Slavoj Zizek. The Future of Europe. 2009 3/12
Talk · European Graduate School Video Lectures ·
2009-03-07 · 0:09:54 · 1,396 words
ideologycapitalismcinema-art-culturepolitics
Žižek argues that contemporary society suffers from a lack of 'cognitive mapping,' resulting in a post-political condition where global capitalism is accepted as the only possible horizon. He diagnoses this through the popularity of conspiracy theories and 'Western Buddhism,' and illustrates the limit of our imagination via apocalyptic films and superhero movies, which allow us to envision the end of the world but not a change in the capitalist system. He concludes that modern ideology functions cynically, where we do not believe in it but act as if it works, citing the Niels Bohr horseshoe anecdote.
every located moment in this recording, click one to read it
The ideas in it 9
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
A basic orientation or set of cognitive coordinates of the world, which Žižek claims is currently missing in contemporary society.
Conspiracy theories, which Žižek defines as a compensatory construct for when people do not know what is going on due to a lack of cognitive mapping.
A dominant, desubstantialized ideology in developed societies that emphasizes inner experience and flux over organized religion or substantial reality.
as “Fukuyamaists”
People who accept Fukuyama's thesis that liberal democratic capitalism is the final formula, despite laughing at Fukuyama himself.
as “global capitalism with a human face”
The current leftist dream, analogous to 'socialism with a human face,' representing a desire for a more tolerant capitalism rather than systemic change.
as “post-political left”
A political stance characterized by moral fury translated immediately into legal regulations, lacking any imagination for alternative political orders.
A popular cultural mood or atmosphere focused on global catastrophe, which reveals our inability to imagine a change in capitalism.
The ideological thesis that truth must be hidden to preserve public confidence in institutions, illustrated by Batman taking the blame for a crime.
as “ideology reproduces itself by way of people not taking it seriously”
The modern paradox where ideology functions precisely because people cynically make fun of it, yet continue to act as if it works.
Stories he reaches for 3
Physicist Niels Bohr has a horseshoe above his door for luck. When asked why a scientist would believe in superstition, he replies that he doesn't believe in it, but has it because 'it works even if you don't believe in it,' illustrating modern ideological functioning.
“I have it because I was told that it works even if you don't believe in it!”
The film mixes orientalist mysticism with cynical vulgarity, teaching that even if you make fun of ideology, it still functions, illustrating how modern ideology reproduces itself through cynicism.
“Even if you make fun of ideology, it still functions. That's the mystery today.”
In The Dark Knight, Batman takes the blame for a crime committed by the public prosecutor to preserve public trust in the law, illustrating the 'necessity of a lie' and Bush/Cheney logic.
“Batman proposes this solution: if we make this public... this will ruin confidence of people in the law”
Works invoked 4
Kung Fu Panda film
Analyzed as 'pure ideology' that mixes orientalist mysticism with cynicism, showing that ideology functions even when mocked.
The Dark Knight film
Analyzed for its ending, where Batman takes the blame for a crime to preserve the law, illustrating the 'necessity of a lie'.
Deep Impact film
Cited alongside Independence Day as a key indicator of the 'apocalyptic Stimmung' and the limit of political imagination.
Independence Day film
Used as an example of apocalyptic movies that reveal our inability to imagine anything other than the end of the world.
People invoked 6
Dick Cheney negative
Cited alongside Bush as exemplifying the political logic that 'we need a lie' to preserve public trust.
Cited alongside Fukuyama in the 'Clash of Civilizations' vs. 'End of History' opposition, which Žižek dismisses as a false one.
Tenzin Gyatso negative
Used as the figurehead for 'Western Buddhism,' which Žižek critiques as a dominant, desubstantialized ideology in developed societies.
Francis Fukuyama negative
Žižek mocks Fukuyama as an 'idiot' who thought history is over, yet argues that everyone today is a 'Fukuyamaist' in practice by accepting global capitalism.
George H. W. Bush negative
Cited as an example of the 'logic of a lie' (along with Dick Cheney) where truth is hidden to maintain power.
Niels Bohr positive
Cited in an anecdote about a horseshoe to illustrate how ideology functions today: we don't believe in it, but we act as if it works.
