Voyeurism and Digital Identity
Talk · zizekpodcast.com ·
2015-05-18 · 1:31:13 · 13,009 words
with Paul Holdengräber
psychoanalysiscinema-art-cultureideologysexuality-gendersubjectivityreligion-theologyeveryday-lifephilosophy-general
In conversation with Paul Holdengräber, Žižek analyzes scenes from David Lynch's Blue Velvet and Wild at Heart alongside Casablanca to develop arguments about fantasy, desire, gaze, and ideology. He argues that sex is structurally always supported by fantasy, that 'spontaneous' outbursts are learned/staged performances, and that ideology functions through a public text and its obscene underside working together. The talk also covers pseudo-activity, the role of masks and digital identity, the critique of wisdom, the progressive function of ethnic jokes, and the disappearance of passionate love in a culture of safe, administered enjoyment.
every located moment in this recording, click one to read it
The ideas in it 22
in the order they first come up; click a row for what he does with the idea here
The privileged point of view around which a scene is organized, in Blue Velvet, ambiguously both Kyle MacLachlan's voyeuristic look and Dennis Hopper's performed display for an imagined observer.
Lacan's formula that the sexual relation does not exist, meaning sex never works without fantasy support, it is structurally incomplete.
as “fantasy as constitutive support of sexuality”
Sex always requires a fantasmatic supplement, one never 'just does it' with a real partner; the fantasy frame is what makes sex possible and meaningful.
Being touched at a distance, fascination requires that proximity to the object be blocked; closing the gap converts fascination into mere disgust.
as “the mysterious X of antisemitism”
In antisemitism the Jew is not hated for any listed property but for an ineffable X that supposedly underlies all those properties, this empty kernel is the mechanism ideology requires.
A psychic structure in which the subject fixates on a preliminary step (a partial object or ritual) and forgets the aim it was supposed to serve, exemplified by the Bobby Peru scene in Wild at Heart.
Dennis Hopper's Frank Booth is not a figure of raw potency but an impotent father who performs brutal excess to conceal his impotence from an imagined gaze.
The symbolic authority whose imagined gaze Dennis Hopper's character performs for, he acts out his potency in order to convince an internalized Other that he is a macho.
as “superego enjoyment”
The excessive, compulsive quality of Dennis Hopper's violence in Blue Velvet, it is funny because it manifests the superego command to enjoy, not spontaneous desire.
as “staged spontaneity”
Explosive outbursts of swearing or violence follow a learned formula and are performed for an imagined gaze rather than being genuine unmediated releases.
All excessive pleasures, alcohol, smoking, sex, are first experienced as disgusting and then culturally learned; there is nothing natural or spontaneous about them.
Kierkegaard's goal of arriving at a second immediacy after passing through reflective mediation, Hegel's monarch serves as such an immediate anchor point within a structure of pure mediation.
as “le point de capiton”
The quilting point, an element of immediacy (such as a hereditary monarch) that anchors and makes possible an entire structure of mediation.
Ideology is not only the sanitized official message but equally its obscene supplement, the Casablanca censorship scene works precisely because both the innocent reading and the dirty implication coexist.
as “the mask as truer than the face”
A digital or theatrical persona one adopts can reveal more truth about the person than their 'real' inner self, which is constructed as a protective fiction.
as “alienation as positive”
External identification and alienation are not obstacles to truth but its condition, the truth is 'out there' in one's mask, not buried in an inner self full of misery.
as “fantasy as a constitutive lie”
Our inner psychic truth is the lie we construct to make our actual lives bearable; fantasy is not escape but the very substance of subjectivity.
Hyperactivity whose real function is to prevent genuine change, ecological recycling, charity, and obsessive talking in analysis are examples of doing things precisely so that nothing has to really change.
A psychic structure in which the subject is hyperactive not to achieve anything but to prevent something from happening, Žižek identifies his own ceaseless talking as a form of this.
as “sex as masturbation with a real partner”
Lacan's insight that real sex has the structure of masturbation, the partner functions as a prop for one's own fantasy rather than as a genuine Other encountered directly.
Dating agencies advertising 'love without the fall' epitomize contemporary culture's horror of traumatic passionate attachment, risk-free love evacuated of its constitutive excess.
as “safe sex / controlled enjoyment”
Contemporary culture commands enjoyment but only in a administered, non-excessive form, the injunction to enjoy is matched by the prohibition on falling too deeply.
Stories he reaches for 10
Job's three comforters each offer ideological meaning for his suffering; Job refuses all of them. God ultimately vindicates Job's complaints, and Chesterton reads God's response as a confession that all creation is a mess.
“Everything that those three idiots, priests, said is wrong. Everything that Job says, all the complaints are, he was right. That's the first wonderful rehabilitation of critique of ideology.”
French and American dating agencies advertise 'love without the fall', Alain Badiou's find, epitomizing the contemporary foreclosure of traumatic passionate attachment in favor of safe administered encounters.
“'use our agency and we will enable you to be in love without the fall.' And that's the horror today.”
During his brief spell in psychoanalysis Žižek talked continuously to prevent the analyst from asking a really uncomfortable question, identifying his own ceaseless speech as obsessional pseudo-activity.
“I was afraid that if I stop talking, the analyst may ask me a really unpleasant question... So I talked all the time just to keep him quiet.”
A patient taking a woman to a hotel restaurant for dinner before sex says to the waiter 'A bed for two, please.' Lacan's reading: not wish-fulfillment but an anxiety-reminder not to enjoy the food too much and forget the official goal.
“He was afraid that he will enjoy eating more than sex, so that 'A bed for two' was rather a reminder, 'Wait a minute, I should not forget what's my real aim.'”
In old Yugoslavia each nation had a stereotyped trait (Slovenes: misers; Bosnians: sexually obsessed; Montenegrins: lazy) and the cultural game was competitive self-mockery, whose joke about their own nation is the nastiest? These jokes disappeared when real ethnic tension rose in the 1980s.
“The whole point was to tell a joke mocking yourself and the competition was who will tell a nastiest joke about yourself.”
The attacking shark in Spielberg's Jaws crystallizes all diffuse American fears (immigrants, nature, big banks, the poor) into one empty symbol, the wrong move is to decode its 'real' meaning (right-wing: immigrants; Fidel Castro: capitalism).
“magically we replace all these fears for one empty symbol: the shark. My point being — it's exactly the same with basically with antisemitism.”
Two Talmudic rabbis debate a theological point; one calls on God to adjudicate. Before God can speak, the second rabbi shouts at him to leave, 'You created the world, you screwed it up, now leave it to us scholars.' God agrees and runs away.
“Basically, I translate it freely, 'Fuck off, old guy. You created the world, you screwed it up, you did your work, leave it now to us wise scholars to debate it.'”
Socialism is a synthesis of all humanity's greatest achievements: from prehistory it took primitivism, from antiquity slavery, from medievalism domination, from capitalism exploitation, and from socialism it took the name.
“Socialism is a synthesis of all the greatest achievements of human history. From prehistory it took primitivism... and from socialism it took the name.”
At the end of Kubrick's film, after all the erotic dreams, Kidman/Cruise resolve to 'go home and fuck quickly', Žižek reads this not as authenticity recovered but as flight into practical sex to avoid confronting the traumatic kernel of their fantasy life.
“'Listen, we have to do something, we have to go home and fuck quickly.' I think this is an escape from the real.”
Joshua Oppenheimer's documentary shows Indonesian right-wing killers could only carry out their murders by identifying with Hollywood noir personas, violence is not natural but requires a learned performative script.
“for them, the Indonesian right-wing murderers, to do it, they had to act. They had to identify with Hollywood with Humphrey Bogart, all the noir and so on.”
Works invoked 17
The Da Vinci Code film
Cited alongside Quantum of Solace as evidence of Hollywood deleting sex, no sex between Langdon and Sophie, confirming the contemporary hegemony of safe, risk-free enjoyment.
Casablanca film
The airport-tower cut analyzed as a model of ideology functioning through public text plus obscene underside, simultaneously offering plausible innocence and unmistakable sexual signaling.
Quantum of Solace film
Described as 'otherwise a good James Bond, politically progressive' (saves Bolivia from right-wing coup) but the first Bond without final sex between Bond and Bond girl.
Žižek's own September 11 book cited as an example of being simultaneously attacked as antisemitic (Jerusalem Post) and Zionist (Al-Ahram), which he takes as confirmation he is doing something right.
Jaws film
Used as the key example of an empty ideological signifier that crystallizes diffuse fears, Fidel Castro's 'shark = capitalism' reading dismissed as the wrong approach.
Annie Hall film
The Marshall McLuhan cameo scene briefly referenced as analogous to the Talmudic story of calling in an authority to settle a debate.
Blue Velvet film
Central text of the talk; analyzed for the gaze, fantasy, the impotent father, staged excess, and Michel Chion's child-hallucination reading. Described as still fascinating and funny after thirty years.
The Castle book
Kafka's novel cited as the masterwork of fascination-requires-distance: the castle looks sublime from afar but ugly up close, illustrating the constitutive role of blocked proximity.
The Name of the Rose book
Umberto Eco's novel cited as promoting the idea that laughter is liberating, a position Žižek and friends were 'absolutely opposed to' because totalitarian power also laughs.
The Act of Killing film
Oppenheimer's documentary cited with 'deep respect' to show that violence requires learned performative scripts, the killers had to play Hollywood gangsters to be able to commit murder.
Dune film
Lynch's adaptation; described as something 'some people claim is his worst movie, but I like it'; Baron Harkonnen cited as comically excessive in the same vein as Frank Booth.
Jonathan Littell's novel praised for making the point that the inner subjective life of Nazi perpetrators is a fantasy that distracts from the truth of what they actually did.
Lost Highway film
Robert Loggia's gangster character cited as another Lynch example of excessive superego authority becoming funny, the road-rage tirade about traffic rules as comical excess.
Wild at Heart film
The Bobby Peru scene analyzed for humiliation, perverse non-consummation, and staged excess; Bobby Peru's walking away after coercing consent described as 'even worse than real rape.'
Eyes Wide Shut film
Kubrick's film used to illustrate pseudo-activity: the ending's 'let's go home and fuck quickly' is a flight from the traumatic real of their fantasy life, not its resolution.
Mansfield Park book
Jane Austen's novel invoked (with some uncertainty about which Austen novel) for the drawing-room theatrics topos where masked roles allow characters to express genuine love they cannot voice in real life.
The Piano Teacher film
Michael Haneke's film cited as an example of sex without fantasy support, Isabelle Huppert 'like a dead piece of wood', demonstrating what sex becomes when stripped of its fantasmatic frame.
People invoked 25
Udi Aloni positive
Described as a Jewish friend who told Žižek Talmudic stories and the closing 'tired Jew' joke, cited as an example of the best of Jewish culture.
Adam Kirsch negative
The New Republic critic whose 'Deadly Jester' piece argued that Žižek's buffoonery masks a dangerous totalitarian message, Žižek dismisses this as a new mode of neutralization.
Michel Chion positive
French cinema theorist and specialist of voice; described as 'my friend'; his reading of the Blue Velvet scene as a child's hallucination of parental sex is cited approvingly.
Umberto Eco negative
Name of the Rose cited as promoting the idea that 'laughter is liberating', a position Žižek rejects; totalitarian power also laughs.
Israeli writer Žižek finds 'too cheaply humanitarian' and dislikes personally, but whose anecdote about taking swimming lessons after the 1967 threat is cited approvingly for its literalist humor.
Jacques Lacan positive
Central theoretical reference throughout: il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel, sex as masturbation with a real partner, fantasy as constitutive lie, le point de capiton, the big Other.
Used as an example of a politician who pre-empts satire by becoming his own satirist, thereby immunizing himself from critique while pursuing a neoliberal agenda.
G. K. Chesterton positive
Described as 'my favorite Catholic theologian'; his reading of God's speech to Job as a divine confession of cosmic failure is cited enthusiastically.
Stanley Kubrick positive
Not described as a great admirer, but Eyes Wide Shut is used to illustrate how 'let's go home and fuck quickly' is an escape from the real of passion.
David Lynch positive
Central figure of the talk; Blue Velvet and Wild at Heart analyzed at length. Lynch's understanding of the comical dimension of extreme figures and his hatred of Jungian hermeneutic depth are endorsed.
Robert Pfaller positive
'My Austrian friend'; his notion that excessive pleasures are first disgusting and then learned is cited to support the argument that 'spontaneous' outbursts are always staged.
Woody Allen positive
Praised for anti-wisdom humor; 'I want to be immortal so that I just don't die' and the masturbation line cited approvingly. Described as 'a good reader of Kafka' though 'sometimes too bright for his own good.'
Praised with 'deep respect'; The Act of Killing demonstrates that extreme violence requires learned performative scripts (Hollywood noir identification), supporting the staged-spontaneity thesis.
Alain Badiou positive
Described as 'my good friend'; drew Žižek's attention to the dating agency slogan 'love without the fall' as evidence of contemporary foreclosure of passionate attachment.
Jonathan Littell positive
Author of Les Bienveillantes; cited as making the point that inner subjective depth of perpetrators (Nazis) is a distraction from the truth, which lies in their acts.
Peter Sloterdijk positive
Described as a right-winger with whom Žižek has good personal relations; agrees with his formula 'more communication means at first, above all, more conflict.'
Richard Gere negative
Used as an example of pseudo-Buddhist hedonism, 'no wonder Richard Gere is a Tibetan Buddhist', embodying the contemporary ideology of non-attachment applied to pleasures.
Darian Leader positive
British Lacanian psychoanalyst and friend; his patient's Freudian slip ('a bed for two') is cited to illustrate the perverse structure of contemporary sexual desire.
Her saying via Karen Blixen, 'storytelling reveals meaning without committing the error of defining it', is cited but partially criticized for not going far enough: every meaning has an undefined dimension.
Søren Kierkegaard positive
Repeatedly invoked as the anti-wisdom thinker par excellence; the Christian wager, immediacy after reflection, and Kierkegaard's deliberate self-staging as a public persona are all cited approvingly.
Jonathan Coe positive
English novelist whose London Review of Books essay on political satire and Boris Johnson is read at length and endorsed: laughter is a substitute for rather than conduit of thought.
Josef von Sternberg positive
The Sternberg-Breen dialogue about whether a hay-stack scene depicts sex is used to illustrate how Hollywood censorship and its obscene underside were mutually constitutive.
Martin Luther King Jr. positive
Briefly cited in context of Žižek's critique of 'tolerance', King never used the word 'tolerant,' which supports Žižek's view that the all-pervasiveness of 'tolerance' is ideological.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel positive
Žižek identifies as Hegelian; Hegel's theory of monarchy as the immediate quilting point in a system of mediation is used to explain the need for le point de capiton.
