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Why Radical Politics Needs Philosophy? A Masterclass With Slavoj Zizek. Day 2

Lecture · John Hillman · 2023-11-22 · 2:10:06 · 14,692 words
with Cathy Newman
ideologyrace-antisemitismgeopolitics-warfascism-populismcinema-art-culturephilosophy-generalhistorypsychoanalysisreligion-theologycapitalismecology-climatesubjectivitytechnology-ai-cyberspacedemocracy

Žižek opens by mocking the German state's official denial of antisemitism, contrasting it with the more subtle, rumor-based antisemitism in other contexts. He highlights the absurdity of blaming immigrants for antisemitic sentiments when such sentiments are embedded in official state policy, framing this as a key example of ideological hypocrisy. Žižek critiques the liberal notion that totalitarian figures are 'heroes' who do the 'dirty work' so others can sleep peacefully, using examples from A Few Good Men, the Holocaust, and Trujillo’s massacre of Haitians. He argues that these figures are not ethical heroes but are driven by an inability to confront the 'Real' of social antagonism. He further analyzes Heidegger’s antisemitism through the Black Notebooks, arguing that Heidegger’s philosophy inherently excludes Jews as 'homeless' calculators who disrupt authentic rootedness. Žižek analyzes Martin Heidegger’s antisemitism, arguing that Heidegger conflates the metaphysical stance of modern technological nihilism with the Jewish people, while positing Germans as the only authentic metaphysical people. He critiques attempts to save Heidegger by appealing to his ontological distinction, showing how Heidegger views the Holocaust as the Jews’ self-annihilation via their own technological logic. Žižek contrasts this with the actual horror of extermination camps and explores the deep spirituality of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions, concluding that modern global capitalism merges technological exploitation with rooted cultural identity, rendering any search for unspoiled origins (like the Nazis’ Tibet expeditions) futile. Žižek analyzes the theological-political logic of 'Next year in Jerusalem,' contrasting empirical and transcendental interpretations to warn against the 'founding crime' of ethnic cleansing. He critiques Habermasian universal ethics, Derrida’s 'democracy to come,' and deep ecology’s spiritualization of nature, arguing instead for nature’s absolute indifference. He concludes by reinterpreting Wittgenstein’s Tractatus to argue that ethical truths (like dignity) must be shown, not spoken, via a spontaneous act that bypasses the Big Other. Žižek responds to questions on cancel culture, AI, shame, and Chinese politics. He argues cancel culture is exclusionary despite its inclusive rhetoric, using the enunciation/enunciated distinction. He posits that human speech uniquely displays meaning through failure, contrasting this with AI's error-correction. He redefines shame as 'too much' (vulgar/traumatic) rather than lack, citing Pfaller. Finally, he critiques Chinese political transparency, praising the opaque, non-elite selection of leaders as a necessary democratic feature, referencing Hegel's monarch and the jury.

ideas stories works 0:00 30:00 1:00:00 1:30:00 2:00:00ideas stories works 0:00 1:05:03 2:10:06
every located moment in this recording, click one to read it
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The ideas in it 31

in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here

Stories he reaches for 1

Žižek describes leftist philosopher Gianni Vattimo’s attempt to save Heidegger by arguing he was just a 'stupid local guy' making a concrete mistake, ignoring that Heidegger’s philosophy itself warns against confusing metaphysical stance with concrete people.
“Heidegger was also a stupid local guy from that area... Because his entire philosophy is about the difference between ontological... and ontic level...”

Works invoked 15

Žižek’s book Let Them Rot (or Zupančič’s analysis) is used to illustrate the 'founding crime' and the creation of a new universality through a 'crazy act of exception'.
Žižek's own book, used to discuss AI and the problem of error/failure.
Cited for the song 'I am sixteen going to seventeen,' which Žižek mocks as 'disgusting' but uses to contrast with his own aging and the horror of the Holocaust.
Described as 'disgusting' but a 'good example' of displaying love through failure/stumbling.
Used to illustrate the 'You can't handle the truth' fantasy, where a brutal general does 'dirty work' so civilians can sleep peacefully; Žižk argues this stance is a lie.
Wittgenstein’s work is reinterpreted to derive political and ethical injunctions, specifically the idea that what cannot be spoken must be shown.
Schelling’s work, cited for its metaphysical question about what happened before the beginning/creation.
Heidegger’s Schwarze Hefte, which Žižek argues reveal that antisemitism is integral to Heidegger’s philosophy, specifically regarding 'Judentums' and 'Machenschaft'.
Žižek's book, referenced regarding ordinary workers reading Heidegger and the topic of shame.
Haaretz journal
The newspaper that published a sanitized version of Žižek’s text ('decaffeinated Zizek'), removing his 'obscenities' to avoid conspiracy theory accusations.
Described as a 'disgusting movie' that fails to emphasize that the German character (played by Brad Pitt) was sent by the Nazis to study racial purity in Tibet.
Mentioned in the context of a Chinese scholar's public beneficial activities.
The official journal of the Vatican, where Žižek proudly published two texts, illustrating his 'atheist Christian' stance.
Described as capturing the concreteness of the Finnish countryside, storms, forests, and lakes, representing a rooted spiritual relationship to nature.
Cited for its discourse theory on fascism and the Lacanian Real.

People invoked 50

Avital Ronell positive
Cited in an anecdote about a blackmail scandal to illustrate Derrida’s notion of 'infinite justice' and the 'Nuremberg trial of nature.'
Called a 'nightmare' and Holocaust denier, but Žižek reluctantly agrees with his observation that Auschwitz was a symbolic site compared to the true horrors of Sobibor/Treblinka.
Žižek critiques the German state's official narrative and policy regarding antisemitism, viewing the 'excuse' as a form of ideological hypocrisy.
Mocked as a decolonial thinker who believes one can find unspoiled origins (like Incas or Amazon tribes) that escape Western imperialist logic, which Žižet rejects.
Director of A Few Good Men, cited in the context of the 'You can't handle the truth' scene.
Identified as a mediator and friend who told Žižek about the 'decaffeinated Zizek' published in Haaretz.
Narendra Modi negative
Cited alongside Erdoğan as trying to unite global technological exploitation with rooted cultural identity.
A friend present at the event, mentioned in the context of managing time.
Cited as a collaborator whose book on Antigone changed Žižek’s mind about the 'founding crime' and the nature of Antigone’s act.
Mentioned in the context of his idea that Incas might offer resistance, which Žižek’s Latin American friend concedes doesn't work but still seeks unspoiled origins.
Appreciated for early deconstruction but critiqued for his 'ethico-political turn' (democracy to come), which Žižek finds too teleological and metaphysical.
Pierre Bayard positive
Žižek appreciates Bayard’s theory that new concepts (like 'banality of evil' or 'bystander effect') are often productive but based on false concrete examples; he uses this to critique liberal compassion myths.
Georg Lukács positive
Cited for the quote 'Nature is a social category,' which Žižek uses to argue that nature’s meaning changes historically.
Called 'the only serious guy in critical theory'; Žižek agrees with his view that poetry is possible after Auschwitz, whereas prose is not.
Žižek cites Trujillo’s pride in the 'Shibboleth' massacre of Haitians as an example of redefining 'courage' as the strength to do horrible things for one's country, a logic Žižek finds depressing and heroic in a false sense.
Described as a leftist/communist philosopher who tried to save Heidegger by appealing to his ontological distinction, though Žižek finds this defense fails.
Jacques Lacan positive
Žižek uses Lacanian terminology ('the Real') to explain Nazi violence, arguing that Nazis targeted Jews because they could not confront the 'Real of the social antagonism' (internal class tensions) in German society.
Actor in A Few Good Men, cited in the context of the 'You can't handle the truth' scene.
Žižek cites Albright’s statement that 500,000 dead Iraqi children were 'a price worth paying' as an example of someone who deserves a special place in hell, contrasting her explicit cruelty with bureaucratic 'banality'.
Mentioned in a vulgar anecdote about his physical paralysis and sexual function, used to illustrate a point about treating friends in trouble.
Austrian philosopher whose work on shame vs. guilt is cited; Žižek builds on Pfaller's distinction.
Judith Butler negative
Critiqued as a 'radical liberal' who remains trapped in the Big Other; her reading of Antigone is seen as applying existing laws rather than creating a new universality.
Mentioned as a popular eco-Marxist whose book sold half a million copies in Japan; cited as falling into the trap of the Big Other.
Žižek argues Eichmann was not an 'ordinary bureaucrat' but a gang member who beat Jews from youth, contradicting Arendt’s 'banality of evil' example, though the concept remains useful.
Alain Badiou positive
Cited for his book on Saint Paul, developing the idea of the Holy Ghost as the spirit of an egalitarian community without distinctions.
Žižek makes 'tasteless jokes' about feminism; Rose criticized him using Lacan's enunciation/enunciated distinction, which Žižek ironically adopts.
Respected for his 'obscenity' in hosting orthodox rabbis who agreed that 'eternal Israel' is not about occupying land, highlighting the confusion of transcendental and empirical Jerusalem.
Admired but criticized for a 'naive' theory of language origin from cooperation.
A Chinese scholar and friend, now an official figure, with whom Žižek disagrees.
Cited in Madeleine Albright’s quote about women who prefer Sanders to Hillary Clinton.
Actor in A Few Good Men, cited in the context of the 'You can't handle the truth' scene.
Cited as a French right-wing philosopher who argued that Jews, by establishing Israel, have chosen the path of 'rooting,' admitting Heidegger was right about the need for concrete land.
