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Slavoj Žižek — On G.W.F. Hegel, Lecture 4 [Remaster]

Lecture · WhereAreWeSeeing · 2009-08 · 1:17:36 · 10,336 words
hegel-dialecticspsychoanalysisideologycinema-art-culturephilosophy-generalcapitalismdemocracysexuality-gender

Žižek argues that Hegel’s apparent failures to grasp modern phenomena (repetition, the unconscious, science) are not simple omissions but rather moments where Hegel was 'more Hegelian than Hegel saw.' He posits that Hegel’s system contains traces of 'non-productive repetition' and 'abstract negativity' (e.g., in his theory of war and madness) that anticipate post-Hegelian thinkers like Kierkegaard and Freud. Žižek attempts to push Hegel forward by showing how these 'inconsistencies', such as the necessity of conflict or the compromise of the unconscious, reveal a deeper, more radical logic than standard liberal interpretations allow. Žižek argues that modern phenomena, specifically late Romantic music, capitalism, and abstract art, exhibit a 'Hegelian' logic that Hegel himself failed to recognize, effectively making them 'more Hegelian than Hegel.' He reinterprets Marx’s Capital as a materialist reading of Hegel’s substance-subject dialectic, positing capital as an 'automatic subject.' He further explores Hegel’s concept of reconciliation through J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace and the paradox of formal equality in modern democracy, concluding with an analysis of the monarch as a decentered, empty signifier necessary to prevent totalitarian bureaucratic rule. Žižek argues that true democracy requires a moment of contingency, drawing parallels between the King's pure biological contingency and the 'rebel' (Pöbel) at the bottom of the social body, who stands for universality. He critiques Hegel for failing to connect these excesses, suggesting this omission led to a proto-fascist conservatism, and applies this framework to late capitalism's exclusionary mechanisms. Finally, he reinterprets sexuality not as nature sublimated into culture, but as an excess of 'denaturalized nature' (Tristan and Isolde), arguing that capitalism itself is a metaphysical phenomenon where virtual financial speculation dictates material reality.

ideas stories works 0:00 15:00 30:00 45:00 1:00:00 1:15:00ideas stories works 0:00 38:48 1:17:36
every located moment in this recording, click one to read it
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The ideas in it 29

in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here

Stories he reaches for 6

Markus Gabriel’s argument (co-authored with Žižek) that madness is a necessary step to humanity; we must pass through the threat of madness to develop 'Gewohnheit' (customs/discipline).
“Hegel’s theory of madness... how madness is not just an abstract possibility but it’s an necessary step on the path to humanity.”
In the Prussian-Austrian war, the King observes chaos and fears defeat, but General Moltke congratulates him on a 'brilliant victory' because the King was actually winning. The King is a 'total idiot' but formally the victor, illustrating the 'decentered subject.'
“General Moltke... turned to the King and told him, 'May I be the first to congratulate Your Majesty for a brilliant victory,'... The King formally won but he was a total idiot he didn’t know.”
Why are policemen always three in a group? One knows how to read, one how to write, and the third controls them if they read or write correctly.
“why are the policemen always three in a group? Because one one knows how to read, the other how to write, and the third one controls them if they read or write correctly”
Žižek describes the situation in Slovenia where only well-paid professionals (doctors, judges, police) can afford to strike, while construction and textile workers are too precarious to even raise their voices.
“in my country, Slovenia, now the situation is horrible. Construction workers, textile working women, they are just fired and so on. They don’t dare to strike”
Adorno attacks Sibelius and Tchaikovsky as 'bad guys,' but Žižek argues Sibelius’s Fourth Symphony captures the 'painful struggle for melody' better than Mahler’s Adagietto, validating the romantic struggle.
“Sibelius’ Fourth Symphony is nonetheless not total shit... Fourth Symphony go to the third movement and it’s I think even better than Adagietto of Mahler.”
Žižek cites J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace as the closest literary approximation to Hegelian reconciliation: the hero loses everything, and this total loss/acceptance is the reconciliation, not a triumphant reappropriation.
“the final situation of the hero, no this you lose everything you are this total loss. This is maybe the closest we get to maybe to Hegelian reconciliation.”

Works invoked 23

Capital book
Cited as demonstrating how capital is a 'subject' (substance-subject dialectic), beating Hegel at his own terrain.
Hegel’s work, cited for its description of the emergence of new forms of life and the 'master and servant' dialectic.
Hegel's work where he discusses the King's contingency and the problem of the rebel, which Žižek analyzes closely.
Cited as showing a 'naive' Hegelian dialectic of liberation, contrasting with Capital.
Used as an example of a motif source tradition (film).
Parsifal opera
Used as an example of a motif source tradition (opera).
Cited as the model for the reading that Hegel’s dialectic is a 'mystified version of the process of liberation'.
Cited ironically as a film Badiou thinks is 'great,' contrasting with his highbrow status.
Cited as the closest literary model to Hegelian reconciliation, where the hero's total loss is the reconciliation.
Freud’s work, cited for the example of the woman’s uncertain dream.
Visconti film that mediated Badiou's appreciation of Mahler's Adagietto.
Cited as Marcuse's 'younger' and 'much better' work.
Cited for Marx’s critique that Hegel’s King is an 'appendix to his penis,' which Žižek reinterprets as the King being a 'pure symbolic authority.'
Cited for showing how Hegel’s concepts can generate the concept of modern abstract painting.
Freud’s work, cited for the 'Signorelli paradox' case study.
Used as the prime example of 'absolute sexual passion' that is self-destructive and represents an excess over nature.
Cited for the argument that Hegel’s conception of labor was a 'handicraft ideology' blind to industrial production.
Cited as 'slightly boring' due to the struggle with material, illustrating the romantic shift.
A book co-authored by Žižek and Markus Gabriel, published with Continuum, arguing that madness is a necessary step to humanity.
Used as an example of 'romanticism proper' and the painful struggle for melody.
Hegel’s lectures, cited for his claim that the aim of religious ritual is to produce 'enjoyment' (jouissance).
Lacan’s seminar, cited for his acknowledgment of a 'Hegelian unconscious'.
Defended against Adorno; cited as having a movement better than Mahler's Adagietto.

People invoked 79

Cited for the metaphor of the 'tree of liberty' being watered by blood, used by Žižek to justify internal social terror as a Hegelian necessity.
Julius Caesar positive
Used by Hegel as an example of repetition through idealization (from man to title).
Robert Pippin positive
American Hegelian whose book The Persistence of Subjectivity is praised for showing how Hegel’s concepts generate modern abstract painting.
Blaise Pascal positive
Cited for the phrase 'silent abstract universe' describing the modern mathematical order.
Used as an example of modernity’s 'silent abstract universe'; Žižek claims Bach is the origin of musical modernism.
Director of Death in Venice, which mediated Badiou's appreciation of Mahler.
Cited for the phrase 'imperialism the last stage rotting capitalism,' which Žižek mocks.
Georg Lukács negative
Representing the 'Western Marxism' reading that Hegel’s dialectic is a 'mystified version of the process of liberation' which just needs the working class substituted for Absolute Spirit.