Friedrich Nietzsche positive
The mask-as-truth idea is described as 'a very Nietzschean move'; Žižek notes he has 'problems with Nietzsche' but agrees on this point.
What it argues
Fantasy as constitutive support of sexualityThe staged and learned nature of 'spontaneous' excessIdeology as public text plus obscene undersidePseudo-activity versus genuine subversionThe mask as truer than the inner selfCritique of wisdom, tolerance, and safe enjoymentThe gaze, fascination, and the logic of distance
Dialectical moves 10
“It's not that internet gives us a medium of pseudo-activity while real life is genuine — real activity itself can be the escape, the pseudo-activity.”
The flight from the real is not into fantasy but into frantic real-world doing: 'real' activity is often deployed precisely to prevent confrontation with the traumatic kernel.
“Sex is not masturbation with an imagined partner, as we usually say — real sex is masturbation with a real partner.”
Inverts the standard description to show that even 'real' sex is structured by the fantasy frame; the partner functions as a prop for one's own inner scenario.
“The true mask is my authentic real self; the truth comes out precisely in the guise of a fiction.”
The digital or theatrical persona one adopts can be truer than the supposedly authentic inner self, which is itself a defensive construction.
“He is not the brutal virile father — he is an impotent father who boasts all the time to cover up his impotence.”
Frank Booth's extreme violence in Blue Velvet is a performance staged to conceal castration, not an expression of power.
“It's not that she got what she wanted — if anything, getting your fantasy in reality is the most terrifying thing that can happen.”
Realizing one's fantasy in the real is catastrophic rather than gratifying, making the rape of a woman who fantasized about rough sex more devastating, not less.
“Far from escaping into fantasy in order to avoid real activity, you construct your real activity itself as an escape.”
The structure of ideology is not that fantasy substitutes for action but that ostensibly real action (charity, recycling) functions as a fantasy substitute that forecloses genuine change.
“Wisdom is the most conformist thing you can imagine — whatever you do, a wise man will come and justify it.”
Wisdom is not a higher truth but a flexible legitimating machine that retroactively sanctions any outcome, functioning as ideology.
“God's arrogant answer to Job is really a confession: 'You think your life was a catastrophe? Look at all of creation — I screwed up everything.'”
Chesterton's reading inverts divine arrogance into divine admission of failure, God's speech to Job is not superiority but commiseration.
“The ideal viewer of the Casablanca scene is not the pure innocent one but precisely the one who plays on both levels simultaneously.”
Ideology works not by splitting audiences into naive and knowing viewers but by offering everyone the double satisfaction of innocence and prurience at once.
“The subversive thing is sometimes to do nothing — by doing nothing you reveal what all the hyperactivity is covering.”
Genuine subversion can lie in radical inaction rather than protest, because pseudo-activity is the norm that conceals the underlying impasse.
Claims 20
asserts
Sex always requires a fantasmatic supplement and never works as just a direct encounter between two people.sexuality and fantasy
asserts
We never reach sexual maturity in the sense of finally dispensing with fantasy — humans always need a fantasy to sustain sexuality.fantasy and psychic structure
asserts
Wisdom is the most conformist thing imaginable — it is a flexible legitimating ideology that can justify any outcome retrospectively.wisdom as ideology
asserts
The book of Job is the first great text of the critique of ideology, because Job refuses to accept that his suffering has a deeper meaning.ideology critique and religion
asserts
The figure of the Jew in antisemitism is structurally inconsistent — contradictory traits (lazy and overworking, dirty and intellectual) are unified only by an empty X, just as the shark in Jaws crystallizes all diffuse American anxieties.antisemitism and ideological mechanism
asserts
Ideology is not just the public sanitized text but the public text together with its obscene underside, and the underside is even more powerful when left unspoken.ideology and censorship
asserts
Dennis Hopper's Frank Booth in Blue Velvet is not a figure of genuine potency but an impotent father performing for an imagined gaze.psychoanalytic reading of Blue Velvet
asserts
Explosive or violent 'spontaneous' outbursts are always staged and learned, never genuine unmediated releases — there is nothing natural about them.spontaneity, performance, and learned behavior
asserts
A digital or theatrical persona can be truer than one's 'real' inner self, which is itself a protective fantasy construction.identity, masks, and digital selfhood
asserts
Personalized ecology (recycling, separating cans) is a paradigmatic pseudo-activity — it lets people feel they have done their duty while ensuring nothing structural changes.ecology and pseudo-activity
asserts
Real activity can itself be the escape from confronting the traumatic real — in Eyes Wide Shut, going home to 'fuck quickly' is the flight from passion, not its fulfillment.pseudo-activity and the real
asserts
Real sex has the structure of masturbation — one uses the real partner as an instrument to enact one's own fantasy rather than genuinely encountering the Other.sexuality and the Lacanian subject
asserts
Contemporary culture's disappearance of passionate love (Bond with no sex, dating agencies offering love without the fall) reflects the hegemony of safe, controlled enjoyment.love, passion, and neoliberal culture
asserts
Political laughter and satire can function as a substitute for genuine critical thought rather than as a vehicle for it — Boris Johnson weaponizes this dynamic.political comedy and ideology
asserts
True multiculturalism is not empathetic understanding of the Other but the ability to coexist without understanding — cultures are inconsistent and do not understand themselves.multiculturalism and tolerance
asserts
Ethnic self-deprecating jokes in Yugoslavia functioned as a form of friendly multicultural competition, not racism, and their disappearance in the early 1980s tracked the rise of genuine ethnic tension.ethnic jokes and their social function
asserts
If a woman who secretly fantasized about rough sex is raped, her situation is worse, not better, than an autonomous woman who is raped — getting your fantasy in reality is the most terrifying thing that can happen.fantasy, rape, and the real
asserts
The inner truth of Nazi executioners is not their private feelings and memories but what they actually did in the camps — inner story is a fantasy that lets them avoid confronting the horror.subjectivity, inner truth, and evil
reframes
Rejects the idea that cinema's Blue Velvet scene should be understood as a simple voyeuristic fantasy from Kyle MacLachlan's point of view; the scene is more plausibly organized around Dennis Hopper's performance for an imagined gaze.voyeurism and gaze in Blue Velvet
reframes
Searching for the symbolic meaning of the shark in Jaws is the wrong question — the shark functions as an empty symbol that condenses all existing fears rather than representing any one of them.interpretation, ideology, and cinema
Quotes 18
“Wisdom is the most conformist thing you can imagine. Whatever you do, a wise man will come and justify it.”Slavoj Žižek · wisdom as ideology
“Whatever Jesus Christ was, he wasn't a wise guy. He was a provocative madman.”Slavoj Žižek · anti-wisdom, Christ as radical
“Ideology is not just the public text. Ideology is the public text and its obscene other side, which is even more forceful if it remains unspoken.”Slavoj Žižek · ideology's obscene underside
“The truth comes out precisely in the guise of a fiction. Which is why I like very much old-fashioned novels like Jane Austen.”Slavoj Žižek · mask as truth
“I never believed in emancipatory potential of this gesture, let's tear off the masks.”Slavoj Žižek · critique of authenticity politics
“Our inner truth when you really open up yourself... then you really lie.”Slavoj Žižek · fantasy as constitutive lie
“You don't escape into fantasy in order to avoid doing it really. No, you construct your real activity itself as an escape.”Slavoj Žižek · real activity as pseudo-activity
“Sometimes the truly subversive thing is to do nothing. Because by doing nothing you make people feel what through all their hyperactivity they are covering.”Slavoj Žižek · inaction as subversion
“Real sex is just masturbation with a real partner.”Slavoj Žižek · sex as masturbation with a real partner
“If you dream about something intimately, the most terrifying thing that can happen to you is to get it in reality.”Slavoj Žižek · the horror of fantasy fulfilled
“In the good old days, Hollywood was adding sex to commercialize the story. Now Hollywood is deleting sex.”Slavoj Žižek · disappearance of passion in contemporary culture
“I want to live in a building where you precisely remain at the level of superficial politeness. I don't want to understand you.”Slavoj Žižek · coexistence without understanding as true multiculturalism
“An enemy is a person whose inner story we don't know. Maybe, maybe. But the truth of this is extremely limited.”Slavoj Žižek · critique of multicultural empathy formula
“Your truth is outside. Your truth is what you did there in the camp. I'm not interested in your inner story.”Slavoj Žižek · against inner subjectivity as truth in perpetrators
“Fame is but the collection of misunderstandings that gather around a new name.”Slavoj Žižek · on being misread and mischaracterized
“The same book: Jerusalem Post attacked it as brutal open antisemitism and Al-Ahram attacked it as the most perfidious Zionist propaganda. If this happens, maybe I'm doing something right.”Slavoj Žižek · being attacked from all sides as sign of correctness
“Cinema is the ultimate pervert art. It doesn't give you what you desire, it tells you how to desire.”Slavoj Žižek · cinema as ideological apparatus of desire
“If you go deep into anyone, I discover shit. We are all filthy, egotists, whatever. It doesn't interest me.”Slavoj Žižek · against depth psychology and the inner self
Transcript 114 turns
Slavoj Žižek
Slavoj,
Slavoj,
Paul Holdengräber
let's get into it immediately. Why, why this clip? I mean, it's after thirty years, it remains as violent and perhaps as distasteful.
let's get into it immediately. Why, why this clip? I mean, it's after thirty years, it remains as violent and perhaps as distasteful.
Slavoj Žižek
Maybe distasteful, but very funny. And I don't mean this disgusting male chauvinist way that when a man terrorizes a woman, it's funny. No. I mean in a very precise way. First, what's so interesting is just think about whose standpoint, point of view is privileged in this scene. You know, around whose gaze, that's what comes to our topic, is this scene constructed, as it were? The obvious answer would have been Kyle MacLachlan, you know, the Twin Peaks guy, who is hidden in the closet observing. Maybe. And here, okay, we can watch this clip in this way. There, this is the obvious way to watch it. And there I would like to draw your attention nonetheless to one or two details. One is that my friend, the French cinema theorist Michel Chion, specialist of voice, gave a wonderfully simple reading of this scene claiming that we should imagine it as a visual hallucination of a child, not watching, observing visually, but, you know, child at the behind the closed door listening to parental intercourse and that all the weird features are to be understood as visual imaginations of a child who doesn't know what sex is yet and simply tries to imagine it. And this is a wonderful reading of this, you know, the oxygen or whatever it is, this mask that he puts on and breathes. The idea is a small boy listens to parental intercourse and hears—okay, I will not imitate it for you, it's too vulgar, but you know, the father intensely doing it.
Maybe distasteful, but very funny. And I don't mean this disgusting male chauvinist way that when a man terrorizes a woman, it's funny. No. I mean in a very precise way. First, what's so interesting is just think about whose standpoint, point of view is privileged in this scene. You know, around whose gaze, that's what comes to our topic, is this scene constructed, as it were? The obvious answer would have been Kyle MacLachlan, you know, the Twin Peaks guy, who is hidden in the closet observing. Maybe. And here, okay, we can watch this clip in this way. There, this is the obvious way to watch it. And there I would like to draw your attention nonetheless to one or two details. One is that my friend, the French cinema theorist Michel Chion, specialist of voice, gave a wonderfully simple reading of this scene claiming that we should imagine it as a visual hallucination of a child, not watching, observing visually, but, you know, child at the behind the closed door listening to parental intercourse and that all the weird features are to be understood as visual imaginations of a child who doesn't know what sex is yet and simply tries to imagine it. And this is a wonderful reading of this, you know, the oxygen or whatever it is, this mask that he puts on and breathes. The idea is a small boy listens to parental intercourse and hears—okay, I will not imitate it for you, it's too vulgar, but you know, the father intensely doing it.