Cited as a contemporary example of global capitalism uniting technological exploitation with invocation of specific cultural roots.
A 'good Japanese friend' whose idea of returning to a 'logic of exchange with nature' is rejected by Žižek as obfuscating nature’s meaninglessness.
Not explicitly named but implied in the context of 'Nazi antisemitic procedures' and 'settlers' in Hebron, though Žižek does not name him directly.
Not explicitly named but implied in the context of 'Latin America' and 'Caribes' regarding Trujillo’s actions, though Žižek does not name him directly in this excerpt.
Žižek mentions enjoying Sibelius, a composer popular in Nazi Germany, as an example of a musical figure who might be evoked by Heidegger regarding cultural horizons.
Jon Elster positive
Cited for the notion of 'by-products,' which Žižek uses to explain how dignity is achieved spontaneously rather than consciously.
Žižek considers Heidegger a 'really great thinker' and argues his antisemitism (found in the Black Notebooks) is integral to his philosophy, not an empirical error, specifically regarding the concept of 'homelessness' and 'Machenschaft'.
Mentioned as the new president of Argentina, with Žižek speculating that Milei might force the opposition to abandon Peronist dreams.
Žižek respects Arendt and her concept 'banality of evil' as useful for analyzing modern bureaucratic power ('collateral damage'), but argues her concrete example (Eichmann as an ordinary bureaucrat) was factually false.
Cited for the quote 'bad assimilationists, good Zionists,' which Žižek uses to analyze the paradoxical Nazi view of Zionism.
Preferred by Žižek over Hegel for his question in Ages of the World: what happened before the beginning/creation?
Cited in Madeleine Albright’s quote about women who neglect her.
Cited as repeating the view that Heidegger was 'simply a Nazi' and doesn't deserve serious philosophical treatment.
Žižek criticizes Habermas’s attempt to dismiss Heidegger as 'simply a Nazi' and not a serious philosopher, calling this 'too easy' and ignoring the philosophical depth of Heidegger’s antisemitism.
Sigmund Freud negative
Cited for the castration anxiety theory, which Žižek reinterprets/contradicts regarding shame.
Cited for his reading of the crucifixion: what dies on the cross is not God but the 'God of beyond,' leading to the immanent Holy Ghost.
Juan Perón negative
Žižk characterizes Peronism as a 'neo-fascist movement' based on 'class peace' and cites Perón’s distribution of Argentinian passports to Nazis in 1945.
Reinterpreted to argue that ethical truths (dignity) must be shown, not spoken; his Tractatus is used to support a political injunction to speak about horror.

Transcript 32 turns

Slavoj Žižek
Is she here? No, already. Put her on the blacklist, one traitor more. Because I checked it up, yes, it's incredible. The big German excuse is now it's all, they are not antisemitic at all, it's all the fault of the immigrants of course, no. Also? Yeah, but in Germany it's the official policy, no? I mean, like here it's probably more at the level of rumors, in Germany it's leading. Okay, sorry, we should start. Okay,
Cathy Newman
very very short introduction because Slavoj Zizek has to leave at four promptly. So I just wanted to say for those who were not here yesterday, or for those who were here yesterday, we heard under the heading Interpretation as a Political Act this very grim outlining of repetitions and resonances and resemblances on a world-historical scene, specifically Israel and Gaza. And in the course of that, Slavoj promised us more philosophy. So let's see. And I should have said welcome to this event from Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, so I'll hand over to
Slavoj Žižek
Slavoj. Thanks very much. If you want more philosophy/theology, I just am in conversation to come here again, the usual two days stuff, in somewhere late March to misuse you and others to make propaganda for my new book on. But on the other hand, yesterday I made a mistake of looking at podcasts and so on, and my god, the world is really going crazy. It makes me so sad. First, I found multiple other podcasts done by Jews on what is going on now in the West Bank city of Hebron. It's really like Nazi antisemitic procedures. Settlers are simply, because this is the only genuine city where two parts are Jewish, parts are Palestinian, and they are simply marking the Palestinian houses with red color and then personal pressure, beating them. The horror is that nobody is ashamed. Like, they don't do it secretly, discreetly, they're doing it publicly, no? And you know that the thing that I once thought is a joke, you know they are literally repeating it. You know that idea of, because you know, and that I consider a great thing, Israel is maybe the most atheistic country in the world, and people are saying that old joke, it's a reality. I don't believe in God, but nonetheless he gave us this land, you know, like, no problem. On the other hand, to be balanced, you know why I never understood, I some bad thing I want to insult everybody, about Arabs, you know that, I think it still goes on, except Egypt and maybe Dubai, they like money, tourists, if you enter Israel, they don't put a stamp into your passport, but you are just given a piece of paper. Why? Because out of kind of kindness? Because I asked, idiot as I am, why, and he told me well, if you want to visit any Arab land around, if they check the stamp, if they see Israeli stamp, you are not allowed to enter, no? Another bad story maybe just to warm things up, it's such a sad world where only horrors happen. Did I already tell it to you, interrupt me if I did, a couple of years ago I was flying to London with a Slovene doctor specialized for emergency cases. And he told me that he is moving to the UK, he was a top specialist. He told me that for a couple of years he was in Dubai. And why are you leaving Dubai? He said no, it was nice, he lived in a privileged suburb with a house half the Olympic sized swimming pool, everything, a lot of money, English school for his children, but he said it didn't go. Why? You know what was his main duty? Every weekend it was his time to work day and night for seventy-two hours because every weekend at least ten thousand, even more, wealthy tourists come, especially from Saudi Arabia and other rich Emirates, to do prostitution. And they are literally untouchable, which means they are beating women, cutting them and so on, and the authorities bring these women to him, brought these women to him, like patch them up anyway you can. And then he asked the innocent question which I love, I'm in my mind a bureaucrat, no? Okay, but how do I put this into my books? They told him you don't, these women legally don't exist. So even if they are half dead, some of them died, this is not, these brutal rapists are untouchable, you know? So my lesson is a very sad one, the whole world is a shit, to cut a long story short. But yesterday I mentioned that Argentinian guy to provoke you if some of you are from there, Milei or what, the new president. I think that I know that Peronism was split, left wing, right wing and so on, but I think that at its most basic Peronism was a neo-fascist movement. The basic idea was peace of the class peace and so on. So no wonder that Perón did what he did, you know in forty-five he had, he printed four hundred thousand of Argentinian passports, distributed them around Europe and North Africa, said any German who comes, you don't ask for anything, you just give him Argentinian citizenship. So I think that it didn't work, even economically, Peronism. You know that in the golden twenties, 1920s, Argentina was well, one of the six, seven richest countries in the world. And then they had the crisis early thirties, but then they never picked up. And I think it was Peronism and reactions to it. So maybe, I always also try to look at the good side of things, maybe Milei will force the opposition to abandon these Peronist dreams to begin from a new point. Okay, enough of this, let's begin doing it. Now I would like to begin before we go to, as I promised, vagaries of antisemitism. Incidentally I just heard from Haaretz, they will print my text, but they even didn't ask me, if you listen to my yesterday's talk, you can immediately guess what they insisted on throwing out. My favorite part, that imagined phone call, you know, obscene. And it's typical how, okay, maybe they are right, they said there are idiots who may take this as a conspiracy theory, with all my provisos and so on. I accept, what can I say, although as my friend Udi Aloni, who is a mediator here, told me that you know what you get there is, you know this my eternal joke, how we get today a thing without its substance. Decaffeinated coffee, desserts, sweet patisserie without sugar and so on, and he told me okay, in Haaretz they will get decaffeinated Zizek, you know, without my obscenities. But what I want to talk today is precisely this little bit more refined dialectic between appearance, truth, what is traumatic in truth. My target is the idea that what is traumatic, this is I think really an honest anti-totalitarian, anti-brutal power moment, my target today will be the idea that, and it's a very refined way to praise brutal people, you know, the idea that nonetheless there is something heroic in totalitarians. Like, most of us, sorry to be, I don't want to point at anybody because I will be in a justified trouble, but let's say you, I don't know who. I'm still a restrained normal, under quotation mark, okay not very normal, but somehow human being. So if somebody were to tell me why don't I torture that guy, first pull his eyes out, whatever, his testicles, make him swallow his own testicles, this is standard procedure incidentally in torture today, no? I wouldn't be able to do it. But to claim that people who are able to do it are some kind of ethical heroes is deeply deceiving. The point is to show how even those who did this are still avoiding the truth, escaping the truth. What do I mean by this? I'm of course referring, but I yesterday, the most, the moment that was full of anxiety for me was will those clip, clips work, you know? So I wanted to, but you saw probably a movie which is now exactly or one year more than thirty years old, Rob Reiner's *A Few Good Men*. That central scene, viral, everybody knows it, where Tom Cruise addresses Jack Nicholson, a brutal general, with "I want the truth." And Jack Nicholson's character shouts back, "You can't handle the truth." The idea is a very precise one and deeply reactionary. That yeah, we can afford to be liberals, respect human rights, blah blah blah, but somebody has to do the dirty work for us discreetly, and we can't handle that. Now my other, as I already indicated, I think that this pseudo, this pseudo-heroic stance, this stance of "I am ready to do the dirty thing so that you can sleep in calm" is in itself a lie. Whenever you encounter cases like this, and this also up to a point explains Holocaust, let's take Holocaust. No, the Nazis, I think even Hannah Arendt with all my respect for her was wrong, as I often said, even here. It's more complex. I don't, she was, I think I already repeated this line here but it's my favorite, a guy whom I appreciate immensely, Pierre Bayard, developed in one of his books a wonderful theory. The theory is that quite often a new concept is introduced, a concept which is very productive, useful, but as a rule, the concrete example which prompted an author to introduce this concept is false, is a fake. And he gives, okay, three examples, I will limit myself not to lose your time to two. First is precisely Hannah Arendt, the banality of evil. The idea is that basically Adolf Eichmann was just an ordinary bureaucrat, and I almost, you know, when I say that I love something it means ultimate obscenity, no? I almost love his basic defense, which is "Why are you bothering me with details, Holocaust? I didn't know anything about it. I was a simple organizer of trains, so many trains from here, there" and so on, you know? Now I think