Transcript 3 turns
unknown
Then we have people who see a break
Then we have people who see a break
Slavoj Žižek
and try to invent a name for what is emerging today: reflexive society, risk society, informational society, post-industrial society. I cannot go into it now why do I think this, but I think these are not yet proper concepts. These are still journalistic descriptions. We, and I include myself, I am not an arrogant guy who says, oh, but I know. I claim we miss what some American thinkers call cognitive mapping, you know, that you have some kind of a basic orientation, cognitive coordinates of the world, which is why I think two things are getting popular which are a symptom of this lack of cognitive mapping. On the one hand, conspiracy theories; they are always, as we all know, poor man's ideology. When you don't know what's going on, you construct a conspiracy. The other is the popularity of what I ironically call Western Buddhism, this kind of a Dalai Lama-style popular Buddhist ideology, which is I think more and more emerging as the dominant ideology in developed societies. Even if they are nominally still Christians, it's already Christianity flavored in this way, which is like you know, forget about organized religion, inner experience, and then especially the ontology involved, which is like there is no substantial reality, there is just a flux of multiple appearances, that kind of a desubstantialization like don't try to grasp, don't try to understand, just open yourself to the multiplicity and so on and so on. So these two, I think, are the indications. Or to make a step further, the thing we should become aware of is that the opposition, another conclusion for this, the opposition between two big names, Huntington and Fukuyama, is a false one. I think this is the ABC. You know, Fukuyama—and don't laugh about Fukuyama, I mean, it's very—this is one of the typical symptoms today how people laugh, oh, that idiot who thought history is over but no it goes on. No, I claim that of us today are Fukuyamaists. His basic thesis is of course conflict goes on, but that we have a formula: liberal democratic capitalism. His thesis is that we found the formula and that the only changes we can imagine are this: how to make it a little bit better. Like, if in the old times we leftists were dreaming about socialism with a human face, what today's left is dreaming, I think is of it, global capitalism with a human face. You know, just a little bit more tolerant. But how—let me give you a nice example of this limitation of our imagination. If you are old enough, you remember how years ago we were still talking about what will the future be: communist, capitalist, new authoritarianism, and so on. Things were somehow open. Or we were still asking these old-fashioned questions: is the state here to stay? Can we imagine different political order or what? Today nobody even asks these questions. Whatever remains of the left is post-political left which has two characteristics mainly: that it's moralized and legalized. It's kind of a moral fury and then immediately translated into legal like we have to—we have to pass this law to guarantee tolerance, whatever, and so on and so on. So what I'm saying here with regard to this—to our constellation today is that—how should I put it—in this post-political constellation we are mostly Fukuyamaists. Nobody asks these questions. But what always surprises me is how popular are—nonetheless there is a kind of an apocalyptic Stimmung, you know how popular are movies about—from Independence Day to I don't know Deep Impact—movies about global catastrophe. They are one of the keys to our predicament, I claim. Don't underestimate popular culture as indicator enabling to diagnose where we are. This is the sad thing: we cannot—we can well imagine the end of the world, that's very simple, ecological catastrophe, asteroid, but we cannot imagine a small change in capitalism. As if the world may well end, but capitalism will somehow stay, no? That's the limit of our imagination. Second thing, yeah, a little bit—allow me an improvisation to teach you how one can learn where we are in popular culture. I hope you saw some of these blockbuster movies, let me mention if you saw the last Batman, The Dark Knight. Oh my God, clearly totally political ideological film. I'm sorry to bother you with these details, but you know what happens at the end of the film. The positive hero, not Batman, the public prosecutor who fights crime, is discovered to be a murderer himself. And then at the end Batman proposes this solution: if we make this public, that the big figure of the law whom people trusted is himself a criminal, this will ruin confidence of people in the law. So Batman says, no, I will take this crime on myself so that the power—people will trust the law and power, it remains clean. So the central thesis of the film is the necessity of a lie. It imposes this basically George Bush logic of—like Dick Cheney and George Bush logic of we need a lie. Or another example, even better. If you have children maybe you saw the film, this last animated cartoon film Kung Fu Panda. Pure ideology. Why? The film tells a story about big fat panda who want to be a Kung Fu warrior and so