Slavoj Žižek on Israel Palestine
In this PoliticsJOE interview, Žižek addresses the Israel-Gaza war, arguing that both Hamas and Israeli hardliners symmetrically deny any place for the other, creating a mutual trap. He contextualizes the conflict within broader civilizational pessimism, the rise of the global right, the fragility of liberal democracy, antisemitism becoming a marker of anti-colonial struggle, while advocating a 'moderately conservative communism' of emergency collective action. The conversation also touches on violence in liberation struggles (Haiti, South Africa, ANC), the moral catastrophe of Germany's unconditional pro-Israel stance, and briefly on Barbie, Oppenheimer, and the Bhagavad Gita.
The ideas in it 10
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
Stories he reaches for 8
Works invoked 7
People invoked 36
What it argues
Dialectical moves 8
Claims 18
Quotes 18
“The real aim of this attack was to eternalize war, to prevent any possibility for decades of peace.”Slavoj Žižek · Hamas strategy as anti-peace
“I still advocate communism. But what kind of communism? A moderately conservative communist.”Slavoj Žižek · self-description: moderately conservative communism
“It's not a communism of joy, abundance; it's a sad, pessimistic communism.”Slavoj Žižek · communism as emergency pessimism
“Before you act, think well about all possible consequences. Because social life is obscure, non-transparent, complex. You never know what the actual result would be.”Slavoj Žižek · moderately conservative caution
“These people are in a horrible position. And without justifying the brutal Hamas attack — I condemned it ruthlessly — they live in ontological limbo.”Slavoj Žižek · Palestinian ontological limbo
“Those who now appear as the opposite poles are really playing a very similar game.”Slavoj Žižek · symmetry of Hamas and hardline Zionism
“Zionist Israelis who mention in today's situation Holocaust are doing a terrifying, disrespectful exploitation of Holocaust itself.”Slavoj Žižek · Holocaust instrumentalization
“Precisely because they were stateless, we cannot even imagine European modernity, enlightenment, without the Jews. They were condemned to be universalist.”Slavoj Žižek · Jews as structural universalists
“In Lacanian terms theoretically, there is no big Other. No global symbolic order which tells you what to do.”Slavoj Žižek · absence of the big Other
“My motto is the one from old Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer: our stance today should be pessimism in theory, optimism in practice.”Slavoj Žižek · Frankfurt School motto / Žižek's orientation
“If there ever was a postmodern president, historicist, relativist, it's Donald Trump.”Slavoj Žižek · Trump as postmodern relativist
“If there ever was a person who embodies at its best this moral majority, simple in a progressive sense — isn't it Bernie Sanders?”Slavoj Žižek · Sanders as progressive moral majority
“How could they spoil a beautiful sex act with a porn dirty book like Bhagavad Gita?”Slavoj Žižek · Bhagavad Gita as ethically pornographic
“The mega tragedy of Zionism is that what the greatest victims of European antisemitism chose the way to oppress others there and got caught into this way.”Slavoj Žižek · Zionism's founding tragedy
“As if I borrow from you one billion dollars and then instead of paying you back, I say, 'Take that guy's money.'”Slavoj Žižek · Holocaust reparation as displaced debt
“More and more the predominant atmosphere, feeling, in the poor black majority is nostalgia for apartheid.”Slavoj Žižek · South Africa's nostalgia for apartheid
“You cannot propose a simple solution. The starting point is there is no clean solution here.”Slavoj Žižek · irreducible complexity of Israel-Palestine
“I hate this traditional leftist game of 'Yeah, imperialism still controls us,' and so on.”Slavoj Žižek · critique of blame-deflecting leftism
Transcript 29 turns
The real aim of this attack was to eternalize war, to prevent any possibility for decades of peace. What horrifies me is there are two narratives, opposed, radical, which in an uncanny, terrifying way echo each other. Those who now appear as the opposite poles are really playing a very similar game. What I fear terribly is that in the long term, all sides will be losers. Now is the moment for Israel: yeah, annihilate Hamas, but at the same time reach out to Palestinians, giving them some kind of a clear,
clear program of hope. Slavoj Žižek, welcome back to PoliticsJOE. For those unfamiliar with who you are, how would you like to introduce yourself?