Paul Holdengräber
But tell me, tell me what I'm failing to see for the moment is what's funny
But tell me, tell me what I'm failing to see for the moment is what's funny
Slavoj Žižek
about it. Not yet. Okay. The funny guy is Dennis Hopper, obviously, no? Okay. What I want to say is that it's as if the child then imagine, my God, why is my dad breathing like that, he must have some oxygen mask on or whatever. You know, almost everything can be read in this way. This brings us to the first crucial point, we don't have time to develop it, the role of fantasy, and this is the basic lesson of Freud, more actual than ever today. You know, these so-called immature fantasies, children suspect there is sex, something mysterious, they don't know what it is, and they then try to imagine it. Now, I don't think we ever reach maturity in the sense that finally you know what is sex, you don't need these dreams. I think that we humans, we humans always need a fantasy. It's never that you say, now I'm fully mature, I know what we are doing is just me and my partner, we are doing it. And I remember— And and we need it because— We need it because, okay, now we go into Lacanian legacy, my Lacanian theory, my point would have been because as Lacan says, il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel. It doesn't work without it. If you want sex without fantasy, without fantasy support, it's one of the most painful scenes that I remember—did you see Michael Haneke's The Piano Teacher? When the young boy and Isabelle Huppert finally do it, and she is just like a dead piece of wood there, you know, sex without any fantasy support. But what I wanted to tell you is to tell you how this works. Two funny details from my youth. I remember when I was, I don't know what, six, seven of age, I knew vaguely how you do sex, but I didn't know how it functions, how it is connected with producing a child. And then even now I'm proud of them. I had two ideas, I remember. You're proud of the ideas you had back then? Yes, the ideas. First was this one. I, I knew that sex has something to do with producing children, but I couldn't accept it, this is that such a disgusting thing, their sweating bodies mingling, how can this produce something so noble as a child? So I said at the same time it must be true that, with who are the stupid birds, storks are really bringing children. And then here came my genius. I invented a theory of how to bring the two together. Let's say you want a child. Yeah. You make love to your wife and a stork is observing you. If the stork likes how you do it, you will get a reward, a child. You see, this is creative thinking, you know. Then I had to accept the disgusting fact that nonetheless sperm and so on. And for a couple of years I had a theory which is, no wonder women who want to suck our life energy of men loved it, I had a much crazier theory that to make a child, you have to make love the whole year of pregnancy. You know, like once you make love, you say, "Darling, today we will produce the ear of our child. Next sex the the hand, the eyes," you know. Isn't this a nice idea? It's a
about it. Not yet. Okay. The funny guy is Dennis Hopper, obviously, no? Okay. What I want to say is that it's as if the child then imagine, my God, why is my dad breathing like that, he must have some oxygen mask on or whatever. You know, almost everything can be read in this way. This brings us to the first crucial point, we don't have time to develop it, the role of fantasy, and this is the basic lesson of Freud, more actual than ever today. You know, these so-called immature fantasies, children suspect there is sex, something mysterious, they don't know what it is, and they then try to imagine it. Now, I don't think we ever reach maturity in the sense that finally you know what is sex, you don't need these dreams. I think that we humans, we humans always need a fantasy. It's never that you say, now I'm fully mature, I know what we are doing is just me and my partner, we are doing it. And I remember— And and we need it because— We need it because, okay, now we go into Lacanian legacy, my Lacanian theory, my point would have been because as Lacan says, il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel. It doesn't work without it. If you want sex without fantasy, without fantasy support, it's one of the most painful scenes that I remember—did you see Michael Haneke's The Piano Teacher? When the young boy and Isabelle Huppert finally do it, and she is just like a dead piece of wood there, you know, sex without any fantasy support. But what I wanted to tell you is to tell you how this works. Two funny details from my youth. I remember when I was, I don't know what, six, seven of age, I knew vaguely how you do sex, but I didn't know how it functions, how it is connected with producing a child. And then even now I'm proud of them. I had two ideas, I remember. You're proud of the ideas you had back then? Yes, the ideas. First was this one. I, I knew that sex has something to do with producing children, but I couldn't accept it, this is that such a disgusting thing, their sweating bodies mingling, how can this produce something so noble as a child? So I said at the same time it must be true that, with who are the stupid birds, storks are really bringing children. And then here came my genius. I invented a theory of how to bring the two together. Let's say you want a child. Yeah. You make love to your wife and a stork is observing you. If the stork likes how you do it, you will get a reward, a child. You see, this is creative thinking, you know. Then I had to accept the disgusting fact that nonetheless sperm and so on. And for a couple of years I had a theory which is, no wonder women who want to suck our life energy of men loved it, I had a much crazier theory that to make a child, you have to make love the whole year of pregnancy. You know, like once you make love, you say, "Darling, today we will produce the ear of our child. Next sex the the hand, the eyes," you know. Isn't this a nice idea? It's a
Paul Holdengräber
very nice idea. You put it into practice? Sorry? You put it into practice? Yeah, and then I had my first heart attack and so
very nice idea. You put it into practice? Sorry? You put it into practice? Yeah, and then I had my first heart attack and so
Slavoj Žižek
on, but that's another story. No, quite seriously, what I try to tell you is that sex, it's never just the two of us, me, my lover, and what we are doing. There—
on, but that's another story. No, quite seriously, what I try to tell you is that sex, it's never just the two of us, me, my lover, and what we are doing. There—
Paul Holdengräber
And sex is is between more than two people is what you're
And sex is is between more than two people is what you're
Slavoj Žižek
saying. Yeah. It has to be a fantasy. It has to be. It's all in this sense— Let's
saying. Yeah. It has to be a fantasy. It has to be. It's all in this sense— Let's
Paul Holdengräber
let's try to link it to what we saw. Let's try to link it to what we saw and also try to— Ah, now I will do this, but now let's go further. If we want to see this, we should
let's try to link it to what we saw. Let's try to link it to what we saw and also try to— Ah, now I will do this, but now let's go further. If we want to see this, we should
Slavoj Žižek
go further. Further, so this is one standpoint. He, Kyle MacLachlan, as the one who imagines the scene. And— But more than just imagines, he's stuck. I mean, we've really, you know, I— Yeah, but in a way, libidinally. Of course we accept that within the narrative it all really happened. You know, you know the
go further. Further, so this is one standpoint. He, Kyle MacLachlan, as the one who imagines the scene. And— But more than just imagines, he's stuck. I mean, we've really, you know, I— Yeah, but in a way, libidinally. Of course we accept that within the narrative it all really happened. You know, you know the
Paul Holdengräber
line I so much like of Blanchot where he says that fascination is to be touched at a distance, which is very much what's happening here. Absolutely. It must be at a distance, yes. I mean, because
line I so much like of Blanchot where he says that fascination is to be touched at a distance, which is very much what's happening here. Absolutely. It must be at a distance, yes. I mean, because
Slavoj Žižek
if you come close to it, you're no longer fascinated, it's just disgust. Right. You know who was the great master here? Kafka. Remember in The Castle, not The Trial. You remember how from below the valley, the castle is magnificent, sublime, blah blah, but once the land surveyor K., the the guy, almost goes up and almost arrives at the
if you come close to it, you're no longer fascinated, it's just disgust. Right. You know who was the great master here? Kafka. Remember in The Castle, not The Trial. You remember how from below the valley, the castle is magnificent, sublime, blah blah, but once the land surveyor K., the the guy, almost goes up and almost arrives at the
Paul Holdengräber
cast and all of a sudden he notices these are just small, ugly buildings and so on and so on. And I think, this is the point now about fascination. You know, there is a point of so-called Christian, not only Christian, wisdom, to which I'm totally opposed. I'm generally opposed wisdom. I think wisdom is the most disgusting thing that you can imagine. Wisdom is the most
cast and all of a sudden he notices these are just small, ugly buildings and so on and so on. And I think, this is the point now about fascination. You know, there is a point of so-called Christian, not only Christian, wisdom, to which I'm totally opposed. I'm generally opposed wisdom. I think wisdom is the most disgusting thing that you can imagine. Wisdom is the most
Slavoj Žižek
conformist thing you can imagine. Wisdom is this, you know, whatever you do, a wise man will come and justify it, you know, like you do something risky and you succeed. There will be, there will be a wise man who will come and say something like, I don't know, in Slovenia we have a proverb, maybe you have a similar one: "Only those who risk profit" and so on and so on. Let's say you do the same thing but fail. A wise man will come and he will say something like, in Slovenia we had a vulgar saying which says, "You cannot urinate against the wind" or something like that. You know, this is wisdom. Whatever you do, a wise guy will come and— And
conformist thing you can imagine. Wisdom is this, you know, whatever you do, a wise man will come and justify it, you know, like you do something risky and you succeed. There will be, there will be a wise man who will come and say something like, I don't know, in Slovenia we have a proverb, maybe you have a similar one: "Only those who risk profit" and so on and so on. Let's say you do the same thing but fail. A wise man will come and he will say something like, in Slovenia we had a vulgar saying which says, "You cannot urinate against the wind" or something like that. You know, this is wisdom. Whatever you do, a wise guy will come and— And
Paul Holdengräber
wisdom, you know, I will— But it's so interesting that a a philosopher should be against wisdom. We all
wisdom, you know, I will— But it's so interesting that a a philosopher should be against wisdom. We all
Slavoj Žižek
are. I mean, your Kierkegaard knew this. Kierkegaard was anti-wise man par excellence. Wisdom is pagan. Should be liquid—okay, now I'm not going to my Stalinist stuff. But what I want to—once I made a mental experiment, if you don't believe me. Let's take, I will say something. I will say, I don't know how to say it, I'm too ironic with all this pathos, you know. Why are we, why are we running after these miserable earthly pleasures? Think about eternity. The only satisfaction is eternity. If I were to say it with proper pathos, it would sound a deep thing to say. Okay. It it sounded it it did. Now let's say the opposite. Why run after the specter of eternity? Carpe diem, grasp what you have here. It sounds wise. Now I will say the third option. Why be caught in a contrast between eternity and temporary existence? The true wisdom is to see eternity in fleeting temporary pleasures. It is also wise. Then I say the fourth variation: we are forever condemned between the two, a wise man accepts this. You know, whatever I say, that's my point, you can sell it as a wisdom. This is a wisdom. And if from no one else, from your Kierkegaard you can learn this: that whatever Jesus Christ was, he wasn't a wise guy. He was a provocative madman.
are. I mean, your Kierkegaard knew this. Kierkegaard was anti-wise man par excellence. Wisdom is pagan. Should be liquid—okay, now I'm not going to my Stalinist stuff. But what I want to—once I made a mental experiment, if you don't believe me. Let's take, I will say something. I will say, I don't know how to say it, I'm too ironic with all this pathos, you know. Why are we, why are we running after these miserable earthly pleasures? Think about eternity. The only satisfaction is eternity. If I were to say it with proper pathos, it would sound a deep thing to say. Okay. It it sounded it it did. Now let's say the opposite. Why run after the specter of eternity? Carpe diem, grasp what you have here. It sounds wise. Now I will say the third option. Why be caught in a contrast between eternity and temporary existence? The true wisdom is to see eternity in fleeting temporary pleasures. It is also wise. Then I say the fourth variation: we are forever condemned between the two, a wise man accepts this. You know, whatever I say, that's my point, you can sell it as a wisdom. This is a wisdom. And if from no one else, from your Kierkegaard you can learn this: that whatever Jesus Christ was, he wasn't a wise guy. He was a provocative madman.
Paul Holdengräber
It reminds me of of something you've said about Martin Luther King, that he never used the word tolerant.
It reminds me of of something you've said about Martin Luther King, that he never used the word tolerant.
Slavoj Žižek
Yeah, this is, but this is part of my general polemics, yes, against, you know, like against the all-pervasiveness of the term tolerance today. How this, here you find ideology. Of course I'm for tolerance in the sense of I'm not for intolerance, I don't think we should beat women— But you're but you're not against real wisdom, or that doesn't exist? There is no real wisdom. Real wisdom is like democratic Stalin, you know. What do you want? There is no real wisdom as such has this cheating—but this you should learn from your Kierkegaard, my God. That—or Kierkegaard, how do you I don't know, you pronounce it differently. Yeah. That that that the basic Christian gesture is this, you know, wager on a crazy mad decision, you know. But let me go on nonetheless. So, we have a so— Let me I've just never heard anybody rant so powerfully against wisdom. It strikes me as— Are you a Jew? Are you a secret pagan? Somewhere in between, but go on. Because it it all, it all, it all begins, I think, with, with Old Testament, which is why I always repeat that the greatest, the not the greatest, the first real book, text on critique of ideology is the book of, how do you pronounce it, Job? The guy who got screwed up by God and so on. Can you imagine what an incredible book this is? You know what happens, no? Everything goes wrong for Job. He he loses, and that's how it's written in the Bible: his sheep, his cows, his chickens, his wife and so on, they come after, you know. So he loses everything. And then ideology enters. You remember, three wise men that you obviously like— Well, no, I I'm quite sure that I don't like
Yeah, this is, but this is part of my general polemics, yes, against, you know, like against the all-pervasiveness of the term tolerance today. How this, here you find ideology. Of course I'm for tolerance in the sense of I'm not for intolerance, I don't think we should beat women— But you're but you're not against real wisdom, or that doesn't exist? There is no real wisdom. Real wisdom is like democratic Stalin, you know. What do you want? There is no real wisdom as such has this cheating—but this you should learn from your Kierkegaard, my God. That—or Kierkegaard, how do you I don't know, you pronounce it differently. Yeah. That that that the basic Christian gesture is this, you know, wager on a crazy mad decision, you know. But let me go on nonetheless. So, we have a so— Let me I've just never heard anybody rant so powerfully against wisdom. It strikes me as— Are you a Jew? Are you a secret pagan? Somewhere in between, but go on. Because it it all, it all, it all begins, I think, with, with Old Testament, which is why I always repeat that the greatest, the not the greatest, the first real book, text on critique of ideology is the book of, how do you pronounce it, Job? The guy who got screwed up by God and so on. Can you imagine what an incredible book this is? You know what happens, no? Everything goes wrong for Job. He he loses, and that's how it's written in the Bible: his sheep, his cows, his chickens, his wife and so on, they come after, you know. So he loses everything. And then ideology enters. You remember, three wise men that you obviously like— Well, no, I I'm quite sure that I don't like
Paul Holdengräber
them anymore. Okay. Okay,
them anymore. Okay. Okay,
Slavoj Žižek
three, and each of them—you have converted me. —each of them proposed to Job precisely an ideological formula which gives some meaning to his suffering, no? The first one says, "God punished you, so you must have done something wrong, even if you don't know what, look deeper into yourself." The second one basically says, "This is God is testing you, persist," blah blah. His suffering has a meaning. And it's interesting if you read it carefully. Job's defense is not, "No, I'm an innocent guy." He just cannot accept that this stupid catastrophe, calamity that hit him has any deeper meaning. Ah, so
three, and each of them—you have converted me. —each of them proposed to Job precisely an ideological formula which gives some meaning to his suffering, no? The first one says, "God punished you, so you must have done something wrong, even if you don't know what, look deeper into yourself." The second one basically says, "This is God is testing you, persist," blah blah. His suffering has a meaning. And it's interesting if you read it carefully. Job's defense is not, "No, I'm an innocent guy." He just cannot accept that this stupid catastrophe, calamity that hit him has any deeper meaning. Ah, so
Paul Holdengräber
that's it. Yeah. Wisdom is against the notion that there is something containable like deeper meaning. Yeah,
that's it. Yeah. Wisdom is against the notion that there is something containable like deeper meaning. Yeah,
Slavoj Žižek
