuing a ruthless ethical imperative. Sade only works if you read him as somebody pursuing *jouissance* as an unconditional ethical imperative. At the level of pleasures it's boring, it doesn't work. I mean read Days of Sodom*, no it has nothing to do with pleasures, it's pure mathematics like you know if you go to the day you know like three cows, one boy, three women, one dog, they screw in this way, two cows, three dogs, whatever. It has nothing to do with pleasures, it's purely abstract. But so how should I put it, you know usually we think that here Kant and Lacan is a little bit like Graham Greene in the sense that the miracle is the ethical act. The the the traumatic thing to accept is not that we did an ethical act, no but no the traumatic thing to accept is not that the ethical act is not pure, that we have this psycho... okay put in this way. You remember the last time I told you about how false it is this pseudo-psychoanalytic search for real or in modern art you look for the real for the real foundation whatever. Last time I mentioned this modern art works this uh Saci and so on. Even a nicer one would have been in medieval times. You know how priests if you were too obsessed by sexuality, the priest's standard approach was "okay imagine your favorite woman, boy, man, whatever naked, but then just imagine how he or she will be years from now, old teeth, sagging breast, disgusting, or even imagine now what is beneath the skin." But this is easy to do. The true trauma is how should I put it, this is again this is not the real. This is what you escape from. And in the same way the real is the miracle of the ethical act. And that's the death drive. Okay, I was maybe a little bit too long and disorganized. Next time in two days we go from here to directly to Hegel, only Hegel. If you want, read, read the most miraculous Hegel, well Hegel does better than Foucault and all of them, I already mentioned it. You have a good Oxford University Press published it, Hegel *Philosophy of Spirit*, which is part three of *Encyclopedia*. Just browse a little bit, it's very easy to read but it must be the thick complete edition, I mean with all the later later later added transcripts of Hegel's students, anthropology. That part where Hegel deals with madness and habits. It's unbelievable. All Foucault is there. Hegel says explicitly: being mad is a structural presupposition through which subjectivity awakens from animal spirit through madness. And then habit as basic human nature, second habit is an attempt to control constitutive madness. It's unbelievable. So in other words, from death drive we go to Hegelian death drive. So we have ten minutes of discussion? In principle yes, okay. But ten minutes, you know I always fight linear Derridean notion of temporality and so on and so on. So any questions on what's been said? (Inaudible question from the audience...) That's a very good question you know in what sense? Because I think that Lacan himself oscillates here. Which is why I think that *Ethics of Psychoanalysis* is not the ultimate version because in *Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan is for me too close to that Bataillean transgressive model where it is that in the ethical experience, prosopopoeia, you go through the Big Other, you see this abyss, but then nobody can dwell there too long you basically return to the Big Other and then at the end we have a kind of a almost cynical logic like: you play the game being aware that it's only the game, you return to the Big Other in a playful mocking way. But I absolutely don't want to return to this option. I claim that the Big problem of Lacan of the last years is this, without any irony I use the term, the Leninist problem: can we have not this transgressive individual experience, but can we have a form of collectivity without Big Other? I think this is what he was looking in in this ridiculously Leninist problematic of writing pure Lenin Lacanian you know this new statutes rules of psychoanalytic societies and so on and so on. How to constitute... of course it was empirically it was really a failure. But I think we shouldn't renounce this dream. If we do, then we are back at this common cynical wisdom where truth is a moment of this of this transgressive enlightenment, but then in everyday life all we can do is return to no normal cynical, we you have to play the game. If there is a phrase which I think encapsulates everything that if not Lacan I am against is this: at the end of the day you discover you must play the game, you just have to do it in a wise way, be aware that it's only a game, don't take it too seriously and so on and so on. No, I want it to take it seriously, how should I put it. If there is something against my nature is this attitude of wisdom. So in this sense I think that what you approached now is crucial topic because for example here I'm almost alone with Badiou. Miller opts in his last writings clearly for this cynical version. For him society needs corruption, it is obscene, and politics as such, social life is a domain of identifications in the sense of wrong blinding identifications. So in other words, social space as such is link rooted in certain self-blinding. So you can only arrive at truth in distancing from social space. For example that's Miller's option and so I I mean at least the way he formulated it in some texts. So then there is there is a different option which a young pupil of my student who book I now organized the Italian guy who works in Oxford Lorenzo Chiesa, he develops in his thesis another radical version. Why not we need new ego ideal, new super-ego and so on. That we can do it better like that we do need simply a new order, a new super-ego... but things are