Ah, now comes a surprise. I still advocate communism. But what kind of communism? A German journalist asked me what kind of communist you are, and I gave an answer: a moderately conservative communist. By moderately conservative, I mean something very precise. You know what bothers me with some leftist liberals? They make big plans, you know, "let’s do this new legislation" and so on, but not with Rishi Sunak kind, but with authentic—they are endangered species today—old conservatives, what even Lenin and Mao admired in them, is this brute realism, you know, in the sense of: "Yes, we can do this, but you think like crazy about what will be the consequences, what if we screw that other thing," and so on and so on. Because isn’t the standard even radical leftist game: then you of course cause a catastrophe and then you blame the enemy? You know, it’s like what I call sadly in Africa the Mugabe game. You screw it up and then you blame: "Ah, because secretly the whites still control everything." And what is really breaking my heart is that now South Africa is approaching the same. So by moderately conservative, I mean simply: before you act, think well about all possible consequences. Because social life—here I am very pessimistic, not a traditional Marxist—is obscure, non-transparent, complex. You never know what the actual result would be. So now you can counter-attack me: but why then communist at all? To give you a very short answer: it’s not a communism of joy, abundance; it’s a sad, pessimistic communism. Look, we are facing now three, four, five—I cannot even nominate them all—real apocalyptic threats: war, immigration, ecological threat, artificial intelligence. And I don’t see any other way to cope with this than what I provocatively call "war communism." An emergency state where—I’m not talking about world government and state taking over, that would be a catastrophe, even worse—but some kind of global international cooperation. Not just this aesthetic cooperation: "Yes, we must understand each other," but more forceful cooperation will be necessary. Now, when people tell me, "Oh, but this is total utopia," I tell them, "Sorry, remember COVID?" Even Trump had to do measures which come very close to what I call communism. You remember every family got a check for and so on. Stimulus checks. Yeah, yeah. And you remember how half a year before, if you were to mention an idea like this, all the neoliberals would say, "No, this would mean ruin of our economy." No, it didn’t. The good point about COVID epidemics was that it was made clear how much we can play with the market, do things independently of the market, and they don’t necessarily ruin the economy. So again, communist—it means I sincerely don't see how to cope with the problems, threats that are on the horizon without a much stronger collective collaboration well beyond the limits of the sovereign nation-state. Just to conclude, please allow me this, my example that I mention all the time: you remember two and a half years ago, that crazy hot summer where northwest of United States, southwest of Canada—Seattle, Vancouver—50 degrees Celsius? It was warmer than Mumbai or Emirates. You cannot say they should take care more of ecology. No, these are rich parts of the world; they did the proper measures. The problem is that the whole circulation of air around the North Pole is disturbed. So in this sense, I am a communist in the sense of: we have to prepare for some emergency state. Precisely because if we don't do it in a transparent, democratic way, then better not to think what can happen. But again, moderately conservative: be careful about the consequences. I hate again this traditional leftist game of "Yeah, yeah, imperialism still controls
us," and so on. So the reason we're talking is because of this book, *What Lies Ahead When There Is No Future?* You talk [unintelligible] the threats you mentioned there: war, climate catastrophe, those things of that nature. That it's important that we have to conceptualize and understand these catastrophes in order to avert them. Most recently, and I think the most prominent example of any of those currently, is the war in Israel, the bombing of Gaza. And I wondered if you could talk a little bit about how we need to conceptualize that conflict in order to understand it and in order to avert the possible catastrophe that it contains. It's the question which I am almost afraid to answer because it's all
the time on my mind. Maybe you or some of our viewers know it: I, two weeks ago, I was in Frankfurt Book Fair and I practically caused a scandal addressing this issue. All the big media—big daily newspapers—attacked me as practically antisemitic, supporting terrorists, although the first sentence of my speech was: Hamas did a horrible crime, Israel has the right to annihilate it. And all my "but" is: but we all know that in the background there is the unresolved status of the Palestinians. There are over four million people on the West Bank, in Gaza, in Israel itself, in East Jerusalem, and they live in—I cannot but call it ontological limbo. It's not clear what they are. Even the name of the territory is not clear. Is it, as is for the hardline Zionist, is it Judea and Samaria? Is it Palestine? Is it West Bank or whatever? And these people are in a horrible position. And without justifying the brutal Hamas attack—I condemned it ruthlessly—now maybe you cut out if you want this, let me tell you a story which really hit me. I am in close contact with Palestinians and with West Bank, and not only West Bank, Jews. And they told me, you know why some of them, leftists especially, were so hurt by the Hamas attack? Because that area of that famous, famous, terrible rave party where Hamas was doing the murdering, a kibbutz there—do you know that these were—I don’t know them, but I know people who knew people who were massacred there—these were the most progressive Jews. They all the time had contact with Gaza, helping them, hiring them to help them. Taking them to hospital and things like that, yeah. Yeah, it's incredible. And this tells a lot about why did Hamas attack there? Not only because it was most practical, but unfortunately because the real aim of this attack was to eternalize war, to prevent any possibility for decades of peace. And it's breathtaking how, with all absolute unambiguous condemnation of Hamas, when I just said "but can't you see the terrible predicament of Palestinians who are now in one or another way under Israeli control?" They