Cited for the argument that Bach is the 'Newton of music' and a formalist, contrary to views of him as a traditional religious composer.
Simone Weil positive
Praised for seeing the metaphysical dimension in the lowest sexual passion and for her idea of the proletarian position as telling the truth.
Cited as an example of a conservative English neo-Hegelian who fully developed the 'soft fascist tendency' of Hegel's thought.
Jacques Lacan positive
Cited as being 'right' regarding the structure of sexuality and the excess of denaturalized nature, contrary to the Catholic Church.
Actor who played the lead in the film adaptation of Disgrace, which Žižek implies might have been better cast with Fiennes.
Žižek agrees with Deleuze’s focus on 'repetition' as the key post-Hegelian break, linking Kierkegaard and Freud.
Described as 'my best friend'; co-author of 'Hegel’s theory of madness' published with Continuum.
Judith Butler negative
Critiqued for attacking Žižek from 'binary logic'; Žižek mocks her by suggesting she gets 'more than binary logic' in his examples.
Mentioned in Hegel’s example of Caesar ('that guy who screwed Cleopatra').
Mentioned alongside Haydn as perfecting the sonata form before Beethoven.
Cited for his late works, which perfected the sonata form but felt that something precious (fugue/Bach) was lost.
Actor and friend; Žižek recounts Fiennes turning down the role in Disgrace out of 'pure vanity'.
Cited as someone whose science Hegel was uneasy with, trying to supplement it with conceptual underpinning.
Alain Badiou positive
Friend and fellow thinker; Žižek shares Badiou's 'limitations' and cites his admission about liking Mahler via Death in Venice.
French writer on Hegel who defined capital as an 'automatic subject' (blindly repeating itself).
Cited for his analysis of Hegel’s 'handicraft ideology' of labor and his brilliant phrase about the 'vulgar' rich man in modern democracy.
Adolf Hitler positive
Cited alongside Napoleon III as an example of a populist authoritarian regime based on the SA thugs/rebel.
J. M. Coetzee positive
South African author of Disgrace, cited as providing the closest literary model to Hegelian reconciliation through the hero's total loss.
Žižek claims Markus Gabriel is 'more Foucault than Michel Foucault,' implying Gabriel’s theory of madness surpasses Foucault’s.
Jean Sibelius positive
Defended against Adorno; Žižek argues Sibelius’s Fourth Symphony is better than Mahler’s Adagietto.
Cited as composer of a piano piece used to illustrate the generation of melody in romanticism.
Prussian General in the anecdote who congratulates the ignorant King on a victory he didn't understand.
Cited for claiming American imperialism in the 1950s was the 'last stage' and 'absolutely rotten,' which Žižek mocks.
Cited alongside Adorno as viewing dialectic as the logic of alienated society, from which liberation requires stepping out.
Cited as right that capitalism is a deeply ethico-religious phenomenon, not just economic.
Cited as a 'strange bedfellow' with Freud, representing repetition against philosophy (Erinnerung/rememoration).
Gustav Mahler positive
Composer of the Adagietto, used as an example of 'romanticism proper' and the painful struggle for melody.
Cited alongside Schumann as examples of romantic explosion.
Cited as one of Adorno’s 'absolute bad guys' in music, which Žižek disputes.
Mentioned alongside Mozart as perfecting the sonata form before Beethoven.
Cited as an example where the struggle with material 'explodes' in romanticism.
Mentioned as part of the 'Marxian aspect' of the post-Hegelian break (positivity/positive reality).
Napoleon III positive
Used by Marx to illustrate a populist authoritarian regime whose true social base was the 'thugs' or 'rebel'.
Joseph Stalin negative
Criticized for pretending to be a rational scientist rather than a true despot, hiding the contingency of power.
Plato positive
Cited in contrast to Hegel regarding Kierkegaard’s view of philosophy (Erinnerung/rememoration).
Cited as part of 'Harmonia Mundi' and 'cosmic music,' representing pre-modern mathematics that Marx (as a German nationalist) preferred over Newton.
Karl Marx positive
Cited for his reference to 'overdetermination' in the Grundrisse (production encountering itself) and his 'German nationalist' preference for Kepler.
Socrates positive
Cited in contrast to Hegel regarding Kierkegaard’s view of philosophy (Erinnerung/rememoration).
Sigmund Freud positive
Cited as a 'strange bedfellow' with Kierkegaard, representing 'blind compulsion' and the contingent, compromised nature of the unconscious.
Respected for his deep insights (King, rebel, war) but criticized for failing to draw the political conclusion that the rebel stands for universality, leading to a 'soft fascist' conservatism.
Immanuel Kant negative
Cited for his 'dream of eternal peace,' which Hegel opposes with his deduction of the necessity of war.
Isaac Newton positive
Cited as the mathematical counterpart to Bach’s formalism in the 'silent abstract universe' of modern science.

Transcript 1 turns

Slavoj Žižek
This is how you recognize a truly great thinker, that of course there are phenomena where Hegel fell short, couldn’t grasp them, but it’s not in the sense that, you know, there was some totally different logic which Hegel wasn’t able to grasp. It is more as if what escaped Hegel in some phenomena was the very Hegelian dimension of it. You know, like things got more Hegelian than Hegel didn't see it. What do I mean by this? Okay, let me begin in a very simple honest empiricist way by a series of topics, concepts, operative, important in our times where one can claim Hegel really cannot think them. First, the concept of repetition. I already spoke about this, I want to repeat it myself, the point is what kind of repetition. We all know Hegel does have even a very nice theory of repetition. But it’s a repetition which is never, let’s call it, zero repetition, just repetition. It’s always a repetition through idealization or Aufhebung, sublation, no? Like, you know, the classical examples. The idea is what first happens and appears is experienced as something contingent, through repetition it is aufgehoben, turned into a notion. Like ultra-classical example, I’m sorry I repeat it all the time, Hegel’s beautiful theory of Caesar. Caesar, first we have Caesar as a name, that guy who screwed Cleopatra and so on, Julius Caesar, then we get Caesar dies and returns precisely as Caesar the title, as a universal notion, idealization. It’s in this sense what Hegel cannot think, we may say, but is it true? I think it’s more ambiguous, is pure repetition, repetition without this moment of idealization, Aufhebung. In other words, and I think Gilles Deleuze is right when he focuses on two strange bedfellows which are part of the same, sorry to use this obscene word, spiritual constellation, Kierkegaard and Freud. I think Deleuze is right in emphasizing that there are two aspects to so-called post-Hegelian or post-idealist break in the 19th century. We usually focus too much on this Marxian aspect of and Feuerbach and so on, positivity, like against the self-enclosed circle of ideas, the assertion of some positive reality and so on. But I think this is maybe even the less important part of the post-Hegelian break. What is truly new is repetition. Repetition in Kierkegaard, it’s crucial, you know that the whole Kierkegaard’s edifice is Christianity, religion as repetition against philosophy, for Kierkegaard from from Socrates or Plato rather to Hegel, like Erinnerung, rememoration. And of course in Freud, it’s absolutely crucial, the compulsion to repeat which as Freud emphasizes is precisely this blind compulsion. So this is the first thing. The second thing, unconscious. Now I will immediately elaborate this because in a way Hegel definitely can think an unconscious. And I checked it up even Lacan is aware of it. He says I think, I may be wrong, that it’s in Seminar on Identification that there is a Hegelian unconscious, but Lacan insists not the same as Freudian. Overdetermination. Then this is the truly hard point, modern formalized science. Hegel obviously dismisses it as something pertaining to understanding as opposed to authentic reason, mechanical and so on. And we can then say can Hegel really think class struggle, antagonism, like in the like class struggle like sexual difference and so on. Now I want to complicate things a little bit because you know apropos each of these topics we can demonstrate that it’s never a question of Hegel simply cannot do it. It’s yes he cannot do it, but. For example, with repetition I will return it at the very end. I think nonetheless that we can find traces of precisely what I like to call a non-productive repetition in Hegel. It’s there in the background but it’s there. Where? And again if there will be time but I