Twitch Q&A
Q&A · zizekpodcast.com ·
2019-03-27 · 0:56:37 · 7,621 words
capitalismcommunism-socialismideologypsychoanalysishegel-dialecticsreligion-theologyrace-antisemitismfascism-populismliberalism-political-correctnessdemocracytechnology-ai-cyberspacecinema-art-culturegeopolitics-warsubjectivityethicseveryday-life
In this Twitch-streamed conversation, Žižek ranges across video games and temporality, the Jordan Peterson debate framing, China as a model combining capitalism and communism, Brexit and European identity, anti-Semitism and Zionism, love and polyamory, religion and the death of God, accelerationism, Neuralink/singularity, and film (Lars von Trier, Green Book, Roma). The talk is structured as a Q&A with an interviewer, with Žižek offering his characteristic pessimistic-leftist diagnoses of contemporary politics and culture. Running themes are the failure of principled radicalism, the paradox of authoritarian capitalism's success, and the ways popular revolt has been captured by the right.
every located moment in this recording, click one to read it
The ideas in it 12
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
Enjoying something vicariously through another (here: his son playing video games) rather than doing it oneself, attributed to Robert Pfaller but used by Žižek as his own concept.
as “vampire temporality”
A new sense of time introduced by video games in which death is not final, you can always restart, creating a circular, undead temporality that Žižek sees bleeding into everyday life and subjectivity.
Žižek's deliberately imprecise term for the narrative structure of video games where all alternate possibilities must be held in view simultaneously to understand what actually occurred.
as “superposition of states”
Borrowed from quantum physics and applied to narrative: to understand what happens in a story (or life-choice), one must include all the other possibilities that did not actualize.
as “authoritarian capitalism”
A socio-economic model combining full market capitalism with strong authoritarian/nationalist rule, exemplified by China, which Žižek identifies as the most economically successful contemporary formation.
Žižek's coinage for a left that clings to abstract principles without concrete political engagement, which he treats as a comfortable alibi that obliges nothing and changes nothing.
as “the event”
Taken from Badiou: a sudden rupture that exceeds ordinary causation, which Žižek links here to falling in love as a paradigmatic event, something that happens to you beyond your control.
as “love without falling”
Žižek's phrase for the contemporary strategy of managing romantic attachment so as to avoid the shock and loss-of-control proper to genuine love, epitomized by rationalized dating agencies.
as “anti-Semitic Zionism”
The paradoxical position of European right-wingers who are anti-Semitic at home yet fully support Israel as a bulwark against Muslim immigration, using Jews instrumentally while harboring anti-Semitism.
Invoked implicitly when Žižek discusses the collapse of a central power that 'knows what it is doing', the ruling elite losing its capacity to rule is figured as the disappearance of the symbolic order's guarantor.
Implicit in the discussion of capitalism as an undead vampire that keeps returning stronger despite repeated predictions of its imminent collapse.
as “singularity / Neuralink”
The prospect of brain-computer interfaces enabling direct mind-to-mind communication beyond language, which Žižek takes seriously as a site of genuine post-human transformation rather than dismissing it.
Stories he reaches for 4
An American dating agency ad explicitly promised 'You are a busy person, we will enable you to be in love without falling', which Žižek takes as a symptom of the horror of contemporary managed love.
“You are a busy person, you cannot afford confusion... we will enable you to be in love without falling, without the fall.”
Žižek recalls his father, a self-described open democratic liberal, telling him privately such vulgar anti-gay jokes that they still appear in his nightmares, used as evidence of genuine progress since May '68.
“Privately he was telling me such vulgar anti-gay and so on jokes that even now it's the stuff of my nightmares.”
Žižek defends von Trier's notorious Cannes remark about Hitler by pointing out that von Trier was practically quoting Wittgenstein's 1944 diary entry expressing sympathy for Hitler's isolation in his bunker.
“He practically von Trier quoted there Ludwig Wittgenstein... 'Nonetheless in spite of all his crimes, Hitler must feel now terribly isolated in that bunker.'”
Žižek traces a century-long lineage from Marx through Lenin ('imperialism, last stage') to Mao ('highest rotting state') and postmodernism, each predicting capitalism's imminent end while it returned stronger.
“For over one century this story goes on, we think capitalism is pushed to its limit but it returns stronger.”
Works invoked 12
Melancholia film
Žižek calls it 'one of the crucial movies' and, paradoxically, 'a very optimist movie', the end of the world as a wonderful relief from an evil race.
Zardoz film
Referenced as an early Hollywood depiction of a future divided between a protected elite and those outside, used to illustrate Sloterdijk's cupola thesis.
Žižek's own forthcoming book (at time of talk), mentioned as where he develops his ideas on video games and new temporality.
The Idiots film
The one Lars von Trier film Žižek says he hates, finding its implied liberation through idiotic regression repellent.
Europa film
Lars von Trier's early film about an American in post-war Germany; Žižek calls it 'an excellent film.'
Steven Weinberg's book on the Big Bang; Žižek quotes it for the remark that religion is needed to make good people do bad things.
Roma film
Cuarón's film; Žižek regards it as infinitely superior to Green Book and a much greater and more important movie, though it was denied the top Oscar.
Houellebecq's novel; Žižek praises it for painting an excellent image of what went wrong with the '68 legacy, how political revolt was reduced to sexual revolution.
Green Book film
Žižek agrees with Spike Lee that it is a 'politically correct' film that obliterates the real emancipatory dimension of anti-racist struggle.
Žižek expresses regret at not having had time to see it, but uses the question as an occasion to defend von Trier generally.
Žižek singles it out as his favorite of the recent Star Wars productions because all the protagonists die at the end after completing their mission.
Žižek watched some installments and finds interesting its idea that the young revolutionary Pope is the most dangerous reactionary figure.
People invoked 34
Alfonso Cuarón positive
Director of Roma, which Žižek rates as infinitely superior to Green Book, a more important and greater film despite Cuarón's compromises in his Oscar strategy.
Michel Houellebecq positive
Despite left horror at him, Žižek praises Houellebecq (Elementary Particles) for painting an excellent image of what went wrong with the legacy of '68.
Lars von Trier positive
Žižek defends von Trier against his Cannes controversy, praises Melancholia as a crucial film, Europa/Zentropa as excellent, and declares himself unwilling to renounce him as 'one of the great authentic ones.'
Žižek says he doesn't know his work well; watched some of The Young Pope which he found interesting for its idea of the radical young pope as the most dangerous figure.
Cited in the lineage of failed 'final stage' diagnoses of capitalism (imperialism as capitalism's last stage).
Robert Louis Stevenson positive
Quoted by the interviewer on falling in love as 'the one illogical adventure'; Žižek affirms the connection to his own concept of the event.
Theodor W. Adorno positive
Cited alongside Brecht as another great Marxist who was privately pessimistic.
Steve Bannon negative
Cited as actively working to undermine European unity by supporting right-wing populist movements across Europe.
Jacques Lacan positive
Called 'my psychoanalytic mentor'; cited for his inversion of Dostoyevsky, that God, not his absence, permits everything.
Steven Weinberg positive
Quantum cosmologist, author of The First Three Minutes; quoted for the line that religion is needed to make good people do bad things.
Steven Pinker negative
Grouped with Sam Harris as a rational optimist whose emphasis on absolute poverty reduction obscures growing relative inequality.
Robert Pfaller positive
Described as 'my friend'; Žižek uses Pfaller's concept of interpassivity to describe his own relation to video games via his son.
Donald Trump negative
Cited as absolutely anti-European in ideology, part of a broader pattern of forces working to destroy European unity.
Sam Harris negative
Grouped with Pinker as a 'rational optimist' who emphasizes declining absolute poverty while ignoring exploding inequality.
Antonio Negri negative
Named as a past advocate of accelerationism, pushing capitalism further to provoke its self-destruction, a position Žižek rejects.
Alain Badiou positive
Described as 'my friend'; Žižek credits him with the concept of 'event' and quotes his remark 'Tout ce qui bouge n'est pas rouge' about the Yellow Vests.
Named as the proponent of Neuralink brain-computer interface; Žižek uses this as a prompt for philosophical reflection on post-humanity, without personal comment on Musk.
Bob Avakian negative
Leader of the Revolutionary Communist Party USA; cited as the archetype of pseudo-radical principled posturing that is systemically harmless and secretly convenient for the status quo.
Bertolt Brecht positive
Cited as an example of the great Marxist who was privately a pessimist, in defense of Žižek's own pessimism.
Peter Sloterdijk positive
Described as a 'German conservative philosopher'; his image of humanity divided into those inside and outside a protective cupola is used approvingly to describe new global hierarchies.
Christopher Hitchens positive
Žižek says he is 'practically on the side of' Hitchens in his critical attitude toward religion, while acknowledging religion can play a progressive role.
Spike Lee positive
Žižek agrees with Spike Lee's negative assessment of Green Book as a politically correct film that destroys the emancipatory dimension of anti-racism.
Viktor Orbán negative
Named as one of the populist actors (alongside Brexit, Catalonia separatists) serving Putin's goal of fragmenting Europe.
Cited as another in the series of thinkers who declared post-WWII capitalism to be in its highest rotting state, another failed prediction.
Cited at the close for the claim that the ego must transcendentally constitute itself, used as a self-deprecating joke about Žižek's own slow morning reconstruction.
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling positive
Described as 'the deepest German idealist'; cited for the claim that true radical evil is more spiritual than ordinary goodness.
Jordan Peterson negative
Žižek frames the upcoming debate not as a contest to win but as an occasion to reveal how shared surface positions conceal deep disagreements; he is skeptical of the 'duel of the century' framing.
Vladimir Putin negative
Cited as systematically working to fragment Europe whether through right-wing or left-wing movements, Brexit, Catalonia, Orbán.
Karl Marx positive
Cited for the lesson to learn from intelligent conservatives, and for his initial (failed) prediction of capitalism's imminent end; invoked throughout as Žižek's general theoretical framework.
Ludwig Wittgenstein positive
Cited via his 1944 diary entry expressing sympathy for Hitler's isolation, which Žižek uses to contextualize and partially defend von Trier's Cannes remark.
Referenced in the context of Blair-era UK government resisting EU ecological and labor regulations, used to illustrate how Brexit's real legacy will be anti-worker.
Victor Kravchenko positive
Described as 'my hero in the Soviet Union, early dissident'; his memoir of being sent to suppress Ukraine famine resistance is used to illustrate how higher causes license atrocity.