this notion is useful, banality of evil, for today's bureaucratic functioning of power. It is what we usually call collateral damage, you know today in more refined terms. And this is for me the most, the lowest point, you must know it of, how was she called, my god, who was the Secretary of State, Foreign Minister under Clinton, that woman? Madeleine Albright. Yes, sorry, yeah, getting senile. You know against Bernie Sanders, she said that there must be special place in hell for women who prefer Bernie to Hillary Clinton, for women who neglect Clinton. My answer would be, I wrote about it maybe some of you know it, no, if there is hell, which I doubt, I think hell is already here on this earth, if there is hell, then there is a special place in it for anyone, woman, man, trans, who can say something that Madeleine Albright said at another interview. She was asked do you think that half a million of children that died in American bombardment of Iraq, that it's a price worth to pay? She said yes. I mean, those guys should go to hell. But what I wanted to say is that let's return to, let's return to this "You can't handle the truth." Ah sorry, no, step by step. So this guy Bayard went to study in detail Eichmann's life and discovered no, he was absolutely not this banality of evil bureaucrat. Already as a young boy he was part of gangs beating the Jews and so on. No, sorry, he was not that. Another false concept, I like it because I always like things which undermine these big liberal compassion examples. You know I forgot where, I think in Queens not Brooklyn, I think or is a classical example of mass psychology. A lady, girl from Manhattan was returning home late in the evening and somebody attacked her with a knife and raped her. It was a long process. Like he hit her a little bit, she ran away, he again caught her, she was shouting. It took twenty minutes, almost half an hour. Lights were turned on and the shock is allegedly, the shock which was confirmed, is that dozens of people were just observing it, not one called the police. Now Bayard again did something I like, this evil approach. He checked it up in police archives, everything was there. First it's not true that dozens of lights were turned on, just two or three, and both called the police. Just police didn't take it seriously. So, but I to avoid a misunderstanding, I think that this notion is very useful. It happens, but it's not simply the evil of women, because some intelligent social psychologist repeated this as an experiment and discovered this: if you presume that when you see something horrible, if you see that other people are also observing it, you don't want to stick out, but if you think or know that you are alone seeing it, probably you do alert police. So it's a more complex logic. Okay, but it does happen, it's a good example. But again the shock is that although this example concrete was fake, wrong, nonetheless it became a very useful concept. And that triggers my dialectical maybe mind. Why to propose a correct right theory you have to begin with an example which is wrong? But let me go on. So Eichmann and so on. You know what's the problem with the Nazis? No, they were not brutal heroes, even in a horrible sense, who were ready to do something horrible. They were able to do these things because they couldn't handle the truth. The truth to put it in very simple traditional Marxist terms, the truth of the social antagonism. Why they were targeting the Jews? Because what they couldn't confront was not reality, but in Lacanian terms, the Real of the social antagonism. The fact that German society was immanently, not because of the Jewish intruders, traversed by social tensions, antagonisms, which again cannot be explained by an external intruder. Their basic vision was a fiction, a lie. But they needed this lie, they couldn't handle the social truth, to be able to do all the horrors. And this is what as I already I think developed here, this is what I find so horrible in today's global political space. Namely that this secret part, like do it privately, secretly, no this is typical liberal hypocrisy. We know that dirty thing has to be done but keep it secret there, we will protest a little bit but we are aware that heroic acts are necessary. You know which is for me at least one of the most horrible examples of this? In, not Latin America but those islands around Cuba, Caribes and so on. You know what happened in Dominican Republic in The Haiti island was divided. The east was Dominican Republic doing better, the west was Haiti. Which because they dared to do the black revolution were systematically punished, I will not go into the story you probably know it, by the West, kept impoverished. So poor Haitis were constantly penetrating like today's immigrants the Dominican Republic space. And to prevent this, Trujillo, Rafael the dictator, who ruled till I think mid-sixties or when, when he died in an attentat and then his regime that he established crumbled. They, they killed probably around forty thousand Haiti people at the border and it's well known as the, well known as the, as the, this how do you call it when you differently pronounce the same word? Shibboleth? Yeah, shibboleth. I'm so sorry, I'm really getting senile. Because the Dominican soldiers were just stopping people there close to the border and showed them parsley and asked them how do you pro- what is this? Because you know Haiti was more French speaking, Dominican Republic was Spanish and they pronounce it in different way. If you pronounced it in the wrong way you were instantly shot. But what I consider so sad is that when towards the end of his life, early sixties I think, Trujillo was asked which act of you you are most proud of? He said this massacre. He said I did a great crime, yes, a great heroic thing for my country. And I find this so depressing that today it's not even that they hide it, it is as if they are doing it openly, in the sense that we are all fascinated by this heroic images of those who are allegedly our saviors. And courage is redefined not as courage, even under pressure, to courage to stick to your basic decency, but sorry, basic decency is claimed to be a form of cowardice. And the true courage is defined as your strength to do the horrible thing for the sake of your country. This was done, I already repeated this here many times I know, by the Nazis, unfortunately by the Soviets around in, for example, when the early Stalinists were training cadre to do the compulsory collectivization. They told them "You will be exposed to great temptations, you will see there starving children, mothers, starving mothers crying, but if you for a moment feel a compassion for them you are a traitor. The true greatness is to step to step over this." And this logic is returning today. Where, how? Now comes a more problematic part maybe, but I don't really think, what I promised you. I think that and I am of course not blaming the Jews, just something strange, measured by the standards of the Jewish history itself, strange, happened with the establishment of the state of Israel. In what sense? In Heydrich's terms, you remember I quoted yesterday Heydrich who said "bad assimilationists, good Zionists". In Heydrich's terms, among Jews Zionism won over assimilationism. Now the problem here is that what did this do to the status of Jews, the way they are considered by Western racism? And here I will take, as I already announced sorry yesterday, the very sad example of a Heidegger. I say sad example because Heidegger was, whatever you say, unfortunately a really great thinker. And you know, I don't like this Habermasian attempts to say if he wrote this then he is not really a thinker. People like Richard Wolin repeat "he was simply a Nazi, he doesn't even deserve to be treated by as serious philosopher." It's too easy. So again, let's go to the worst and to see how this unfortunately cannot be dismissed as an empirical error of Heidegger but is part of his philosophical edifice, his antisemitism. Which wasn't of course openly stated in his works, but when they published the black so-called *Schwarze Hefte* or what, *Black Notes*, it is clear. The problem and it's not that these were private diaries, no he himself insisted that they should be these daily reflections that Heidegger wrote that they should be part of his *Gesamtausgabe*, complete works. So in Heidegger had urged an examination of, quote, "*Judentums*" Jewry's predisposition to planetary criminality, *planetarischen Verbrechertum*. Why? A quote: "With their marked gift for calculation the Jews, life, 'life' in quotation mark, as if Jews are monsters they are not really living beings. The Jews live according to the principle of race and indeed have done so for the longest time, for which reason they themselves most vigorously resist its unrestricted application. The arrangement of racial breeding stems not from life itself but from the hyper-empowerment of life by," Heidegger uses the term "*Machenschaft*", which is like machination, the spirit of machination. "What this brings about with such planning is a complete deracination, loss of the roots, of peoples by harnessing them in a uniformity in a uniformly constructed and streamlined arrangement of all entities. Along with deracination goes a self-alienation of peoples. The loss of history, that is to say of the regions of decision for being." Now let's elaborate this a little bit. It's simple, but we have to read it clearly. Heidegger's conceptual opposition here is the one between authentic historical being which is also, Heidegger repeated himself, rooted in certain land, in certain not in of course just physical sense, but a certain let's call it, in a totally inappropriate term Heidegger would have exploded, cultural horizon, cultural complex. Each ethnic group is characterized or even constituted by a specific what Heidegger called disclosure of being. How reality discloses itself to us, our old historical myth, traditions, everyday mores, customs and so on. This is always historically specified. What happens for Heidegger potentially already with ancient Greek philosophy, but especially with modernity, is that with modern universalism is that we lose this sense of concrete historical belonging. For Heidegger being limited to a certain spiritual horizon, what it means in the spiritual sense to be German, to be British and so on, is not a limitation but it's precisely what makes a group historical in the deepest sense. And for Heidegger, Jews because they are homeless betray this. They don't, although they pretend to be faithful to their religious identity, they perceive themselves what, as homeless abstract masters whose goal is not to live a concrete meaningful historical life, but to treat external reality, nature, other people as objects of manipulation and exploitation. Especially modern scientific exploitation. Heidegger goes quite far here, he even says at some point that no wonder Jews know so much about mathematics and so on. They just like this abstract approach. When they see a city in a forest, their view is not 'My God, how do people there relate to a forest, a horizon of meaning, how is forest located into their mythology' and so on. And Heidegger would have probably evoked here a composer, musical, who was very popular in Nazi Germany in 1930s, whom even I, I am not politically pure here, sometimes enjoy, Jean Sibelius. You know for example his, it's quite nice, what's that, okay forget everything, his late last big work, symphonical poem is about you really feel the concreteness, what spiritually means to Finns, he was a Finnish composer, of Finnish countryside with all the storms, forests, lakes and so on and so on. Heidegger's counterpoint would have been a Jew would not be able to do that. A Jew would just think "Okay, there are people there, how can I exploit the forest, should we eliminate those people or should we use them as slaves to cut down forest" and so on. That's the idea. Now again, incidentally Sibelius was pretty sympathetic to Nazi Germany, but that's another story. Now there