on. So on the one hand we have in this film all the struggle about—all these orientalist mystics, struggle to become a sacred warrior, fate, karma, whatever, all this orientalist mythology. At the same time the film is totally cynical, making fun of these very values, you know, making fun of Buddhism, all this like common sense cynical vulgarity against. But what's the lesson of the film? And that's where we are in ideology today. Even if you make fun of ideology, it still functions. That's the mystery today. If in the old times ideology was usually functioning so that you pretended to believe in it publicly but secretly you laughed at it and so on and so on—this is for example how—this is I think the moment of pride for me—how if people ask me, didn't we lose something with the disintegration of communism nonetheless, communist regime? I say, yes definitely, the high culture of political jokes. This is for me the true catastrophe, how much more—so this was you know, publicly official jargon, privately all the jokes and so on and so on. Today I think it's almost the opposite. Publicly you say, I don't care, who gives a shit, you make fun, but de facto you believe much more than you think. Like the ideology reproduces itself precisely by way of people not taking it seriously. There is a wonderful anecdote which I repeat all the time, I love it, attributed to Niels Bohr, you know, Copenhagen quantum physicist. I read in a biography of Niels Bohr, the story is that once Niels Bohr was visited in his country house by a friend, another scientist, and this friend saw above the entrance of Niels Bohr's house a horseshoe. You know in Central Europe I think at least this is the superstitious item, no, horseshoe above the entrance to the house prevents evil spirits to enter the house and so on. So this friend asks Niels Bohr, but wait a minute, you are a scientist, you are not supposed—why do you have this? Do you believe in it? Niels Bohr's answer, don't be stupid, of course I don't believe in it. Then—but why do you have it? Ah, Niels Bohr answered, wonderful answer, of course I don't believe in it, but I have it because I was told that it works even if you don't believe in it! This is ideology today. You don't have to believe in it, but you count—you know, who believes in democracy? It's corrupt and blah blah blah. But we somehow assume it works even if not. Now coming back to the—my last point, Clash of Civilizations. I claim that you know it's the same argument I already implicitly made when I talked about tolerance intolerance. I claim that on the one hand, yes, we are all Fukuyamaists, that is to say global capitalism, depoliticized
and try to invent a name for what is emerging today: reflexive society, risk society, informational society, post-industrial society. I cannot go into it now why do I think this, but I think these are not yet proper concepts. These are still journalistic descriptions. We, and I include myself, I am not an arrogant guy who says, oh, but I know. I claim we miss what some American thinkers call cognitive mapping, you know, that you have some kind of a basic orientation, cognitive coordinates of the world, which is why I think two things are getting popular which are a symptom of this lack of cognitive mapping. On the one hand, conspiracy theories; they are always, as we all know, poor man's ideology. When you don't know what's going on, you construct a conspiracy. The other is the popularity of what I ironically call Western Buddhism, this kind of a Dalai Lama-style popular Buddhist ideology, which is I think more and more emerging as the dominant ideology in developed societies. Even if they are nominally still Christians, it's already Christianity flavored in this way, which is like you know, forget about organized religion, inner experience, and then especially the ontology involved, which is like there is no substantial reality, there is just a flux of multiple appearances, that kind of a desubstantialization like don't try to grasp, don't try to understand, just open yourself to the multiplicity and so on and so on. So these two, I think, are the indications. Or to make a step further, the thing we should become aware of is that the opposition, another conclusion for this, the opposition between two big names, Huntington and Fukuyama, is a false one. I think this is the ABC. You know, Fukuyama—and don't laugh about Fukuyama, I mean, it's very—this is one of the typical symptoms today how people laugh, oh, that idiot who thought history is over but no it goes on. No, I claim that of us today are Fukuyamaists. His basic thesis is of course conflict goes on, but that we have a formula: liberal democratic capitalism. His thesis is that we found the formula and that the only changes we can imagine are this: how to make it a little bit better. Like, if in the old times we leftists were dreaming about socialism with a human face, what today's left is dreaming, I think is of it, global capitalism with a human face. You know, just a little bit more tolerant. But how—let me give you a nice example of this limitation of our imagination. If you are old enough, you remember how years ago we were still talking about what will the future be: communist, capitalist, new