Thomas Piketty positive
Cited for data showing that while absolute poverty decreases, relative inequality is exploding, used to qualify optimistic accounts of capitalist progress.
Fyodor Dostoyevsky negative
Žižek explicitly rejects Dostoyevsky's claim ('if there is no God then everything is permitted') as empirically wrong and dialectically inverted.
What it argues
vampire temporality and video-game subjectivityauthoritarian capitalism as the unexpected success modelprincipled opportunism and the failure of the abstract leftanti-Semitic Zionism and the limits of identity politicslove as subversion versus polyamorous pragmatismreligion enables rather than restrains evilaccelerationism and its discontents
Dialectical moves 8
“The true difference is when you say the same thing but you mean something entirely different.”
Real political divergence is not visible in explicit disagreement but precisely where apparent consensus conceals opposed meanings, the shared surface is the site of the deepest rupture.
“Don't we live in a sad world where what the left hated most—pure unbridled capitalism combined with totalitarian rule—turns out to be the most successful economic model?”
The very combination the left defined itself against (capital + authoritarian state) is revealed as the most effective engine of poverty reduction, a dialectical inversion of progressive assumptions.
“If there is God—of course God to whom you claim that you have a privileged contact—then everything is permitted to you.”
The reversal of Dostoyevsky: it is not the absence but the presence of a transcendent authority (claimed as one's own) that licenses atrocity, the inversion of the standard religious ethics argument.
“True evil is not egotism—true evil is envy: I don't even care about my welfare, it matters more to me to destroy you than to enjoy it myself.”
Evil is not the pursuit of self-interest but its opposite, a purely negative spiritual drive to negate the other at the cost of oneself, which is why ordinary egotism and social good are easy to reconcile.
“Today to be passionately in love is effectively more subversive than sexual promiscuity.”
In a permissive culture that has neutralized sexual transgression, genuine romantic love, with its involuntary fall and loss of control, is the true subversive act.
“Capitalism is like an undead vampire—for over a century people thought it was approaching its end, but it returns stronger and stronger.”
Every successive stage diagnosed as capitalism's final crisis (Marx, Lenin, Mao, postmodernism) has proved wrong; capitalism's apparent mortality is itself a structural feature of its persistence.
“Both accelerationism and the withdrawal to calm inner life are part of the same capitalist logic.”
The two apparent opposites, push the system to its limit vs. step back from it spiritually, converge as complementary poles that capitalism can accommodate and even instrumentalize.
“The most radical new Pope is the most dangerous—far from being a force of renewal, he is the most reactionary.”
In contemporary politics, apparent radicalism and novelty can be the vehicle of the most dangerous conservatism, the form of revolution is appropriated by reaction.
Claims 18
asserts
Video games are philosophically important because they introduce a new 'vampire temporality'—a circular, reversible sense of time—that is reshaping how people experience subjectivity even outside games.video games and subjectivity
asserts
China today is the purest example of authoritarian capitalism, combining brutal market capitalism with Communist Party rule, and its economic success is the sad proof that this combination works.China and authoritarian capitalism
asserts
Brexit will not deliver more rights for workers but the opposite, despite its proponents' rhetoric about sovereignty.Brexit
asserts
The true difference between Žižek and Jordan Peterson is not visible where they disagree, but precisely where they seem to agree—the same words mean something entirely different.Žižek–Peterson debate
asserts
Principled radicalism that refuses concrete political engagement is not truly radical but comfortable and effectively impotent—a form of contractual dissidence the system can absorb.principled left politics
asserts
The real measure of a revolution's success is not the spectacular mass event but the concrete changes detectable afterwards in everyday life.revolution and political change
asserts
Anti-Semitism and the legitimate criticism of Israeli policy on the West Bank must be part of the same struggle, not conflated—using the Holocaust to justify West Bank policy is sacrilegious.anti-Semitism and Israel-Palestine
asserts
Anti-Semitic Zionism—supporting Israel while being anti-Semitic at home—is a real and growing right-wing phenomenon that corrupts both the fight against anti-Semitism and the defense of Palestinian rights.anti-Semitic Zionism
asserts
Today, being passionately in love is more subversive than sexual promiscuity, because contemporary culture works to eliminate the disruptive 'fall' from love.love, sexuality, and subversion
rejects
Polyamory is not real love but a pragmatic calculation that parcels out needs among different partners, missing love's essential character.polyamory
rejects
Dostoyevsky was wrong: it is not the absence of God but the presence of God—as a higher cause one claims privileged access to—that permits everything, including atrocity.Dostoyevsky's 'if there is no God everything is permitted'
asserts
True evil is not egotism but spiritual envy—the willingness to destroy others at the cost of one's own welfare—which is why evil has nothing to do with the absence of transcendent authority.the nature of evil
rejects
Accelerationism—the strategy of pushing capitalism to its limits to provoke its collapse—is a fantasy with a century-long failed track record; capitalism keeps returning stronger like an undead vampire.accelerationism
rejects
The withdrawal to inner calm (Westernized Buddhism practiced by top managers) is not an alternative to capitalist dynamics but part of the same logic.spiritual withdrawal from capitalism
asserts
The political ruling elite is losing its ability to rule—not in a way that should please the left, because a ruling class that does not know what it is doing produces a dangerous situation.contemporary political power vacuum
asserts
Today's populist right has appropriated the energy of popular revolt, so not all that moves and protests is on the left—this is the most significant political lesson of the present.right-wing populism and protest
rejects
Green Book is a politically correct film that stifles and obliterates the real emancipatory dimension in the fight against racism.Green Book and liberal race politics
asserts
The legacy of May '68 that actually persisted is not political but a change in public customs—one can no longer make certain vulgar jokes about gays and women in public—and this constitutes real progress.May 1968 legacy
Quotes 12
“The true difference is when you say the same thing but you mean something different.”Slavoj Žižek · real political divergence concealed by apparent consensus
“Don't we live in a sad world where what the left hated most—pure unbridled capitalism combined with authoritarian rule—you combine them both, you get the most successful economic model.”Slavoj Žižek · authoritarian capitalism's paradoxical success
“Tout ce qui bouge n'est pas rouge. All that moves, protests, revolts and so on is not necessarily on the left.”Slavoj Žižek · right-wing capture of protest energy
“It's easy to be principled. But I'm tired of this principled left which likes to organize some big event and then they are ecstatic and live from nostalgic memories for decades.”Slavoj Žižek · critique of principled opportunism on the left
“Today we are approaching a strange situation where to be passionately in love is effectively more subversive than sexual promiscuity.”Slavoj Žižek · love as subversion
“If there is God—of course God to whom you claim that you have a privileged contact—then everything is permitted to you.”Slavoj Žižek · inversion of Dostoyevsky: God permits rather than prohibits atrocity
“True evil is envy. True evil is 'I don't even care about my welfare, it matters more to me to destroy you than to enjoy it myself.'”Slavoj Žižek · evil as spiritual envy not egotism
“True evil is spiritual. In true evil you're not an egotist who cares for—egotism and common good are easy to combine.”Slavoj Žižek · spirituality of evil
“For over one century this story goes on, we think capitalism is pushed to its limit but it's like an undead vampire or whatever, it returns stronger and stronger.”Slavoj Žižek · capitalism as undead; failure of accelerationism
“You are a busy person, you cannot afford confusion, we will enable you to be in love without falling, without the fall. That's the horror of today.”Slavoj Žižek · love without falling as ideological horror
“The true measure of the success of a revolution is not the ability to organize these big events... is how—if any change can be detected afterwards when things return to normal.”Slavoj Žižek · measuring revolution by everyday residue
“All great Marxists were privately pessimists. Bertolt Brecht was a pessimist. Adorno I know was privately a pessimist.”Slavoj Žižek · Marxist pessimism
Transcript 36 turns
unknown
So we're live on Twitch, which is usually used for people playing video games and other people who are watching them. So I thought I'd actually ask you, start by asking you about video games, because you've mentioned them before. You said recently in a lecture that philosophy students today should study video games, and I was wondering if you could expand on that.
So we're live on Twitch, which is usually used for people playing video games and other people who are watching them. So I thought I'd actually ask you, start by asking you about video games, because you've mentioned them before. You said recently in a lecture that philosophy students today should study video games, and I was wondering if you could expand on that.