is a way to to defend Heidegger here, popular with some thinkers. It is to say that Heidegger in his antisemitism confuses two things. First the metaphysical stance of rootlessness, of this abstract technological exploitative relationship to your environs with, which in any case predominates today. Today's civilization is as such, Heidegger admits this. But then he always mentions just, he really hated, for him French were superstitious, it's English, Americans and Russians. He always liked to repeat metaphysically America and Russia are the same, instead of the oppo- they it's both in both case this terrifying technological civilization. But Heidegger confuses identifies this metaphysical predisposition with concrete people, the Jews, which embodies this stance with in their empirical existence. So the way they try to save Heidegger, I think even the guy who was definitely a leftist, even a communist, I liked him, proclaimed to be, he now unfortunately died, Gianni Vattimo, the early postmodernist. This was more or less, maybe I'm mistaken, his way to save Heidegger. Forget about the Jews, he was concrete, he was not just the great philosopher, Heidegger was also a stupid local guy from that area, Schwarzwald whatever there around Freiburg and like he made a mistake which precisely his philosophy warns about. Because his entire philosophy is about the difference between ontological, which is the horizon of meaning, and ontic level, entities, reality out there in the world. Heidegger's basic point is that Jews don't see that. Reality is never just an abstract object of technological exploitation, it's always our understanding of reality, it's always rooted in a certain horizon, metaphysical horizon of meaning. So that it's not only society, also the point of Sibelius, the way the things relate to their lakes and forests, it's total different from the way Germans, French do and so on and so on. Now so again, the solution is, and it can be put very elegantly, that the only way to save Heidegger is through Heidegger himself. That to apply his own notion of ontological difference and to claim "Op, measured by your own standards you are making a mistake here. You are confusing a certain metaphysical stance, modern technological manipulation, exploitation, calculation, with a concrete empirical people." Unfortunately this doesn't work I think because it's not only Jews that Heidegger understands in this way. The counterpoint to Jews are of course the Germans. And till the end Heidegger emphasizes that the German people are the only properly metaphysical people. All others, French, Americans you hear of course, can succumb to this Jewish trap, become imperialists blah blah, but Germans are the only people who are or which are authentically rooted in their historical environment. So Heidegger goes to the end here. The absolute opposition, first Germans are an exception, and the ultimate conflict today, the conflict between what Heidegger calls this nihilism, nihilism of modern technology, where we are all reduced to objects of scientific experiments, economic exploitation, mass culture and so on, and on the other hand a proper metaphysical new beginning, new approach to reality, new spirituality, can only is the conflict ultimately between Jews and Germans and this is a matter of a struggle to death. One pole has to destroy, Heidegger uses the term often in his black notebooks, *Vernichtung*, has to annihilate the other. There is no compromise here. And now I come to what now this is for me the really depressing quote. Heidegger here does not, one would have thought that's his perversity, that he would simply say "Okay, it's us Germans against the Jews, and it's a big metaphysical conflict. Don't count, count bodies and so on, that's minor." This was his reaction when Holocaust became known. It was "No, this is already a Jewish approach, like is it six million Jews or five and a half or what, no, you don't see the metaphysical dimension that with the defeat of Germany Jews won over the West over European spirituality." And then he links to the Jews our popular culture which loses spiritual whatever you want. But so he could have said "Okay, we had to do this, otherwise Jews would have done this to us." No, he goes as already indicated yesterday a step further. He paints, and he is unique here I think, he paints a picture of Holocaust in which from which Germans, already they did it, disappear. He claims that Holocaust was the supreme climatic point of modern nihilism because it was at the same time the highest *Vernichtung*, technological destruction of thousands and he likes to quote in this very weird fragments from after World War Two, when it was known, that what happened in the Holocaust is that people were no longer properly dying. You know in this authentic sense, you are close to death, you think about the meaning of your life, finitude, all that bullshit you know. And since I am now old, seventy-four, now I think a different song. Did you look one of the greatest movies did you see of all time, kidding, *Sound of Music*? You know that disgusting song, "I am sixteen going to seventeen." Now my song is "I am seventy-four going to seventy-five" you know. And my friends did something wonderful to me, they invited me to celebrate my birthday last March and they really trained themselves well, they sang this version of the song, my god. Only this, either an ultimate enemy or a true friend does something like this to you, and I think they were friends. But what I want to say is that Heidegger says that in the Holocaust bodies were just produced, in the same way then in mechanical agriculture, you don't properly grow the earth with personal care like authentic farmer, you do it just in an industrial way, everything is done industrially, in the same way in the Holocaust corpses, bodies were just produced, produced. The victims didn't properly die in this again authentic sense. You know, again there are many people who defend here Heidegger claiming that that's precisely the horrible point that he is trying to describe. That in Holocaust you were not even allowed to properly die. You were simply reduced to an object to be technologically annihilated. I unfortunately oppose this version. You know why? Because yes, it was like this, but not for the Jews who were killed. It was like this for the perpetrators, for Germans. Who knows how Jews experienced it, one cannot even imagine what horror this was for them. I mean this is why I always like maybe it was this extreme movies like I always emphasize this, I told you here a couple of times, you know how no wonder that all good movies about Holocaust are comedies. Because not because it was a joke, but when things are really horrible you cannot do a tragedy. The basis of a tragedy is you have a dignified author who heroically make a faithful makes a faithful decision and then this decision is his downfall, you know? But in the universe of concentration camps, and here now don't kill me if I say this, but I mean it in a very, it's my nature that I provoke people all the time, there is a point where I agree with who is the great one obscenity, David Irving, no? No no no, he's nightmare, don't, don't understand me. But I spoke with people who were in Auschwitz and there is one element that he David Irving notes correctly. Auschwitz was selected as the symbolic site, you know? But then, and I asked my Polish friends they told me it's true, what you have there is one gas oven and my friends confirmed me, go to the edge of that building and you will find a metal plate saying constructed by the Polish government in So it was built as a symbolic place. Frankly no wonder that now the people are horrified because it became, you know when you visit Poland it's very practically located Auschwitz, it's near near Krakow, the big old town which Stalin ordered Soviet army not to destroy because it's historically important and so on. So you make a detour there, selfies are made, you already have a store for memorials like like here around the corner all those London tourist souvenir shops, you have it there. And I agree only here with David Irving that a much worse horror are the three others, no? Sobibor, Treblinka, and I think Bergen-Belsen or what. These were the true horrors. And here all honor goes to Russians and Jews, in those absolutely terrible conditions they did it. They did in forty-three forty-four a successful uprising. They noticed how the guards work and during the night blah blah, they slaughtered silently most of the guards, sixty seventy of them prisoners escaped and the Germans caught only I think about half of them. The other half escaped. It was for me in those desperate conditions because again Sobibor was not like Dachau. Dachau is a good place in near Munich. I would like to be in Dachau. Not quite, but you know why? Because remember Dachau was a working camp, not the annihilation camp. There you were used, but this Sobibor, Treblinka just factories of death. So let's go on. What does Hei- what how does Heidegger interpret the Holocaust? Again the idea is this one: in Jews are on the one hand supreme technological manipulators, producing industrially fruits, corpses, machine, whatever, but at the same time they are concrete living being and what is more logical then to bring this duality to an extreme and made the Jews apply this nihilistic stance to themselves. Heidegger sees in this some kind of a sorry for the term poetic justice. The logic introduced and sustained and embodied by the Jews, the logic of reducing everything to object of technological destruction, manipulation and so on, was applied to them. Quote, this is for me one of the most horrible Heidegger's, quote: "Only when what is essentially Jewish in the metaphysical sense, this technological stance, battles against the Jewish is turned against the Jews themselves is the pinnacle of self-annihilation in history attained, assuming that what is Jewish has everywhere ceased dominion entirely for itself, so that even the battle of the Jewish and this above all becomes subjection to it." So you know like Holocaust is the radi- because Jews, the idea is pretty tasteless and vulgar even with my bad taste, the idea is since Jews don't have a proper spiritual horizon, experiencing life as impenetrable meaningful horizon of meaning, they cannot say that technology endangers their own meaningful being. The only way they can treat themselves ultimately is the same way they treat others. So you see of course Heidegger is aware that the Germans effectively did it, but it's in a terrifying sense a wonderful reformulation, a false step from concrete to abstract, where Germans in their particularity, all this question but why were Germans obsessed by this, disappears, all we have is the pathologies of German historical development. All this disappears and Germans become just an anonymous perpetrator of the self-annihilation of the Jews themselves. So to go this to bring this to the end, Heidegger implies that the Nazis when they organized the Holocaust, they were just, they were really the victim of *Judentum*, of the Jewishness. Because they took upon themselves, they stand for they stood for metaphysical Jewish principle of production of corpses in the same way as you produce objects in industry against the concrete historical being. So Nazis were in the Holocaust seduced by Jews. They embodied Jewishnessness in the metaphysical sense. I'm tempted to say, and it's not a bad joke, I'm tempted to say that in some sense Heidegger is right here, but he should just have turned it around. What if we say that, and this would be my immediate answer, that in reality first, it's obvious what I will say now, I always fight with my Jewish friends because I remain an atheist Christian, you know, that's my point. What do you mean by atheist Christian? I mean and it's incredible, I begin to like Christianity because I notice that you know a couple of Baptist colleges in Southern United States are again inviting me. Then I told them "But listen, are you crazy, I'm an atheist." They say "No, no, we find it very interesting." And one of my proudest publications is, do you know if some of you are from Italy what is *L'Osservatore Romano*? The official journal of Vatican. Haha, I published two texts there. I don't know what is happening today. But what I want to say is that my reading of Christianity to simplify it to the utmost is God dies. To quote Hegel, what dies on the cross is not representative of God. It's not God is up there, we are here, and God sent Jesus and then "Okay guys, you screwed it up this time, it didn't work. Wait for hundreds of years, maybe I will send another one." No, as Hegel put it, what dies on the cross is the God of beyond itself. That's Hegel's reading. Because what comes under crucifixion is not God, it's the Holy Ghost. And Holy Ghost is simply the spirit of a new egalitarian community where, as Badiou developed this in his book on Saint Paul, where there are no men and women, there are no Jews and Greeks, like egalitarian community. So what I want to say is that it's a I want just to state this obviously, that the wealth of the Jewish tradition, which is a very deep tra- all of these religions, Jews, Muslims, all the different Muslim mysticisms and so on. Even those who are considered in Islam the darkest, I always loved them. You know the story of Alamut, those perfect assassins? They existed, but they are my heroes. Wait a minute. They are supposed to be perfect murderers. No, they were murderers of the highest standard. What they were basically doing is they were as a rule hired by lower class exploited people to kill a bad tyrant. And this idea that, you know that I read somewhere that our word assassin comes from hashish. The idea is that they were so de- so how could they be so perfect, not afraid of death? Oh they must have been drugged by hashish. Never in original Alamut texts surviving do you find this. This is clearly a Western invention. We, the West crusaders, couldn't see how such dedication is possible because they had extreme standard. If by mistake, let's say you, sorry to be personal, well like, let's say I have to kill you, no? It happens, you know, it happens, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And let's say that by mistake I I kill you also, no? I would be liquidated by assassins. No, their rule is never, it's absolutely unex- like that's what we have let's learn from them today, to them this collateral damage was prohibited. No, doing- this is why sometimes they waited for days, for weeks, so that they were sure they kill only that per- but okay, so that I don't get lost. How could Heidegger totally ignore Jewish spirituality which for example my god rules shockingly deep? Do you know for example what that this idea that before creating the world, God had to create nothing as an open space for the world? That's incredible. And without this you cannot properly understand neither Christian nor Muslim mysticism and so on. Because the true problem of mystics was always not "God created the world", but what had to happen before. The conditions of possibility of the creation of the world. Or as my favorite, more and more, even maybe more than Hegel, German idealist Schelling said in his *Ages of the World*, at the beginning was the word, but what happened before the beginning? That's the metaphysical problem. But okay, let's not lose time. So that's the problem with Heidegger. He the lesson of Heidegger is what? That, and today we see it, in today's capitalism, global capitalism which precisely unites the two aspects that Heidegger thought they can be opposed. Brutal global technological exploitation justified in or experienced as part of being rooted in a particular tradition. This is what Erdoğan is trying to do, this is what Modi is trying to do in India. That's the difficult thing to grasp. How today any invocation of specific race, cultural horizon, is already part of the global technological exploitation. You cannot oppose the nihilism of self-destructive dimension of global capitalism by playing upon by mobilizing some particular roots which resist the capitalist uni- This is why how was he called Oscar the guy, our our Latin American friend? De-colonial... yeah, is he here? No, nice, then I can say something against him. No because I remember because I always mocked him, he was maybe he is no longer, one of those guys who thought if you look at Incas or some culture you find something that escaped the Western imperialist logic, the the site of resistance, no. And the last time I spoke with him he tried to convince me that "Okay," he said, "Incas like David Graeber idea that you know Incas and so on, they okay I concede it that doesn't work, but," he said, "but you know, somewhere deep in Amazon there is a tribe which has the answer. We should look to him." I mean, I find this totally unacceptable, this idea that you will find some unspoiled origin untouched with our civilization, no. I again, Nazis were already doing it. It will shock you, do you know, if you are educated then you must have seen that disgusting movie, *Seven Years in Tibet*. What is not enough emphasized in the movie is that the character, the German who was played by Brad Pitt, was sent there by the Nazis. The Nazi idea was that the moment you go down to swamplands, to flat, it's already it's already Semitic. Even if it's not Jews, it's already corruption. Only in the pure air up there in Himalayas do you find purity. So it was non-ly that one. Do you know that the Nazis sent seven expeditions to Tibet doing all their racial measures and so on, studying it, because they thought that literally Germans are bringing bringing back something that can only be understood as a repetition of or returning to this mystery of Tibet. Well they didn't go far enough because friends convinced me that Tibet itself is rooted in Mongols, Mongolia. You know that the term Dalai Lama is Mongolian. But that's another story. Okay, let's go on. Now I didn't lose my line of thought. I want to point out that how would Heidegger have reacted to the fact that with establishment the establishment of the state of Israel, it is as if the Jews somehow admitted "Yes, maybe the Nazis were right, we also need concrete land, concrete roots." You know? Or as a French right-wing philosopher Alain Finkielkraut wrote in in a letter to *Le Monde*, "The Jews, they have today chosen the path of rooting." So it is as if the Jews have read Heidegger and established "My God, that guy was right, we also need a concrete historical experience, we no longer have to be just self-annihilating wandering Jews." But I think, and I don't blame Jews here, this is a very dangerous attempt. And a big argument for the greatness of the Jewish community, many of them are aware of it. Why? Let me explain this by you know the deep ambiguity or even three meanings of the traditional Jewish greeting saying, you know, "Next year in Jerusalem." Pronounced at the end of Seder, the religious meal served in Jewish home to commence the festival of Passover. Many Jews who believe strongly in the importance of a Jewish state see "Next year in Jerusalem" as an expression of the need to protect Jerusalem and Israel as it exists today. Others think that the Jerusalem mentioned in "Next year in Jerusalem" is more an ideal of what Jerusalem could be. For them "Next year in Jerusalem" is a prayer that Israel will move closer to this ideal. It's a symbol of utopia and it's more a metaphysical hope of bringing peace to earth than a concrete empirical idea of "Okay, why just dream about next year in Jerusalem, we have it now." Then there is the third version which I think is the worst, the most dangerous. A kind of synthesis of the first two. The logic is "Now that we have Jerusalem, next year it will be rebuilt with Palestinian buildings destroyed and a new big temple constructed again on the site of Al-Aqsa mosque" and so on. Like, we have Jerusalem, but it's not the real Jerusalem yet. So we have to ethnically cleanse it and so on to make it really ours. What I want to go back to Heidegger, this duality of empirical existence entities in the world and the transcendental horizon, we have here again this opposition. For the proponents of "Next year in Jerusalem" means "let's try to get Jerusalem back," it simply means "let's get the city about which we were dreaming for thousands of years." The problem of course as every hermeneutician will tell you is that those dreams were penetrated by a certain utopian dimension of an ideal spiritual place, blah blah blah. But you know when you get the real place, what happens with that utopian dimension? So on the other hand, the let's called transcendentalists, and there is there they are a minority but a strong minority, I respect them very much although they sometimes go too far. Those who cling to this metaphysical utopian idea of Jerusalem. "Next year in Jerusalem" doesn't mean "let's occupy a city," it means "let's spiritually renew us to find home" and so on. You know what's the irony, and that's why I don't also idealize them, is that they are very popular among some Muslim fundamentalists because they and even in Israel there are a couple of them I found their podcasts who defend Palestinians now. Because they said "sorry, eternal Israel is not about occupying land, it's about our spiritual renewal." And no wonder that, now that is a perverted excess, but I remember Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, you remember him? He organized, it must be now already some fifteen years ago, maybe you know better, a big congress symposium in Tehran about how to get rid of Israel, Israel as a state. And you know that there was a dozen of very orthodox rabbis there. "He said yes, you are right, it's an obscenity to identify eternal Israel with that city there." And Ahmadinejad, it was an obscenity but I almost respected him. He I remember seeing it on TV, he embraced, greeted this rabbis, "you are my friends" and so on, it was an incredible obscenity. But for them again, to confuse the transcendental notion of Jerusalem with the empirical city is the ultimate blasphemy. And I think that this is a problem for what to do now that the Jews more or less have Jerusalem and now they want to have all of Judea. The danger of course is double here. A, that they will lose the proper utopian metaphysical dimension which was clearly at work in this eternal dream "Next year in Jerusalem", which was simply the dream of an emancipated egalitarian society and had nothing to do with any type of brutal nationalist assertion. The second danger even worse is that when you identify "Next year in Jerusalem" with "Ah now we have Jerusalem itself", you get very close to the logic that I hinted at before and to the logic, sorry I just I'm losing... namely the logic of what in the last time I was here I think I already developed and to get a notion of this please read Alenka Zupančič's book on Antigone, this idea of the founding crime. You know, Alenka wonderfully begins with, I am with her, with this eternal joke which is more than ever actual today. This joke about you know anthropologists, explorers come to a tribe and say "Are there still cannibals with you?" They answer "No, just yesterday we ate the last one," no? I think that the danger of "Now we have Jerusalem" if you take it too literally is that you regress, fall into this logic of the sacred crime that is needed to commit to establish a new to establish a new order. Now my god how time is running. You know what I propose you, who is where? You are there. Can I, because I nonetheless want to deliver to you in some sense what I have. Can I, do you have my KGB agent, do you have their emails? Yes. So I will send you a full new unpublished text on all this so that I promise you this evening. The only problem is that evening, not afternoon, because as I told you my god I have to go to Stanmore now at four to visit Hanif and so on. And I will do something very risky, I will keep to my obscenity. Because really to be sympathetic to friends in trouble, I learned it works, is to be obscene. Because when he got this