suspect there will not be time so I am now that so that my conscience will be clear, I will announce it, some of the apparently most problematic reactionary parts of Hegel have precisely this dimension. For example, let me go to the darkest of the darkest, Hegel’s deduction of the necessity of war which is supposed, you know, opposing to this Kantian dream of eternal peace. If you look closely at the reasoning behind it, you can see that Hegel was not as he is usually interpreted by liberals today, Hegel was not into this dream of a bourgeois society as prosa, prose, like prosaic society, the antagonisms are over, we lead our peaceful lives and so on. For Hegel there has to be from time to time a war, not for any militaristic reasons but for a purely conceptual necessity that precisely there cannot be lasting peace between universal and particular, that from time to time, okay Hegel gives here a reasoning which may sound almost reactionary but I claim it’s not. The idea is that from time to time we, we citizens living within our more or less satisfied petty lives each at our place have to be reminded from time to time of the strength of abstract negativity. Like Hegel puts it in a wonderful brutal way appropriate to his time, now we would have even more horrible examples, when he says that it’s easy for a religious man to claim oh the vanity of all earthly life, no, but he says that this we do it in a hypocritical life, you know you say vanity all eternal life is vain and then you go to a nice restaurant and so on, no? But Hegel says it’s slightly different when you really get this lesson like when a foreign soldier with a with a saber is killing, he mentions like the Russians, the when the Cossack is killing your family in front of your house, you get the same lesson but you get it for the real, no, of the vanity of the. So what I’m saying is that here is one example of how it’s not true that Hegel’s ultimate vision is that of peace of the developed prosaic bourgeois society. He knows that there is an excess of negativity which repeatedly has to be reasserted. And if there will be time what I would like to do, because this is the game I will be playing today, push Hegel forwards beyond Hegel but through Hegel. I think what I will try, some of the developments maybe even known to you, is to show apropos three four topics how Hegel was inconsistent with himself. Where was he inconsistent? I claim that what Hegel because again the point of his theory of war is that again the meaning of the war is not external, it’s not from time to time we have to show to the others that we are stronger or whatever, no. The true meaning of war is purely that you should experience your own abstract freedom, negativity and so on. So what Hegel should have done is what I’m tempted to call the and it can be, I will do it in my next book, the one that you graciously mentioned, much more in detail, namely to demonstrate how you know what Hegel should have done there, the what I like to call the Thomas Jefferson step. To say not only war with outside but from, you know this wonderful totalitarian metaphor of Thomas Jefferson that the tree of liberty has to be watered by blood from time to time, no? This and even here an idea came to me, a Hegelian idea of synthesis of the opposites. This is what I like about the Jacobins where in their terror the state terror against the individuals, everyone could have been guillotined, in a way overlaps by the popular terror, you know it’s both at the same time. I think we need to shake us up from time to time, some kind of Jacobinical terror. I would even go a step further and say that the status of this terror is the same as the status of madness in that What do you just think that you own the world and can be late or what? Okay, sorry, he is my best friend you can guess from what I said. Okay, that you know I published it in a book with Continuum together with the German guy Markus Gabriel, Hegel’s theory of madness. Again he is more Foucault than Michel Foucault I claim there. He wonderfully developed how madness is not just an abstract possibility but it’s an necessary step on the path to humanity. Humanity can you don’t pass from animal to human directly, you have to go through this step of at least threat of madness. It’s only as a reaction to madness that the properly human dimension of what Hegel calls Gewohnheit, customs, emerges. And Hegel also has there a wonderful theory how mechanical customs, discipline, you learn something without understanding it, is the basis of all humanity. You have to begin with this blind drill and so on. Only then. So again there he is consequent, Hegel. There he admits that it’s not that madness as a possibility of this radical outbreak of radical negativity is sublimated, sorry, sublated, aufgehoben, in some higher spiritual unity. No, it’s only that it always remains there lurking beneath as a possibility to explode. All that Hegel had to do but was a little bit too conformist is to follow again his own logic also to the domain of social order, war and so on. Okay, more about this later. Let me move now to the unconscious. I think that linked to this topic of the unconscious is the topic of overdetermination. Here we can make a good argument that Hegel what he cannot do is the Freudian unconscious. That is to say Hegelian unconscious is is a transcendental unconscious of the form. You know how in one of the key passages of the introduction to phenomenology when Hegel describes the emergence of a new form of life he says it happens but the individuals just experience it as coming from nowhere, they don’t see its formal aspect. And Hegel repeats this again and again, like when we speak we don’t see the universal character of what we say. You know already at the most elementary at the beginning of phenomenology sense certainty when Hegel says you say now, you mean this now, what you don’t know is that it’s a universal every now and so on. So again for Hegel unconscious is the abstract form. The Freudian unconscious of course is totally particular contingent. Like this is maybe what Hegel cannot think, sorry to mention an example that you maybe know in for example one of the wonderful dreams that I really like from Freud’s interpretation of dreams is a woman patient who reports to Freud a dream that she was at a funeral felt very sad and so on and so on. Then Freud discovers again what’s the meaning of the dream is that at that funeral she encountered her ex-love and was very glad about this. But in no way can you get at this point through a hermeneutic analysis of the dream. Everything is there to cheat. She feels sad, funeral and so on and so on. You see the whole point is this totally contingent partial connection. This brings us to overdetermination. Hegel in a formal sense can think overdetermination again in this formal sense of what he calls oppositional determination that an element can be overdetermined by itself. In the sense that as even Marx refers to this in the that introduction to Grundrisse, methodological introduction, how you have the four species, no, production, distribution, exchange, consumption and that production encounters itself as its own species, is in this purely formal sense overdetermined. But again what Hegel cannot think is the complex network of particular links organized along the contingent lines of condensation, this displacement and so on. Or in more general terms, the Hegelian process always deals with a radical clear-cut solutions or resolutions. What is foreign to Hegel is the Freudian logic of pragmatic opportunistic compromises. This is I think maybe the true limit. Not that Hegel was not radical enough, but that Hegel was too radical in the sense that you know when you have a tension Hegel’s automatic reaction is let’s push it to the end, resolve it. While isn’t the whole of Freudian unconscious one big shitty compromise? You know in the sense of I like that but I don’t want to admit it so let’s do a compromise, let’s stage it but let’s not quite admit it and so on and so on. So we get a kind of a complicated network of distortions where where again there is no clear resolution. Just think about maybe Freud’s most famous case, sorry example, that of Signorelli from the beginning of psychopathology of everyday life. You know the story. Freud himself couldn’t recall the name of the painter of the Orvieto frescoes, Signorelli, and produced as substitutes the names of two other painters, Botticelli and Boltraffio. And then his analysis brings to light the process of associations which links Signorelli to Botticelli and Boltraffio. The village Trafoi was where Freud received the message of the suicide of one of his patients. Herr, herr like Signor, herr the German word for master is linked to a trip to Herzegovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, when