authoritarianism, and so on. Things were somehow open. Or we were still asking these old-fashioned questions: is the state here to stay? Can we imagine different political order or what? Today nobody even asks these questions. Whatever remains of the left is post-political left which has two characteristics mainly: that it's moralized and legalized. It's kind of a moral fury and then immediately translated into legal like we have to—we have to pass this law to guarantee tolerance, whatever, and so on and so on. So what I'm saying here with regard to this—to our constellation today is that—how should I put it—in this post-political constellation we are mostly Fukuyamaists. Nobody asks these questions. But what always surprises me is how popular are—nonetheless there is a kind of an apocalyptic Stimmung, you know how popular are movies about—from Independence Day to I don't know Deep Impact—movies about global catastrophe. They are one of the keys to our predicament, I claim. Don't underestimate popular culture as indicator enabling to diagnose where we are. This is the sad thing: we cannot—we can well imagine the end of the world, that's very simple, ecological catastrophe, asteroid, but we cannot imagine a small change in capitalism. As if the world may well end, but capitalism will somehow stay, no? That's the limit of our imagination. Second thing, yeah, a little bit—allow me an improvisation to teach you how one can learn where we are in popular culture. I hope you saw some of these blockbuster movies, let me mention if you saw the last Batman, The Dark Knight. Oh my God, clearly totally political ideological film. I'm sorry to bother you with these details, but you know what happens at the end of the film. The positive hero, not Batman, the public prosecutor who fights crime, is discovered to be a murderer himself. And then at the end Batman proposes this solution: if we make this public, that the big figure of the law whom people trusted is himself a criminal, this will ruin confidence of people in the law. So Batman says, no, I will take this crime on myself so that the power—people will trust the law and power, it remains clean. So the central thesis of the film is the necessity of a lie. It imposes this basically George Bush logic of—like Dick Cheney and George Bush logic of we need a lie. Or another example, even better. If you have children maybe you saw the film, this last animated cartoon film Kung Fu Panda. Pure ideology. Why? The film tells a story about big fat panda who want to be a Kung Fu warrior and so on. So on the one hand we have in this film all the struggle about—all these orientalist mystics, struggle to become a sacred warrior, fate, karma, whatever, all this orientalist mythology. At the same time the film is totally cynical, making fun of these very values, you know, making fun of Buddhism, all this like common sense cynical vulgarity against. But what's the lesson of the film? And that's where we are in ideology today. Even if you make fun of ideology, it still functions. That's the mystery today. If in the old times ideology was usually functioning so that you pretended to believe in it publicly but secretly you laughed at it and so on and so on—this is for example how—this is I think the moment of pride for me—how if people ask me, didn't we lose something with the disintegration of communism nonetheless, communist regime? I say, yes definitely, the high culture of political jokes. This is for me the true catastrophe, how much more—so this was you know, publicly official jargon, privately all the jokes and so on and so on. Today I think it's almost the opposite. Publicly you say, I don't care, who gives a shit, you make fun, but de facto you believe much more than you think. Like the ideology reproduces itself precisely by way of people not taking it seriously. There is a wonderful anecdote which I repeat all the time, I love it, attributed to Niels Bohr, you know, Copenhagen quantum physicist. I read in a biography of Niels Bohr, the story is that once Niels Bohr was visited in his country house by a friend, another scientist, and this friend saw above the entrance of Niels Bohr's house a horseshoe. You know in Central Europe I think at least this is the superstitious item, no, horseshoe above the entrance to the house prevents evil spirits to enter the house and so on. So this friend asks Niels Bohr, but wait a minute, you are a scientist, you are not supposed—why do you have this? Do you believe in it? Niels Bohr's answer, don't be stupid, of course I don't believe in it. Then—but why do you have it? Ah, Niels Bohr answered, wonderful answer, of course I don't believe in it, but I have it because I was told that it works even if you don't believe in it! This is ideology today. You don't have to believe in it, but you count—you know, who believes in democracy? It's corrupt and blah blah blah. But we somehow assume it works even if not. Now coming back to the—my last point, Clash of Civilizations. I claim that you know it's the same argument I already implicitly made when I talked about tolerance intolerance. I claim that on the one hand, yes, we are all Fukuyamaists, that is to say global capitalism, depoliticized
unknown
society and so on.
society and so on.