yeah, wisdom brings meaning always, you know. Wisdom says, "Oh, maybe all this suffering seems to you meaningless, but it has a deeper meaning," whatever. But you know what's the miracle then? God comes then, as you know, and says everything that those three idiots, priests, said is wrong. Everything that Job says, all the complaints are, he was right. That's the first wonderful rehabilitation of critique of ideology. Then it goes even further. Then just read the Bible, you young people should learn from it. Then Job nonetheless asks the obvious question, no? But okay, but nonetheless, why did you screw me up? Why did I suffer? And then comes God's famous answer, you know, that arrogant: "Where were you when I created this monster, that, whatever." This is usually read as a simple divine arrogance, like "Who are you to talk to me? I am infinitely above you." Ah, my favorite Catholic theologian, Gilbert Keith Chesterton, gives a wonderful totally opposite reason. He said that God's answer is really, "You think your life was a catastrophe? But look at all the creation, it's one great nightmare. I screwed up everything," you know. Like it's kind of a God's confession, "It's all chaos, it's not only you." And you see, this is anti-wisdom there. And you Jews, I say this— Yeah, yeah, with with— You say this with affection. Yeah. Yeah. No, no, seriously, let me tell you very short, another, my favorite story. My Jewish friends, Udi Aloni and others explained to me this. You know that in Talmud you have two times the same story? In my new book you find all the quotes and so on, which is incredible. Two rabbis debate about certain I don't know which theological point. And I warn you, this is not humor, joke, or blasphemy. This is sacred stuff of of Jewish tradition. And one who is losing the argument says, "Wait a minute, why don't we call God to resolve, you know?" It's like the beginning of Woody Allen's Woody Allen's Annie Hall, you know, when they debate Marshall McLuhan I think and Marshall McLuhan— And then God comes and before even God starts to answer, the second rabbi who didn't want to call God starts to shout at Jehovah. Like basically, I translate it freely, "Fuck off, old guy. You created the world, you screwed it up, you did your work, leave it now to us wise scholars to debate it, you don't—" And you know what then happens? Jehovah says, "Oh my God, they're right, they're right," and runs away. This is miracle. This is what I'm talking about. You know, it's so funny you should mention— Do you know that? I don't, but it's so funny you should mention it. It's not a joke, this. This story is even told in two versions, but let's drop that. It's funny that you mention Woody Allen because I'm thinking that one of your rants against wisdom makes me think that it's a bit—wisdom is too rosy, it's too sweet, it offers consolation. And in some way you're fighting that notion of consolation. Do you know that line of Woody Allen where he ends up a stand-up comedy he does? He says, "I'd like to leave you on a positive note. Will you
yeah, wisdom brings meaning always, you know. Wisdom says, "Oh, maybe all this suffering seems to you meaningless, but it has a deeper meaning," whatever. But you know what's the miracle then? God comes then, as you know, and says everything that those three idiots, priests, said is wrong. Everything that Job says, all the complaints are, he was right. That's the first wonderful rehabilitation of critique of ideology. Then it goes even further. Then just read the Bible, you young people should learn from it. Then Job nonetheless asks the obvious question, no? But okay, but nonetheless, why did you screw me up? Why did I suffer? And then comes God's famous answer, you know, that arrogant: "Where were you when I created this monster, that, whatever." This is usually read as a simple divine arrogance, like "Who are you to talk to me? I am infinitely above you." Ah, my favorite Catholic theologian, Gilbert Keith Chesterton, gives a wonderful totally opposite reason. He said that God's answer is really, "You think your life was a catastrophe? But look at all the creation, it's one great nightmare. I screwed up everything," you know. Like it's kind of a God's confession, "It's all chaos, it's not only you." And you see, this is anti-wisdom there. And you Jews, I say this— Yeah, yeah, with with— You say this with affection. Yeah. Yeah. No, no, seriously, let me tell you very short, another, my favorite story. My Jewish friends, Udi Aloni and others explained to me this. You know that in Talmud you have two times the same story? In my new book you find all the quotes and so on, which is incredible. Two rabbis debate about certain I don't know which theological point. And I warn you, this is not humor, joke, or blasphemy. This is sacred stuff of of Jewish tradition. And one who is losing the argument says, "Wait a minute, why don't we call God to resolve, you know?" It's like the beginning of Woody Allen's Woody Allen's Annie Hall, you know, when they debate Marshall McLuhan I think and Marshall McLuhan— And then God comes and before even God starts to answer, the second rabbi who didn't want to call God starts to shout at Jehovah. Like basically, I translate it freely, "Fuck off, old guy. You created the world, you screwed it up, you did your work, leave it now to us wise scholars to debate it, you don't—" And you know what then happens? Jehovah says, "Oh my God, they're right, they're right," and runs away. This is miracle. This is what I'm talking about. You know, it's so funny you should mention— Do you know that? I don't, but it's so funny you should mention it. It's not a joke, this. This story is even told in two versions, but let's drop that. It's funny that you mention Woody Allen because I'm thinking that one of your rants against wisdom makes me think that it's a bit—wisdom is too rosy, it's too sweet, it offers consolation. And in some way you're fighting that notion of consolation. Do you know that line of Woody Allen where he ends up a stand-up comedy he does? He says, "I'd like to leave you on a positive note. Will you
Paul Holdengräber
accept two negatives?" Yeah, yeah. But let's
accept two negatives?" Yeah, yeah. But let's
Slavoj Žižek
go back— But Woody Allen has this anti-wisdom. For example, you know which is one of his favorite lines for me? Maybe you know it. Like he says, "People can achieve immortality in different ways: through your great deeds, heroic deeds, through your works of art, through your sacrifice." He said, "I want to be immortal so that I just don't die," you know. I don't want to do those—No, he is good here, although he is sometimes too bright for his own good. Like— And he's a good reader of Kafka. But now, back to to what we're seeing, because what I would like for you to express here is why you think it's comical. Yeah, why Jack—because I, as you know, I interviewed David Lynch not long ago, and one of the things he said is that Jack for him is funny. Absolutely. And that's
go back— But Woody Allen has this anti-wisdom. For example, you know which is one of his favorite lines for me? Maybe you know it. Like he says, "People can achieve immortality in different ways: through your great deeds, heroic deeds, through your works of art, through your sacrifice." He said, "I want to be immortal so that I just don't die," you know. I don't want to do those—No, he is good here, although he is sometimes too bright for his own good. Like— And he's a good reader of Kafka. But now, back to to what we're seeing, because what I would like for you to express here is why you think it's comical. Yeah, why Jack—because I, as you know, I interviewed David Lynch not long ago, and one of the things he said is that Jack for him is funny. Absolutely. And that's
Paul Holdengräber
crucial. Funny, though though at the same time, you know, Lynch is very, very careful at never really saying anything that is absolutely meaningful. He's very afraid of attributing meaning to anything. But here he is, he is—although I am more pro-Christian atheist—here he is deeply Jewish. You know which is for me the ultimate, there is in Jewish approach some kind of a way of taking things too literally which is so subversive. For example, I met at a round table in I don't know where in Spain, that
crucial. Funny, though though at the same time, you know, Lynch is very, very careful at never really saying anything that is absolutely meaningful. He's very afraid of attributing meaning to anything. But here he is, he is—although I am more pro-Christian atheist—here he is deeply Jewish. You know which is for me the ultimate, there is in Jewish approach some kind of a way of taking things too literally which is so subversive. For example, I met at a round table in I don't know where in Spain, that
Slavoj Žižek
Israeli writer David Grossman. I think he's too cheaply humanitarian, I don't like him, but he told me something wonderful. He told me that, you know, the war of '67, when Arabs were, Nasser and they were doing all the threats, "We will throw Jews into the sea." He told me, you know what was his reaction, Grossman's? He said, "My God, they may come and throw me into the sea and I don't know how to swim." So he enrolled into swimming swimming teacher whatever lesson taking swimming lessons and so on. Very practical solution, yes.
Israeli writer David Grossman. I think he's too cheaply humanitarian, I don't like him, but he told me something wonderful. He told me that, you know, the war of '67, when Arabs were, Nasser and they were doing all the threats, "We will throw Jews into the sea." He told me, you know what was his reaction, Grossman's? He said, "My God, they may come and throw me into the sea and I don't know how to swim." So he enrolled into swimming swimming teacher whatever lesson taking swimming lessons and so on. Very practical solution, yes.
Paul Holdengräber
Isn't this all about I think anyone who wants to know what real Freudian interpretation is against all this Jungian hermeneutic of depths what Lynch hates, you told me differently. Well yeah, he hates, you know, there's a line that I want to quote to
Isn't this all about I think anyone who wants to know what real Freudian interpretation is against all this Jungian hermeneutic of depths what Lynch hates, you told me differently. Well yeah, he hates, you know, there's a line that I want to quote to
Slavoj Žižek
you particularly here in in Denmark. Hannah Arendt
you particularly here in in Denmark. Hannah Arendt
Paul Holdengräber
says about Karen Blixen, she says, "Storytelling reveals meaning without committing the error of defining it." And that to my mind is very Lynchian, is it not? Yeah, the only my only problem with Hannah Arendt here is
says about Karen Blixen, she says, "Storytelling reveals meaning without committing the error of defining it." And that to my mind is very Lynchian, is it not? Yeah, the only my only problem with Hannah Arendt here is
Slavoj Žižek
that like every was she aware? Maybe she was, don't underestimate her that—every meaning has something undefined. Like the moment you can define it, it's no longer meaning. You know, like when if some of you are proud to be Danes, of Danish nationality, if I ask you, "But what does it mean to be Danish?" Ah, then you say, "Uh, way of life blah blah," but it's not meaning, like the the—it's always something as they say in French, je ne sais quoi, I don't know what. You know, meaning must have this undefined dimension, which is why— Which which will lead us to certain questions about what identity is and what a person is. Okay. Okay, we could go on here again at ideological mechanism because I think ideology always works like this. Let's take ideology at its most brutal: antisemitism. I think that if you just say, "Jews are greedy, exploitative, cunning, dirty, too hard-working, too intellectual," this is dirty, but it's not yet antisemitism proper. Antisemitism proper occurs when you turn this around and you say, "They are dirty da-da-da blah blah because they are Jewish." And what are they, Jews, in themselves? We don't know. Some mysterious X which makes it—you always have this mystery and I'm so—okay, I will develop this idea briefly, it's nice one, because this is how for me ideology
that like every was she aware? Maybe she was, don't underestimate her that—every meaning has something undefined. Like the moment you can define it, it's no longer meaning. You know, like when if some of you are proud to be Danes, of Danish nationality, if I ask you, "But what does it mean to be Danish?" Ah, then you say, "Uh, way of life blah blah," but it's not meaning, like the the—it's always something as they say in French, je ne sais quoi, I don't know what. You know, meaning must have this undefined dimension, which is why— Which which will lead us to certain questions about what identity is and what a person is. Okay. Okay, we could go on here again at ideological mechanism because I think ideology always works like this. Let's take ideology at its most brutal: antisemitism. I think that if you just say, "Jews are greedy, exploitative, cunning, dirty, too hard-working, too intellectual," this is dirty, but it's not yet antisemitism proper. Antisemitism proper occurs when you turn this around and you say, "They are dirty da-da-da blah blah because they are Jewish." And what are they, Jews, in themselves? We don't know. Some mysterious X which makes it—you always have this mystery and I'm so—okay, I will develop this idea briefly, it's nice one, because this is how for me ideology
Paul Holdengräber
works. Here within antisemitism, the Jew is this— Are we doing anything wrong? Do you have a phone on you? Do you have a phone on you? No, I don't have a phone. Let me see. Let me take it. Ha ha ha. Is that what is beeping? No, now it's off. Okay. He works for NSA, they are listening to all of us. Yes, so— No, seriously. You know, let me tell you briefly a story that maybe some of you know it, but I think it works perfectly. You remember Jaws, the movie where the sharks
works. Here within antisemitism, the Jew is this— Are we doing anything wrong? Do you have a phone on you? Do you have a phone on you? No, I don't have a phone. Let me see. Let me take it. Ha ha ha. Is that what is beeping? No, now it's off. Okay. He works for NSA, they are listening to all of us. Yes, so— No, seriously. You know, let me tell you briefly a story that maybe some of you know it, but I think it works perfectly. You remember Jaws, the movie where the sharks
Slavoj Žižek
attack? Now, the wrong question that Lynch was right to hate is: what's the meaning of the attacking shark killing people? And then you can play all possible games. For right-wing interpretation, the shark stands for immigrant threat, third-world threat, whatever, attacking ordinary Americans. Then you have leftist—did you know that Fidel Castro admired Jaws, Spielberg movie? He said, "It's clear to me shark is a metaphor of big capitalism exploiting small ordinary Americans." But it's wrong, here I hope David Lynch would agree with me, it's totally wrong to press into this
attack? Now, the wrong question that Lynch was right to hate is: what's the meaning of the attacking shark killing people? And then you can play all possible games. For right-wing interpretation, the shark stands for immigrant threat, third-world threat, whatever, attacking ordinary Americans. Then you have leftist—did you know that Fidel Castro admired Jaws, Spielberg movie? He said, "It's clear to me shark is a metaphor of big capitalism exploiting small ordinary Americans." But it's wrong, here I hope David Lynch would agree with me, it's totally wrong to press into this
Paul Holdengräber
direction and ask: but what does it really mean? No, the whole point is that we in, let's say, everyday Americans in their everyday life, have a whole series of fears. We fear
direction and ask: but what does it really mean? No, the whole point is that we in, let's say, everyday Americans in their everyday life, have a whole series of fears. We fear
Slavoj Žižek
nature, hurricanes, tornadoes, we fear immigrants, we fear the poor, we fear the big banks and so on, and it is as if magically we replace all these fears for one empty symbol: the shark. My point being— So whatever we can catch as it were. Yeah, and it's exactly the same with basically with antisemitism. In the sense of, imagine a German in the late 20s in Germany. He fears financial exploitation, media, sex perversion, whatever. And what Hitler did is to tell him, "Behind all this is a Jew." All these inconsistent fears are exchanged for one big fear, fear of the figure of the Jew, which explains why the figure of the Jew in antisemitism—did you notice this? It's crucial—is totally inconsistent. Jews are at the same time lazy, exploiting us, and working too much. You know, in American university, I encounter even today, they say, "He's Jewish, how can we compete with him? We go out, we have a beer, we drink, they work all the night," or whatever. Then, Jews are at the same time hyper-intellectual and dirty, don't—you know, this inconsistency. Now, what's the mechanism here? Sorry if I repeat my old jokes, but they work here, I claim. There is in Poland, I found it, from socialist times, a wonderful joke which says, you know, you must just remember that in official communist ideology, communism or socialism was the highest result of entire human history, the synthesis of all that was greatest in humanity's achievements. And the story goes like this, the joke. Socialism is a synthesis of all the greatest achievements of human history. From prehistory it took primitivism. From ancient times it took slavery. From medieval times it took domination. From capitalism it took exploitation, and from socialism it took the name. And my point is that this is antisemitism. From the poor people it takes their poverty, dirty, laziness, whatever we attribute to them. From the rich it takes exploitation, blah blah, and from the Jews it takes the name. Now, I do want to get back to Blue Velvet. Okay, let's do it. Second figure, the father. I I want to get back to— The father. I mean yeah, the father because, you know, you say that cinema is the ultimate pervert art. It doesn't give you what you desire, it tells you how to desire. I was too wise when I said that. Okay. I mean, nobody's perfect. It's fine. Oh yeah, but now—but okay. Now explain. Yeah, because there's a this scene which, you know, thirty years later is still quite shocking, is very perverse in some way. I agree with you. And there are only a couple of films—I I wondered how I saw now fifty years later and Hitchcock's Psycho still works in this way up to a point. There are just a few films. Okay. Go on. Why let me just ask you why why what is it in—maybe you can't say—but what is it in something like that scene we saw? I think, maybe I'm totally wrong, but what fascinates me and now I'm coming back to my point, it's precisely that it's not just the scene that we described, this gaze observing. Okay, within this perspective we can even say that what happens in the room may be only the hallucination. The only narrative reality is the guy there in the closet, Kyle MacLachlan hearing something and imagining it. But we can do the opposite reading which says maybe he doesn't exist, Kyle MacLachlan, maybe the only reality is that of disgusting behavior of Dennis Hopper in the room and how does then Kyle MacLachlan exist? Now we come to the comical side. What does, how, the only way to account for—it's very simple primitive reading but I think it does strike the truth—the only way to account for Dennis Hopper's behavior is that he is not what he appears to be, this brutal half-raping figure. He is an impotent father who boasts all the time to cover up his impotence. When he shouts at her, Isabella Rossellini, "Don't you fucking look at me!", why? Because he's impotent, nothing to look at. And all this shouting and so on is that he imagines a gaze in the closet. He, it is absolutely clear that what he does there is he performs something