Slavoj Žižek
First I must say I consider myself too old, too stupid, I don't play video games. It's kind of a form of what my friend Robert Pfaller would have called interpassivity: I enjoy it through my younger son playing them. The reason I think they are so important is... okay, money is money, but nonetheless one should note that I read that already two-three years ago video games began to turn around more money than movies and TV series together. We are talking about enormous sums of money. Now we could adopt this conservative Marxist standpoint and say this is just another cultural manipulation, whatever. I don't think it's as simple as that. As I will develop in my new book, Sex and the Failed Absolute, appearing in September—sorry for this short bit of propaganda—what I find interesting in video games is a new sense of temporality which I call it the vampire temporality, temporality of undeadness. Like, you die, you can start again. It's not our finite universe where you make a choice, that's it. You can step back and do it again and again. It's a kind of a circular universe. And I think this type of temporality is gaining importance even in our so-called real life outside video—outside video games. For example, I noticed from people that I know they already discuss, if they talk about it publicly, their love problems in this way: "Okay, I blew it up, maybe I should ask my partner to just step back and begin again" and so on and so on. So this is one extremely important feature: our basic sense of temporality is changing. Second thing: in the primitive old times, the structure of video games was basically very simple. But now you also get very complex narratives. And I think that we cannot understand again what is happening today with narratives, with our storytelling and so on, without following what goes on in video games. What I like about video games is precisely this idea that it's not simply in a classical narrative, like as in a classical narrative where what happens, happens. To understand what happens you must include into it all other possibilities of what might have happened but didn't happen and so on and so on. So we get some kind of a pluriverse, almost—I know I'm using here the term not in a precise scientific sense—but something that in quantum physics is called superposition of states. No, it's not the same as multiple possibilities. Sometimes to understand what it is, you have to understand all other alternate versions of what might have been. It's—because in our usual life, there are possibilities, but once you make your choice or fate makes a choice for you, that's it; other options are out. Here we live in a different universe. So again, we are talking here about very basic things, how do we experience ourselves as subjects and so on and so on. I think to provoke you with a rad—or the kind person who raised this question, I don't know if it was you or somebody else. It's from Twitch. Okay, okay. Then maybe the best shortcut to understanding what is happening today with our subjectivity, how it is changing, is to look at video games. Okay. I'd like to go on and ask more but I realize we have limited time so I will move on. I'm sorry, yes... no, it's fine. Thank you for being here
First I must say I consider myself too old, too stupid, I don't play video games. It's kind of a form of what my friend Robert Pfaller would have called interpassivity: I enjoy it through my younger son playing them. The reason I think they are so important is... okay, money is money, but nonetheless one should note that I read that already two-three years ago video games began to turn around more money than movies and TV series together. We are talking about enormous sums of money. Now we could adopt this conservative Marxist standpoint and say this is just another cultural manipulation, whatever. I don't think it's as simple as that. As I will develop in my new book, Sex and the Failed Absolute, appearing in September—sorry for this short bit of propaganda—what I find interesting in video games is a new sense of temporality which I call it the vampire temporality, temporality of undeadness. Like, you die, you can start again. It's not our finite universe where you make a choice, that's it. You can step back and do it again and again. It's a kind of a circular universe. And I think this type of temporality is gaining importance even in our so-called real life outside video—outside video games. For example, I noticed from people that I know they already discuss, if they talk about it publicly, their love problems in this way: "Okay, I blew it up, maybe I should ask my partner to just step back and begin again" and so on and so on. So this is one extremely important feature: our basic sense of temporality is changing. Second thing: in the primitive old times, the structure of video games was basically very simple. But now you also get very complex narratives. And I think that we cannot understand again what is happening today with narratives, with our storytelling and so on, without following what goes on in video games. What I like about video games is precisely this idea that it's not simply in a classical narrative, like as in a classical narrative where what happens, happens. To understand what happens you must include into it all other possibilities of what might have happened but didn't happen and so on and so on. So we get some kind of a pluriverse, almost—I know I'm using here the term not in a precise scientific sense—but something that in quantum physics is called superposition of states. No, it's not the same as multiple possibilities. Sometimes to understand what it is, you have to understand all other alternate versions of what might have been. It's—because in our usual life, there are possibilities, but once you make your choice or fate makes a choice for you, that's it; other options are out. Here we live in a different universe. So again, we are talking here about very basic things, how do we experience ourselves as subjects and so on and so on. I think to provoke you with a rad—or the kind person who raised this question, I don't know if it was you or somebody else. It's from Twitch. Okay, okay. Then maybe the best shortcut to understanding what is happening today with our subjectivity, how it is changing, is to look at video games. Okay. I'd like to go on and ask more but I realize we have limited time so I will move on. I'm sorry, yes... no, it's fine. Thank you for being here
unknown
by the way, we really appreciate it. A lot of people have asked me about your debate with Jordan Peterson. The topic is happiness, capitalism versus Marxism. And if I'm understanding you both correctly, neither of you places very much value on happiness. So is the title of your debate misleading?
by the way, we really appreciate it. A lot of people have asked me about your debate with Jordan Peterson. The topic is happiness, capitalism versus Marxism. And if I'm understanding you both correctly, neither of you places very much value on happiness. So is the title of your debate misleading?
Slavoj Žižek
No, you know what's my hope for this debate? I consider it pure madness. People think, you know, the duel of the century, who will win, who will lose. Well, it will be very sad if we will descend to that level. We are very different. And what interests me—that would have been something interesting, don't you agree—is to focus on points where we share, where it seems that we share an opinion, but then propos of this what appears as a shared point, to make all—to make all the more clearly visible the difference. You know, the true difference is when you say the same thing but you mean something different. Okay, my direction, I will just give you two-three hints which may be of some interest to our public. First, the title. I will probably begin—I haven't yet decided, I decided to begin to think about the debate two-three days before when I'm already be in the United States and Canada. But one proposition, starting point came to me today. Is there a country where the three are united? Instead of seeing in—thinking in the terms of alternative communism or capitalism again, is there a country today which combines the three? I think it's today's China, which is maybe our future. On the one hand, China is in some sense capitalist, even a very brutal capitalism. On the other hand, Communists are still in power. And what is the result? Let's face it—and I'm not saying this in order to praise China, quite the opposite—but let's face it: was there ever in the history of humanity a greater economic miracle, explosion in diminishing poverty, they—and so on, than in China in the last around, I don't know, forty years or what? It was an absolute miracle. Never were in such a short time so many people raised above the level of poverty and so on. And who did it? My point is that you need both
No, you know what's my hope for this debate? I consider it pure madness. People think, you know, the duel of the century, who will win, who will lose. Well, it will be very sad if we will descend to that level. We are very different. And what interests me—that would have been something interesting, don't you agree—is to focus on points where we share, where it seems that we share an opinion, but then propos of this what appears as a shared point, to make all—to make all the more clearly visible the difference. You know, the true difference is when you say the same thing but you mean something different. Okay, my direction, I will just give you two-three hints which may be of some interest to our public. First, the title. I will probably begin—I haven't yet decided, I decided to begin to think about the debate two-three days before when I'm already be in the United States and Canada. But one proposition, starting point came to me today. Is there a country where the three are united? Instead of seeing in—thinking in the terms of alternative communism or capitalism again, is there a country today which combines the three? I think it's today's China, which is maybe our future. On the one hand, China is in some sense capitalist, even a very brutal capitalism. On the other hand, Communists are still in power. And what is the result? Let's face it—and I'm not saying this in order to praise China, quite the opposite—but let's face it: was there ever in the history of humanity a greater economic miracle, explosion in diminishing poverty, they—and so on, than in China in the last around, I don't know, forty years or what? It was an absolute miracle. Never were in such a short time so many people raised above the level of poverty and so on. And who did it? My point is that you need both
unknown
to achieve this. Neither capitalism alone would
to achieve this. Neither capitalism alone would
Slavoj Žižek
have done that—if China were simply to enter capitalism with some form of parliament of democracy, I'm a pessimist here, it would have meant probably a much more chaotic situation and so on—if it would be only the old-style communism, also obviously there wouldn't have been this economic miracle. So you need both. This for me again is not praising China. Quite on the contrary, don't we live in a sad world where what the left hated most in the twentieth century—on the one hand pure unbridled capitalism, on the other hand a strong totalitarian or at least authoritarian rule—you combine them both, you get the most successful economic model. Now just to conclude, where does happiness enter here? Ah, I'm following, it always interests me, how does the Chinese Communist Party legitimize their or its authoritarian rule? It's by systematically evoking happiness. Of course, in their own traditional—although I think this is a fake invented tradition—Confucian way. Harmony, happiness, this is the ultimate goal of our new, as they call it, socialism in the Chinese way. So all three we have them there in China: communism, capitalism and happiness combined. Now my question to you and my public is: do you want that? Well, whether or not they want it is one question, but my question to you would be: how do we get there in the West? If you say that's the future, how does it happen here? I'm not saying it will necessarily happen, but I think that—and that's why I am, without any big illusions about Europe, Brussels bureaucracy and so on—obviously there is something in the very idea of European identity which bothers the advocates of this type of approach. I mean, we are all moving towards this new type of authoritarian capitalism. Capitalism which combines on the one hand global market, full participation in global market, but at the same time a kind of a nationalist, patriotic, local tradition roots and so on and so on. And it's quite breathtaking, you know. This is maybe my private perverted pleasure. I like to read different conspiracy theories, right-wing madness and so on. It's interesting how if you look at the most radical right-wingers, for them the enemy is not even Islam, is Europe. For them, the idea is that the basic anti-American entity is European Union and that they even control Arabs to engage in terrorist acts, somehow some undescribed European elite is behind it. And they