are now explicitly not treated as second-class citizens, a whole series of things they cannot do and so on. And as I always mention this name, if you want a symbol of what Israel is doing now—Israel the state, I mean just the government now—remember the name Itamar Ben-Gvir, who was years ago or when, condemned by Israeli courts as a potential terrorist, racist, and so on. This guy is now—it sounds like a bad joke—this guy is now Minister for Public Security or whatever. And it’s—I learned this from friends on the West Bank—how public order is falling around, settlers attacking, it’s slow but continuous ethnic cleansing. I think that what horrifies me is there are two narratives, opposed, radical, which in an uncanny, terrifying way echo each other. On the one hand, I agree there is the Hamas narrative, their leader Haniyeh, who said message to Israel: "Go out, we will kill you if you remain, you don't belong here." But then if you look at the first principle officially published of the new Netanyahu government is: all of Jewish land—they include Judea, Samaria, Golan Heights, and so on—is exclusively a Jewish land. So it's symmetrical idea of: there is no place for the other. So I think that the key point here is not to fall into this trap of Palestinians versus Israeli, but to see how those who now appear as the opposite poles are really playing a very similar game. And then I did something, not to lose too much time, which caused even more of a scandal. I warned them that there is in the West, in the Western antisemitism, a long tradition—I'm not inventing crazy terms—of you cannot but call it Zionist antisemitism. Do you remember that guy who shot Norwegian leftists, Breivik? He says, he said: "Here we have too many Jews, throw them out. But Israel is a wall against Oriental barbarism, we should fully support Israel." You know who began this? I couldn't believe it. Reinhard Heydrich, the father of the Holocaust. He said, he wrote—I quote, I don't know if it's in this book or another—"There are two types of Jews: integration Jews who want to blend into our society, and Zionist Jews. These Jews who want to integrate into our society, we have to get rid of them. But if Jews move to Palestine, we could have wonderful collaboration of them," and so on and so on. And the same thing goes on now. Trump is doing the same. Trump supports Israel there, but in United States, you know, Proud Boys and so on, he is supported by explicitly antisemitic game. So I will conclude quickly just with one point which is important: I think to understand properly the ongoing war is to take into account its catastrophic effect in Israel itself. There was a moment of hope in Israel a couple of months ago, you remember that big conflict, hundreds of thousand of people opposing this new legislation which basically abolishes the independent legal structure and so on. And this war now serves perfectly Netanyahu government. Now we forget about that and so on and so on. So what I fear terribly is that in the long term, all sides will be losers. In the sense that I am very sensitive apropos antisemitism—I recognize it wherever it is—and I think the first thing that will happen is: antisemitism was till now a mostly European and a little bit Middle East, but mostly European-American phenomenon. Now antisemitism will become a worldwide movement in a totally disgusting way. It will be a new link in this series of what I call unholy alliances. For example, you remember what happened in Uganda half a—half a year ago, I think, where their parliament, democratically of course, imposed the most terrifying anti-gay law. If you are caught in homosexual act, the punishment can be death. But you know how they justified it? As struggle against colonialism. And what I’m so afraid is that antisemitism will be included into this series, like: to be antisemitic means to be for the Third World suffering nations and so on. This will be a catastrophe. Even if in the short term Israel wins there—and I think this was the idea of Hamas: we may lose here (not they, they will escape), ordinary people, but it will give birth to such a new way of antisemitism, not only in the Arab world. Then the game Putin is playing here, who is counting on this equation: Israel is like Ukraine, a colonialist, Western-dominated nation and so on. This is quite catastrophic. The only hope I see, there are reasonable voices, I’m in contact with them, although we are politically not on the same side and he doesn’t go far enough, but for example, Yuval Harari, that guy, *Homo Deus*. He said something which is very important. He said: there is no peace in the Middle East without Palestinians being allowed to live free, dignified life in their homeland. He meant West Bank and so on. And it's very important that he used the term "in their homeland." This is also their home. So it's too utopian, but now it is growing stronger in Israel, this idea for which I was attacked as an antisemite. In all left Israeli media, you find it now that now is the moment for Israel: yeah, annihilate Hamas, but at the same time reach out to Palestinians, listening: here we can make a deal, you can live safely here, and so on and so on. To continue the theme of catastrophe, you’ve also described the Western response to the conflict as a moral catastrophe. Could you talk about that a little bit more? The problem was that now it's getting more mixed. But this—you know, I was interrupted in my Frankfurt speech because the basic problem was—I even didn't use the word "but," like "I condemn Hamas, but." And as somebody says at the end of the debate, the word "but" should be prohibited now. Another word that should be prohibited, I was informed, is "complex situation." No, there is only one side, it's absolutely clear. And you know where I see a moral catastrophe? Now I'm sorry if I will become anti—sound anti-German. I don't mean all of Germany, I mean the predominant stance in politics now. It’s this one: Germans admit they did the Holocaust, and now by pursuing radically pro-Israeli politics, they do something disgusting, I think. They think that by supporting Israel where Israel is not the right—West Bank and so on—they will somehow pay their debt for the Holocaust and so on. I find this something so terribly immoral. Another thing that I find immoral is also and at multiple levels—and here only quote Yuval Harari and all of them—this is for me the true moral catastrophe where you posit a choice: either you speak about Israeli victims