nature, hurricanes, tornadoes, we fear immigrants, we fear the poor, we fear the big banks and so on, and it is as if magically we replace all these fears for one empty symbol: the shark. My point being— So whatever we can catch as it were. Yeah, and it's exactly the same with basically with antisemitism. In the sense of, imagine a German in the late 20s in Germany. He fears financial exploitation, media, sex perversion, whatever. And what Hitler did is to tell him, "Behind all this is a Jew." All these inconsistent fears are exchanged for one big fear, fear of the figure of the Jew, which explains why the figure of the Jew in antisemitism—did you notice this? It's crucial—is totally inconsistent. Jews are at the same time lazy, exploiting us, and working too much. You know, in American university, I encounter even today, they say, "He's Jewish, how can we compete with him? We go out, we have a beer, we drink, they work all the night," or whatever. Then, Jews are at the same time hyper-intellectual and dirty, don't—you know, this inconsistency. Now, what's the mechanism here? Sorry if I repeat my old jokes, but they work here, I claim. There is in Poland, I found it, from socialist times, a wonderful joke which says, you know, you must just remember that in official communist ideology, communism or socialism was the highest result of entire human history, the synthesis of all that was greatest in humanity's achievements. And the story goes like this, the joke. Socialism is a synthesis of all the greatest achievements of human history. From prehistory it took primitivism. From ancient times it took slavery. From medieval times it took domination. From capitalism it took exploitation, and from socialism it took the name. And my point is that this is antisemitism. From the poor people it takes their poverty, dirty, laziness, whatever we attribute to them. From the rich it takes exploitation, blah blah, and from the Jews it takes the name. Now, I do want to get back to Blue Velvet. Okay, let's do it. Second figure, the father. I I want to get back to— The father. I mean yeah, the father because, you know, you say that cinema is the ultimate pervert art. It doesn't give you what you desire, it tells you how to desire. I was too wise when I said that. Okay. I mean, nobody's perfect. It's fine. Oh yeah, but now—but okay. Now explain. Yeah, because there's a this scene which, you know, thirty years later is still quite shocking, is very perverse in some way. I agree with you. And there are only a couple of films—I I wondered how I saw now fifty years later and Hitchcock's Psycho still works in this way up to a point. There are just a few films. Okay. Go on. Why let me just ask you why why what is it in—maybe you can't say—but what is it in something like that scene we saw? I think, maybe I'm totally wrong, but what fascinates me and now I'm coming back to my point, it's precisely that it's not just the scene that we described, this gaze observing. Okay, within this perspective we can even say that what happens in the room may be only the hallucination. The only narrative reality is the guy there in the closet, Kyle MacLachlan hearing something and imagining it. But we can do the opposite reading which says maybe he doesn't exist, Kyle MacLachlan, maybe the only reality is that of disgusting behavior of Dennis Hopper in the room and how does then Kyle MacLachlan exist? Now we come to the comical side. What does, how, the only way to account for—it's very simple primitive reading but I think it does strike the truth—the only way to account for Dennis Hopper's behavior is that he is not what he appears to be, this brutal half-raping figure. He is an impotent father who boasts all the time to cover up his impotence. When he shouts at her, Isabella Rossellini, "Don't you fucking look at me!", why? Because he's impotent, nothing to look at. And all this shouting and so on is that he imagines a gaze in the closet. He, it is absolutely clear that what he does there is he performs something
Paul Holdengräber
for an imagined gaze. To convince the big other, the authority that, my
for an imagined gaze. To convince the big other, the authority that, my
Slavoj Žižek
God, I'm a macho, I can do it. And and the funniness is— The funniness is—ah, this is the
God, I'm a macho, I can do it. And and the funniness is— The funniness is—ah, this is the
Paul Holdengräber
beauty. It's the superego funniness. In what sense? You know, the first thing, if you know and you do David Lynch movies, first, the first thing to do is to put Dennis Hopper here, Jack or I even forgot, in the series with other David Lynch heroes who, the more brutal they are, the more they have this funny element. For example, what some people claim it's his worst movie, but I like it, Dune. The big bad guy, Baron Harkonnen, he is absolutely
beauty. It's the superego funniness. In what sense? You know, the first thing, if you know and you do David Lynch movies, first, the first thing to do is to put Dennis Hopper here, Jack or I even forgot, in the series with other David Lynch heroes who, the more brutal they are, the more they have this funny element. For example, what some people claim it's his worst movie, but I like it, Dune. The big bad guy, Baron Harkonnen, he is absolutely
Slavoj Žižek
ridiculously funny, it's clear. Because of excess. Because of excess. Yes. Then, another example, from Wild at Heart, Bobby Peru, played by Willem Dafoe. I feel we should show
ridiculously funny, it's clear. Because of excess. Because of excess. Yes. Then, another example, from Wild at Heart, Bobby Peru, played by Willem Dafoe. I feel we should show
Paul Holdengräber
it. Yeah, but just so that I finish this line— Maybe— I want to show it but I'm not sure right after after another Lynch— Whatever you want. Okay, okay. But just
it. Yeah, but just so that I finish this line— Maybe— I want to show it but I'm not sure right after after another Lynch— Whatever you want. Okay, okay. But just
Slavoj Žižek
another example then. Did you see Lost Highway? There, again, this excessive figure of male authority played by Robert Loggia, the gangster boss. There is a wonderful moment of this excessive superego which becomes funny— The driving. The driving, and then they hit or some car and then he stops that guy and brutally starts to shout at him, "Don't you know the fucking rules? If you drive like this, people—" "You're going you're going over speed limit, it's crazy." Is this a wonderful moment? I mean of this, this excess. So I, and what strike me is that it's put in a funny way but I agreed with the guy there. He was right. Okay, but what I want to say, so we have the second— But so so in fact the funniness comes also from the tension between what we're seeing, which is brutally horrible, and the the extreme, nearly performative, brutally unrestrained quality of Jack. Yeah, but this extreme quality—now allow me a line of thought which is I think crucial—is always already staged. I'm now, I will explain it to you. I will now engage in a brief digression, as you like to put it, no? I I digression, I think that it may not be brief, but— digression— Yeah, yeah. I think that precisely when we appear to be spontaneous, in the sense of like "I have enough of it, I start to swear" or whatever these excessive moments, then we act. You have to learn that. There is nothing spontaneous in it. This idea was given to me with my by my Austrian friend Robert Pfaller, who developed this notion of how, look, we have ordinary small pleasures, like if you really want to drink something pleasurable, you do milk or fruit juice or whatever. But all the excessive pleasures are first experienced as disgusting and then learned. Think about how probably did you discover alcohol, hard drinks. You were seven, eight, nine, ten when a friend told you, "Don't you know what adults are drinking?" And he gave you some vodka, whiskey. And admit it: first after you tried you
another example then. Did you see Lost Highway? There, again, this excessive figure of male authority played by Robert Loggia, the gangster boss. There is a wonderful moment of this excessive superego which becomes funny— The driving. The driving, and then they hit or some car and then he stops that guy and brutally starts to shout at him, "Don't you know the fucking rules? If you drive like this, people—" "You're going you're going over speed limit, it's crazy." Is this a wonderful moment? I mean of this, this excess. So I, and what strike me is that it's put in a funny way but I agreed with the guy there. He was right. Okay, but what I want to say, so we have the second— But so so in fact the funniness comes also from the tension between what we're seeing, which is brutally horrible, and the the extreme, nearly performative, brutally unrestrained quality of Jack. Yeah, but this extreme quality—now allow me a line of thought which is I think crucial—is always already staged. I'm now, I will explain it to you. I will now engage in a brief digression, as you like to put it, no? I I digression, I think that it may not be brief, but— digression— Yeah, yeah. I think that precisely when we appear to be spontaneous, in the sense of like "I have enough of it, I start to swear" or whatever these excessive moments, then we act. You have to learn that. There is nothing spontaneous in it. This idea was given to me with my by my Austrian friend Robert Pfaller, who developed this notion of how, look, we have ordinary small pleasures, like if you really want to drink something pleasurable, you do milk or fruit juice or whatever. But all the excessive pleasures are first experienced as disgusting and then learned. Think about how probably did you discover alcohol, hard drinks. You were seven, eight, nine, ten when a friend told you, "Don't you know what adults are drinking?" And he gave you some vodka, whiskey. And admit it: first after you tried you
Paul Holdengräber
said, "Egh, this is disgusting." Then you learn it. It's it's the same with
said, "Egh, this is disgusting." Then you learn it. It's it's the same with
Slavoj Žižek
smoking. You start smoking, you cough, it's disgusting. All these pleasures are learned pleasures. And I claim ultimately the same goes with sex. If you want to do it with pleasure, you must, for pleasure is masturbating in peace. Anything more is learned. And I'm claiming especially swearing. I learn this, I wonder if it's with you the same. People would have thought we have a polite conversation and then you have enough of it of that idiot, maybe you, maybe not, and you start to swear—whatever. No, with me it's the opposite. Precisely when you explode in fury, you follow a formula. It's learned. And you know, I noticed that with my friends in Slovenia, we developed a ritual to get rid of this. When we met, we first do ten minutes of totally ritualized swearing, humiliations like, "Fuck off, I will dig your mother up her grave and fuck her in her—" Disgusting. And then after ten minutes of this we said, "Okay, we did our duty, now we can talk like kind people
smoking. You start smoking, you cough, it's disgusting. All these pleasures are learned pleasures. And I claim ultimately the same goes with sex. If you want to do it with pleasure, you must, for pleasure is masturbating in peace. Anything more is learned. And I'm claiming especially swearing. I learn this, I wonder if it's with you the same. People would have thought we have a polite conversation and then you have enough of it of that idiot, maybe you, maybe not, and you start to swear—whatever. No, with me it's the opposite. Precisely when you explode in fury, you follow a formula. It's learned. And you know, I noticed that with my friends in Slovenia, we developed a ritual to get rid of this. When we met, we first do ten minutes of totally ritualized swearing, humiliations like, "Fuck off, I will dig your mother up her grave and fuck her in her—" Disgusting. And then after ten minutes of this we said, "Okay, we did our duty, now we can talk like kind people
Paul Holdengräber
what we are." It's like a relief, you know. And I think that Lynch is deeply aware of it. This what Jack is doing there, this is not a wild outburst, my God. This is staged. This is learned staged. And that's the horror about horrible things. There is nothing natural about them. You know, what I have learned among other things—we don't have time to talk about it but
what we are." It's like a relief, you know. And I think that Lynch is deeply aware of it. This what Jack is doing there, this is not a wild outburst, my God. This is staged. This is learned staged. And that's the horror about horrible things. There is nothing natural about them. You know, what I have learned among other things—we don't have time to talk about it but
Slavoj Žižek
I want to express my deep respect for it—among other great thing that this country produced, Joshua Oppenheimer. You know, the documentary that The Act of Killing, whatever? That's the lesson that for them, the Indonesian right-wing murderers, to do it, they had to act. They had to identify with Hollywood with Humphrey Bogart, all the noir and so on and so on. No, all these wild outbursts, you act. You know, there's a—since we were mentioning Danish thinkers and you were mentioning Kierkegaard before, there's a line of Kierkegaard that I've always loved, where he said that the goal is to arrive at immediacy after reflection. Yeah, yeah, although one has to be here—but you wouldn't believe that because you don't think— Hegel. Hegel. Here I think the only problem I have with you— Because in a way, I'm—do you believe in such a thing as an immediacy, if if we're staged? You are talking with a Hegelian. As a Hegelian, I can prove anything to you, including— Okay. So, um— Yes, I believe, and I will tell you how. Hegel knew this. This is why Hegel was for monarchy. Hegel knew that in order to have a state of mediation, everybody works, constructs himself, you have to have an idiot on the top, who is, king is for Hegel an idiot, who is directly what he is by birth. He doesn't need any any any mediation. And what Hegel knew, again in a very Kierkegaardian way, is that you can sustain all the edifice of mediation but you need, like what Lacan calls le point de capiton, quilting point, you need an immediacy, which is not— This this is the perfect the the moment to ask you what, I mean, since we are going to be speaking and are already in some way speaking about our identities, what is in in an age of digital identity, a person? I I always have problems with persons because I think that person should be opposed to subject. Person is for me, maybe I'm wrong, this inner wealth of, you know, all the fears, your dreams blah blah, all that bullshit. Subject is something much more terrifying. Subject is a void. Person is here to mask the subject. I don't I think person is an excuse not to be subject. But okay, this is another—but I know what you want to say. I don't know what I want to say. But I know, that's why I know it. I say I know. I didn't say that you know. Of course you don't know. Who claimed that you know? No, no, it's obvious. But since we were talking about, um, indeterminacy and you you you took to task Hannah Arendt, I want to show a passage that you wanted to see from Casablanca. Ah, watch it and very carefully. Now, one of the advantages of these passages as compared to the one you saw before is they're very short. One minute. So if we could watch number two, please. [Scene from Casablanca plays] Go ahead and shoot. You'll be doing me a favor. Richard! I tried to stay away. I thought I would never see you again. That you're out of my life. The day you left Paris... if you knew what I went through. If
I want to express my deep respect for it—among other great thing that this country produced, Joshua Oppenheimer. You know, the documentary that The Act of Killing, whatever? That's the lesson that for them, the Indonesian right-wing murderers, to do it, they had to act. They had to identify with Hollywood with Humphrey Bogart, all the noir and so on and so on. No, all these wild outbursts, you act. You know, there's a—since we were mentioning Danish thinkers and you were mentioning Kierkegaard before, there's a line of Kierkegaard that I've always loved, where he said that the goal is to arrive at immediacy after reflection. Yeah, yeah, although one has to be here—but you wouldn't believe that because you don't think— Hegel. Hegel. Here I think the only problem I have with you— Because in a way, I'm—do you believe in such a thing as an immediacy, if if we're staged? You are talking with a Hegelian. As a Hegelian, I can prove anything to you, including— Okay. So, um— Yes, I believe, and I will tell you how. Hegel knew this. This is why Hegel was for monarchy. Hegel knew that in order to have a state of mediation, everybody works, constructs himself, you have to have an idiot on the top, who is, king is for Hegel an idiot, who is directly what he is by birth. He doesn't need any any any mediation. And what Hegel knew, again in a very Kierkegaardian way, is that you can sustain all the edifice of mediation but you need, like what Lacan calls le point de capiton, quilting point, you need an immediacy, which is not— This this is the perfect the the moment to ask you what, I mean, since we are going to be speaking and are already in some way speaking about our identities, what is in in an age of digital identity, a person? I I always have problems with persons because I think that person should be opposed to subject. Person is for me, maybe I'm wrong, this inner wealth of, you know, all the fears, your dreams blah blah, all that bullshit. Subject is something much more terrifying. Subject is a void. Person is here to mask the subject. I don't I think person is an excuse not to be subject. But okay, this is another—but I know what you want to say. I don't know what I want to say. But I know, that's why I know it. I say I know. I didn't say that you know. Of course you don't know. Who claimed that you know? No, no, it's obvious. But since we were talking about, um, indeterminacy and you you you took to task Hannah Arendt, I want to show a passage that you wanted to see from Casablanca. Ah, watch it and very carefully. Now, one of the advantages of these passages as compared to the one you saw before is they're very short. One minute. So if we could watch number two, please. [Scene from Casablanca plays] Go ahead and shoot. You'll be doing me a favor. Richard! I tried to stay away. I thought I would never see you again. That you're out of my life. The day you left Paris... if you knew what I went through. If