have done that—if China were simply to enter capitalism with some form of parliament of democracy, I'm a pessimist here, it would have meant probably a much more chaotic situation and so on—if it would be only the old-style communism, also obviously there wouldn't have been this economic miracle. So you need both. This for me again is not praising China. Quite on the contrary, don't we live in a sad world where what the left hated most in the twentieth century—on the one hand pure unbridled capitalism, on the other hand a strong totalitarian or at least authoritarian rule—you combine them both, you get the most successful economic model. Now just to conclude, where does happiness enter here? Ah, I'm following, it always interests me, how does the Chinese Communist Party legitimize their or its authoritarian rule? It's by systematically evoking happiness. Of course, in their own traditional—although I think this is a fake invented tradition—Confucian way. Harmony, happiness, this is the ultimate goal of our new, as they call it, socialism in the Chinese way. So all three we have them there in China: communism, capitalism and happiness combined. Now my question to you and my public is: do you want that? Well, whether or not they want it is one question, but my question to you would be: how do we get there in the West? If you say that's the future, how does it happen here? I'm not saying it will necessarily happen, but I think that—and that's why I am, without any big illusions about Europe, Brussels bureaucracy and so on—obviously there is something in the very idea of European identity which bothers the advocates of this type of approach. I mean, we are all moving towards this new type of authoritarian capitalism. Capitalism which combines on the one hand global market, full participation in global market, but at the same time a kind of a nationalist, patriotic, local tradition roots and so on and so on. And it's quite breathtaking, you know. This is maybe my private perverted pleasure. I like to read different conspiracy theories, right-wing madness and so on. It's interesting how if you look at the most radical right-wingers, for them the enemy is not even Islam, is Europe. For them, the idea is that the basic anti-American entity is European Union and that they even control Arabs to engage in terrorist acts, somehow some undescribed European elite is behind it. And they
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openly say that Brussels is the new capital of evil and so on and so on, whatever. So my question is, what bothers them so much in Europe? Because
openly say that Brussels is the new capital of evil and so on and so on, whatever. So my question is, what bothers them so much in Europe? Because
Slavoj Žižek
let's look around. Trump ideology is absolutely anti-European. He now—he didn't change it, okay, but still. Steve Bannon came to Europe now and it's again making a great effort to support all these local populist movements to destroy European unity. Putin, as we all know, is doing exactly the same. It doesn't matter—Putin is here very brutal—it doesn't matter if you are right-winger or left-winger, anything: Brexit, Catalonia, Orbán in Hungary, just that you ruin, you want to decentralize, whatever, ruin European Union. And this is an enigma for me. So will Europe succeed in resisting this? I doubt, I'm not an optimist here. But nonetheless, I think that—and I'm not talking now about the miserable Brussels reality—although maybe I should tell to your viewers one thing which may interest them. You know, a friend of mine, when Brexiteers claim "but Europe means Brussels, international capital" and some leftists claim "this then limits our ability to have more rights for workers, more leftist measures" and so on and so on. Listen, it's very interesting to look at the list of conflicts between European Union and British government, or successive governments. In most of the cases, I was absolutely on the side of Europe. Most of the cases were at the level of—I remember from Tony Blair years—Europe wanted to impose some basic ecological measures about pollution and so on and so on. British government protested, "oh it threatens our competitiveness" and so on and so on. Europe wanted to maximize the workload, how many hours per week a worker can work. Again, British government protested and so on and so on. So that's my basic reproach to Brexit. The reality of Brexit will not be more rights for workers, it will be probably the opposite. But if you are asking me what to do, I don't have a clear answer. I'm a pessimist, we shall see. Do you have any sympathy for the idea that it's the principle that matters rather than the actual laws that would be passed, it's who passes them? Ah, you know, it's very nice to speak about principles, but I coined recently a term: principled opportunism. You know, like many of my radical leftist friends are telling me—not in the sense in which you meant it—but like even if our politics is totally utopian and so on—utopian in the simple sense that it has no chances of being actual—what matters is that we stick to our principles. Well, I'm telling them, and I learned this lesson from communism, that this is a very comfortable position. Like the most comfortable thing in the United States, they have that small revolutionary Communist Party, Bob Avakian their leader. They pretend to be radical, all others are opportunists, we are for revolution. I always was telling them, if I—let's imagine, I don't know if it exists or not, some secret fund in FBI, wherever, to prevent radical change. If I were to be the manager of that fund, I would have financed immediately this revolutionary party and so on. Because such a pseudo-radical position effectively obliges you to nothing. You know, you can be very comfortable, your conscience is always clear and so on and so on. I learned this in communism, why? In the last ten-fifteen years, in slightly more liberal Communist regimes like ours in ex-Yugoslavia, even more in Hungary and Poland, I noticed a wonderful phenomenon. If you were radically critical against communism, like you wrote a book claiming communism is worse than fascism, blah blah, all this. If you remained at a principled, abstract level, no problem. They even, I know cases, this kind of a contractual dissidence—contractual in the sense that you made a deal with those in power—was even part of the game. I mean like they paid you for the trip to the West to participate in. What was not prohibited was something much more modest but concrete. Not "communism is the worst", who cares about that, but: let's change that law which
let's look around. Trump ideology is absolutely anti-European. He now—he didn't change it, okay, but still. Steve Bannon came to Europe now and it's again making a great effort to support all these local populist movements to destroy European unity. Putin, as we all know, is doing exactly the same. It doesn't matter—Putin is here very brutal—it doesn't matter if you are right-winger or left-winger, anything: Brexit, Catalonia, Orbán in Hungary, just that you ruin, you want to decentralize, whatever, ruin European Union. And this is an enigma for me. So will Europe succeed in resisting this? I doubt, I'm not an optimist here. But nonetheless, I think that—and I'm not talking now about the miserable Brussels reality—although maybe I should tell to your viewers one thing which may interest them. You know, a friend of mine, when Brexiteers claim "but Europe means Brussels, international capital" and some leftists claim "this then limits our ability to have more rights for workers, more leftist measures" and so on and so on. Listen, it's very interesting to look at the list of conflicts between European Union and British government, or successive governments. In most of the cases, I was absolutely on the side of Europe. Most of the cases were at the level of—I remember from Tony Blair years—Europe wanted to impose some basic ecological measures about pollution and so on and so on. British government protested, "oh it threatens our competitiveness" and so on and so on. Europe wanted to maximize the workload, how many hours per week a worker can work. Again, British government protested and so on and so on. So that's my basic reproach to Brexit. The reality of Brexit will not be more rights for workers, it will be probably the opposite. But if you are asking me what to do, I don't have a clear answer. I'm a pessimist, we shall see. Do you have any sympathy for the idea that it's the principle that matters rather than the actual laws that would be passed, it's who passes them? Ah, you know, it's very nice to speak about principles, but I coined recently a term: principled opportunism. You know, like many of my radical leftist friends are telling me—not in the sense in which you meant it—but like even if our politics is totally utopian and so on—utopian in the simple sense that it has no chances of being actual—what matters is that we stick to our principles. Well, I'm telling them, and I learned this lesson from communism, that this is a very comfortable position. Like the most comfortable thing in the United States, they have that small revolutionary Communist Party, Bob Avakian their leader. They pretend to be radical, all others are opportunists, we are for revolution. I always was telling them, if I—let's imagine, I don't know if it exists or not, some secret fund in FBI, wherever, to prevent radical change. If I were to be the manager of that fund, I would have financed immediately this revolutionary party and so on. Because such a pseudo-radical position effectively obliges you to nothing. You know, you can be very comfortable, your conscience is always clear and so on and so on. I learned this in communism, why? In the last ten-fifteen years, in slightly more liberal Communist regimes like ours in ex-Yugoslavia, even more in Hungary and Poland, I noticed a wonderful phenomenon. If you were radically critical against communism, like you wrote a book claiming communism is worse than fascism, blah blah, all this. If you remained at a principled, abstract level, no problem. They even, I know cases, this kind of a contractual dissidence—contractual in the sense that you made a deal with those in power—was even part of the game. I mean like they paid you for the trip to the West to participate in. What was not prohibited was something much more modest but concrete. Not "communism is the worst", who cares about that, but: let's change that law which
unknown
prohibit—you
prohibit—you
Slavoj Žižek
know, these detailed small things that matter. Let's change our penal code and so on like this, like that. You know, real changes never are—are never accomplished in—at this principled level. You always need a concrete pretext, like even although I'm very critical of them, Yellow Vests in France. It all began by raising the price of gasoline I think, and so on, no? So my—and my general conclusion is here: it's easy to be principled. But I'm tired of this principled left which likes to organize some big event and then they are ecstatic and live from nostalgic memories for decades. Like, oh my God, one million people on Tahrir Square, one million people in front of the palace—government palace in Athens, whatever. No, I hope we agree that for me more and more the true measure of the success of a revolution is not the ability to organize these big events where we all cry, oh my God, how wonderful, we are all together, is how—if any change can be detected afterwards when things return to normal. Is there any progress there which again can everyday people feel in their lives? And I'm not always a pessimist here. Although for example the legacy of '68, May '68, is very mixed. But one thing is true: it's the legacy of the sixties that we today are no longer allowed to speak in a certain brutal way about gays, about women and so on and so on. There was a certain quite considerable change in, let's call it, public customs, public manners which persists today. Again, you cannot make fun in the—I remember, this may amuse your—our listeners. I remember my father was this type of old guy, he considered himself open democratic liberal, but privately he was telling me such vulgar anti-gay and so on jokes that even now it's the stuff of my nightmares, you know. I awaken in the—in the—like let me no, I don't want to tell them, I would be attacked, and it's even embarrassing for me. Just I emphasize the incredible vulgarity of it. Things like this are no longer possible today, at least not in public. Sorry, this is some kind of a progress. I talk too much, go on. It's fine. Moving on to culture. Some—who have I got here—E-Sports asks: do you like the films of Paolo Sorrentino? He did Youth, The Young Pope the TV series, what else did he do? He did... Yeah, but not excessive, you know. You must—you must take into account something. I am getting old, my eyes hurt and so on. It's very physical what I will say. My abilities are limited and so on and so on. So I must say I apart from watching some of the installments of that series, The Young Pope, I don't know his work a lot. What I nonetheless up to a point liked is this idea that as my friend Alain Badiou recently said commenting on the Yellow Vests in France, he said in French, I will immediately translate it: "Tout ce qui bouge n'est pas rouge." The lesson today is all that moves, protests, revolts and so on is not necessarily on the left. That's for me maybe the most significant lesson of today's anti—of today's revolts, Yellow Vests and others. That in our old universe, we have the government, financial institution, blah blah, and then from time to time people explode from the left. Now the new populist right appropriated this energy of protest. That should worry us. And where do I see the similarity? What I like in the—in that series is that precisely the true force of radical reaction is not some young progressive, is not some old Pope, it's precisely the young revolutionary Pope which is the most dangerous one that you can imagine. And my friends from all countries told me the same thing. Like when I was recently in Spain, they told me that now they remember kindly the conservative Prime Minister Rajoy from a couple of years ago. They told me he was conservative, but at least he was sticking to that form, he didn't want radical change. Now you have there liberals who want to demolish welfare state, who are much more radicals. So now we live in such a sad era that against this popular right-wing revolt we almost nostalgically idealize the old authentic conservatives. So again, that's my interest. Otherwise I must say I don't want to disappoint my speakers, my listeners. All I can tell them about my taste about movies and so on and so on is that I agree with Spike Lee. How is it called, the movie which got the Oscar, The Green Book, what type of book no? I've never seen it. The movie about white—white limousine driver, the great book whatever, who takes on a tour in the old South a Black gay piano player or whatever musical player and then this is the most disgusting political—it's politically correct movie, it's the way political correctness stifles, obliterates all real emancipatory dimension in the fight against racism. I think that although I made some, I will soon publish it, critical points or at least ambiguous points about Roma, I think Roma is