total paralysis, I tried and it worked for a week or two at the beginning, I tried to amuse him by saying, you can imagine what, by evoking Stephen Hawking. You remember why? Stephen Hawking although he was also totally crippled discovered with pleasure that erection of penis is not controlled by this system. This is why it wasn't a fake, he was able, okay not to move but to get erection and probably to be vulgar the woman had to sit on him but and I and he was so glad "Oh my god, so even if I remain a cripple there will be chance" and so on, no? So I will have on the on the on the subway there to invent some other obscenity because you know when people are desperate, you know, the only way that works is to treat them like this. I remember I had a blind friend, student, not really friend, and I asked him "Are you really blind or do you just pretend to be blind so that women thinking that you don't see them would undress, change their" no? And he embraced me and said "Finally a guy who treats me normally." Not all those who are saying you know "Oh do you need help, should I cut your steak" and so on. So okay, so let's I there are many more you know I will I prefer to send you some stuff because okay I will give you just a kind of a very brief résumé. From all this stuff I wanted to say that today we should rethink our future without any reference to what Lacan calls the big Other. We should abandon this notion of future as something which is part of the evolutionary cycle where the history is moving and so on and so on. In this sense we have to move beyond the ethical, the ultimate ethical act involves what I call political suspension of the ethical. The real problem today is, and here I disagree with Habermasians, is not to elaborate a new universalist ethics which will ground our endeavors, but to really reinvent it without any metaphysical grounding in the sense of "oh it's in some larger sense part of our spiritual legacy." No, we have to reinvent it. And Alenka in her book Zupančič on Antigone point this out nicely, I already spoken plagiarizing here a year ago about this, of how this is what she changed my mind about Antigone, this is what Antigone does. Her true act is not applying the already existing eternal laws like this I'm evil here Judith Butler liberalism, you know. My reproach to her is that, and she admitted this once, that she is still just a radical liberal. Like, you know, nobody should be excluded, everybody should be included, even if you are a criminal you deserve blah blah. But yes, this is the best known passage from Antigone, you know, this eternal laws created neither by God nor by people, blah blah. But my god, read ten pages later, when she says, and everybody is embarrassed, all conservatives included Judith Butler. When she says it's only for my brother. If it were to be my father, who cares, he is dead. If it were to be my sons, I can marry again and get other children. Only my brother. So her rule is she she does introduce a new universality, but as a crazy act of exception. It is totally crazy what she does. That's where the title of Alenka's book *Let Them Rot* comes, when she says she doesn't care about thousands of people, let them rot, I only care about my brother. This is not simply particularity. No, in this way she introduces a new universality. So who is here to be criticized, criticized stupid to say, rejected? I think that even somebody who you would have thought is beyond this temptation of the big Other remains here for me too metaphysical, Jacques Derrida. I like early Derrida where it was just deconstruction not in this stupid sense but in the sense of showing the blah blah and then his ethico-political turn, democracy to come, some the idea that there is some although we will never arrive there, future utopian point where all accounts will be settled. For example, once I was dining with Avital Ronell, remember her scandal? Yeah, did I tell you? You know what's the solution and people don't talk about that. She won totally. You know why? Because the guy who accused her, her lawyers found what was a fake. She was the fourth case of that, she already did the same thing three times in Jerusalem. Trying to blackmail a professor through accusing him and all those accusations about her now no- okay, but what I want to say is that we were eating some chicken very stupidly and then she said, "But what about when there will be a Nuremberg trial of nature against what horrible thing we did to nature?" You see, although she knew this will never come, but she I think properly applied Derrida's notion of deconstruction as infinite justice. In the sense of deconstruction means in every existing ethical project, political project, you bring out its inconsistency, injustice and so on. And even if we never will get there, ultimately you have to have this infinite horizon of injustice where all our ethical debts will be settled and so on and so on. I think the really difficult thing is to abandon this. This is I think a benevolent fiction, it's not dangerous because you are always aware that this will become a utopian point, but it's for me too teleological. The other one whom I appreciate immensely and I think he falls into the same trap is my good Japanese friend. I have now two good Japanese friends. One is and you should invite him because he is not yet so famous you can get him, but he is now getting famous, very popular, you know Kohei Saito? The eco-Marxist? He is his book sold half a I envy him, half a half a million copies in Japan. His eco- okay this is Kohei Saito and then our old friend Kojin Karatani. He claims that today his big idea, there is some sense in it, is that we have to make a move from modes of production to modes of exchange. Because he claims that with capitalism something happens, exchange our exchange with nature is no longer exchange in the spiritual sense. You know he claims that in more authentic ancient society let's say you killed an animal, a bear, a buffalo whatever, but then in some ritual you were aware that you are indebted to it, you have somehow to repay your debt, even our violence towards animals was part of a some kind of spiritualized exchange with nature where you have to show respect. It's a spiritual exchange. And he claims that with modernity where we simply as what Heidegger attributed to Jews we simply just exploit nature, there is no authentic spiritual exchange. So his idea is that the price we are paying for this absence of exchange in the sense that nature is not our partner but simply an object to be exploited is ecological crisis. And that the solution, the only solution because today's ecological crisis is some kind of a revenge of nature for its rootless exploitation, that we should return to the logic of exchange with nature. Nature is not our partner, but simply an object to be exploited is ecological crisis. And that the solution, the only solution because today's ecological crisis is some kind of a revenge of nature for its rootless exploitation, that we should return to the logic of exchange with nature. Nature is not our partner, but simply an object to be exploited, is a kind of spiritualized other to whom we should be indebted and so on and so on. Well, I don't want to lose time. I just want to conclude maybe if you allow me then five minutes more with the idea that I don't believe in this. I claim that such logic of exchange obfuscates us to the how should I put it, total meaninglessness of nature. In nature things happen and we insofar as we are part of nature, we have to accept this. Now I read, because I'm secretly superstitious and always afraid, you know how they always discover some asteroid or whatever which maybe in two years it will hit Earth and so on and so on. Yes, it can happen. So what, it's meaningless. The trick to do here is to precisely avoid the logic of "Did we do something wrong, is nature taking revenge of us?" No, nature is not stupid in the sense of stupidity, but stupid in the sense of if the term nature has any meaning, it means utter, absolute indifference. Which is why I also as many intelligent ecologists do, totally reject this idea of which is so arrogant, two points of deep ecology. The first, the idea that also natural objects not only animals but rivers, mountains have certain rights. Yeah, but the problem is that they don't know it. We, you know precisely when we want to be open to nature, we elevate ourselves as the only universal beings. We can speak for the rights of all of them. No, they don't have rights, this doesn't mean we shouldn't take care of it, but let's be frank, why? And this can be so nicely shown by detailed analysis of I read some deep ecological texts. When they speak about how we should take care of nature because we are part of it and so on, I will be now very brutal. What this means is that we should take care of nature so that the natural environment will remain livable for us. We really don't care about nature, we care about us. You know? And it's clear, just read the texts. Temperatures rise for three degrees Celsius. Yeah, why do we care about it? Fuck nature, it's about it will be more difficult for us and so on. Nature it's difficult to accept this, this is the most important aspect of today maybe of Lacan's big Other. Nature is not the big Other. Nature is totally is totally indifferent. Or as I like to put it, not only society doesn't exist or whatever, nature also in this sense doesn't exist. Or as the young Lukács, apparently the most subjectivist one, beautifully said: "Nature is a social category." Which doesn't mean it doesn't exist out there, no, it means that in every historical epoch, what we understand as nature, as natural, changes. In medieval times nature was penetrated by ghosts, spirits and so on. In early modernity it was object of mechanical exploitation. Then with quantum physics now it is changing and so on and so on. Okay, you know what, maybe I should stop now so that at least you get [unintelligible] questions. Although, can I just tell you and you will get it, but it's already in philosophical song, I wanted to repeat something came to me as a philosophical reflection. You know the last sentence of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." *Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen*. I love this, you know why? First because it's an obvious nonsense. I mean, first you say, it's like it's like a woman telling you whom you want to seduce, "You are not able to fuck me that's why you shouldn't fuck me." I mean it's nonsense. If you say we cannot speak about it why then do you prohibit something which is already impossible? Oh no, here things get complicated. Of course Wittgenstein is aware that the entire metaphysics is in speaking about things about which you cannot say really meaningfully anything. The second problem here is that there is a nice, not explicated enough by Wittgenstein, ambiguity here. This "whereof one cannot speak" can be understood as a simple impossibility, like we cannot do it even if we try, or it can be understood as an ethical prohibition. Like, you know some dirty private things about me, sorry, I don't allow you to speak about it. Keep silent keep silent about it. But then what interested me very briefly I would go through it is that if I build if I try to build all the variations of this Wittgenstein's phrase. Like what if we turn it around? "Whereof one cannot be silent, thereof one must speak." It's a deeply meaningful political injunction. When horrible things happen, in Gaza and so on, you we simply shouldn't keep silent. We should talk about it. Then we have another version: "Whereof one cannot be silent, thereof one must be silent." It also works perfectly as a conformist vision. Which is ethics which is even if you know that something horrible is going on and ethically you cannot keep quiet about it you should keep quiet. Better for you. Then the other around, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one should speak." It's the best definition of poetry that I know. This here is I would you agree an old Adorno girl to