an old Muslim told Freud that after you no longer can engage in sex there is no reason to go on living and so on and so on. But you see the point. You don’t get a clear-cut or whatever. You get just a series of connections with no final radical with no final radical resolution. On the again, but again I’m even here I’m a little bit tempted to to defend Hegel at least on two counts. First, it’s not quite true that Hegel doesn’t doesn’t always opts for a clear-cut resolution. You know maybe the most famous passage in entire Hegel in phenomenology of of master and servant, the fight. I mean the result there is a compromise. They don’t go to the end. The point is if we fight really to the end, one will die, it has no sense. So it’s a kind of a symbolic compromise there. Point two, even the form of the unconscious, this is Freud as his best which is typically Hegelian unconscious, you also find it in Freud. For example, it’s much more complex in Freud but I give you the simplified gist of it. There is a patient woman who comes to Freud and says she remembers a dream but it’s uncertain dream, she cannot identify who the man is in the dream and so on. So it appears a formal purely formal uncertainty. I don’t see it clearly and so on. And then Freud gets the point that this formal uncertainty is the form of the return to what the woman is not ready to confront at the level of content. What is repressed as content returns in the form. It’s to put it in vulgar terms her uncertainty who is the father, who screwed, no, that this quite clear uncertainty of again of the content she is not ready to admit it so it returns as pure form. It’s blurred, I don’t know who that person is and so on and so on. Then we have the problem of jouissance of enjoyment as opposed to mere pleasure. Here also what Hegel can think is nonetheless jouissance as such. He is not as stupid as it may appear, for example in surprising places. Look at his lessons on the philosophy of religion when Hegel there talks about what is the aim of religious ritual. He says it brutally, to produce enjoyment. That you know the what happens in in praying in the act of praying Hegel is not bullshitting there, no you are doing literally for your enjoyment and so on. But nonetheless the motive which is central for Freud and especially Lacan, the motive of the gap between the true and the real, the real of jouissance. This gap Hegel maybe cannot get it. Let me give you here a brief quote of one of late Lacan’s seminars, Seminar sorry, from where Lacan says a quote, session of December 14th "The true or the real. At this level everything is set up as if these two terms are synonymous. But the unpleasant thing is that they are not. When we are dealing with the real, the true is in divergence" and so on and so on. So let’s go then okay we have other moments. But now let me start a defense of Hegel. Ah yes sorry we have of course then as already mentioned another crucial example that of modern science. It is nonetheless unfortunately clear here even I cannot fully defend Hegel that his universe is not yet the universe of modern formalized science. It is clear in his uneasiness with Galileo and Newton, how he tries to to as it were supplement this natural science, emerging formal natural sciences with some kind of a more conceptual underpinning. Hegel simply has no sense for this dimension here. Okay and along the same lines if I may permit myself a brief detour. I think that Adorno was right if you like classical music, when he said that the greatest task of everyone who really likes Bach, Bach the boring guy with music, that that to defend Bach against himself, against his defenders, no? Because it’s very popular for the last years to defend Bach as a kind of a pre-modern organic fully religious composer against modernization against later modernization like you know the in Bach as a traditional composer you find peace in these large harmonious structures before all the modernist or even romantic excesses. But as Adorno points out, Bach is the Newton of music. He’s you should just read a little bit of the history, historical situation of Bach. You know how Bach was perceived by his contemporaries. He was not very popular. Why? Because the idea was he is too much of a formalist playing with abstract mathematical variations, not enough melody. The true reactionary was Bach’s son Christoph something I don't know who it’s interesting to learn was towards the end of Bach’s life much more popular than his father. Why? Because the reaction to Bach was Italian. Italian melody singing which was precisely perceived as a return to authentic sentiments against all those abstractions and so on. What is crucial, now I make my point in a very simple way of course. What is crucial is that you know this is common topic, we know it all, how modernity proper emerges with this Cartesian formalized mathematical universe but it’s different mathematics from not only pre-modern but even Renaissance mathematics. Here for example Kepler, although Marx as a German nationalist always says no no Kepler better than Newton, but this is Marx a German stuff. There of course you have elevation of mathematics, but it’s part of this bullshit of Harmonia Mundi, you know cosmic music, harmony of the world and so on. With Bach it is precisely that we enter in a brutal way into this modern, as Pascal would have put it, silent abstract universe where you cannot rely on any of these celestial harmonies between our world celestial world. We are in an abstract world and the whole problem of Bach is how to invent from his mathematical combination an artificial harmony. He has to construct it. You no longer can rely on all these natural harmonies on this Pythagorean bullshit, you know numbers their secret meanings and so on and so on. So again it’s on the contrary I claim the reaction to Bach which is truly which is truly which is in a way the reaction. Or even there, my God you see where my true love is music and so on, even there all great guys were bothered by Bach. Bach is at the origin literally of end of classicism, of musical modernism. You know in what sense? You know what is the problem of late Beethoven. He perfected what Haydn and Mozart did the sonata form and then his big problems was he felt that in all this sonata bullshit something precious that you find in Bach, fugue and so on, is lost. So modernity it’s a very nice dialectic, modernity started not as an attempt to we are stifled by old forms let’s look forward, but no, by the insight that in the classical music something was lost from that was there in Bach and that how to revitalize that part. Even at this level, I even am trying now to write something but I’m not sure I will because it’s too close to pure bluff no, to save in a materialist way romanticism in music. Because I participated in some stupid round table in France where some people who really know talked that you know if you look at really great romantic pieces of music, it’s not spiritualism, forget about all that bullshit about you know beyond the misery of terrestrial life, whatever, no no. The greatness of a guy in France explained it to me in wonderful terms when we were listening to some wonderful, I underestimated him, piano piano piece by Felix Mendelssohn. How romanticism proper begins when the moment melody is not simply given, but you have as if to struggle with the musical material to to generate the melody. You know in Mozart even early Beethoven it’s not a problem, the melody is here, you state it or the motive and then you play all those stupid ballerina forms variations on it. But the proper of romanticism is this long struggle to painfully generate the melody. Even great romantic, okay, now I will admit together with Badiou he is also deep in this shit, my limitations, like Badiou once admitted to me, he told me don’t tell anyone so of course I’m that’s called dialectic, that he likes Mahler but that he discovered Mahler through Visconti Death in Venice, you know that one, no, we got him here no I mean no you know who is Alain Badiou no, the guy who thinks Bridges of the Madison County is a great film and so on, no, we got him. No but seriously yeah, no but seriously, take that famous Adagietto that we all know it’s in all those you know classical music in cinema all those pence DVDs with the thing. But what happens there this is I think okay it’s late romanticism already but romanticism at its purest. This painful slow struggle for the melody to emerge. Again I think it’s a very materialist movement. And I think this is, now I will be betray my low class Balkan origins, this is what makes slightly boring for example Beethoven’s late late sonatas, no, piano sonatas. That you already have this struggle with the material and then of course all this explodes in Schumann, Schubert and so on