know, these detailed small things that matter. Let's change our penal code and so on like this, like that. You know, real changes never are—are never accomplished in—at this principled level. You always need a concrete pretext, like even although I'm very critical of them, Yellow Vests in France. It all began by raising the price of gasoline I think, and so on, no? So my—and my general conclusion is here: it's easy to be principled. But I'm tired of this principled left which likes to organize some big event and then they are ecstatic and live from nostalgic memories for decades. Like, oh my God, one million people on Tahrir Square, one million people in front of the palace—government palace in Athens, whatever. No, I hope we agree that for me more and more the true measure of the success of a revolution is not the ability to organize these big events where we all cry, oh my God, how wonderful, we are all together, is how—if any change can be detected afterwards when things return to normal. Is there any progress there which again can everyday people feel in their lives? And I'm not always a pessimist here. Although for example the legacy of '68, May '68, is very mixed. But one thing is true: it's the legacy of the sixties that we today are no longer allowed to speak in a certain brutal way about gays, about women and so on and so on. There was a certain quite considerable change in, let's call it, public customs, public manners which persists today. Again, you cannot make fun in the—I remember, this may amuse your—our listeners. I remember my father was this type of old guy, he considered himself open democratic liberal, but privately he was telling me such vulgar anti-gay and so on jokes that even now it's the stuff of my nightmares, you know. I awaken in the—in the—like let me no, I don't want to tell them, I would be attacked, and it's even embarrassing for me. Just I emphasize the incredible vulgarity of it. Things like this are no longer possible today, at least not in public. Sorry, this is some kind of a progress. I talk too much, go on. It's fine. Moving on to culture. Some—who have I got here—E-Sports asks: do you like the films of Paolo Sorrentino? He did Youth, The Young Pope the TV series, what else did he do? He did... Yeah, but not excessive, you know. You must—you must take into account something. I am getting old, my eyes hurt and so on. It's very physical what I will say. My abilities are limited and so on and so on. So I must say I apart from watching some of the installments of that series, The Young Pope, I don't know his work a lot. What I nonetheless up to a point liked is this idea that as my friend Alain Badiou recently said commenting on the Yellow Vests in France, he said in French, I will immediately translate it: "Tout ce qui bouge n'est pas rouge." The lesson today is all that moves, protests, revolts and so on is not necessarily on the left. That's for me maybe the most significant lesson of today's anti—of today's revolts, Yellow Vests and others. That in our old universe, we have the government, financial institution, blah blah, and then from time to time people explode from the left. Now the new populist right appropriated this energy of protest. That should worry us. And where do I see the similarity? What I like in the—in that series is that precisely the true force of radical reaction is not some young progressive, is not some old Pope, it's precisely the young revolutionary Pope which is the most dangerous one that you can imagine. And my friends from all countries told me the same thing. Like when I was recently in Spain, they told me that now they remember kindly the conservative Prime Minister Rajoy from a couple of years ago. They told me he was conservative, but at least he was sticking to that form, he didn't want radical change. Now you have there liberals who want to demolish welfare state, who are much more radicals. So now we live in such a sad era that against this popular right-wing revolt we almost nostalgically idealize the old authentic conservatives. So again, that's my interest. Otherwise I must say I don't want to disappoint my speakers, my listeners. All I can tell them about my taste about movies and so on and so on is that I agree with Spike Lee. How is it called, the movie which got the Oscar, The Green Book, what type of book no? I've never seen it. The movie about white—white limousine driver, the great book whatever, who takes on a tour in the old South a Black gay piano player or whatever musical player and then this is the most disgusting political—it's politically correct movie, it's the way political correctness stifles, obliterates all real emancipatory dimension in the fight against racism. I think that although I made some, I will soon publish it, critical points or at least ambiguous points about Roma, I think Roma is
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infinitely like above it. And it's significant how with all the compromises and very good strategy that Cuarón made, Roma although undoubtedly
infinitely like above it. And it's significant how with all the compromises and very good strategy that Cuarón made, Roma although undoubtedly
Slavoj Žižek
a much greater and more important
a much greater and more important
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movie didn't make it to get the big reward, no? So you're generally pretty pessimistic
movie didn't make it to get the big reward, no? So you're generally pretty pessimistic
Slavoj Žižek
about life I'd say, but I've noticed that in one respect... Absolutely. But you know all great Marxists were privately pessimists. Bertolt Brecht was a pessimist. Adorno I know was privately a pessimist. Why do people think that Marxists have to be these idiots, you know, "oh life is nice, we are just corrupted by bourgeois decadence" or—no, life is big shit. I'd argue you are like that in one respect and it's when it comes to love. Can I read you a quote from Stevenson, who says: "Falling in love is the one illogical adventure, the one thing of which we are tempted to think is supernatural in our trite and reasonable world. The effect is out of all proportion with the cause." And that reminded me of your definition of an event. So I wondered to what extent you had love in mind when you defined event. I do, I do. And also one must say Alain Badiou, from whom I took the term event, does it. Again, in English we have, but also in French, I've written about it abundantly, this beautiful phrase. In many other countries, most of the countries, whenever I go to a country, from Korea to I don't know where, I always ask them: do you also for falling in love use this verb "to fall"? Which precisely means this shocking surprise. You lose control, you fall into love. And I claim in spite of all our permissivity and so on, all the strategy today is to be in love without the fall. I was shocked at how an American ad that I saw for organizing dates, dating agency, used this very reference. Their ad was: "You are a busy person, you cannot afford confusion, blah blah, we will enable you to be in love without falling, without the fall." That's the horror of today. That's why my old thesis—yes, I agree with this religious dimension that you mentioned and so on and so on, although I'm an atheist of course—I think that today we are approaching a strange situation where to be passionately in love is effectively more subversive than sexual promiscuity. This is why I'm also—another horrible feature of me—negatively disposed towards polyamory. I think you don't get real love that. It's this pragmatic calculation: "I need this guy to satisfy this aspect of me, I need another person to satisfy another aspect" and so on and so on. Okay, do it, I'm not a conservative, I don't want to prohibit. I just claim this is not love. Okay. I had a few people submit questions about anti-Semitism on the left. To what extent do you think it is making a resurgence and to what extent is it a conspiracy theory? A very good question, I don't try to avoid it. Let me first make this point. I think that the most dangerous tendency in this field is what I call, and I insist more and more on this, what I call anti-Semitic Zionism. That is to say, it's an old strategy of European right to oppose Jews there—too strong influence and so on in their own country—but to fully support Jews in Palestine as the protecting Europe from Muslim invasion and so on and so on. And so it's incredible how today, you know when it all began? Already some twenty years ago in the United States when the radical Christian fundamentalist right, which was
about life I'd say, but I've noticed that in one respect... Absolutely. But you know all great Marxists were privately pessimists. Bertolt Brecht was a pessimist. Adorno I know was privately a pessimist. Why do people think that Marxists have to be these idiots, you know, "oh life is nice, we are just corrupted by bourgeois decadence" or—no, life is big shit. I'd argue you are like that in one respect and it's when it comes to love. Can I read you a quote from Stevenson, who says: "Falling in love is the one illogical adventure, the one thing of which we are tempted to think is supernatural in our trite and reasonable world. The effect is out of all proportion with the cause." And that reminded me of your definition of an event. So I wondered to what extent you had love in mind when you defined event. I do, I do. And also one must say Alain Badiou, from whom I took the term event, does it. Again, in English we have, but also in French, I've written about it abundantly, this beautiful phrase. In many other countries, most of the countries, whenever I go to a country, from Korea to I don't know where, I always ask them: do you also for falling in love use this verb "to fall"? Which precisely means this shocking surprise. You lose control, you fall into love. And I claim in spite of all our permissivity and so on, all the strategy today is to be in love without the fall. I was shocked at how an American ad that I saw for organizing dates, dating agency, used this very reference. Their ad was: "You are a busy person, you cannot afford confusion, blah blah, we will enable you to be in love without falling, without the fall." That's the horror of today. That's why my old thesis—yes, I agree with this religious dimension that you mentioned and so on and so on, although I'm an atheist of course—I think that today we are approaching a strange situation where to be passionately in love is effectively more subversive than sexual promiscuity. This is why I'm also—another horrible feature of me—negatively disposed towards polyamory. I think you don't get real love that. It's this pragmatic calculation: "I need this guy to satisfy this aspect of me, I need another person to satisfy another aspect" and so on and so on. Okay, do it, I'm not a conservative, I don't want to prohibit. I just claim this is not love. Okay. I had a few people submit questions about anti-Semitism on the left. To what extent do you think it is making a resurgence and to what extent is it a conspiracy theory? A very good question, I don't try to avoid it. Let me first make this point. I think that the most dangerous tendency in this field is what I call, and I insist more and more on this, what I call anti-Semitic Zionism. That is to say, it's an old strategy of European right to oppose Jews there—too strong influence and so on in their own country—but to fully support Jews in Palestine as the protecting Europe from Muslim invasion and so on and so on. And so it's incredible how today, you know when it all began? Already some twenty years ago in the United States when the radical Christian fundamentalist right, which was
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usually always anti-Semitic, all of a sudden discovered Israel. So—and although
usually always anti-Semitic, all of a sudden discovered Israel. So—and although
Slavoj Žižek
it's in a very manipulative way because it says in the Bible that before Armageddon Jews will return to Jerusalem and so on and so on. But what I'm saying is that I still think that on the one—well, I disagree with both poles. So on the one hand, I don't buy the version which is the version of some of my leftist friends, that there is no real anti-Semitism,
it's in a very manipulative way because it says in the Bible that before Armageddon Jews will return to Jerusalem and so on and so on. But what I'm saying is that I still think that on the one—well, I disagree with both poles. So on the one hand, I don't buy the version which is the version of some of my leftist friends, that there is no real anti-Semitism,
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anti-Semitism is a Islamophobic construct and so on and so on. No, it is. It's obvious that in many Arab countries there is anti-Semitism and it's also clear how it functions in a very reactionary way. They focus then their hatred on Israel in order to stifle, to control their own outbursts which may topple local masters there, dictators and so on and so on. That here I—and also to give you concrete examples: my friends from, for example, from Malmö are telling me how effectively
anti-Semitism is a Islamophobic construct and so on and so on. No, it is. It's obvious that in many Arab countries there is anti-Semitism and it's also clear how it functions in a very reactionary way. They focus then their hatred on Israel in order to stifle, to control their own outbursts which may topple local masters there, dictators and so on and so on. That here I—and also to give you concrete examples: my friends from, for example, from Malmö are telling me how effectively
Slavoj Žižek