or you speak about Palestinian victims in Gaza. If you mention Palestinian victims, you are already antisemitic and so on and so on. My basic insight here is—that's why I think it's a moral catastrophe—that those Zionist Israelis who mention in today’s situation Holocaust are doing a terrifying, disrespectful exploitation of Holocaust itself. Holocaust, a terrifying, unimaginable crime, they use it as a stake, a jeton, to justify their policy now. That's why I think that—and did you notice this detail, that's why so many people attacked me? I was very restrained and careful in my Frankfurt speech. All the positive people I quoted were Jews. Even Moshe Dayan, who admitted—how much more refreshing is now to read the first generation, Ben-Gurion, Dayan, who didn't play the game "this is our land," blah blah blah. No, they said it's an impossible conflict, we know nobody is right, and so on. Not to mention Simon Wiesenthal, not to mention my true ethical hero. If there is a person whom I would—to whom I would give, maybe please to our listeners check it on Wikipedia or wherever, is Marek Edelman. It's a Polish Jew, mega-hero. He was a Bundist, more socialist Jew. He was one of the key organizers of the Ghetto Uprising '43 in Warsaw. Magically he survived it. Then he was one of the key organizers of the Warsaw Uprising '44. Magically he survived it. Then he remained in Poland. And he gave a wonderful theoretical explanation when later antisemitism under communism emerged again. He stayed there. And he again, he provided a beautiful metaphor. He said: "It's not what I am saying, but imagine me as a stone in Auschwitz. Somebody has to be here to embody, not to talk about that memory." And at the end of his life, he wrote a letter to my Palestinian friends where he said, "I support your rebellion against the Israel," of course condemning all Palestinian violence. There is a great Jewish tradition which is incredible. That's why I don't like this Western, this
the most disgusting Western position, antisemitic Zionist of: "not too many Jews here, but you go there
and protect our civilization." No, I like Jews here also. Wherever they are, they make a great contribution to our civilization and so on. Look, precisely because they were stateless, we cannot even imagine European modernity, enlightenment, and so on without the Jews. The very idea of enlightenment universalism came from the Jews who simply, like, they were condemned to be universalist, you know. But you know where the—sorry, just one thing—you know Netanyahu and others, when you ask them why is that place Palestine yours, they said, "Look at the Bible, it tells everything," and so on. But in the most ironic case of cancel culture, mention the Bible and you will be excluded as antisemitic. Once I did this in a debate in New York, I think some Jews said, "But sorry, we are attached to our tradition, look at the Bible." So I told them, I quoted, I said, "Yes, let's look at the Bible. You know Moses, years wandering around Sinai, then up on the mountain Moses dies, he already sees the valley, and then Joshua takes over. And what to do? And God's voice tells him: Canaanites are down there, they are evil people, kill them all: men, women, children, and so on." So you know, if I were a Jew, I wouldn't insist too much on the Bible, you know. But to avoid a misunderstanding, I’m not here condemning the Jews because at that time, let’s be frank, everybody was acting like this. We Slavs from some Siberian steps, I don’t know where, how did we come to Europe? By invading it and so on. At that point—so I'm just saying that in the same way that we talk about invented traditions, we should also treat our historical documents. And now I will make a very sad conclusion: I am very skeptical about this idea that originally religions are good—Islam, Judaism, Christianity—it's only in their political application that they are—that they are misused. No, you find a lot of horror and shit already in the origin. So I’m here much more of a pessimist. The lesson of this—I will immediately conclude, sorry—the lesson of this is: we are left to our own resources. In Lacanian terms theoretically, there is no big Other. By big Other, I don't mean just God, but some global symbolic order which tells you what to do. No, we live in a very dangerous era where no reference to tradition or to science or whatever can tell us what to do. I’d also in the tradition of kind of, you know, emancipatory Judaism encourage listeners to consult the Wikipedia of Denis Goldberg, who was imprisoned on Robben Island and actually separated—he was part of the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa and also imprisoned there with Mandela, but of course separated from him because of apartheid. And so was alone in prison for the same period of time. Why, because he was a Jew or what? Because Mandela was black, right, and he was a Jew, he was white, so they were separated. Ah, yeah, Jew was white, yeah. Because—no, I—sorry to interrupt you, this is very—I know the situation there very well. You know, even now in India many people, many—some people, many don't know about me, hate me because I killed or at least undermined the respect for another sacred cow there: Gandhi. You know when Gandhi was in South Africa, yes, he fought against apartheid, but only for the Indian minority. Read Gandhi's text, my friends republished them now. He doesn't put in doubt the big separation black-white; he just says we Indians should be counted as white and so on. The second thing, you see this is what I mean: moderately conservative. Maybe you read it, I think I already used this somewhere, a couple of months ago at Birkbeck College where I'm temporarily employed, there was a debate with a lady from South Africa, hardline old ANC fighter. And I asked her a frank question. I asked her: in all our media I read all the time about how South Africa is on the border of becoming a fail—on the edge of becoming a failed state, blah blah blah. I don't want to believe Western media, please tell me how do I reply to this. And I was almost crying, so sad. You know what she told me? She told me that more and more the predominant atmosphere, feeling, in the poor black majority, poor, is nostalgia for apartheid. She said that now in memory they remember apartheid as a time where, yes, they were second-class citizens, but if anything, the standard of living was the same, maybe a little bit even higher for the poor black majority, plus it was a police state which means