and so on. Or if you want other pieces, I am in my perverse attitude I told myself that is Adorno, I asked myself, is Adorno really right to attack so ferociously, you know who are the two absolute bad guys for Adorno in music, Sibelius and Tchaikovsky. Like there it is like Adorno becomes a Goebbelsian, like burn them like no. But I think that if you know it, Sibelius’ Fourth Symphony is nonetheless not total shit. I agree with Adorno that number two, all those Finland stuff, freedom, blah blah blah. But Fourth Symphony go to the third movement and it’s I think even better than Adagietto of Mahler. This kind of melody with pain trying to formulate itself but it it fails. Okay, so let’s now go nonetheless back back back back back to back to Hegel. The point is this would be my first basic point that again it’s not a question of simply moving beyond Hegel, but it’s the the point is to demonstrate how what Hegel doesn’t see, again is not some post-Hegelian dimension totally outside his grasp, but the very Hegelian dimension of what is coming. For example, when Marx demonstrated in his Capital how the self-reproduction of capital obeys the logic of the Hegelian process of substance subject which retroactively posits its own presuppositions. He there, the unheard of character of Marx does there is to as it were implicitly in Capital he beats Hegel at its own terrain. His point is not oh Hegel stupid idealist here is real life, no, his point is and I like this formulation that the way to produce materialist Hegel is to claim that Hegel in some crucial domains wasn’t idealist enough. Because as Fred Jameson pointed it out very nicely in his this book on phenomenology, Variations on Phenomenology or whatever, it’s that Hegel’s I quote Fred Jameson, "Despite his familiarity with Adam Smith and emergent economic doctrine, Hegel’s conception of work and labor I have specifically characterized it as a handicraft ideology betrays no anticipation of the originalities of industrial production or the factory system." That is to say again Hegel thinks in an almost naive materialist way that production is just me as a concrete individual working on some stuff and so on. What he doesn’t see is a very Hegelian point, how in capitalism this concrete interaction between me others and the stuff is regulated by the abstraction of the capital. How you know precisely the Hegelian notional subject-substance is there. And I’m so sad we don’t have more time or maybe I’m hypocritical here and it’s nice, but please I beseech you to read, he is politically don’t worry when we take power he goes to Gulag, but nonetheless he is not an idiot, Robert Pippin, the American Hegelian, who nonetheless in his last good book, last good book, the latest one on Hegel, Hegel’s ethics or whatever is not good, but the previous one, The Persistence of Subjectivity, Pippin has a wonderful text on along the same lines on, it’s worth reading, on Hegel and the modern art. Where I think in a model-like way he shows how Hegel was too went too fast in predicting the end of art, although of course Hegel knew this doesn’t mean simply art would stop whatever. But he claims that Hegel was not able to imagine art beyond representation, this realist representation and so on. And Pippin claims that again he was not Hegelian enough here, that if you just apply to visual arts Hegel’s notion of subjective reflexivity, mediation and so on, you can clearly in a beautiful way generate in a purely Hegelian way the concept of modern abstract painting. You see this is I think how it should be done. So okay let me now go a little bit to to go on let me now go a little bit to this Hegel and Marx topic. So again of course it you can say it’s true that Hegel’s limitation was here a purely historical one, like of course he couldn’t write about what he wasn’t able to see. Although it’s more complex because I think the first financial crises were already there and so on, so it was a kind of self-blindness. So again let me dwell a little bit on this. It is clear for example if you read the Capital of Marx, not only part one, sorry not only first chapter, value, forms of value, but especially I think it’s chapter seven, I’m not sure, the passage from money to capital. It’s clearly formulated in Hegelian terms of the passage from substance to subject. With capital, value is no longer just a substance, the universality within which we exchange commodities, but it becomes subject in the sense of agent, self-positing and so on and so on. And why maybe Hegel wasn’t able to do it, I think already quoted this passage here it’s from a book by a very good writer on Hegel who recently died, the French guy Gérard Lebrun who says that that what is so new in the Capital of Marx is that capital is a subject in the Hegelian sense, self-positing self-mediating agent, but an automatic subject. That is to say a subject which again we are back to repetition, just wants more, more profit, just blindly repeats itself. So again a nice point, what Hegel wasn’t able to think is not some dimension beyond but this weird unity of subjectivity which for Hegel is always life, living creative subjectivity, a subjectivity which is at the same time dead blindly repetitive. It’s this unity of blind automatism, repetition and conceptual self-mediation which Hegel missed there. Of course things are here more complicated, I am aware of it. That is to say when Marx describes the dance of capital, capital’s self-reproduction as this Hegelian process of the substance, value, acting of subject mediating itself, positing its presuppositions and so on. Of course for Marx this is not the ultimate truth. For Marx of course the ultimate truth is that the autonomy of this process of self-self-generation of value, it’s an ideological myth, ultimately it feeds itself on the exploitation of workers and so on and so on. But nonetheless we can say that what Hegel describes here is something which is very mysterious because it’s not simply ideology in the sense of how bourgeois individuals perceive themselves, but it’s not also the brutal reality, which is that of workers’ exploitation. It’s something in between that we can call the the objective fantasy of capital. So again here we I don’t want today to enter into into all those problems of of the ambiguous status of the reference to Hegel’s dialectic in Marx. I already I think mentioned it how if you read it closely you have two fundamentally different references. In Grundrisse manuscripts, for Marx the Hegelian dialectical process is still let’s call it naively the model of liberation. You know that famous text which is brilliant of course, the pre-capitalist modes of production. This is a pure Hegelian rereading of history. You start with so-called primitive societies where you have the substantial unity, then you get gradual alienation which reaches its high point with proletarians, pure abstract subjectivity from which all the substantial content is taken, and then you have reconciliation, subjectivity reconciled with substance. What happens in Capital it’s something totally different I claim. There Hegelian dialectical process is not a model for the process of liberation but rather a model for the very alienated logic of the capitalist reproduction. And now the big question is here, I don’t have time to enter into it today, the big question here would have been was the late Marx simply right? This was the reading, this is the predominant reading of Frankfurt School. What we are to put it in terms of the so-called Western Marxism, Lukács is the model of the of the first reading. Hegel is the Hegel’s dialectical process is a mystified version of the process of liberation. Lukács even in his History and Class Consciousness says it literally. He says Hegel was right, he just applied his dialectical matrix on the wrong subject. He literally says, he must have known it, it’s too simple, replace absolute spirit with working class and you got it. But Adorno, Marcuse and so on, for them dialectic is not dialectic of liberation but the very form of the self-reproduction of alienated society. So and you have this permanent motive in Adorno in in Marcuse, I’m talking here about especially Hegel and Revolution, the younger Marcuse who is much better and so on than the late one, namely that this idea that liberation, communism, whatever we call it, will be a step out of dialectics. Dialectics is the logic of alienated society where everything turns into its opposite and so on and so on. My solution here, again this is kind of a blurb to arouse you maybe later read my book, is that I think we should do a much more daring move here. Namely what I find problematic in both Lukács and Adorno and Marcuse is their reading of Hegel as if what Hegel calls reconciliation is the simple subjective appropriation of the substance. You know