Jews feel endangered there and so on. So here I'm absolutely pro-Jewish. At the same time, I find it terrifying, abominable, how partisans of the Israeli state, how they use the accusation of anti-Semitism for something that is for me a quite legitimate criticism of Israel, of what it is doing on the West Bank. They all mention Gaza there firing rockets on Israel. Okay, okay, okay. This is one thing, but to all those partisans of strong Israeli state I would simply ask them: but please, you can do it, it's not dangerous—visit the West Bank. It's an exemplary case of this, I would say, it's not so much police terror, it's more a dictatorship of bureaucracy, of endless legal regulations and so on and so on to stifle that. And you know what bothers me? How today, all of a sudden, here we can see where history is moving. Positions which were till recently officially internationally accepted positions, like two-state solution and so on and so on, most of the West Bank should be given to—back to Palestinians, all of a sudden all of a sudden are proclaimed anti-Semitic and so on and so on, or at least a threat to the state of Israel and so on. This is what makes me suspicious of it. So again, my position is very idealist here but I insist on it. It is that our struggle for against anti-Semitism in Europe—and again, anti-Semitism is strong, go to Poland, go to Hungary, and also some other Western European countries—and our struggle for the right of West Bank Palestinians should be part of the same struggle. If we don't insist on this we lost our
Jews feel endangered there and so on. So here I'm absolutely pro-Jewish. At the same time, I find it terrifying, abominable, how partisans of the Israeli state, how they use the accusation of anti-Semitism for something that is for me a quite legitimate criticism of Israel, of what it is doing on the West Bank. They all mention Gaza there firing rockets on Israel. Okay, okay, okay. This is one thing, but to all those partisans of strong Israeli state I would simply ask them: but please, you can do it, it's not dangerous—visit the West Bank. It's an exemplary case of this, I would say, it's not so much police terror, it's more a dictatorship of bureaucracy, of endless legal regulations and so on and so on to stifle that. And you know what bothers me? How today, all of a sudden, here we can see where history is moving. Positions which were till recently officially internationally accepted positions, like two-state solution and so on and so on, most of the West Bank should be given to—back to Palestinians, all of a sudden all of a sudden are proclaimed anti-Semitic and so on and so on, or at least a threat to the state of Israel and so on. This is what makes me suspicious of it. So again, my position is very idealist here but I insist on it. It is that our struggle for against anti-Semitism in Europe—and again, anti-Semitism is strong, go to Poland, go to Hungary, and also some other Western European countries—and our struggle for the right of West Bank Palestinians should be part of the same struggle. If we don't insist on this we lost our
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soul. This is why the most immoral disgusting position is for me the position, a version of which we find on both sides. Like Palestinians say in Ljubljana, here in my town, there
soul. This is why the most immoral disgusting position is for me the position, a version of which we find on both sides. Like Palestinians say in Ljubljana, here in my town, there
Slavoj Žižek
was a pro-Palestinian graffiti on a building which said: "If I were to live in Gaza, I would also have denied the Holocaust" and so on. In the same way, radical Zionists are using the same argument. Basically they're saying we suffered so horribly, Holocaust and so on, how can you measure us in—how can you appreciate—how can you criticize us for what we're doing there after all horrible things that we suffered. I find this a terrifying position. I—when my Jewish friends—okay, very few of them, most of them are much more open—tell me but "Holocaust, Holocaust" and so on, as if this justifies whatever the state of Israel is doing, I'm telling them you are now doing something sacrilegious terrifying. You are using mega-tragic crime event Holocaust to justify intricacies of your daily politics on the West Bank and so on and so on. But again, just compare what is today considered an anti-Semitism for what was ten years, fifteen years ago considered as a standard possible solution accepted by—by everybody and so on and so on. You can see how—how things are changing. And again, here I'm a pessimist again. What especially worries me is Israel's more and more often link with most disgusting conservative Arab states like Saudi Arabia. I read this in big public media, they are now directly already half militarily collaborating, their—their secret agencies are collaborating. Even you know when Israel a couple of years ago already wanted to bomb Iran? Now we know that Saudi Arabia put pressure on Israel, wanted it to bomb Iran and so on and so on. This is the formula of a catastrophe in the long term. I've often heard you describe the job of critical theorist to ask the right questions. It seems to me that it's more difficult to know these days who we should be asking. There seems to be a power void, especially if you look at British politics at the moment, it's not clear who's in charge. What do you think of this? It's not just United Kingdom, it's all of Europe. Look, let me tell you something which may amuse you even. You know the old Marxist paranoiac dream was in reality there is some secret power center which decides everything. The fantasy was that let's say in the United States once a year somewhere halfway between Wall Street and Washington all true decision makers meet and decide everything. Isn't your impression, at least it's mine, of European and British and other politics that—my God, if at least there were to be this type of center of power who knows what it is doing. There doesn't seem to be such a secret power or whatever. It's the—or I'll put it in this way—the ruling class, not in the strict Marxist sense but the political ruling elite, is simply losing its ability to rule. And I'm not as an evil leftist praising this. The ruling elite, it's their duty to know what they're doing. If they don't know what they're doing, it's a very difficult situation, it's dangerous situation. And if I were to be a leftist—if I am a leftist—I wouldn't be too glad about it. Do you think there are parallels with what happened after the death of God going on in politics, if we have that same sort of vacuum in political power? Will there be any parallel effect? Yeah but I—okay, on the other hand, I wouldn't like to mention too much this death of God here although I consider myself an atheist Christian, no? I'm rather on the side practically of Christo—of Christopher Hitchens, you know. In the sense that on the one hand yes, religion is not just a—is not just some obscure dark force as we learned from Latin America and so on, it can play even in processes of social emancipation a very progressive role and so on and so on. On the other hand—and here I'm also in some sense criticizing Stalinist communism—you know what I think it's Steven Weinberg, that quantum cosmology guy who wrote a wonderful book, The First Three Minutes, about Big Bang. He said somewhere—I quote this in one of my old books—that in a world without a religion good people would have been doing good things and bad people bad things. You need something like a religion to make good people do bad things. And that's the function of—of—of fundamentalism today. And in a similar way, I read a couple of memoirs—my hero in the Soviet Union, early dissident Victor Kravchenko who emigrated to the West. His story is very tragic. He was an honest people—sorry, an honest Communist dedicated the people then he was sent to Ukra—to Ukraine in the early thirties to fight rebellion when there was a big hunger there and he was simply devastated by what he saw there. What devastated him was what? Precisely this logic of: when those in power want from you horrible things—pogroms, criti—killing, torturing ordinary people—they present this to you as your highest sacrifice for the revolutionary cause. "Yes, if you're really faithful to our cause you must be ready to do horrible things" and so on and so on. And isn't this more than true today? Which is why as I emphasize again and again in the last years, as Jacques Lacan my psychoanalytic mentor emphasized it also all the time, Dostoyevsky was totally wrong when he said "if there is no God then everything is permitted." No, religious fundamentalism means precisely there: "if there is God—of course God to whom you claim that you have a privileged contact—then everything is permitted to you." You can bomb nations, you can rape, we saw it in ISIS state and so on and so on. So again, I—I—I think it's so even in a very naive sense empirically wrong this attitude that if we take some transcendent value, higher authority from the people they will all become egotists and murderers and so on and so on. First, this is a wrong perspective. First, evil has nothing to do with
was a pro-Palestinian graffiti on a building which said: "If I were to live in Gaza, I would also have denied the Holocaust" and so on. In the same way, radical Zionists are using the same argument. Basically they're saying we suffered so horribly, Holocaust and so on, how can you measure us in—how can you appreciate—how can you criticize us for what we're doing there after all horrible things that we suffered. I find this a terrifying position. I—when my Jewish friends—okay, very few of them, most of them are much more open—tell me but "Holocaust, Holocaust" and so on, as if this justifies whatever the state of Israel is doing, I'm telling them you are now doing something sacrilegious terrifying. You are using mega-tragic crime event Holocaust to justify intricacies of your daily politics on the West Bank and so on and so on. But again, just compare what is today considered an anti-Semitism for what was ten years, fifteen years ago considered as a standard possible solution accepted by—by everybody and so on and so on. You can see how—how things are changing. And again, here I'm a pessimist again. What especially worries me is Israel's more and more often link with most disgusting conservative Arab states like Saudi Arabia. I read this in big public media, they are now directly already half militarily collaborating, their—their secret agencies are collaborating. Even you know when Israel a couple of years ago already wanted to bomb Iran? Now we know that Saudi Arabia put pressure on Israel, wanted it to bomb Iran and so on and so on. This is the formula of a catastrophe in the long term. I've often heard you describe the job of critical theorist to ask the right questions. It seems to me that it's more difficult to know these days who we should be asking. There seems to be a power void, especially if you look at British politics at the moment, it's not clear who's in charge. What do you think of this? It's not just United Kingdom, it's all of Europe. Look, let me tell you something which may amuse you even. You know the old Marxist paranoiac dream was in reality there is some secret power center which decides everything. The fantasy was that let's say in the United States once a year somewhere halfway between Wall Street and Washington all true decision makers meet and decide everything. Isn't your impression, at least it's mine, of European and British and other politics that—my God, if at least there were to be this type of center of power who knows what it is doing. There doesn't seem to be such a secret power or whatever. It's the—or I'll put it in this way—the ruling class, not in the strict Marxist sense but the political ruling elite, is simply losing its ability to rule. And I'm not as an evil leftist praising this. The ruling elite, it's their duty to know what they're doing. If they don't know what they're doing, it's a very difficult situation, it's dangerous situation. And if I were to be a leftist—if I am a leftist—I wouldn't be too glad about it. Do you think there are parallels with what happened after the death of God going on in politics, if we have that same sort of vacuum in political power? Will there be any parallel effect? Yeah but I—okay, on the other hand, I wouldn't like to mention too much this death of God here although I consider myself an atheist Christian, no? I'm rather on the side practically of Christo—of Christopher Hitchens, you know. In the sense that on the one hand yes, religion is not just a—is not just some obscure dark force as we learned from Latin America and so on, it can play even in processes of social emancipation a very progressive role and so on and so on. On the other hand—and here I'm also in some sense criticizing Stalinist communism—you know what I think it's Steven Weinberg, that quantum cosmology guy who wrote a wonderful book, The First Three Minutes, about Big Bang. He said somewhere—I quote this in one of my old books—that in a world without a religion good people would have been doing good things and bad people bad things. You need something like a religion to make good people do bad things. And that's the function of—of—of fundamentalism today. And in a similar way, I read a couple of memoirs—my hero in the Soviet Union, early dissident Victor Kravchenko who emigrated to the West. His story is very tragic. He was an honest people—sorry, an honest Communist dedicated the people then he was sent to Ukra—to Ukraine in the early thirties to fight rebellion when there was a big hunger there and he was simply devastated by what he saw there. What devastated him was what? Precisely this logic of: when those in power want from you horrible things—pogroms, criti—killing, torturing ordinary people—they present this to you as your highest sacrifice for the revolutionary cause. "Yes, if you're really faithful to our cause you must be ready to do horrible things" and so on and so on. And isn't this more than true today? Which is why as I emphasize again and again in the last years, as Jacques Lacan my psychoanalytic mentor emphasized it also all the time, Dostoyevsky was totally wrong when he said "if there is no God then everything is permitted." No, religious fundamentalism means precisely there: "if there is God—of course God to whom you claim that you have a privileged contact—then everything is permitted to you." You can bomb nations, you can rape, we saw it in ISIS state and so on and so on. So again, I—I—I think it's so even in a very naive sense empirically wrong this attitude that if we take some transcendent value, higher authority from the people they will all become egotists and murderers and so on and so on. First, this is a wrong perspective. First, evil has nothing to do with