Paul Holdengräber
you knew how much I loved you. How much I still love you. The clip, the way you sent it to me it was five second—okay, but we can describe it— No, no, it's not problem. Was it turned off before? Discuss it. Okay, but let's go on. It's not a problem. Just to describe to you what happens then. We pass to the Casablanca airport tower. We see it for three and a half seconds, and then we return to Rick's,
you knew how much I loved you. How much I still love you. The clip, the way you sent it to me it was five second—okay, but we can describe it— No, no, it's not problem. Was it turned off before? Discuss it. Okay, but let's go on. It's not a problem. Just to describe to you what happens then. We pass to the Casablanca airport tower. We see it for three and a half seconds, and then we return to Rick's,
Slavoj Žižek
to Humphrey Bogart's room where he stands close to the door and the same conversation seems to go on. That was the point. Now, why I like immensely this scene? Because in its very simplicity, essays were written on it, it demonstrates the role of censorship, what can be seen, what cannot, what should not be seen, how they interact, and in this sense how ideology functions in Hollywood. Namely, when you see also ten seconds more, one big question arises, if you are a normal human person: did they do it or not? That is to say, are we really doing just with three seconds and a half of a blackout and then the same conversation goes on, or do these three seconds
to Humphrey Bogart's room where he stands close to the door and the same conversation seems to go on. That was the point. Now, why I like immensely this scene? Because in its very simplicity, essays were written on it, it demonstrates the role of censorship, what can be seen, what cannot, what should not be seen, how they interact, and in this sense how ideology functions in Hollywood. Namely, when you see also ten seconds more, one big question arises, if you are a normal human person: did they do it or not? That is to say, are we really doing just with three seconds and a half of a blackout and then the same conversation goes on, or do these three seconds
Paul Holdengräber
and a half of a tower stand for twenty minutes, half an hour, whatever you want, of intense sex? And the tower is also— Yeah, the stupid phallic symbol, yes. So
and a half of a tower stand for twenty minutes, half an hour, whatever you want, of intense sex? And the tower is also— Yeah, the stupid phallic symbol, yes. So
Slavoj Žižek
we have a whole series of signs that it did happen. First, in classical Hollywood, where direct mention of sex was prohibited, you know that it was extremely codified, like how you hinted at it. For example, in classical Hollywood, my God, Hays Code censorship was absolutely at the same level as Stalinist censorship, sometimes even worse. For example, homosexuality was not permitted even to mention it, but the way they did it is when a guy enters a room and somebody says, "Hmm, you have a perfume, what perfume do you wear? Did you put on you?" This means homosexuality. Or prostitution was prohibited to mention directly even as a topic, but when—this is very funny, dirty for me—when
we have a whole series of signs that it did happen. First, in classical Hollywood, where direct mention of sex was prohibited, you know that it was extremely codified, like how you hinted at it. For example, in classical Hollywood, my God, Hays Code censorship was absolutely at the same level as Stalinist censorship, sometimes even worse. For example, homosexuality was not permitted even to mention it, but the way they did it is when a guy enters a room and somebody says, "Hmm, you have a perfume, what perfume do you wear? Did you put on you?" This means homosexuality. Or prostitution was prohibited to mention directly even as a topic, but when—this is very funny, dirty for me—when
Paul Holdengräber
somebody says, "That woman
somebody says, "That woman
Slavoj Žižek
comes from New Orleans," this was the
comes from New Orleans," this was the
Paul Holdengräber
code for she is a prostitute. So along these lines, when a couple passionately embraces and then you have fade out, especially if what follows is this type of obvious symbol, phallic tower, it means sex. Another thing: after we return to them, they are smoking. They are smoking, which is— Which is also a standard—when you see a couple after a fade out smoking a cigarette, it means they did it before. So we have, then we have another line making it clear that they didn't do it. For example, the same conversation seems to go on, they're fully dressed,
code for she is a prostitute. So along these lines, when a couple passionately embraces and then you have fade out, especially if what follows is this type of obvious symbol, phallic tower, it means sex. Another thing: after we return to them, they are smoking. They are smoking, which is— Which is also a standard—when you see a couple after a fade out smoking a cigarette, it means they did it before. So we have, then we have another line making it clear that they didn't do it. For example, the same conversation seems to go on, they're fully dressed,
unknown
blah blah. And the the bed is made. Yeah, yeah. And then the so the way we should read it, I think, is: imagine
blah blah. And the the bed is made. Yeah, yeah. And then the so the way we should read it, I think, is: imagine
unknown
some authority telling you, "We will first present you a scene so
some authority telling you, "We will first present you a scene so
unknown
that you can claim innocence. 'I didn't do
that you can claim innocence. 'I didn't do
unknown
anything sinful, I can claim in the eyes of some moral authority that nothing happened, they just talked.' But at the same time, as if after you can claim your innocence in the eyes of some moral authority, at the same time we will give you a whole series of hints for your
anything sinful, I can claim in the eyes of some moral authority that nothing happened, they just talked.' But at the same time, as if after you can claim your innocence in the eyes of some moral authority, at the same time we will give you a whole series of hints for your
Slavoj Žižek
dirty imagination and so on." They, it is as if they offer you double identification. But they offer you also the possibility of being a
dirty imagination and so on." They, it is as if they offer you double identification. But they offer you also the possibility of being a
Paul Holdengräber
less or more or more sophisticated reader. Yeah, but but I think, now comes my point of critique of ideology, but I think that the ideal viewer is not a pure one who doesn't
less or more or more sophisticated reader. Yeah, but but I think, now comes my point of critique of ideology, but I think that the ideal viewer is not a pure one who doesn't
Slavoj Žižek
see, is precisely the one who plays on both levels. On ambivalence. Let me give you another example, very short, on ambivalence. There is a wonderful dialogue I quoted between Joseph Sternberg, you know, the Marlene Dietrich director, and one of the—I forgot who he was—the main guy of Hays Code, Breen, I think, Joseph Breen. And Joseph Breen is asking Sternberg, they are going through the scenario for a film with Marlene—to make it clear—like in scenario it just says, "They withdraw to a stack of," how do you call it, "dry grass, hay or whatever, and lie down." And Breen asks him, Sternberg, "What does this mean? Do they fuck or not?" And then Sternberg says, "Oh, it's not clear, it's poetry." And Joseph Breen, the censor: "Please tell me clearly. If they fuck, we will do it the way our censorship demands, but we will make it absolutely clear that they do." Everything was clear. So what interests me is that—this is my big lesson—ideology is not only this superficial line, you know, like "nothing happened," and then in a subversive way you get the other message. No, institutions also need—our society needs also this obscene other side. Ideology is not just the public text. Ideology is the public text and its obscene other side, which is even more forceful if it remains unspoken. Because you know that an author, I forgot him, wrote a short story, I forgot his name, twenty pages about this scene. You know what— Maltby, no? No, Maltby wrote a text on it theoretically, but he wrote a short story. It's like this: it describes Casablanca up to this point, you know, Marlene—sorry, Ingrid Bergman comes up, they embrace. And then at the end we are where we are, they start to talk again. But in between you have fifteen pages of extremely explicit sexuality, they do everything and so on. But I think this doesn't work. There are even some nice details there. He—no, no, sorry. What I mean is that he recontextualized—you know these famous lines from Casablanca, like one of them is Humphrey Bogart telling to her I think, "Here's one to you, kid," no? You know what happens in this story? He pulls out his penis and pushes his towards her mouth and says, "Here is one to you, kid," and so on. It's incredible. But what I want, I don't celebrate this. I think if you put it out in this way, you lose the effect. It's vulgar. So in in some way, in our world now, we're putting it out. Yeah, but I don't like this. I I don't like this. I think that then you get in some kind of an apparently sexualized but really very sterile universe, you know. I don't believe in putting it out all. No, I know. Yeah. I'm a conservative here, like. You know what I mean? No, no, but I know what you mean. But, um, let's get at what you mean. I mean, places such as, let's take for an example, let's take for an example Facebook, where you have to choose between different genders, between different, you know, gender—you and I have spoken a little bit about Jaron Lanier and his critique of that—there's a problem with the notion that we have to in some way identify. We we have to exclude. Okay. We can't have different ambivalent meanings in the same way. Yeah, but in a, okay. What interests me, if you ask me, in phenomena not only Facebook but generally these, let's call them staged identities, you know, like where you can invent a fake identity. I can be a straight man and I can construct my my digital web persona which is that of a promiscuous woman, of a gay person, whatever. The thing, it's obvious what I will say, the thing that interests me is how there can be more truth in the mask that you adopt than in your real inner self. I always believe in masks. I don't if you tear—I never believed in emancipatory potential of this gesture, let's tear off the masks. Okay, let me give you a— So keep the persona. Yeah, but why? Let me give you a simple example. Let us say that I am in reality a shy, impotent, stupid person, afraid, but then in internet interaction, I adopt a screen persona of a brutal, rapist guy who humiliates people, beats women and so on. It's too easy to say, "Oh, I'm really a coward but there I imagine to be a powerful macho." What if it's the opposite? What if I really am that, a brutal guy, but in real life, because of social pressure and so on, I oppress it? So that the the true mask is my authentic real self and truth the truth comes out precisely in the guise of a fiction. Which is why I like very much old-fashioned novels like—is it Mansfield Park or which—Jane Austen. You know this classical topos that there are a group of people, some of their lovers, who are too shy to act upon their love, but then, for example, if they're upper class, they decide to stage a play and as if by a miracle, the roles that are that they play there allow them to say on stage to the person they love that in real love they cannot say and so on and so on. I mean this is a very Nietzschean move of you, no? The notion that our truth is really the mask we put on. Yeah, although okay, that's another topic, my problems with Nietzsche and so on, you know. But yes, I I believe in this, I believe here in alienation, in alienation in the sense of, again, you need an external point of identification, the truth is out there, but not because we have to avoid our true inner self. Our true inner self is full of shit, it's misery, whatever. I never believed in, you know, getting deep into a person. If I go deep into anyone, I discover shit. We are all filthy, egotists, whatever.
see, is precisely the one who plays on both levels. On ambivalence. Let me give you another example, very short, on ambivalence. There is a wonderful dialogue I quoted between Joseph Sternberg, you know, the Marlene Dietrich director, and one of the—I forgot who he was—the main guy of Hays Code, Breen, I think, Joseph Breen. And Joseph Breen is asking Sternberg, they are going through the scenario for a film with Marlene—to make it clear—like in scenario it just says, "They withdraw to a stack of," how do you call it, "dry grass, hay or whatever, and lie down." And Breen asks him, Sternberg, "What does this mean? Do they fuck or not?" And then Sternberg says, "Oh, it's not clear, it's poetry." And Joseph Breen, the censor: "Please tell me clearly. If they fuck, we will do it the way our censorship demands, but we will make it absolutely clear that they do." Everything was clear. So what interests me is that—this is my big lesson—ideology is not only this superficial line, you know, like "nothing happened," and then in a subversive way you get the other message. No, institutions also need—our society needs also this obscene other side. Ideology is not just the public text. Ideology is the public text and its obscene other side, which is even more forceful if it remains unspoken. Because you know that an author, I forgot him, wrote a short story, I forgot his name, twenty pages about this scene. You know what— Maltby, no? No, Maltby wrote a text on it theoretically, but he wrote a short story. It's like this: it describes Casablanca up to this point, you know, Marlene—sorry, Ingrid Bergman comes up, they embrace. And then at the end we are where we are, they start to talk again. But in between you have fifteen pages of extremely explicit sexuality, they do everything and so on. But I think this doesn't work. There are even some nice details there. He—no, no, sorry. What I mean is that he recontextualized—you know these famous lines from Casablanca, like one of them is Humphrey Bogart telling to her I think, "Here's one to you, kid," no? You know what happens in this story? He pulls out his penis and pushes his towards her mouth and says, "Here is one to you, kid," and so on. It's incredible. But what I want, I don't celebrate this. I think if you put it out in this way, you lose the effect. It's vulgar. So in in some way, in our world now, we're putting it out. Yeah, but I don't like this. I I don't like this. I think that then you get in some kind of an apparently sexualized but really very sterile universe, you know. I don't believe in putting it out all. No, I know. Yeah. I'm a conservative here, like. You know what I mean? No, no, but I know what you mean. But, um, let's get at what you mean. I mean, places such as, let's take for an example, let's take for an example Facebook, where you have to choose between different genders, between different, you know, gender—you and I have spoken a little bit about Jaron Lanier and his critique of that—there's a problem with the notion that we have to in some way identify. We we have to exclude. Okay. We can't have different ambivalent meanings in the same way. Yeah, but in a, okay. What interests me, if you ask me, in phenomena not only Facebook but generally these, let's call them staged identities, you know, like where you can invent a fake identity. I can be a straight man and I can construct my my digital web persona which is that of a promiscuous woman, of a gay person, whatever. The thing, it's obvious what I will say, the thing that interests me is how there can be more truth in the mask that you adopt than in your real inner self. I always believe in masks. I don't if you tear—I never believed in emancipatory potential of this gesture, let's tear off the masks. Okay, let me give you a— So keep the persona. Yeah, but why? Let me give you a simple example. Let us say that I am in reality a shy, impotent, stupid person, afraid, but then in internet interaction, I adopt a screen persona of a brutal, rapist guy who humiliates people, beats women and so on. It's too easy to say, "Oh, I'm really a coward but there I imagine to be a powerful macho." What if it's the opposite? What if I really am that, a brutal guy, but in real life, because of social pressure and so on, I oppress it? So that the the true mask is my authentic real self and truth the truth comes out precisely in the guise of a fiction. Which is why I like very much old-fashioned novels like—is it Mansfield Park or which—Jane Austen. You know this classical topos that there are a group of people, some of their lovers, who are too shy to act upon their love, but then, for example, if they're upper class, they decide to stage a play and as if by a miracle, the roles that are that they play there allow them to say on stage to the person they love that in real love they cannot say and so on and so on. I mean this is a very Nietzschean move of you, no? The notion that our truth is really the mask we put on. Yeah, although okay, that's another topic, my problems with Nietzsche and so on, you know. But yes, I I believe in this, I believe here in alienation, in alienation in the sense of, again, you need an external point of identification, the truth is out there, but not because we have to avoid our true inner self. Our true inner self is full of shit, it's misery, whatever. I never believed in, you know, getting deep into a person. If I go deep into anyone, I discover shit. We are all filthy, egotists, whatever.