you are the subject, you alienate yourself, you produce the substantial content and then in communism you reappropriate it. I don’t think Hegel is in this sense a subjectivist. I think if you really want to understand Hegel you should see that what he calls reconciliation it’s not this like like voracious subjective idea of oh collective subject will swallow all reality or whatever, it’s a much more even I’m tempted to say pessimist move. I’m so sad we don’t have time but I want to signal to you a novel that I really liked and I think it’s absolutely not a racist novel as some people claimed. Again I have a problem here, can you help me, I know whatever I will say will be wrong, namely how to pronounce the name the South African guy, not Nadin Coe Coetzee? Fuck you even Coetzee. Okay whatever yeah yeah okay. You know of course I’m talking of his Disgrace, one of the darkest novels that I know. I think it’s totally wrong to read it as simple reaction of a of a deceived a liberal to the new South Africa, you know like we fought for their freedom now they treat us as if we are their tribal slaves or whatever. But what I want to say is that the final situation of the hero, no this you lose everything you are this total loss. This is maybe the closest we get to maybe to Hegelian reconciliation. If you want to understand what Hegel means by reconciliation read that. Ah now comes the three minutes of my boasting, no I hate myself for doing it which is why I like to do it. You know yesterday I had a tea with Ralph, Ralph Fiennes you know and he told me you know that he would have been better, you saw the movie you should buy it you get it cheap, Disgrace with John Malkovich. But Ralph told me that he was the first candidate and that he admitted it to me that he rejected it out of pure vanity. He told me it was ten years ago, he wasn’t even forty at that point and he said no I will not play a white guy who is fifty. Pure vanity. But I think maybe he would have been for this bitterness and so on maybe he would have been even better. Okay so again this is another topic we don’t have time to go into it now. This idea of that maybe the way to go back to Hegel is to abandon this basic hyper-idealist subjectivist reading as if Hegelian reconciliation means subject swallows everything. No it’s not that, I think it’s something much closer to this Christian moment of you know you get out of alienation not by overcoming it but by way of redoubling it. You know the formula for me the one that I always quote that Hegel’s formula "Secrets of the Egyptians for us were also secrets for the Egyptians themselves." It’s just this shift from my alienation from the substance to the substance being screwed up in itself already to simplify things. But okay let’s not go this path it would have brought us too much. The the thing I want to draw your attention to is this simple fact which is crucial how to go beyond Hegel means paradoxically to to discover a Hegelian dimension like in modern art, modern abstract art, like in developed capitalism, to discover Hegelian dimension precisely in what Hegel wasn’t able to grasp. Like what Hegel Hegel not only was not this absolute narcissist in the sense of oh I see everywhere my own system, no, paradoxically my point would have been that he wasn’t enough of a narcissist, no. He didn’t see for example how contemporary capitalism is more Hegelian sometimes than Hegel himself. Then there is the third point which bring us it’s a very delicate point to the true limit of Hegel unfortunately, social limit but which has conceptual consequences. Namely, Hegel comes at that point where we have a passage from traditional society master servitude to modern bourgeois society of formal equality and freedom. And maybe precisely because he wasn’t able to think capitalism proper, what Hegel couldn’t have imagined I think is the basic paradox of capitalist society which is that you have formal legal equality, we are all free citizens, but that a but that relationship of domination reproduces itself precisely under the form of equality. I don’t think Hegel was able to think domination, class distinction, domination which is still here even when you abolish all traditional forms of direct domination. And here I would like again to quote Fred Jameson, a wonderful passage where he says that in a modern democracy the social leveling we are witnessing in modern democracy, I quote Jameson, "certainly does not exclude the emergence of wealth and of profound distinctions between rich and poor even in the socialist countries, nor is it in any way to be understood at the end of classes in their economic sense. There are still workers and managers in these societies, there is still profit and exploitation, reserve armies of the unemployed and so on. But the new cultural equality is infused with a powerful hatred of hierarchy and special privileges and with a passionate resentment of caste caste distinctions and inherited cultural superiority." Now comes maybe you already know it the brilliant phrase by Jameson, "It is in our societies permitted to be wealthy so long as the rich man is as vulgar as everyone else." You know, I think this this is the paradox but a wonderful again Hegelian paradox which I claim gives to us an unexpected possibility of a genuine proletarian reappropriation of the high culture. So what’s my point here? Again that all these three cases that I enumerated seem seem to call for a Hegelian analysis. Workers reduced to an appendix of machinery, a hierarchy persisting in the very form of plebeianization and so on and so on. Here we have to go to think further than Hegel. And now I want to make again another step further and just in the remaining half an hour explain apropos of a couple of cases how Hegel was not consequent enough measured by his own standards. Already two days no yesterday I think I mentioned this paradox of the King how the king should the proper King should be an idiot who just and so on and so on, and that it’s difficult to be a King because to be a good King you must accept that you are a pure puppet, an idiot. I want to give you, I’m sorry if I repeat myself maybe already used it years ago, an ultimate example of what does it mean King’s utter alienation. There is I’m sorry if you know it an anecdote from the Prussian Austrian war in There was this was one of the last battles still done in a traditional way, you know soldiers fighting in the valley, up on the hills the King with his headquarters observing the battle. So in this last battle the Prussian King, formally the supreme commander of the Prussian army, was observing the fight from a nearby hill. He was very worried because it appeared to him that his troops were retreating, that there is at least a confusion. And then all of a sudden General Moltke, von Moltke, the great Prussian strategist who planned this battle, you know in the middle of this chaos, the King sweating, oh my God are we losing, ours are retreating, the guy who knew what is happening, general turned to the King and told him, "May I be the first to congratulate Your Majesty for a brilliant victory," you know like. Because he knew we we won. But this I think is what I like, like the King formally won but he was a total idiot he didn’t know. But it must be attributed to you. This is what in a way I think Lacan means when he talks about the the about the decentered subject. There is no subject more decentered than the King. So I think here Marx is wrong in his critique of Hegelian notion of monarchy in his Notes towards Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law where Marx apropos Hegelian deduction of monarchy explodes. He says that for Hegel, and he thinks this is a great critical point he is making against Hegel, that for Hegel King is nothing more than an appendix to his penis. But my point is that this precisely is what Hegel wants to say. That is to say Hegel’s point is precisely that King is a pure symbolic authority. As Hegel says literally, repeating Kierkegaard, okay Kierkegaard comes after who repeats whom, that the duty of Hegel is not to understand anything, his bureaucrats have to understand things, the duty of the King is to sign his name. Which means that in actuality his duty is to breed his successor. It’s purely it’s the point where pure ideality of a pure signifier I sign my name coincides with its opposite with just your duty is to behave nicely and breed children, don’t be wise and so on. Now why this? I will now be very short because I know that here I repeat myself because Hegel knew something which a lesson which we had to learn in a hard way in the 20th century. That when you have a government grounded which tries to be grounded fully in effective qualities of the leaders, you get what we called totalitarianism. That in order for a power structure to function