there was safety. Now society is disintegrating; South Africa has one of the highest rape numbers per capita. You see, this is what I want the left to avoid. How this eternal stories—look at Latin America: Bolivia, but now they did not do a wise thing, they cut diplomatic ties with Israel, but till now I believed in Bolivia because I was friendly with Vice President of Morales, Álvaro García Linera, and so on. They were years in power without scaring too much the capital. They succeeded: the standard of living went up, and then you remember there was a coup d'etat against them but they won again. So I—that's my moderate conservatism: how to avoid—I will name just three names—Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, where it was a catastrophe. The left has to ask very hard questions here. I don't want to be that comfortable leftist who organizes a revolution, a revolution fails, and then you move back to your academic post and write a thick book how because of the imperialist cunningness and plot it had to fail the revolution. No, the left deserves some authentic success. Can we interrogate a little bit more the role of violence in revolution, in liberation struggle, whether it’s, you know, as we were talking about the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa or, well, take any—any sort of struggle against injustice? The one we’ve been interrogating so far is obviously with Palestine and Israel. Is there an acceptable level of violence, to your mind, in a liberation struggle? I—no no no, I’m not naive here. I know that in certain conditions, if nothing else, a certain level of violence paradoxically creates the conditions for a peaceful revolution. I forgot the guy’s name, I’m old senile, but a guy, a black guy I think, wrote a wonderful book—I quote it, I forgot where, in some new text—where he says that look,
for example, at American in the '60s and so on struggle against racism. Yes, Martin Luther King won, but it also won because it was clear to the white majority there: if there is not a threat of violence behind, Luther King wouldn't be taken seriously. You need it. It was the same in South Africa. Yes, Mandela won, but because the apartheid guys were well aware that there was a much more radical orientation within the ANC threatening with violence. The most tragic example here, let's look into history, is Haiti, where—I mean the exploitation of Haiti till the
Haiti Revolution around was breathtaking. Let's say that
profits from Haiti brought to the
French state more than half of its income. But what I want to say is this: revolution won. The first generation, Toussaint Louverture, were very fair towards the whites. They just freed slaves, but their main worry was to keep the production going, economic collapse to avoid. Then the French—Napoleon is here the bad guy—he brought arrested Toussaint Louverture, brought him to France, and slowly killed him in an abandoned castle, blah blah blah. Then the next generation were more radical, violent. You know what they did? They—I forgot his name, the successor of Toussaint Louverture—he simply gave an order to kill all white people who remained there. With one exception—that’s true, it’s one of the most beautiful revolutionary legend, it again makes me cry—when Napoleon sent an army to Haiti with a horrible order: kill all the blacks. He said, "after the revolution it's not just to enslave them again, kill them all, bring new slaves." Then when the French army was approaching the Haiti black army, revolutionaries, they heard some singing and they thought, "yeah, this must be some primitive African dances." When they come closer, you know what they recognized, in what the black freed slaves were singing? *La Marseillaise*. And thousands of Polish soldiers said, "Wait a minute, are we here on the right side?" and they changed sides. And so Napoleon won, but then the result of all this trauma was this terrifying order to kill all white people. Now you can say, "You see, if you give them freedom what happens." Ah, it's more complex because at precisely this moment, the new black rulers took over, imitated perfectly the French aristocratic system. They named counts and so on, you know. This violence served the establishment as a pure copy of European feudal aristocracy there. But Haiti nonetheless did something prohibited and—to—do you know that to be reintegrated into world economy, Haiti had to pay to France as for the damage of lost property, slaves, throughout 19th century—it was at some point up to its state budget. You know when the last money was paid to France? In I think. So they consciously—they kept— But so I don't avoid your question. I would put it like this: first, my limit is—if they are not well known as a gangster family or what—don't attack civilian population. Keep it to army. There, if the situation is terrorist, I condone a limited amount of violence. But we should always be aware again of this ambiguity that, you know, you need a violent wing so that violence should be more used as a threat to do the necessary compromise. That would be my formula. But counter-attack me, I want the—screw you, I mean you just agree. Do you—did I say anything that you don't agree, please, I would like to— It's actually funny because large parts of what you said I do agree with. Fuck, large parts! Go to small parts where you don't agree! I think there has—there has to be, you know—so let’s interrogate sort of modern
conflicts. The nature of modern conflict: it’s asymmetrical, always, whether it’s the British and American imperial forces in Afghanistan, whether it’s the Palestinians against the Israelis. And to say that the Palestinians should confront the Israelis militarily, it’s essentially a death sentence, isn’t it? It’s to say "yeah, and you can say great, fantastic, morally justifiable," but completely ineffective as a tactic. And it makes me uncomfortable