this? Would you agree that I never agreed with Adorno, he is the only serious guy in critical theory, where he says poetry is not possible after Auschwitz. I'm tempted to say very something very primitive: No, prose is not possible. Exactly poetry is, because prose means you simply describe what goes on, documentary, there is something obscene in it. Only poetry with its ambiguity can do it. But then Heidegger- Wittgenstein goes a step further and says: "*Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, das zeigt sich*." "Whereof one cannot speak, that shows itself." And this category is crucial today, I claim. Not its reversal which would have been which would have been what whereof one cannot what doesn't show itself we must speak about it. This is simple vulgarity in the sense of there are hidden things, we don't see them, they don't show themselves, so let's investigate, speak about what we don't see. Much more important is this one, whereof one cannot speak, that shows itself. Wittgenstein is here and I will conclude in two three minutes if you are stupid enough to believe me, sorry. You know Wittgenstein is here too quickly appropriated by some cheap spiritual mysticism, that he means there are the ultimate mystical experience secrecy, we cannot speak, we can all only experience it in silence the way it shows itself. But look at what Wittgenstein is really saying. He gives a couple of wonderful examples, more actual today than at his time. He says honesty. Honesty is something that can only show itself. If you talk all the time "I am honest, I have dignity", you are self-refuting itself. You know, a dignified person doesn't proudly claim "I am dignified." He simply shows this by his her their its acts. It's something that must be displayed in how you act. Of course Wittgenstein would have immediately conceded, of course you can talk about it, but not in the first person. It's only from outside. You can describe what in our society counts as dignified behavior and criticize it also how dignity all often involves a brutal domination, but the point is that you cannot in the first person talk about your dignity. At this level it can also it can always be shown. And here to conclude really I will mention a guy whom I really like. I think I mentioned him yesterday already. Jon Elster, the Norwegian theorist of rational action who introduced the wonderful notion of things which are essentially by-products. Like numerous example precisely let's say dignity. You must in a spontaneous way act with dignity. The moment you try to act consciously with dignity it self-destroys, it destroys itself. And my point here is that and this would be I'm sorry she is not here my very friendly answer to Jacqueline Rose, who often when I made my tasteless jokes about feminism blah blah she said, and she did hit a point I admit it, that it that she draw upon this Lacanian opposition between enunciation and enunciated. At the level of enunciated I was just describing horror when I described some horrors about how women but at the level of my position of enunciation I secretly enjoyed it. Maybe, I don't care. My defense is that this precisely defines cancel culture, for example. I will use now the same opposition. At the level of enunciated I often agree with it. Yes, cancel culture detects exclusions, is for inclusion, diversity. But at the level of enunciation all it does is excluding. You are out, you are out because you said this and so on. In other words, precisely to refer to Wittgenstein, it talks about inclusion and diversity but what it shows, displays, is exclusion at its purest. With this now believe me or not I'm really finished off. Thank you. Thank you. So a few minutes. Seventeen minutes. Seventeen minutes. How lucky you are. Not a second more. Because I like this manipulation, you know. If you want more questions, you are really hurting my friend Hanif who is there alone. May I can I start? Let's go there first. Oh okay. Oh okay. Sorry. Thank you very much. My question is about something you started referring at the beginning, I'd like to know how you incorporate notions of error, failure, and misunderstanding in your construction of ideas and meaning, so on your daily craft. Thank you. Error, fa- failure and misunderstanding. I will not go now I don't have time into because they are very error is for me not so interesting because it's simple empirical category. I look there, my eyes are not good, and I don't know, I think I see four persons there are three persons or whatever. Failure and misunderstanding is where my heart starts to burn because as I develop in my book, but I'm not satisfied by its conclusion, *Hegel in a Wired Brain*, this is where I see a problem with artificial intelligence. Yes, we all know the mechanisms are now algorithms already so developed that artificial intelligence can as they say learn from mistakes. Gradually learn new lessons, incorporate, correct itself and so on and so on. But I think what it cannot do is precisely and maybe we return thereby to this distinction between saying/displaying. I wonder and I'm not bluffing here, I spoke with so-called specialists who almost agreed with me, they wanted just to be a little bit more optimistic. How that you know I always insist that what specifies human speech is not only that we learn through failures, but that sometimes to deliver something to put it in Wittgenstein's term to display it, to show it, is only so that you fail at the level of what you say. And I usually gave here, I mentioned this in this room already five times in the last decade, and it's a disgusting movie, but it's a good example. I'm ashamed to mention it, *Four Weddings and a Funeral*. Sorry. You remember Hugh Grant makes this love statement with all the mumbling, stumbling, blah blah blah. That's the only way to express, to display love. If he were to say it perfectly it would have been instantly suspicious. And I will give you a much more traumatic example. That's why I find it so obscene when women who report on a rape are then asked the usual police annoyance: "Ah now you said this, but five minutes before you said it differently. So how?" I would if anything for me such small inconsistencies display the true trauma. If, but I in principle believe these women of course, but if I were to be a male chauvinist who is suspicious, you know this dirty stuff like what if she secretly wanted it, no? I would be much more suspicious if a woman delivers a perfectly consistent narrative. Now my problem you see my distinction, it's not just you can learn from mistakes, but it's that there are domains, not some mystical domains but everyday life, when the true message to refer to Wittgenstein can be displayed only through failure and misunderstanding. Misunderstanding is even my favorite category. For example, in a remark when he tries to dismiss modern British democracy, Marx, it's not a point if we agree with him or not, but he says something wonderful. He says that the whole British parliamentary democracy is based on a misreading, wrong interpretation of some ancient medieval documents, you know. And his point is not "they were stupid," no, his point is more intelligent one that such misunderstanding was necessary. Sometimes the most productive thing to do is to misunderstand things. So at this level, I'm just asking you I don't know maybe you know more, I will have a much greater faith into ChatGPT and all that stuff if they can do this. If they can kind of not just correct failure, but stick to the failure as the only thing to deliver certain messages. Because I don't know if I already improvised this yesterday on this, yes I did I think, you know all that point that here I'm anti-Habermasian, I think language was made to lie. That the original function of language is not, it's not here Engels is too vulgar, Engels whom I admire you remember what I said yesterday he saw World War One, but where in his the origin of man from ape work blah blah. He still in a rather primitive way tries to generate the need for language from complex interaction. He even said at some point in the short text that when cooperation among people developed, they saw that it's too complex that they need language to coordinate their acts. I find this so naive that it's almost beautiful in its tautology. Engels is saying as if you know we collaborate in a primitive ape way, then some of us says "Oh my god, listen, this doesn't go without language, you will get the idea." As if already you are standing out of yourself and already had the idea. You know, again sorry I cannot go on indefinitely but... Okay, let's let's have another question. Oh my god. Fuck your hands there. Okay. Hi. Extreme right. Yes. Extreme left from my perspective, so. And I admit it, your perspective is the correct one. You know because in parliament left right it's not from podium, it's from down there. So I concede the point, yes. Eurocentrist in any case here, so. That's a really nasty thing. When we the people take power, good luck good luck for you, you know. Okay, let's go on, sorry I'm losing time, sorry please. At the start you spoke about people committing violence without shame, I think it was in relation to Israel-Palestine stuff. I think that- Sorry, can I interrupt you and then I will let you on. Sure, yeah. Sometimes I'm tempted by naive humanism. Are they really without shame? It's an empirical constatation. What if they invent all this we need to suppress about human blah blah blah, nonetheless secretly they are ashamed? And then there are different ways of dealing with this shame. You like the Stalinists contributing to to your secret bourgeois nature or whatever. But I'm more and more convinced that you know all this idea today people are totally shameless and so on and so on, I wonder if they really are. I'm very sorry, please go on. I was actually going to make the same point, shamelessness and pride are not the same thing, and I think one's the negation of shame and pride is something different. No, the more interesting, now I ask you a question but I think it's in our common interest. You know my good Austrian friend, not a Nazi. I'm saying this because as we all know Austrians were more Nazis than Germans you know this. And they did an ingenious thing in they proclaimed themselves the first victims of Nazism. Okay, sorry, Robert Pfaller in his book developed nicely the difference between shame and guilt. Claiming that guilt is internal while shame is external. That's the traditional notion, which usually also can be given a Eurocentrist racist spin. Like the Asiatic primitives only know about shame because they don't have true inner spiritual life, blah blah, but we Western people have guilt, guilt means you feel guilty in your own eyes, you are ashamed in front of others. So what do you do with this? For me the opposition is not so much pride versus shame as guilt versus shame. And I think that in his book I think it's not yet translated into English, on shame, he proves with excellent examples, I think there is a subchapter in my last book on freedom on this, so I will not bore you, how this simply doesn't work. In the sense of shame also works if you are alone. Shame is not in front of others, it's in front of the big Other which is here also when when you are alone. And so sorry, how would you react to this then? Where does guilt enter your question? Where I was going to go with the question was- I wasn't thinking about guilt when I asked, I was going to ask about how the transition to that position of shameless violence might emerge in a particular historical moment. And I've been thinking about some stuff you wrote in *The Universal Exception* a long time ago, your discourse theory about fascism and so on and the way it relates to the Lacanian Real, and I just wondered if you might elaborate on that link between the traumatic eruption of the social antagonism and the move to shameless violence. Well I must admit I this was long ago. What I would have said is nonetheless that to return to shame and Robert Pfaller, his convincing insight is that shame in general in its a priori structure is not you are ashamed when you have not enough of something. Shame is not shame is always a sign of too much. Something is visible all you know which is the original situation of shame for me? I will trigger warning vulgarity, original situation of shame. Let us say trigger warning vulgar that you run to a toilet and bluh, all the shit comes out noisily and so on, and then all of a sudden since you were in such a panic you see that there are three people there observing you. I mean, this is shame, it's too much in even if it's in the vulgar sense. Shame is this is why some leftists, you know and I claim they are small bourgeois wrong corrupted leftists, claim I don't know how it is here in Slovenia my country