unknown
egotism. True evil is envy. True evil is "I don't even care about my welfare, it matters more to me to destroy you than to enjoy it myself," you know. That's the logic which is why the deepest German idealist, like Schelling, the companion of Hegel although they took different paths, said somewhere
egotism. True evil is envy. True evil is "I don't even care about my welfare, it matters more to me to destroy you than to enjoy it myself," you know. That's the logic which is why the deepest German idealist, like Schelling, the companion of Hegel although they took different paths, said somewhere
Slavoj Žižek
that true brutal radical evil is much more spiritual than ordinary goodness. True evil is spiritual. In true evil you're not an egotist who cares for—you care—egotism and common good are easy to combine. Every egotist knows that it pays even for you in the long term to be kind with other people and so on and so on. Second thing, I don't understand the simple immorality of people who claim without some higher transcendent authority we can do anything. Sorry, let me take a pathetic example. You see a small child drowning in water. And let's say you are an ethical person. You jump into water to save. Don't tell me that your reasoning is "oh, as an egotist I would prefer to run away but my God maybe God is observing me so not to screw..." Nobody reasons like this, you—you just have to do it, it's an immediate decision. That's the ethical stance. While we're on the subject of religion, you sent me an interesting text on Catholicism recently. And
that true brutal radical evil is much more spiritual than ordinary goodness. True evil is spiritual. In true evil you're not an egotist who cares for—you care—egotism and common good are easy to combine. Every egotist knows that it pays even for you in the long term to be kind with other people and so on and so on. Second thing, I don't understand the simple immorality of people who claim without some higher transcendent authority we can do anything. Sorry, let me take a pathetic example. You see a small child drowning in water. And let's say you are an ethical person. You jump into water to save. Don't tell me that your reasoning is "oh, as an egotist I would prefer to run away but my God maybe God is observing me so not to screw..." Nobody reasons like this, you—you just have to do it, it's an immediate decision. That's the ethical stance. While we're on the subject of religion, you sent me an interesting text on Catholicism recently. And
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following on from that I was wondering if you think the Catholic Church can exist as an institution without that perverse
following on from that I was wondering if you think the Catholic Church can exist as an institution without that perverse
Slavoj Žižek
underbelly. Does that make any sense as a scenario? Yeah—I—I cannot provide a definitive answer. Maybe it can, maybe it cannot. I don't know for example what's the situation in Latin America. Is this explosion of pedophile cases... the only thing I know and I—my judgment is based on the reaction of how Church reacted to pedophile scandals in this very protective way and so on and so on, the only thing I can say is that clearly this—and the cases of pedophilia are part integral part of the identity of today's Catholic Church. You cannot say that it's just an empirical fact, there are pedophiles everything so they are also in the Catholic Church, it's more radical. But first I don't want to focus just on Catholicism, so I cannot say what happens with other religions and so on and so on. For example my Greek friends are telling me that the corruption in the Greek Orthodox Church is breathtaking also. So I—I don't have here a clear opinion. I don't want simply to write the Catholic Church off. We have a question from Dave Bikinis who says, "how do we account for the renewed desire for order, certainty and power in today's populist politics?" and he cites examples of slogans like Trump's "Make America Great Again" and the Brexit slogan "Take Back Control." This is—first I think the—this is—okay, it would be—what—sorry. My first idea here would have been this paradox that how they talk about order and so on. But wait a minute, with their economic policy they are creating even more disorder and so on. The element of order in Europe is nonetheless European Union and so on and so on. They want order and deregulation or whatever. No, I also want order. I'm very to put it ironically in quotation marks totalitarian here. I'm not a partisan of disorder. I don't see anything emancipatory in social chaos when public authority disappears and so on and so on. My God, did these people really ever experience this? I remember, I was young, I was there: Paris '68. Yes, there was chaos in Quartier Latin. But then all the protesting students in the evening—it's horrible what I will say—they withdrew to a slightly safer area, Rive Droite, north of Notre Dame, and then sit there nicely in cafeterias and drank their coffees, beers, and exchange memories, what a nice day we have—you know, all the disorder there was against the background of we are creating chaos here but outside our well-ordered reality persists. And I have nothing against it. So the more interesting thing is why—why does the new right experience the situation in which we are now as the situation of disorder? I think they're not consi—at the same time it's disorder, but at the same time they complain all the time about the strong state controlling us and so on and so on. So I—I think again that this is a case of inconsistency of the—of the old right. And sorry... maybe the last one more and then I will unfortunately have to leave. One more. I think that leads quite nicely into this question. A lot of people asked me what your thoughts are on accelerationism and I'm guessing from what you've said that you're not a fan. Yeah but I'm—oh no, here I will—my position is very boring. On one hand I'm against accelerationism in this usual sense it was advocated, it no longer is if I know it correctly, years ago by Toni Negri among others, no? The idea is that we should push capitalism even further at its most crazy, this double speculations with futures and so on and so on—and that then this will then bring capitalism to its self-destruction. Well, you know the problem is that from the very beginning of capitalism people had this hope, you know: "oh, it's approaching its end, let's push it a little bit further." And I find this quite comic, like Marx described capitalism and for Marx capitalism was close to its end approaching disintegration. Then Lenin said "okay now imperialism, the last stage." Then half a century
underbelly. Does that make any sense as a scenario? Yeah—I—I cannot provide a definitive answer. Maybe it can, maybe it cannot. I don't know for example what's the situation in Latin America. Is this explosion of pedophile cases... the only thing I know and I—my judgment is based on the reaction of how Church reacted to pedophile scandals in this very protective way and so on and so on, the only thing I can say is that clearly this—and the cases of pedophilia are part integral part of the identity of today's Catholic Church. You cannot say that it's just an empirical fact, there are pedophiles everything so they are also in the Catholic Church, it's more radical. But first I don't want to focus just on Catholicism, so I cannot say what happens with other religions and so on and so on. For example my Greek friends are telling me that the corruption in the Greek Orthodox Church is breathtaking also. So I—I don't have here a clear opinion. I don't want simply to write the Catholic Church off. We have a question from Dave Bikinis who says, "how do we account for the renewed desire for order, certainty and power in today's populist politics?" and he cites examples of slogans like Trump's "Make America Great Again" and the Brexit slogan "Take Back Control." This is—first I think the—this is—okay, it would be—what—sorry. My first idea here would have been this paradox that how they talk about order and so on. But wait a minute, with their economic policy they are creating even more disorder and so on. The element of order in Europe is nonetheless European Union and so on and so on. They want order and deregulation or whatever. No, I also want order. I'm very to put it ironically in quotation marks totalitarian here. I'm not a partisan of disorder. I don't see anything emancipatory in social chaos when public authority disappears and so on and so on. My God, did these people really ever experience this? I remember, I was young, I was there: Paris '68. Yes, there was chaos in Quartier Latin. But then all the protesting students in the evening—it's horrible what I will say—they withdrew to a slightly safer area, Rive Droite, north of Notre Dame, and then sit there nicely in cafeterias and drank their coffees, beers, and exchange memories, what a nice day we have—you know, all the disorder there was against the background of we are creating chaos here but outside our well-ordered reality persists. And I have nothing against it. So the more interesting thing is why—why does the new right experience the situation in which we are now as the situation of disorder? I think they're not consi—at the same time it's disorder, but at the same time they complain all the time about the strong state controlling us and so on and so on. So I—I think again that this is a case of inconsistency of the—of the old right. And sorry... maybe the last one more and then I will unfortunately have to leave. One more. I think that leads quite nicely into this question. A lot of people asked me what your thoughts are on accelerationism and I'm guessing from what you've said that you're not a fan. Yeah but I'm—oh no, here I will—my position is very boring. On one hand I'm against accelerationism in this usual sense it was advocated, it no longer is if I know it correctly, years ago by Toni Negri among others, no? The idea is that we should push capitalism even further at its most crazy, this double speculations with futures and so on and so on—and that then this will then bring capitalism to its self-destruction. Well, you know the problem is that from the very beginning of capitalism people had this hope, you know: "oh, it's approaching its end, let's push it a little bit further." And I find this quite comic, like Marx described capitalism and for Marx capitalism was close to its end approaching disintegration. Then Lenin said "okay now imperialism, the last stage." Then half a century
unknown
later Mao Zedong says this post-World War II imperialism, it's imperialism capitalism in its highest last rotting state and so on. Then with postmodernism this new cultural—you know, like for over one century this story goes on, we think capitalism is pushed to its limit but it—it's like an undead vampire or whatever, it returns stronger and
later Mao Zedong says this post-World War II imperialism, it's imperialism capitalism in its highest last rotting state and so on. Then with postmodernism this new cultural—you know, like for over one century this story goes on, we think capitalism is pushed to its limit but it—it's like an undead vampire or whatever, it returns stronger and
Slavoj Žižek
stronger. On the other hand, I'm absolutely opposed also to any type of this—how should I call it—withdrawal to calm life, like that "we live in a crazy universe of capitalist dynamics, step back, learn to enjoy daily life, step out of this crazy capitalist dynamics" and so on and so on. I also disagree with this in a very standard way. I think that both these poles are part of the same capitalist logic today. No wonder that I read a wonderful analysis where they claim that today in the United States the preferred religious or spiritual orientation of top managers is a kind of a Westernized version of Buddhism or whatever. The idea being: we live in a crazy world, too much dynamic, we need to learn to withdraw into our inner life to find some
stronger. On the other hand, I'm absolutely opposed also to any type of this—how should I call it—withdrawal to calm life, like that "we live in a crazy universe of capitalist dynamics, step back, learn to enjoy daily life, step out of this crazy capitalist dynamics" and so on and so on. I also disagree with this in a very standard way. I think that both these poles are part of the same capitalist logic today. No wonder that I read a wonderful analysis where they claim that today in the United States the preferred religious or spiritual orientation of top managers is a kind of a Westernized version of Buddhism or whatever. The idea being: we live in a crazy world, too much dynamic, we need to learn to withdraw into our inner life to find some
unknown
peace and so on and so on. In this way you function even better and so on and so on. So I think this is in some sense a wrong dilemma. For example, the prospect which truly fascinates me now—I'm writing a new book on it—what Elon
peace and so on and so on. In this way you function even better and so on and so on. So I think this is in some sense a wrong dilemma. For example, the prospect which truly fascinates me now—I'm writing a new book on it—what Elon
Slavoj Žižek