because what I’m essentially saying—the place I’m left in is essentially justifying the attack on civilians, which something morally, ethically for me, I find deeply distressing, deeply upsetting, and I—but I don’t see any other way in terms of, you know, an effective military campaign, an effective terrorist campaign, the use of limited violence to achieve political ends. You know, if they attack military bases, they will all die. So what else can they do if not kill the civilians? And I find that deeply, deeply uncomfortable because like I said— But okay, now I will accept this totally pragmatic, ruthless thinking. But shouldn’t have then focused a little bit more on some effectively violent groups of settlers or whatever and not precisely that part which was closest, which was closest to them in some sense? Yeah. I mean, here I agree with you, let's begin by this: the situation is tragic in some sense. You cannot propose a simple solution, and so like "this is the formula" and so on. No, I see your point, of course. But again, as you already pointed out, not only this means suicide for Palestinians, but in the long term, such suicidal attacks eternalize war and I don't see then any peaceful ANC, Mandela or whatever arising out of this and bringing peace. That's what horrifies me, you know. I would even accept attacks, here we agree, if there is a hope for they will serve the way the threat with violence was necessary to bring in Mandela, to bring in Martin Luther King, and so on. Otherwise, I—what really, as friend of the Jews and of Palestinians, I see really it scares me again: a new wave of antisemitism. It will—I don’t trust Zionists, but I also see very clearly antisemitism where there is one. And what I again, what horrifies me is this identification of that antisemitism as the result of this war will be elevated into one of the main markers of anti-colonial struggle. Although, you know, again, I like to complicate things. The Jewish side is not clean here. You know, I did something cunning: I read Theodor Herzl, founder of Zionism. You know that he—you know to whom, good for his soul he didn't send it—but you know that he wrote a letter to Cecil Rhodes? Asking him for advice, like, and would he invest money, addressing him in terms of colonization: "You colonized half of Africa, help us to colonize it there." Second thing, he explicitly flirted, Herzl already, with the Western right using this terms of today's right: that a state of Israel, a Jewish state there, will be an impregnable wall to protect Western Europe from Oriental barbarism. So that's the mega tragedy of Zionism, that what the greatest victims of European antisemitism chose the way to oppress others there and got caught into this way. Here I—I hated Ahmadinejad, you know the ex-president of Iran, I even at some point was prohibited to enter because there were some elections years ago where Ahmadinejad won by cheating and so on and I wrote some letters. But you know, when he said something that others also said: "Okay, Germans did something horrible," which Ahmadinejad didn't admit, but let's admit it. "Holocaust. Isn't there something cheating in giving them the land in Palestine? Wouldn't it be normal for Germans: listen, end of World War II, you also have a lot of victims which means empty land, give—why don't you, you who killed six million Jews, give him, I don't know, the city of Hamburg and surround—" You know, there is some cheating in it as if—as if I borrow from you one billion dollars and then instead of paying you back, I say, "Take that guy’s money." You know, the situation is desperately complex. This is why this is not a pessimism. The starting point is there is no clean solution here. And as you know as well, the word "but," "complex situation" is a banned—banned phrase in this conversation, as you said at the beginning. Especially by this now rediscovered as totally pro-Israeli poli—yeah, they—I—you know, an article in I forgot which German daily
newspaper attacking me, they put it as a title of their text: "Hamas has no context." It's madness, like, you know, every mention of context is—but then I answered in I think quite understandable that even if we—it's more complex—just condemn Hamas, of course we should inquire into context because for example, there are dozens, hundreds of books of the origins of Nazism. And it’s clear that there was a crisis in Germany experienced by millions of people, economic crisis and so on, and Hitler profited from that crisis, offering a certain antisemitic narrative. And to many ordinary people, things were all of a sudden clear, you know, like "Ah, now we know, behind all of this are the Jews" and so on. So here is a nice example of how contextualizing doesn't mean justifying in any way. Evil can be a radical crazy evil, but it’s always a product of certain circumstances. It exploded in certain circumstances. Like the same again in Haiti. The second generation who killed all the white people. Yes, I agree, it was horrible. But
let’s take a look at how breathtaking the exploitation in Haiti was. Okay. I will not go on, I talk too much. No, not at all, not at all. I think there’s one other sort of area I’d like to explore on Israel-Palestine before we maybe move to— [The user's water bottle falls over] Sorry. That’s a terrible omen, isn’t it? No no no, it’s good, leave it there, leave it there. That’s where it belongs, facedown on the floor. Yeah yeah yeah, no, I’m always cynical against myself, you know. Or to put it in more humanist terms: books are dead objects, we talk like humans, let the books— Let’s, okay, so between the two extremes, the two totalitarian positions that we’ve discussed: the one of Hamas and the one of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich—that sort of— Smotrich, yes, he is the other hard—hard right Zionist position. Exactly, this sort of Greater Israel idea, right, the expulsion of the Palestinians from Gaza. And if you look at demographic changes happening in Israel, the younger generation skew much more to that extreme right-wing politics, they skew much more towards the politics of the likes of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. And that surely means, looking to the future, whether there’s a solution whether without sounding like Tony Blair, a "third way" somewhere in between those two total extreme poles, because the Israeli population electorally is going to move towards that extreme. So, if anything, the prospect of peace and a lasting peace seems further away than perhaps it ever has been. First, I would say something that may surprise you. I read a good analysis, leftist analysis, of the situation in France and Belgium, and they discovered the same thing there among these—I don't like the term "quotation marks" pro-terrorist Arab immigrants. So it’s not that they—we were not open enough to integrate them. No, most of these young generation of terrorists who did that concert hall bombing, remember a couple of years ago in Paris— The Bataclan, yeah. —do you know that they are second generation? It's the same paradox that the older generation, their