Paul Holdengräber
It doesn't interest me. I— So how so approaching
It doesn't interest me. I— So how so approaching
Slavoj Žižek
them in what way then to get to them? Again, what—I mean is that the wrong way of approaching? Yeah, because you know when you say approaching, you presuppose that people themselves are what they are. I don't think people are persons in the sense of they have some inner truth— So here you're answering the other question about the person. In a way, yes, that people are not persons in the sense that there is some inner truth, their dreams, whatever that makes the real core of a person. And I will give you an ultimate answer which I hope will convince you. Now I mean in an absolutely sincere way for a moment if you can forget my tasteless jokes. You know Jonathan Littell's Les Bienveillantes, yeah, the novel. I think what he did there is precisely in a way making the point that I like—that, you know, when you what
them in what way then to get to them? Again, what—I mean is that the wrong way of approaching? Yeah, because you know when you say approaching, you presuppose that people themselves are what they are. I don't think people are persons in the sense of they have some inner truth— So here you're answering the other question about the person. In a way, yes, that people are not persons in the sense that there is some inner truth, their dreams, whatever that makes the real core of a person. And I will give you an ultimate answer which I hope will convince you. Now I mean in an absolutely sincere way for a moment if you can forget my tasteless jokes. You know Jonathan Littell's Les Bienveillantes, yeah, the novel. I think what he did there is precisely in a way making the point that I like—that, you know, when you what
Paul Holdengräber
always bothers me is this disgusting,
always bothers me is this disgusting,
Slavoj Žižek
again, wisdom—ah, like I'm ready to shoot people who claim—there was a so-called multicultural wisdom which says "an enemy is a person whose inner story we don't know." The idea is clear: we hate
again, wisdom—ah, like I'm ready to shoot people who claim—there was a so-called multicultural wisdom which says "an enemy is a person whose inner story we don't know." The idea is clear: we hate
Paul Holdengräber
someone, but if we were to know his universe from within, we would have seen he also has his side of the story, his experience to tell. Maybe, maybe. But the truth of this is extremely limited, I think. Because what I always fascinated me is how if you take even the greatest criminals, Hitler, Stalin, whatever, murderers, I'm quite sure that each of them will be able to tell you a very authentic inner story and so on. I think that our inner truth when you really open open up yourself, you know, this
someone, but if we were to know his universe from within, we would have seen he also has his side of the story, his experience to tell. Maybe, maybe. But the truth of this is extremely limited, I think. Because what I always fascinated me is how if you take even the greatest criminals, Hitler, Stalin, whatever, murderers, I'm quite sure that each of them will be able to tell you a very authentic inner story and so on. I think that our inner truth when you really open open up yourself, you know, this
Slavoj Žižek
pathetic moment "this is what I am, these are my dreams, my deepest fears, desires," then you really lie. In the case of Nazis and so on, you have this deep inner story to avoid confronting the horror of what you are doing. I don't I think if some Nazi executioner were start to tell you about his inner experience, I would say, "I'm not, your truth is outside. Your truth is truth is what you did there in the camp. I'm not interested in your inner story." Precisely this is the basic Lacanian notion of fantasy as a constitutive lie. Our inner truth is the lie we construct to be able to live with the misery of our actual lives. I want to address you now with this notion that you have of pseudo-activity. Yeah. You you say, you write that the danger is not passivity but pseudo-activity. To what extent do you think the internet provides a perfect forum in which to engage in this form of pseudo-activity? That's a good point because what I want to—again, you're not totally stupid, as I said already yesterday— You said that yesterday and I try to keep that true today. Okay. No, quite seriously, what I, I think we should not understand what you just said and I'm not saying you do, we both agree here, in this obvious sense that, you know, instead of really making love or whatever we dream about it on the net and so on. It's not as simple as that, that internet is a medium where we just pretend to be active. No, it can be much more paradoxical. Real life, real activity can also be even more a pseudo-activity. You know, here, although I'm not such a great admirer of Stanley Kubrick, but there is a nice detail from the very end of his Eyes Wide Shut or what. You remember after they get lost in these fantasies, dreams, yes, at the very end of the film, Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman met I think in some department store and does she tell him or he her, it doesn't matter, something like, "Listen, we have to do something, we
pathetic moment "this is what I am, these are my dreams, my deepest fears, desires," then you really lie. In the case of Nazis and so on, you have this deep inner story to avoid confronting the horror of what you are doing. I don't I think if some Nazi executioner were start to tell you about his inner experience, I would say, "I'm not, your truth is outside. Your truth is truth is what you did there in the camp. I'm not interested in your inner story." Precisely this is the basic Lacanian notion of fantasy as a constitutive lie. Our inner truth is the lie we construct to be able to live with the misery of our actual lives. I want to address you now with this notion that you have of pseudo-activity. Yeah. You you say, you write that the danger is not passivity but pseudo-activity. To what extent do you think the internet provides a perfect forum in which to engage in this form of pseudo-activity? That's a good point because what I want to—again, you're not totally stupid, as I said already yesterday— You said that yesterday and I try to keep that true today. Okay. No, quite seriously, what I, I think we should not understand what you just said and I'm not saying you do, we both agree here, in this obvious sense that, you know, instead of really making love or whatever we dream about it on the net and so on. It's not as simple as that, that internet is a medium where we just pretend to be active. No, it can be much more paradoxical. Real life, real activity can also be even more a pseudo-activity. You know, here, although I'm not such a great admirer of Stanley Kubrick, but there is a nice detail from the very end of his Eyes Wide Shut or what. You remember after they get lost in these fantasies, dreams, yes, at the very end of the film, Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman met I think in some department store and does she tell him or he her, it doesn't matter, something like, "Listen, we have to do something, we
Paul Holdengräber
have to go home and fuck quickly." I think this is an escape from the real. The lesson is not,
have to go home and fuck quickly." I think this is an escape from the real. The lesson is not,
Slavoj Žižek
we were caught in all that dreaming because we didn't have enough real activity, sex. No, the lesson is that all those crazy dreams about which the film is, confronted them with this excessive real of their passion, and sex would be there applied precisely to avoid that trauma. The their dreams were more traumatic, more real than the real activity. And I think this is how ideology really works, where you don't escape into fantasy in order to avoid doing it really. No, you construct your real activity itself as an escape. An example that I always use, I'm sorry if I'm repetitive: charity
we were caught in all that dreaming because we didn't have enough real activity, sex. No, the lesson is that all those crazy dreams about which the film is, confronted them with this excessive real of their passion, and sex would be there applied precisely to avoid that trauma. The their dreams were more traumatic, more real than the real activity. And I think this is how ideology really works, where you don't escape into fantasy in order to avoid doing it really. No, you construct your real activity itself as an escape. An example that I always use, I'm sorry if I'm repetitive: charity
Paul Holdengräber
activity. We like, we like like to do it, you know, "Oh my God, children starving in Africa, I give five
activity. We like, we like like to do it, you know, "Oh my God, children starving in Africa, I give five
Slavoj Žižek
Euros per month whatever to help." I think that or for me the ultimate pseudo-activity: ecology. Pseudo this personalized— We need to save the planet. No, that's okay, maybe,
Euros per month whatever to help." I think that or for me the ultimate pseudo-activity: ecology. Pseudo this personalized— We need to save the planet. No, that's okay, maybe,
Paul Holdengräber
although I'm more on on Trier's side,
although I'm more on on Trier's side,
Slavoj Žižek
Melancholia, but maybe we should save the planet. But what I mean is that this pseudo-personalized ecology which makes you personally responsible and then they say, "Okay, but what did you do about it?" And then— The ideology has an answer to you. Did you, did you, did you put together for for recycling all the newspapers? Did you separate all Coca-Cola cans and so on? As if, you know, you do these small things and you did your duty. This I think is an absolute example of pseudo-activity. We are, this is offered to us so that we don't have to think about it and really to do something. Then you can say to, "Okay, I separated my Coke cans, I did the cans, I did put newspapers aside, okay, I did my duty towards the Mother Earth and now I can have my go on without changing anything." This would be an example and believe of pseudo-activity. Because you can believe me, I know what is pseudo-activity because I embody it. I am, everybody who watches me more than five minutes knows, I'm a perfect obsessional neurotic. And this is what obsessional neurotics are doing: they are hyperactive all the time, not in order to achieve something, but in order to prevent that something would happen. For example, you can imagine— Do you think that your your delivery, your talking as powerfully and as intensely, no, is a way of avoiding? Yeah. At some level I believe. No, let me give you an example. So so in fact, when you're talking so intensely with me now and delivering these beliefs, you you you don't remain silent because it might reveal something, the silence. Okay, now you are too deep for me. I don't like to analyze myself. But what I want to say is I clearly remember when I was thirty years ago in analysis— But there could be some truth to what I'm saying. Yeah, yeah, yeah. No, sorry. What I want to say is that when I was in psychoanalysis, I clearly remember for just a couple of months then I got tired of it. As you can imagine, I talked all the time. You know why? Because I was afraid that if I stop talking, the analyst may ask me a
Melancholia, but maybe we should save the planet. But what I mean is that this pseudo-personalized ecology which makes you personally responsible and then they say, "Okay, but what did you do about it?" And then— The ideology has an answer to you. Did you, did you, did you put together for for recycling all the newspapers? Did you separate all Coca-Cola cans and so on? As if, you know, you do these small things and you did your duty. This I think is an absolute example of pseudo-activity. We are, this is offered to us so that we don't have to think about it and really to do something. Then you can say to, "Okay, I separated my Coke cans, I did the cans, I did put newspapers aside, okay, I did my duty towards the Mother Earth and now I can have my go on without changing anything." This would be an example and believe of pseudo-activity. Because you can believe me, I know what is pseudo-activity because I embody it. I am, everybody who watches me more than five minutes knows, I'm a perfect obsessional neurotic. And this is what obsessional neurotics are doing: they are hyperactive all the time, not in order to achieve something, but in order to prevent that something would happen. For example, you can imagine— Do you think that your your delivery, your talking as powerfully and as intensely, no, is a way of avoiding? Yeah. At some level I believe. No, let me give you an example. So so in fact, when you're talking so intensely with me now and delivering these beliefs, you you you don't remain silent because it might reveal something, the silence. Okay, now you are too deep for me. I don't like to analyze myself. But what I want to say is I clearly remember when I was thirty years ago in analysis— But there could be some truth to what I'm saying. Yeah, yeah, yeah. No, sorry. What I want to say is that when I was in psychoanalysis, I clearly remember for just a couple of months then I got tired of it. As you can imagine, I talked all the time. You know why? Because I was afraid that if I stop talking, the analyst may ask me a
Paul Holdengräber
really unpleasant question, you know, which would really touch something in me. So I talked all the time just to keep him quiet. And then he said, "Okay, for today we are finished, fuck off." Perfect, I go, you know. This is pseudo-activity. And I think today, even politically, we are full of pseudo-activities. We do things not in order really to change something, but just to make it sure that nothing will change. Which is why I think that sometimes the truly
really unpleasant question, you know, which would really touch something in me. So I talked all the time just to keep him quiet. And then he said, "Okay, for today we are finished, fuck off." Perfect, I go, you know. This is pseudo-activity. And I think today, even politically, we are full of pseudo-activities. We do things not in order really to change something, but just to make it sure that nothing will change. Which is why I think that sometimes the truly
Slavoj Žižek
subversive thing is to do nothing. You know, because by doing nothing you make people feel, feel what through all their hyperactivity they are covering. Do you think the internet does that to some extent? I mean in— Not necessarily. Not necessarily. But in a sense for instance, I know you've written about porn and the internet. And so in a sense watching porn on the internet, and watching porn, we don't do anything. Yeah, but the—here things are more complicated. First, I think the lesson of so-called virtual sex, it's a much more tragic one. It's not this humanized idea, "There was some good old time when sex were authentic encounter with a real flesh-and-blood person and now we are just doing virtual." No, what we learned through virtual sex is that sex in a way always was virtual. Virtual in the sense that I already described it. Yeah. That precisely—how to put it—Lacan, Jacques Lacan says somewhere I think that real sex—that sex has a structure of masturbation. In the sense that, as I said already before, you are never alone with your partner. You need a fantasy. It may be even the fantasy about this partner, you know, a certain detail, how she smiles, what to do blah blah, and you basically use the partner as a kind of a masturbatory tool to enact your fantasy. It's never you are never just alone with the partner. So, this is the Lacanian twist. We, how do we usually describe masturbation? As doing it but just with an imagined partner, you do it to yourself, you imagine. But I think— You know you know the Woody Allen line that masturbating is making love to someone I love really dearly. Yeah, which is your fantasy image of your—yeah, yeah. Because again, if this is masturbation, doing it to yourself but with an imagined partner, Lacan Lacan's reply would have been that real sex is just masturbation with a real partner, you know. And I think, now we come to pseudo-activity and all that. I did a year ago The Guardian asked me some stupid question about is there still passion today, how to revive sex? And I there gave the only possible formula of authentic love. My idea was this one. I'm sorry if you know the joke. You know how today we have not only dildos, that is to say plastic penises, we also already have mechanic vaginas. They are called where I read a strange name, I love it: uh uh uh, stimulating training unit, something, it's horrible. It looked like a battery and then you take the top off and it has the entrance and then you can even replace entrance with something which looks like vaginal openings, anal opening or mouth, then you can regulate the density, how it shakes and so on. So my idea for authentic sex today was this one. It answers I think your question about pseudo-activity blah blah. Let's say I make a date with a lady. We're all serious people who would do that naked, you are there mingling on bed, that's not for decent people. You do this: she brings her dildo, I bring my vagina, we put both machines on, we put dildo into vagina and we just listen to the buzzing and let's say you're my lady and then
subversive thing is to do nothing. You know, because by doing nothing you make people feel, feel what through all their hyperactivity they are covering. Do you think the internet does that to some extent? I mean in— Not necessarily. Not necessarily. But in a sense for instance, I know you've written about porn and the internet. And so in a sense watching porn on the internet, and watching porn, we don't do anything. Yeah, but the—here things are more complicated. First, I think the lesson of so-called virtual sex, it's a much more tragic one. It's not this humanized idea, "There was some good old time when sex were authentic encounter with a real flesh-and-blood person and now we are just doing virtual." No, what we learned through virtual sex is that sex in a way always was virtual. Virtual in the sense that I already described it. Yeah. That precisely—how to put it—Lacan, Jacques Lacan says somewhere I think that real sex—that sex has a structure of masturbation. In the sense that, as I said already before, you are never alone with your partner. You need a fantasy. It may be even the fantasy about this partner, you know, a certain detail, how she smiles, what to do blah blah, and you basically use the partner as a kind of a masturbatory tool to enact your fantasy. It's never you are never just alone with the partner. So, this is the Lacanian twist. We, how do we usually describe masturbation? As doing it but just with an imagined partner, you do it to yourself, you imagine. But I think— You know you know the Woody Allen line that masturbating is making love to someone I love really dearly. Yeah, which is your fantasy image of your—yeah, yeah. Because again, if this is masturbation, doing it to yourself but with an imagined partner, Lacan Lacan's reply would have been that real sex is just masturbation with a real partner, you know. And I think, now we come to pseudo-activity and all that. I did a year ago The Guardian asked me some stupid question about is there still passion today, how to revive sex? And I there gave the only possible formula of authentic love. My idea was this one. I'm sorry if you know the joke. You know how today we have not only dildos, that is to say plastic penises, we also already have mechanic vaginas. They are called where I read a strange name, I love it: uh uh uh, stimulating training unit, something, it's horrible. It looked like a battery and then you take the top off and it has the entrance and then you can even replace entrance with something which looks like vaginal openings, anal opening or mouth, then you can regulate the density, how it shakes and so on. So my idea for authentic sex today was this one. It answers I think your question about pseudo-activity blah blah. Let's say I make a date with a lady. We're all serious people who would do that naked, you are there mingling on bed, that's not for decent people. You do this: she brings her dildo, I bring my vagina, we put both machines on, we put dildo into vagina and we just listen to the buzzing and let's say you're my lady and then
Paul Holdengräber
we drink tea, we have a nice conversation and they are doing the business for us, you know. But now comes my miracle. Our duty to enjoy is covered there. And maybe, if you're a lady, maybe, just maybe, while we are just talking and the machines are doing the superego job of enjoying for
we drink tea, we have a nice conversation and they are doing the business for us, you know. But now comes my miracle. Our duty to enjoy is covered there. And maybe, if you're a lady, maybe, just maybe, while we are just talking and the machines are doing the superego job of enjoying for
Slavoj Žižek
us, our hands touch, we embrace, and that would have been the true sex, you know. Not the not the superego duty you have
us, our hands touch, we embrace, and that would have been the true sex, you know. Not the not the superego duty you have
Paul Holdengräber
to
to
Slavoj Žižek
do it there. Because— I must say it's tempting. Sorry? Yeah, but if we do it, machines will only do it. With you, no hand touching, you know, I warn you. No, sorry, another story along the same lines so that I explain it to them. Because you know the lesson of psychoanalysis is often here the opposite one. It's not that, you know, usually people think the lesson of psychoanalysis is whatever you do you think about that, you know. It's all about sex. No, it's much more tragic. My friend, the British Lacanian psychoanalyst Darian Leader told me a wonderful story that happened to him with a patient. A patient told him how once he wanted to seduce a lady, so he took her to a hotel which had a restaurant down there, the idea was first to invite her for a
do it there. Because— I must say it's tempting. Sorry? Yeah, but if we do it, machines will only do it. With you, no hand touching, you know, I warn you. No, sorry, another story along the same lines so that I explain it to them. Because you know the lesson of psychoanalysis is often here the opposite one. It's not that, you know, usually people think the lesson of psychoanalysis is whatever you do you think about that, you know. It's all about sex. No, it's much more tragic. My friend, the British Lacanian psychoanalyst Darian Leader told me a wonderful story that happened to him with a patient. A patient told him how once he wanted to seduce a lady, so he took her to a hotel which had a restaurant down there, the idea was first to invite her for a
Paul Holdengräber
dinner and then of course afterwards to take her up to the room. But he made a Freudian slip. When they entered the restaurant, instead of saying, "A table for two, please," he said to the waiter, "A bed for two, please."