in a minimally open way you have to have some kind of contingency on the top. And that’s Hegel’s point, that the whole point of having a monarch is not to allow all the power to state bureaucracy, to have some empty totally contingent checkpoint on the top. In this sense that’s the dialectical beauty, Hegel’s state of reason means precisely you have to include the moment of pure irrationality on the top. And I think that the same goes even for true democracy. I’m more and more convinced that democracy needs a moment of contingency of lottery. My God ancient Greeks were aware of it, in Venice in their great epoch they were aware of it. This is the horror of Stalinism, that Stalin precisely wasn’t like a king or a despot, no, he pretended to know really the greatest scientist and so on and so on. We have to admit this gap. Of course we can debate and I agree with it that Hegel didn’t see that democracy can also function as introducing this element of contingency. I agree with those who claim. But nonetheless when Hegel spoke about the King as this moment of pure contingency on the top he saw something very deep. The next problem, what Hegel didn’t maybe for conformist political reason wasn’t able to accept is that we have this irrational excess on the top, the King, pure biology, pure contingency, and then I mean Hegel is really aware of it, I mean again read his Philosophy of Right where he says but if King is determined by pure contingency of birth doesn’t this mean that the fate of the state is let is left to natural caprice like the way the King is born I don’t know if he is furious we will have more wars or whatever, and then Hegel says no you miss the point, King just signs the papers, it doesn’t matter what kind of character he is and so on. But then I think what Hegel didn’t see is to connect this excess on the top, excess of irrationality, with the excess on the bottom, the so-called rebel, Pöbel. This part of no part of the social body. I already spoken about it so I will be brief here. You know what’s the point. Hegel saw very clearly that modern capitalist society has its classes and so on but it necessarily produces an excess of rebel, of those for whom there is no place within the social body. And Hegel even openly admitted that there is no solution. Hegel says we are trying to deal with it and he just pragmatically enumerates solutions like colonization, charity, whatever, but he says in in the long term it will not work because he is well aware of this circular paradox because he says the more we are getting rich the more we necessarily produce the rebel. Again I am repeating myself here so I will be brief I know. What for political reasons I claim Hegel was not ready to admit is how this part of no part, the rebel, precisely insofar as it has no specific place within social body, stands immediately for the universality. This idea of the excess is the place of universality, this was too much for Hegel, but again following his theory he should have said it. Here Hegel here everything is decided, like was Hegel a proto-fascist or not. I claim that by by refusing to draw this conclusion Hegel came dangerously close to that soft fascist tendency which was then later fully developed by the conservative English neo-Hegelians like McTaggart and so on, no? This idea that you know the Hegelian vision is to counteract abstract individuality by way of constructing kind of a state of estates where everyone is at his or her own place and so on. But again Hegel knew this is the ABC of Hegelian dialectic that you never can find peace in such a harmonious articulated social body, that always universality has to assert itself as such against its particular embodiments. In the guise of war, in the guise here of in the guise of the rebel and so on and so on. Okay but I already spoke about it so let’s go on. We have now already two three this kind of excesses. We have the excess of the King where precisely the you see the paradox, the social the top of the social hierarchy, the King, is reduced in a way to pure animality, no, it’s at the same time the highest pure name but in its reality totally alienated. We have this, we have rebel. And again here as many intelligent writers interpreters of Hegel noticed, Hegel is very clear, he basically not even between the lines, you just have to read him, he legitimizes revolution because he says this rebel, these are people to whom society denied basic recognition, so he says they don’t owe anything to society if they rebel we have no right to condemn them. So but nonetheless again, you know this idea which was later articulated by Marx, you know that precisely the working class as no class, as the class which cannot realize itself as a class stands for the universality of humanity, no? This is again what unfortunately Hegel the conclusion Hegel doesn’t draw apropos rebel, but I think that this is where Hegel is actual today because if there is now if there are some ultra-orthodox traditional Marxists here they will explode against me, but I claim that the point is not to do what traditional Marxist readers of Hegel did by claiming yeah yeah this was the limit of Hegel he used this vague term rebel but now we know it’s the working class and so on. No if anything today with whatever you call it late capitalism, I don’t like the term because capitalism is late from its beginning, you know my standard joke, like Marx was saying capitalism is rotting, no? As a matter of fact the first guy to say that capitalism is rotting were already the British romantics I think, no? Then you know then Lenin said imperialism the last stage rotting capitalism, then Mao said American imperialism in 1950s that this last stage got so absolutely rotten and you know like, but okay the unfortunately the more it is rotting the better it is doing, no so. Okay what I want to say now is that aren’t we today in our stage of capitalism in a way partially at least returning from the unique position of proletariat as self-conscious working class to rebel, by rebel I mean different kinds of exclusions of those who are excluded. In other words it seems clear to me that we no longer can count on only exclusively or even predominantly on working class as such. I think that capitalism has learned today to play in a much more cynical way with the working class. This is even to refer today, but here I fully support you, I think I mentioned this the first day here, just look I don’t know how it is again in your country but in my country, look at the status of strikes today. Ninety percent I support them but I was opposed to strikes in my country. Why? Because I already told you to some of the strikes. In my country, Slovenia, now the situation is horrible. Construction workers, textile working women, they are just fired and so on. They don’t dare to strike, not even to raise their voice because if they strike they tell them fuck off, perfect, you know those who can afford strike, the tragedy is that in some countries strike can even be a privilege today. You must have a very firm position to even be able to afford a strike. Like in Slovenia who is striking? Doctors who are already relatively very well paid, judges are striking obstructing, policemen like to strike, everybody loves how how corrupt they are and so on, no, and stupid, you know, this is what I like nonetheless in Slovenia, it still has this old socialist legacy. Of the Western countries I think only France had it. That that that policemen are stupid you know, and you have all these jokes of how they are for example you know these standard jokes, like why are the policemen always three in a group? Because one one knows how to read, the other how to write, and the third one controls them if they read or write correctly no or whatever. Or why my favorite one, I’m sorry it’s slightly vulgar but it’s about it combines stupidity and corruption. A policeman comes home and hears just entering the door some of these okay I will not make them sex voices no. So he enters and sees his wife a little bit red in the face of course he gets it no his wife was screwing someone. So he says I will find him no, looks around looks around then looks beneath the bed for for twenty seconds you hear nothing no, and then he comes up and say okay I was mistaken everything is okay and so on and so on, no. And then he later we learn to his friend what happened, no he looked down and he says to his friend you know I made some money because the guy who was screwing my wife bribed me so that I said there is nobody there. And that these people strike in Slovenia no. No it really here I’m really becoming a classical working class defender. Women, women who were working in a textile factory for thirty years my God and now all they get is this postmodern bullshit, you know recreate yourself, this is an opportunity to