Cathy Newman
it's
Slavoj Žižek
now fashionable
Cathy Newman
to say
Slavoj Žižek
you should be ashamed if you have too much money. Like in principle having more money than average must be some crime, is shameful. You know, my there is an
Cathy Newman
element
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of obvious truth in it, but my answer to this is nonetheless: are these people aware how strange this po- how far this position is towards the stance of ordinary poor
Slavoj Žižek
people? No, all they want is more money because they are really poor, you know. I claim this shame of having too much money is something that I don't like. It's a much more perverted stance either of envy towards those who have money, but envy also in in the sense that you would like to have money, or kind of a secret enjoyment in in in having too much money. Again, my point is that okay, to go the to the end to this Freudian vulgarity, it's a naive notion. If we are looking about zero level situation of shame, it's not what Freud describes, and it's much more complex but it can be put naively as the situation of experience of castration, a small boy sees a naked girl and "uh, but there is nothing there," you know, where penis should be. No, the original object of shame is penis itself. My god, there is something where there should have been more natural, which is why as I already improvised here, it's a very naive observation but I appeal to your dirtiest selves: can you imagine anything more vulgar than a man, naked man, walking around with erected penis? It's too much, it's extremely there is too much of it. It's shame. Not only shame in ah, that's another difference that I would like to add here, introduced by Pfaller. The mystery of shame and here you can see empirically why the big Other is always here, is that I can also be ashamed for another. For example when you witness somebody doing something vulgar. Isn't even in your language also I think usual to say "I feel ashamed for having to watch this" and so on. You know like while guilt doesn't work like this. If you were to kill my mother, apart from giving you money for gratitude if I had her, I I I I wouldn't share your guilt but shame, this is the mystery of shame again. How can I also and it often happens like this, I think it was even with these eternal debates now in American Congress when some vulgar populist right-winger is saying something vulgar, racist, sexist and so on, and the opposite leftist Democrat whatever says "I feel ashamed for you" or whatever. So it can be also that if you are a conservative and I am the good lib- that you say something shameful but I feel ashamed, you don't feel ashamed at all. Sorry, that's all I have more to say. Hey have we got time for one more or are you- Yeah, yeah, yeah, let's say one more, yeah. So desperate. The gentleman in the yellow hat. How a big question about the contemporary politics of China and the future politics of China. First of all, you know there is a there is a very famous scholar of Chinese studies, just call him W, yeah. He when he are practicing his political thought, yeah, the core thought of his political is use the three big rights to replace the three small rights. The three big rights is the survive and the development and the and the liberate. And the small and the small three rights is the you know is the liberalism, is the free association and give up the right to work and the you know and to to talk with the company to to against them. Yeah. And and so there are so many guys disagree with his political opinion, especially to against especially against his practice on the power in the rights of survive. Yeah. because when because his action is reform is reformism, you know, he developed the let me find a word... I'm sorry I don't know how can you repeat did you... No,
unknown
no, no,
Slavoj Žižek
no, no, sorry the name of the guy you are... Yeah, I didn't catch your name. Yeah I also... he is popular on the network but he is not the he is not the the the
unknown
the
Slavoj Žižek
scholar of the of the of the university, yeah. What's his name? His name is
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S-M-O-L-I-U. How?
Slavoj Žižek
*Si mo liu*. Yeah, he is a small, like opposite to big. Yeah he is a very famous very famous scholar of Chinese study in the network and let's talk about the the the right of survival to continually. Yeah, his action is public beneficial activities, you know, what what you said in in that book called the *The Iraq's Borrowed Kettle*, yeah, to these actions will will have the reproduction of the capitalism, yeah. And and so so but why the W has these opinions? Because he because he thinks the firstly is the cultural circumstance, yeah, you know, the people cannot give up the dimension of enjoyment, not only not only the enjoyment of the daily life for example the the Hegelian porn, but also the enjoyment of the basically illusion that the the illusion of revolution. They they are fantasy there is the Mao can come back again and lead us to the revolution, yeah, you know... Yeah, but I know I know but I oh my god I you know simply I got some fragments for what you said, but I would simply like to know more. Because I do know some thinkers in China today. My friend with whom I don't always agree Wang Hui, who is now more or less an official figure I learned you know, then then there is I forgot his name, the guy who preaches kind of a return to this ancient Chinese way of deliberate democracy, it's more Confucian he even doesn't refer to Marx and so on.
unknown
But okay, tell me something which may be inter- this guy, does he publish in books or is it just a digital presence on the web? Never, just his thesis of his. How is it then that he is not censored? Does the party tolerate him? The public power. This is always a question to ask in China. Yeah there is there is a few times he
Slavoj Žižek
encountered the the big power of the party, because you know because you know and why he give up the Leninism is is today to Leninism's revolution is impossible because we have the most most powerful tech system, yeah and and... You mean China digitally we are all controlled and so on, yes. But on the on the other oh sorry. Obviously I cannot answer because you know, I need what Heidegger would have called the hermeneutic background the to know. Okay let's how would you evaluate the action of W and what what can we do in this political... Yeah but I again I don't know I didn't get maybe the view enough the the picture of of this guy. What I like about China is that I know not only this guy, I know that there are not only I know, I mentioned it at the beginning of my freedom book I think, some ordinary worker who read Heidegger, translated him, and become a sensation, like these moments are these moments are wonderful. But I you know where I remain an old Eurocentric guy. Now it's very popular to say European liberal democracy is in crisis, which is true, so then they try to bring in some more collective spirit, deliberative, Oriental and so on and so on. I I I am tempted to be very skeptical about it. For example, and this is that's all I can say today now to conclude, you know I had debate with some Chinese people which said but our system is not as obscure as you think, nonetheless with all the control somehow those in power receive process what people care about, try to harmonize it and so on. But you know what is for me crucial and it's in my totalitarian spirit almost my favorite aspect. Look, you know when you have every four years or two the Congress of the Communist Party, the big event everybody waits for is I think at the end when seven members of the standing committee of the Politburo are nominated. Of course formally they are elected. But it's a magical moment because it's absolute there is no debate about which persons will be elected. It's the big decision everybody knows intense negotiations are going on in the background. This is the magical event. You learn these guys won. But how did these guys win? And wait a minute, be careful, I am not saying oh this means China is totalitarian. I like this. I think that every government should be to be efficient at some level non-transparent. I don't be but what we in the West
unknown
know
Slavoj Žižek
and it's not specific to the
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West. I think Karatani whom I mentioned once said something totally crazy. He said that the difference between bourgeois and socialist democracy is that in bourgeois democracy you are elected for your qualities, better qualified in principle, let's forget, but that in people's proletarian democracy you are elected by lot, by lottery. And I more and more think that this non-transparency should be integrated not as some secret power but as an element of chance, lottery. All many powers knew this, like you know how it was in ancient Greece. Okay it was limited to men free men in power, but it was lottery. It was the same in Venice, Venezia, Venetian
Slavoj Žižek
Republic. How the doge, the boss, was dominated.
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It was an absolutely
Slavoj Žižek
crazy system of first you had
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one hundred candidates, then some committee took looking at their qualities, selected half, then by lot they were reduced to ten, where again some committee went through them reduced them to five, where again lots were thrown, lottery who wins and so on. I think there is no democracy without this element of chance unpredictability, if you want and this is my Hegelian argument but in a people's democracy it can be taken over by lottery. That's why I liked Hegel's crazy justification of monarchy. If you read it
Slavoj Žižek
closely, Hegel's point is monarch is an idiot. His function is to screw his wife and produce her a successor, and it doesn't matter, all a good monarch has to know is how to behave properly and so on. And as Hegel said, his only function is to sign the decrees which are prepared by others, experts. What Hegel saw clearly is and today in our technocratic times where experts rule, is
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more
Slavoj Žižek
important by ever is: don't trust the experts to be on the top. We need experts for
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ecology blah blah
Slavoj Žižek
more than ever, but there must be an element of
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chance where at the top,
Slavoj Žižek
and without this democracy has no meaning, not only we all vote but on the very top of power there should be somebody who is not qualified by some special capacities but who is in principle like us. That's also for me the basic principle of justice as Hegel developed. Yes you have the biggest invention for me of good legal system is how do you call it my god, the five idiots... Jury? Yeah, jury is precisely this principle of non-elitism. Yes we need lawyers blah blah to explain, but at the end five idiots, idiots in the sense like all of us, collected by lot will decide. That's that's for me without this democracy is not really a democracy. Sorry, now I will have to run. You will get the text this evening, thank you. If you want something, I will not forget in the evening to thank you, I am very sorry that I have to... [clapping]