here very open. I think, yes. Well since you said you agree with Badiou on the notion of fidelity and ethics, I wonder what for you stands in the ontology for the event. How do you account for the event? Ah, that's are you asking me as a variation of the I'm not mean it in a Jesus way because this is a serious problem, the variation of the question but how do we distinguish fake from real like why Hitler is not an event, to cut a long story short? How do we... well I think this is a big problem because I know I know this is... okay maybe you will not be convinced but I will just give you a brief version. We should never forget at least something it is something that Badiou and Lacan share. One thing that Badiou has even more than Lacan is he always emphasizes that event is nothing in itself, what counts is fidelity to the event. That is to say it's not Badiou is totally opposed to this conservative notion, all conservatives like Paris '68, oh what happens the day after. What matters is the day after, how it is... it's not event, it's precisely how event is to use Badiou's term later inscribed into the order of being. So but next point what Lacan is aware of and also Badiou is that you know and this would be my answer. It's relatively easy to see this insofar as you keep it in mind that an event is not something which is in itself characterized by an event, it's purely structural. A same act, a simple act often even of doing nothing can be an event. What defines an event is are not its inherent characteristic but its structural role, how does it intervene in a situation. Now I claim, maybe I'm too naive here, I claim that if you apply this rule you can easily see for example why precisely fascism is not an event, but a pseudo-event. Why? Because it's easy to show how the whole topic of anti-Semitism and so on
is
here precisely to avoid confronting the true antagonism and so on. So Badiou's I am convinced by Badiou's very formal even answer that event intervenes at what he calls that evental site, you know that or as that symptomal Badiou's term is the symptomal point of of a situation and so on. So again event is defined by its place. Like we all know even okay in a very naive way, don't you know how sometimes to say a simple word, intervention, can have a shocking in a positive sense effect if you say it at the right moment. And we discover clowns are the guys who come too late and make the heroic gesture when it no longer matters no? In this sense if we are aware again that event it's all it's event is totally almost defined by its situation. For example my preferred example of an event, very modest from cinema, I live in cinema, is did you see Atom Egoyan's *The Sweet Hereafter*? You remember the woman the girl when he lies at the court? You know what's the final denouement? All the court, you know the village where the all children died, they want to organize against the bus company or whatever and then the young girl who is the key witness she tells a lie, ruins the case. That's an act for me, that's an ethical act, a simple lie at the right point because it ruins it undermines the whole the false... okay. So if we again if we take it in this sense then I think it's it works as a criterion for me in pure... because again like for example this also shows us why for example people tell me "but you say the event is when you do the impossible and so on, that what was unthinkable publicly before." Then they tell me "but wait a minute also before Hitler even if you were anti-Semitic it was unthinkable to be public, so didn't Hitler also do something" and so on? No my answer is against: it was unthinkable publicly but it was the obscene underground. Hitler just brought up what was already the obscene background underground there and here enters for me the Freudian *Acheronta
movebo*. Hitler didn't move the underground, Hitler just brought up the underground,
Hitler just mobilized all that obscene underground that was there. The true revolution for me is the revolution of the like Freud says *Acheronta movebo*, move the underground, move the obscene underground. So in this sense I know that many people are not convinced by this answer, but I think that in this sense it can be... answered. (Inaudible question from the audience...) No, no, no, here okay, can I come in on that also? Because you dismissed Levinas a bit too easily and it seems to me that some of your analysis about Lacan does coincide with some of the Levinasian positions. The other is someone who hurts me, it is not the, you know, moralistic otherness that many Levinasian readers today... the other is someone who comes onto me, takes me hostage and so on. So there is a sense of trauma with the other, it's not "the other that I love." Yes, the destabilizing other, the traumatic encounter yes. Is it an aspect of the Levinasian ethics which is close to what you're analyzing as a Lacanian? Yeah but I have a couple of problems there again. The first problem for me is the whole question of face. I think that face is for me a mask. I don't accept face as the ethical, I think face is the primordial fetish. That would be the first problem. The second problem is that I think that when you define the experience of other at its most radical as this ethical call responsibility and so on, it already obliterates this radical inhumanity of the other. The other is for me beyond ethics, the other is a monstrosity, the other is a monster for me. I don't think if you... because this is why the third point which is for me more crucial, the way Levinas then passes from this experience of the other to the third, the law and so on. To put it as I put it, I did put it in
my book, I forgot which
one, either *The Neighbor* or the other one...