Musk calls Neuralink, or what some others call singularity. This idea that we are approaching a point where we will be able to wire our brains to directly communicate even beyond language, to participate in the same global consciousness and so on and so on. I don't think the right way is to say "oh this is horror, end of humanity" and to step back. Yes, there are great dangers, we don't know what will emerge out of it. But it's crucial to confront it, to raise serious questions. Does this really mean that we will be kind of a—like all those ants in early from early fifties, sorry, horror movies where they are no longer humans, they are just part of some global awareness, they lose their individuality. So I really think that something radically new is emerging. That gradually we humans will literally change our nature. Something maybe we should even call it post-humanity is emerging. But what will it be, we don't know it. It's a thrilling prospect, I don't think the right way is to step back. So in terms of accelerating the end of capitalism, do I understand you correctly if I say that your criticism is that acceleration just does not achieve that end, it's just a fantasy? Is that essentially your... Not just a fantasy, no it's not a fantasy because acceleration in some sense is a fact. What I'm claiming is that first acceleration is in the sense often or as a rule
Musk calls Neuralink, or what some others call singularity. This idea that we are approaching a point where we will be able to wire our brains to directly communicate even beyond language, to participate in the same global consciousness and so on and so on. I don't think the right way is to say "oh this is horror, end of humanity" and to step back. Yes, there are great dangers, we don't know what will emerge out of it. But it's crucial to confront it, to raise serious questions. Does this really mean that we will be kind of a—like all those ants in early from early fifties, sorry, horror movies where they are no longer humans, they are just part of some global awareness, they lose their individuality. So I really think that something radically new is emerging. That gradually we humans will literally change our nature. Something maybe we should even call it post-humanity is emerging. But what will it be, we don't know it. It's a thrilling prospect, I don't think the right way is to step back. So in terms of accelerating the end of capitalism, do I understand you correctly if I say that your criticism is that acceleration just does not achieve that end, it's just a fantasy? Is that essentially your... Not just a fantasy, no it's not a fantasy because acceleration in some sense is a fact. What I'm claiming is that first acceleration is in the sense often or as a rule
unknown
relative. Again, now although I know this rational optimist like Sam Harris and Steven Pinker all the time emphasize, "but poverty is diminishing" and so
relative. Again, now although I know this rational optimist like Sam Harris and Steven Pinker all the time emphasize, "but poverty is diminishing" and so
Slavoj Žižek
on. Yes but at the same time as we learned from Piketty, differences are exploding. We are entering a new era where as Peter Sloterdijk, a German conservative philosopher emphasized: like one-fourth, third of humanity lives beneath the cupola in relative safety, others are outside. That's why we have the problem of refugees, it's those outside trying to penetrate inside. And that's what Hollywood knew already years ago. I remember all those movies, Zardoz and so on, where you know you have the elite humanity and those outside. This is gradually becoming our reality. So when you talk about accelerationism, I would say yes but let's see what are its concrete social effects. What is happening in terms of new—new distinctions. Maybe it's more and more a serious option, a new hierarchic distinction is emerging which is much stronger than the old class distinction if you ask me. On the subject of film actually one more question for you and I'm interested in the answer too. Walrus asks, "have you seen Lars von Trier's The House That Jack Built and what do you think of it?" And that will be my final question, I'll let you go after that. I am very sorry, it's again you see here my—my limitation. In spite of his mistakes that unfortunate answer he gave—although I had to laugh so much, you remember that answer at the Cannes Festival: "Yes, Hitler must be worried when he was bombed." Now an irony: I had to laugh so much then I checked it. You know whom he practically von Trier quoted there? Ludwig Wittgenstein. I read a selection of his statements from his diary when in '44 early '44 he wrote "Nonetheless in spite of all he crimes, Hitler must feel now terribly isolated in that bunker" and so on and so on. So what I'm saying is that and this makes me this strange misanthropic pessimist Marxist. I admired very much Melancholia, as for me a very optimist movie: wonderful end of the world, an evil race left in the universe. I think this is one of the crucial movies. Then I like very much, did you see his—it's not his first but his first relative success? In some countries it was called Europa, in some countries it was called Zentropa. About an American student going to Germany in early '46 to get a job there and it—it's an excellent film and so on. So I think that I still I am not ready to renounce Lars von Trier. He is one of the great authentic ones. I'm just sorry not having the time... The one film I hate by him incidentally is: how is that one called about that idiots or what no? About a group of people who... Idiocracy or something? Yeah, Idiots. Yeah. Yeah, that one I hate. It's the worst of this—although it's ambiguous film, but most people read it as if, if we let ourselves go into sexual orgies idiocy there is something liberating in it and so on and so on. No thanks, I don't buy that. But otherwise again I admire it. You know why? Because at the same level as there is another writer who is popular but
on. Yes but at the same time as we learned from Piketty, differences are exploding. We are entering a new era where as Peter Sloterdijk, a German conservative philosopher emphasized: like one-fourth, third of humanity lives beneath the cupola in relative safety, others are outside. That's why we have the problem of refugees, it's those outside trying to penetrate inside. And that's what Hollywood knew already years ago. I remember all those movies, Zardoz and so on, where you know you have the elite humanity and those outside. This is gradually becoming our reality. So when you talk about accelerationism, I would say yes but let's see what are its concrete social effects. What is happening in terms of new—new distinctions. Maybe it's more and more a serious option, a new hierarchic distinction is emerging which is much stronger than the old class distinction if you ask me. On the subject of film actually one more question for you and I'm interested in the answer too. Walrus asks, "have you seen Lars von Trier's The House That Jack Built and what do you think of it?" And that will be my final question, I'll let you go after that. I am very sorry, it's again you see here my—my limitation. In spite of his mistakes that unfortunate answer he gave—although I had to laugh so much, you remember that answer at the Cannes Festival: "Yes, Hitler must be worried when he was bombed." Now an irony: I had to laugh so much then I checked it. You know whom he practically von Trier quoted there? Ludwig Wittgenstein. I read a selection of his statements from his diary when in '44 early '44 he wrote "Nonetheless in spite of all he crimes, Hitler must feel now terribly isolated in that bunker" and so on and so on. So what I'm saying is that and this makes me this strange misanthropic pessimist Marxist. I admired very much Melancholia, as for me a very optimist movie: wonderful end of the world, an evil race left in the universe. I think this is one of the crucial movies. Then I like very much, did you see his—it's not his first but his first relative success? In some countries it was called Europa, in some countries it was called Zentropa. About an American student going to Germany in early '46 to get a job there and it—it's an excellent film and so on. So I think that I still I am not ready to renounce Lars von Trier. He is one of the great authentic ones. I'm just sorry not having the time... The one film I hate by him incidentally is: how is that one called about that idiots or what no? About a group of people who... Idiocracy or something? Yeah, Idiots. Yeah. Yeah, that one I hate. It's the worst of this—although it's ambiguous film, but most people read it as if, if we let ourselves go into sexual orgies idiocy there is something liberating in it and so on and so on. No thanks, I don't buy that. But otherwise again I admire it. You know why? Because at the same level as there is another writer who is popular but
unknown
most of the left is horrified by him. How do—I hope I will pronounce it correctly—Michel Houellebecq. You know, Elementary Particles and so on. You may not agree with him but he paints
most of the left is horrified by him. How do—I hope I will pronounce it correctly—Michel Houellebecq. You know, Elementary Particles and so on. You may not agree with him but he paints
Slavoj Žižek
an excellent image of what went wrong with '68. Because you know already today's memory of the sixties is hippies, drugs, sexual revolution and so on. It's incredibly how already in the seventies the sixties were mystified. The sixties were also very strong political movement. You have workers also striking in France. You had Black Panthers and so on in the United States. All this disappears and now all that remained is sexual revolution, new spirituality and so on and so on. And this ended up in a deadlock. Again, as Marx has put it, we should not be afraid to learn from intelligent conservatives. They're usually conservatives, not reactionaries. Reactionaries
an excellent image of what went wrong with '68. Because you know already today's memory of the sixties is hippies, drugs, sexual revolution and so on. It's incredibly how already in the seventies the sixties were mystified. The sixties were also very strong political movement. You have workers also striking in France. You had Black Panthers and so on in the United States. All this disappears and now all that remained is sexual revolution, new spirituality and so on and so on. And this ended up in a deadlock. Again, as Marx has put it, we should not be afraid to learn from intelligent conservatives. They're usually conservatives, not reactionaries. Reactionaries
unknown
always offer a
always offer a
Slavoj Žižek
solution: let's return to some idealized past. Conservatives, many of them are
solution: let's return to some idealized past. Conservatives, many of them are
unknown
simply honest and say we are here in great difficulty, there is no easy way out. I much prefer them to naive progressive liberals. Well, I'm with you on
simply honest and say we are here in great difficulty, there is no easy way out. I much prefer them to naive progressive liberals. Well, I'm with you on
Slavoj Žižek
Melancholia. I think it's an underrated classic and I'm in favor of any film where everyone dies at the end, like you. I wish there were more—I wish there were more of them. Absolutely! This is why my favorite Star Wars of the last series... how is that one called, not—it's not one of these big six, seven, eight, nine that they're doing now, but one of those how do you call them side products where a small group is goes to a certain mission and they get what they wanted and deliver it, the blueprint for the Death Star, but they all die. Right. I've never seen Star Wars. I don't know. No, no, no. I don't mean the one of these big six, seven, eight, nine that they're doing now, but one of those how do you call them side products where a small group is goes to a certain mission and they get what they wanted and deliver it, the blueprint for the Death Star, but they all die. I was quite pleasantly surprised by this, I mean. Well, thank you very much for joining us here. It's been a pleasure. Okay. Oh, I'm thankful to all who listened to us and when I recompose myself, you know now I feel so tired, a little bit ill, that every morning it's for me an effort. You know some philosophers like Husserl claim that the ego has to transcendentally constitute himself. Well, it takes me one hour, half an hour every morning to somehow put the pieces together and reconstruct myself as an ego. When I do this I would gladly do it again. Thanks very much. Thank you for joining us, bye for now.
Melancholia. I think it's an underrated classic and I'm in favor of any film where everyone dies at the end, like you. I wish there were more—I wish there were more of them. Absolutely! This is why my favorite Star Wars of the last series... how is that one called, not—it's not one of these big six, seven, eight, nine that they're doing now, but one of those how do you call them side products where a small group is goes to a certain mission and they get what they wanted and deliver it, the blueprint for the Death Star, but they all die. Right. I've never seen Star Wars. I don't know. No, no, no. I don't mean the one of these big six, seven, eight, nine that they're doing now, but one of those how do you call them side products where a small group is goes to a certain mission and they get what they wanted and deliver it, the blueprint for the Death Star, but they all die. I was quite pleasantly surprised by this, I mean. Well, thank you very much for joining us here. It's been a pleasure. Okay. Oh, I'm thankful to all who listened to us and when I recompose myself, you know now I feel so tired, a little bit ill, that every morning it's for me an effort. You know some philosophers like Husserl claim that the ego has to transcendentally constitute himself. Well, it takes me one hour, half an hour every morning to somehow put the pieces together and reconstruct myself as an ego. When I do this I would gladly do it again. Thanks very much. Thank you for joining us, bye for now.