parents, were much better integrated into French society. So—I—then the second thing one has to mention—I'm sorry if it will sound racist—is that a lot of this younger generation are East European Jews. Who are from Russia and other East European countries, who tend to be much more aggressive racists than the—than the first generation. There really is something very dark. This is the true dark side of the East European till '89 communism. For example, maybe you know the story, I spoke with a German dissident, I don't like him too much, but okay he was well known: Wolf Biermann. Singer who emigrated to the West, friend of Brecht and so on. And he told me that in early '90s, immediately after the reunification, he went to some big ecological meeting in X East Germany, and there was there a strong group of, well, to call them by their name, Neo-Nazi eco people. Ecologically conscious. And he told them, "But you are for Hitler." You know what answer he got, he told me? One of the most terrifying answers that I got: "No, we criticize Hitler because Hitler did some good things like getting rid of the Jews, but also he developed car industry, he built highways and so on, which was horrible." You know, this most obscene version. So this is what always surprised me: that even now, even now, the right-wing Neo-Nazi parties are much stronger
in X East Germany than in the West. This is what again really makes me—really makes me a pessimism. That what you described as something going on among the Israeli youth is also going on among the
Palestinians, up to a point even in the United States. Look, all of this Proud Boys and so on. And what really makes me afraid is that liberal democracy, the way we knew it, is coming to an end. Let's for a moment forget about West Bank, Israel; let's move to the United States. I think United States it’s really in danger on the edge of the civil war. I forget his name because he is a disgusting nobody, who is now the new House speaker? Oh yeah, was it—it’s not McCarthy, is it? It’s—the new one, yeah. But he is like the Trumpist— Yeah, but the ultra-Trumpist. Yeah yeah. Mike Johnson. Yeah yeah. I tell you, after people like him and DeSantis, we will even have, I predict, a nostalgia for Trump. Because Trump was very careful, you know, not to pass a certain limit. Because this guy openly advocates violating the Constitution, problematizing democracy. People noticed very nicely that he never refers to the United States as democracy; he always uses the term "republic." Republic in this Christian fundamentalist sense, and so on and so on. So I don't have a good counter-point to you. My counter-point is much more sad: is that the whole world is
moving in this direction. Look at the catastrophe barely avoided—if it is avoided—remember a couple of weeks ago the first round
of
the presidential elections in
Argentina, where I, again, I prefer to erase the names of really bad people, some
right-wing liberal populist— Milei. Yeah, he went to the end, a nightmare. And I always use this when people ask me about freedom, you know, since I also
published by Bloomsbury a book on freedom, and I try not to relativize the term of freedom, but to see many dimensions, contradictory. He radicalizes—this
guy, something with M—the notion of freedom. Did you read—I couldn't believe my eyes when I read it—I had, you know, I like this scene from old cartoons Tom and Jerry, when you see something and your eyes jump out and turn in the air—you know what he advocates? He said this is a new freedom to solve people from poverty: to give to poor people the right to sell their organs and their children. Sorry, this is liberal capitalism today. And so I—that’s the cause of my pessimism. Yesterday at a debate on that strange
place—I liked it—Royal Institute, you know, somebody attacked me along these lines with a very good question, no? Somebody told me, like, "But your message is we are fucked up, no trouble. But you in any case you are old, you will soon die, so you don't care. What about the majority of young people here? Shouldn't you give them some hope?" And my counter-point was that his question is very ambiguous. Does he mean that—that it's true that we are fucked up, just out of respect for innocent young people we should give them some hope? I totally oppose this, this means patronizing them. Or does he mean there is hope, your analysis is wrong? And I would like to believe I am—that there is some hope. My motto is the one from old Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer says this apropos of Nazism: that our stance today should be pessimism in theory, optimism in practice. And I try to follow it. I’m generally a pessimist, but whenever there is a chance, whatever to do—I was engaged against Putin for Pussy Riot and so on. I’m in contact with—this may surprise you—with some guerrilla group in Philippines and so on. Wherever, I quite liked Aristide in Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti. He was dirtily manipulated by the United States. He was not a crazy Castro-like utopian, he was very modest, honest, but it was too much. So for a long time I supported Syriza, and I still am not sure could they—my reproach to them is again moderately conservative because they complained how the European Union treated them, but what did they expect? You know? Yeah, I—I think that absolutely use any—in India there I’m for Muslims engaged in things against the horror that Modi is doing now. Modi is playing the same game as Trump and the new right. Some people protested, non-Hindus, that they don’t feel safe. You know what was Modi’s answer? Public. Modi’s answer was, "Yeah, and it’s good so so that you will know that you are the threat of the nation," and so on. It’s literal falling apart of this basic safety of the public order. Now, in my old age, this may sound horrible to you, but the right is today the one which is more and more populist, violent, and so on. And I think—now I will say something shocking to you, it's an old story but maybe, I hope you're
not an idiot, not to you but for others—maybe the left should begin to use the term "moral