invent a new job or whatever, no? So again all this points out towards how maybe there is a time to reactualize Hegel’s notion of rebel precisely as the name, you know because again you know my old thesis that capitalism today is no longer and I think it will be less and less able even to sustain its own normative structure which is that of exploitation under the pretext of full personal freedom, legal equality and so on. I think more and more obviously it needs forms of partial exclusion like immigrant workers, outsourcing and so on and so on. So okay, my next point is that the same structure of an excess which stands for universality would have been again ah sorry another thing which I think would be very helpful is again another reason why it is productive to connect these two excesses. Excess at the top, excess at the bottom is that if we unite these two the contingent excess on the top, the excess on the bottom, rebel, is that isn’t this the formula of a populist authoritarian regime? As Marx says what is the secret of Napoleon III that okay he pretended to in a corporate way proto-fascist way to represent every class, no, giving its proper to workers, to farmers, to them but as Marx put it his only true social base was the thugs the rebel, rebel. And again the same with Hitler, SA thugs and so on and so on. Okay but this is another topic. What I want now to go on is to show how there is another which I already developed I just repeat it again, another excess of Hegel where he clearly makes a mistake with regard to his own logic. Sex. I mean there is a certain image of Hegelian process which is that of simple gradual evolutionary culturalization, sub in the sense of to put it very simply, if you conceive sex as a natural substance we copulate like animals but then you say but we humans are more and more conferring a cultural form on it. Like I like a woman or or a woman or a man likes me or two men like me so that you will not accuse me of binary logic whatever. Yeah yeah this is where Judith Butler was furious of me you know because once I debated and I said okay two women, three men, because she is always attacking me from binary logic no? So I told her okay now you will get more than binary logic like. Okay but what I want to say is that so again the idea is I like someone and I’m a cultured man so instead of raping him her beating I write poems blah blah like we do it in a cultivated form. But what Hegel didn’t get but he should have gotten it is that it’s not that we simply pass from nature to culture. The moment you have culture there should be an excess of denaturalized nature. And we have a name in eroticism for this excess. The name is this Tristan and Isolde absolute sexual passion which is self-destructive, you know this Tristan Isolde idea let’s lose ourselves in the self-destructive ecstasies of absolute enjoyment of love death and so on. So again what Hegel did didn’t see is that what we are trying to control, gentrify, domesticate through sexual rituals symbolic forms is not directly nature but it’s already an excess over nature. And okay to repeat another of my ancient points, this is where I think if we are true Hegelians we can nicely show how right was Lacan namely where Catholic Church is wrong apropos sexuality, this idea that the only civilized sexuality is ultimately for procreation and that sexuality done only for lust is like it makes us like beasts and so on and so on. You know I claim that again the structure is much more complex. The the reason Catholic Church is insofar as it is I know it’s more complex but basically nonetheless the basic model of sinning is is is is is to engage in illicit sexual activity, it’s that it fights sexuality not in the sense of higher spiritual vocation fighting elementary biological life but one spirituality fighting another spirituality. Secretly they know that the first proto-metaphysical experience, by metaphysical experience I mean something very simple, I mean you are engaged into something which goes beyond your biological interest. You know you’re kind of you’re literally in a Platonic way you know you are struck by something you are ready to sacrifice everything for it. Sexual lust is this my God it’s absolutely not procreative. And Hegel knew it in some of his writings, namely what he knew is that when you have a certain purposeful activity which serves a purpose, an instrumental biological simple purpose, the way you spiritualize it is to take part of this activity and posit it as an end in itself. Like you make love no longer for procreation in this way love becomes an space to to to to to realize a kind of metaphysical radical passion. In other words Catholics are totally wrong here I claim. It’s precisely when you do sex for procreation that you are like animals. Animals, surely they do like that. You know they they they copulate in certain rhythms times of the year and so on, we are, okay we want to, we cannot, but we are ready to do it in principle all the the all the time no. But so you see my point, I claim that this is the message of Freud, it’s a very nice one. This should be the proper Freudian Hegelian answer to spiritualists. It’s not oh you believe in some shitty spiritualism we know the only reality is power sex whatever. No that we see spirituality where you oppress it. We see a properly metaphysical dimension in it. Which is why I’m so sad I don’t have time for it, but which is why I also think that church is totally wrong in its you know this my God I hate them here when they say you know this is supposedly a deep thing to say, today’s crisis is not economic it’s spiritual ethical crisis. No the first thing to say here is that Benjamin was right, capitalism is deeply an ethico-religious phenomenon. What is wrong with capitalists, greedy capitalists, is not that they are too egotists. They are not. A true capitalist is a pale half dead fanatic who is ready to forsake all his pleasures just so that you know the capital turns around more and more profit and so on and so on. So again I claim when we advocate ecology against capitalist exploitation it’s not a struggle of proper altruistic humanity against some brutal egotism. No I claim it’s precisely a struggle of simple egotism for you maybe for your children against this metaphysics of capitalism, literally metaphysics. Because isn’t capitalism metaphysics embodied? In what sense? You have things really happening. This is the physical dimension, people working consuming whatever. And then you have it’s literally more and more a separate sphere what goes on in Wall Street and so on, these purely virtual financial speculations which literally ideas rule the world. Something is happening in this virtual space which decides the fate of material production. You know this for me the metaphysical dimension of capitalism. You work in a company you think everything is okay, then there is some Wall Street speculation and your company goes bankrupt and it’s totally non-transparent for you. You say but what was wrong? The product is selling well we were working well and so on and so on. So so again I think that here here here here I think that that this is again the point of Freudian sexuality. It’s not kind of a vulgar biological reductionism, it’s exactly the opposite, it and intelligent how is that French mystic woman called, is it Simone Weil? Yeah yeah she saw this wonderfully when she wrote how once in one of her mystical meditations of how even in the lowest sexual passion you can see metaphysical union metaphysical dimension at its purest. And incidentally she also has I don’t have unfortunately time to to quote it now, she do I have it here, she also put it in wonderful way this idea of a this idea of a proletarian position. This idea that in every society there are those who are reduced to nothing and so on and they are the only one who from their very position are are telling the truth and so on and so on. So just to conclude now if you read Hegel in this way, that is to say if you insist on an excess of negativity which persists beyond any sublation, which is always there as a threat, like the necessity and you have different expressions of this, like the necessity of war as the untying of social links. In war we are all reduced to singular individuals ready to die if you are haha for our country. That is to say all the complex social structure no longer matters. You have rebel. You have madness. You have passionate sexual love. All these are excesses sorry examples of this excess of radical negativity and it is clear that we are dealing here with the Hegelian version of precisely a form of repetition. So I claim that nonetheless Hegel had this dimension of repetition but was not ready fully to fully to fully to confront it. So again maybe I should now slowly stop not to become a counter-revolutionary, no?