majority." Look, many people, I don't think they're most antisemites, who demonstrated here hundreds of thousand and there are for Palestine. And there are probably many more who are afraid to. My friends, Israeli friends, are now arrested in Israel and so on. We should address them, we should maybe drop this violence, public violence speech, and—no, my image of the United States is this one: with a little bit of irony but I think it’s true. Look my old story: when on the 6th of January the Trump mob occupied the Congress, my leftist friends were crying: "We should have been doing it, this is our—" I told them, "No, sorry, you live in the wrong time." Today the game—rules of the game have changed. If we mean by postmodernism this cynical relativism, flirting with violence, blah blah blah, then if there ever was a postmodern president, historicist, relativist, it’s Donald Trump. And let’s face it, if there ever was a person who embodies at its best this moral majority, simple in a progressive sense—let’s say conservative in the sense of there should be basic decency—attitude, isn’t it Bernie Sanders? I think we should not leave all these voters to the new right. I didn't meet Sanders himself, but I spoke with his ghostwriter, with some people around him, who told me Bernie knows this. Bernie said when there were elections Trump versus Hillary, he said something ingenious: he said don't worry about—because Democrats under Hillary fell into this trap—they worried about the middle, will we if we become too radical alienate this undecided middle classes. Bernie said, "No, we should aim at Trump’s voters. Many of them are disillusioned poor whites and so on, they should be our—our target." That would be, if you ask me, my politics today. Just finally, because time is short and you have to go, I’d also like to talk to you briefly about culture and about, well, some of the biggest cinematic releases that we’ve had this year. You’ve written already an essay comparing *Barbie* and *Oppenheimer*, and I wonder— Aha! This now you really want to push me into suicide, public suicide! They must be interesting movies, you know, because I haven't seen them, you know. Yeah, of course, yeah. No no no, I just like to read reviews and then react and then react, you know. Okay, I'll make—I'll qualify it a little bit. I was tempted to see *Barbie* because I quite liked her earlier movies by Greta Gerwig. You know, she is serious, she did some good things. As for Christopher Nolan, I’m ambiguous there. I liked the—although which was his last Batman, the one where basically— *The Dark Knight Rises*, yeah. Yeah. What I like is the idea, although he is against it, that Manhattan becomes a people's republic, leftist terror. And he shows his cards there, that he is a reformist. But nonetheless, the topics were so daring that—you know the guy played by Tom Hardy, the brutal terrorist? Not Batman, he is there the opponent. Bane. Bane, yeah. But isn't he the only passionate, sympathetic image in the movie? He really loves that woman and sacrifices his life for her. So as for *Oppenheimer*, no? I will repeat what I said yesterday, something that horrifies many of my friends. You—I saw the movie later, not when I wrote the text. You know which part I liked surprisingly? The political part. You know all that— The committee. —in the committee, how they manipulate Oppenheimer in this double games and so on, how he is in advance sacrificed. What I hate, hate is *Bhagavad Gita*. Because I mentioned this yesterday, read history of SS. Heinrich Himmler, the most disgusting guy. He always carried in his pocket a special leather-bound version of *Bhagavad Gita*. Why? Because he was aware, Himmler, he was well aware that as a SS officer you have to do horrible thing: killing helpless starved Jews. And his problem was an ethical one—ironic as this may sound—how can you do it without losing your dignity? And his answer was *Bhagavad Gita*. You know this idea of "don't be identified with your acts, learn to act at a distance," and so on. So I don't like that reference to *Bhagavad Gita*. So you remember the first sex scene—Oppenheimer with Florence Pugh, the communist mistress, not yet the wife. And she asks him, or who, whom, I don't know, to read *Bhagavad Gita*. And you remember there was an outcry in India? Yes, I agree with them, but in the opposite sense. Why—yes, I'm against that because how could they spoil a beautiful sex act with a porn dirty book like *Bhagavad Gita*? You know? I mean, I—wait wait, I’m not alone here. I’m not alone here. With all my Indian friends. We agree on what I already mentioned: the greatest tragedy in India was that around year zero in our Christian era, you know, all of a sudden Hinduism made a successful return and Buddhism disappeared. And many of my Indian friends, even radical leftists, respect much more than Gandhi, Ambedkar, who was the great anti-caste liberal. Gandhi was never against castes. He
just said each caste has its own dignity, they are all children of God. It's the same thing as fascists are saying: working class also has its proper place and
dignity and so on and so on. So in this sense, I must say I enjoyed the movie, but I didn't like this pseudo-metaphysical background. Forget about that. Slavoj Žižek, thank you so much for taking the time to speak to me. It's been an absolute pleasure. I’m grateful to you and—I’m very sorry, concluding joke if we are still on, that I liked you were not active enough because you know when people ask me about dialogue, I’m violent. You know what’s my standard answer? I like dialogues, but like late Plato’s dialogues, where one guy talks all the time and the other guy just says every 10—no no, every minutes: "By Zeus, so it is, Socrates," and so on. I like the—my favorite part of our speech today—dialogue, is that once I did provoke you into striking back a little bit. You know. Yeah, I— You should maybe even more if we will have another opportunity. No, let's put it in this way, I cannot avoid obscenities, no? I would like to—we go on well, let’s consider this an intellectual, not sexual, quickie, and let’s do another one more, you know, more— Like the *Kamasutra*, yeah. We’ll do *Kamasutra* version, yeah, long—long form, yeah. But also—no, let's not go into it because with *Kamasutra* I also have problems, you know. It’s for me the ultimate book that ruins sexuality. Slavoj, thank you so much. I’m re—I’m really grateful to you because I was told you were a nice surprise for me because I mobilized my small private KGB spy service, you know, and they said: "Oh, he makes jokes, he's—" No, you are not an idiot, although you make jokes and so on, you—you have a mind, you know. Very nice surprise. Thank you very much. That’s high praise, man. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Okay. Happy guys? Finito, finito, finito. Now, fuck you up your [unintelligible] or whatever. My god.