dinner and then of course afterwards to take her up to the room. But he made a Freudian slip. When they entered the restaurant, instead of saying, "A table for two, please," he said to the waiter, "A bed for two, please."
Slavoj Žižek
Now comes, ah, the true Lacanian spirit of Darian Leader. He says we absolutely should not read this as a kind of a pleasurable precipitation: who cares about eating, I really want just to sleep with her. He said it's the opposite. He was afraid that he will enjoy eating more than sex, so that you know he will forget about the official excuse, so this "bed for two" was rather a reminder, "Wait a minute, I should not forget what's my real aim, I must not take too much pleasure in just—" Because this is the problem today, I claim. Today our the structure even of sexual life is more and more this perverse one, because this is the definition of perversion. You take one of these first steps and you forget about the big act, you just you just do this, no? So in a way, let me just another short digression. The tragedy today with sex, I claim, is that precisely because maybe of our permissiveness, it's disappearing. What do I mean here? Did you notice how my good friend Alain Badiou drew my attention to it. Did you notice how we are in a way returning to pre-modern times of arranged marriages, only this time they are not old wise women, relatives who do it, but dating agencies and so on and so on. Internet dating. Yeah, and you know what happens there? Badiou found a wonderful formula in a French agency, dating agency used it in advertisement and I found the same formula in an American dating agency. Namely, you in your language do not have this expression but in English and in French they have it. You use the verb to fall, tomber amoureux, to to fall in love. The phrase they use is: use our agency and we will enable you to be in love without the fall. And that's the horror today. Fall means, you know, that's my God all that love is for me, that traumatic encounter I— But but here, sorry, fall is the traumatic encounter so, Slavoj, there is a real moment where something can happen. Yeah, but precisely all this— But no but it can, in other words— Absolutely. To a romantic here, there is true love, absolutely. And there there is fall and there is the biblical image and there's a falling down and falling as failing and falling as opening. Yeah, absolutely. So there is there is such a thing. Absolutely. I thought there wasn't, though. Are you a Jew at all? I I No, but I had a suspicion that you are a pagan. No, no no, but I thought there wasn't, I thought— No, truly. No, there is, but wait a minute, even intelligent Christians know felix culpa and so on, that the fall is the greatest thing that can happen to humanity, you know. That's the whole point of the Bible. But so there is a moment when actually you do encounter the other. Yes. Absolutely. No, I'm not some stupid postmodernist, you know. But you also you also encounter them not only through falling, but through a habit of going back and back and getting to know them better? No, this I doubt. Wait a minute, you had an interview with Adam Phillips, yes, where the two of you made this point very clear. The falsity of this self-knowledge and so on and so on. Fall happens without self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is a big escape for me from the real of an encounter. So, um— No, but sorry, just to finish this point. You know then where I saw the confirmation of this? And it makes me very sad, I'm a romantic here. Did you notice something weird in the lowest popular culture? Did you notice that for example Quantum of Solace, which is otherwise a good James Bond, politically progressive, to cut a long story short, James Bond there saves Morales regime in Bolivia from right-wing coup. But did you notice it's the first James Bond in which at the end there is no sex between Bond and Bond girl? It's just they embrace and oh they are too traumatized. Then let's go even much lower. Dan Brown. Did you notice how in his The Da Vinci Code, no sex between Langdon and Sophie, the grand-grand-granddaughter of Christ. In Angels and Demons, things are even worse. There there is sex in the novel, but not in the movie. Where are we coming? In the good old days, Hollywood was adding sex to commercialize the story. Now Hollywood is deleting sex. And I think the lesson is very sad. We live in time where you are called to enjoy, but you know the joke that I always repeat, a controlled, safe enjoyment. Safe sex, you know, like or like do it but carefully, don't be excessive and so on. I think that today more and more a passionate love attachment where, you know, real madness, like you are madly in love, you are ready to risk anything for it, is considered pathological. I mean what society is telling us today? It's some kind of an experimental half-Buddhist hedonism: change your life, experiment, an adventure here, an adventure there, but don't take too seriously your attachment, remain free and so on. This is the cheap pseudo-Buddhism that we get. You know, this is how our hedonism—no wonder Richard Gere is a Tibetan Buddhist—we apply to it this Buddhist wisdom: don't get too attached to worldly objects. No, but what you're saying is get attached. Absolutely, to the end, totally attached, totally attached. Fall, fall to the end. Before we before we conclude and fall totally, I want to mention something to you. I want to read a— Yeah, but you will fall deeper. You know what's my joke with him? When we will be both in hell, I will be only in the boiling oil up to here. You know why? Because I will be standing on his arms, you know. I'm sorry. English novelist. Which one? Jonathan Coe wrote in the London Review of Books about political satire and how it may be doing more harm than good. This is what he writes: "These days, every politician is a laughingstock, and the laughter which occasionally used to illuminate the dark corners of the
Now comes, ah, the true Lacanian spirit of Darian Leader. He says we absolutely should not read this as a kind of a pleasurable precipitation: who cares about eating, I really want just to sleep with her. He said it's the opposite. He was afraid that he will enjoy eating more than sex, so that you know he will forget about the official excuse, so this "bed for two" was rather a reminder, "Wait a minute, I should not forget what's my real aim, I must not take too much pleasure in just—" Because this is the problem today, I claim. Today our the structure even of sexual life is more and more this perverse one, because this is the definition of perversion. You take one of these first steps and you forget about the big act, you just you just do this, no? So in a way, let me just another short digression. The tragedy today with sex, I claim, is that precisely because maybe of our permissiveness, it's disappearing. What do I mean here? Did you notice how my good friend Alain Badiou drew my attention to it. Did you notice how we are in a way returning to pre-modern times of arranged marriages, only this time they are not old wise women, relatives who do it, but dating agencies and so on and so on. Internet dating. Yeah, and you know what happens there? Badiou found a wonderful formula in a French agency, dating agency used it in advertisement and I found the same formula in an American dating agency. Namely, you in your language do not have this expression but in English and in French they have it. You use the verb to fall, tomber amoureux, to to fall in love. The phrase they use is: use our agency and we will enable you to be in love without the fall. And that's the horror today. Fall means, you know, that's my God all that love is for me, that traumatic encounter I— But but here, sorry, fall is the traumatic encounter so, Slavoj, there is a real moment where something can happen. Yeah, but precisely all this— But no but it can, in other words— Absolutely. To a romantic here, there is true love, absolutely. And there there is fall and there is the biblical image and there's a falling down and falling as failing and falling as opening. Yeah, absolutely. So there is there is such a thing. Absolutely. I thought there wasn't, though. Are you a Jew at all? I I No, but I had a suspicion that you are a pagan. No, no no, but I thought there wasn't, I thought— No, truly. No, there is, but wait a minute, even intelligent Christians know felix culpa and so on, that the fall is the greatest thing that can happen to humanity, you know. That's the whole point of the Bible. But so there is a moment when actually you do encounter the other. Yes. Absolutely. No, I'm not some stupid postmodernist, you know. But you also you also encounter them not only through falling, but through a habit of going back and back and getting to know them better? No, this I doubt. Wait a minute, you had an interview with Adam Phillips, yes, where the two of you made this point very clear. The falsity of this self-knowledge and so on and so on. Fall happens without self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is a big escape for me from the real of an encounter. So, um— No, but sorry, just to finish this point. You know then where I saw the confirmation of this? And it makes me very sad, I'm a romantic here. Did you notice something weird in the lowest popular culture? Did you notice that for example Quantum of Solace, which is otherwise a good James Bond, politically progressive, to cut a long story short, James Bond there saves Morales regime in Bolivia from right-wing coup. But did you notice it's the first James Bond in which at the end there is no sex between Bond and Bond girl? It's just they embrace and oh they are too traumatized. Then let's go even much lower. Dan Brown. Did you notice how in his The Da Vinci Code, no sex between Langdon and Sophie, the grand-grand-granddaughter of Christ. In Angels and Demons, things are even worse. There there is sex in the novel, but not in the movie. Where are we coming? In the good old days, Hollywood was adding sex to commercialize the story. Now Hollywood is deleting sex. And I think the lesson is very sad. We live in time where you are called to enjoy, but you know the joke that I always repeat, a controlled, safe enjoyment. Safe sex, you know, like or like do it but carefully, don't be excessive and so on. I think that today more and more a passionate love attachment where, you know, real madness, like you are madly in love, you are ready to risk anything for it, is considered pathological. I mean what society is telling us today? It's some kind of an experimental half-Buddhist hedonism: change your life, experiment, an adventure here, an adventure there, but don't take too seriously your attachment, remain free and so on. This is the cheap pseudo-Buddhism that we get. You know, this is how our hedonism—no wonder Richard Gere is a Tibetan Buddhist—we apply to it this Buddhist wisdom: don't get too attached to worldly objects. No, but what you're saying is get attached. Absolutely, to the end, totally attached, totally attached. Fall, fall to the end. Before we before we conclude and fall totally, I want to mention something to you. I want to read a— Yeah, but you will fall deeper. You know what's my joke with him? When we will be both in hell, I will be only in the boiling oil up to here. You know why? Because I will be standing on his arms, you know. I'm sorry. English novelist. Which one? Jonathan Coe wrote in the London Review of Books about political satire and how it may be doing more harm than good. This is what he writes: "These days, every politician is a laughingstock, and the laughter which occasionally used to illuminate the dark corners of the
Paul Holdengräber
political world with dazzling, unexpected shafts of hilarity has become an unthinking reflex on our part, a
political world with dazzling, unexpected shafts of hilarity has become an unthinking reflex on our part, a
Slavoj Žižek
tired Pavlovian reaction to situations that are too difficult
tired Pavlovian reaction to situations that are too difficult
Paul Holdengräber
or too depressing to think about clearly. Boris Johnson, the Conservative mayor of London, seems to know this. He seems to know that the laughter that surrounds him is a substitute for thought rather than its conduit, and that puts him at a wonderful advantage. If we are chuckling at him, we are not
or too depressing to think about clearly. Boris Johnson, the Conservative mayor of London, seems to know this. He seems to know that the laughter that surrounds him is a substitute for thought rather than its conduit, and that puts him at a wonderful advantage. If we are chuckling at him, we are not
Slavoj Žižek
likely to be thinking too hard about his doggedly neoliberal and pro-City agenda, let alone doing anything to counter it. With a true genius
likely to be thinking too hard about his doggedly neoliberal and pro-City agenda, let alone doing anything to counter it. With a true genius
Paul Holdengräber
for taking the temperature of a country that has
for taking the temperature of a country that has
Slavoj Žižek
never been closer to sinking temperature, sniggering beneath the watery main,
never been closer to sinking temperature, sniggering beneath the watery main,
Paul Holdengräber
Boris Johnson has become his own satirist. Safe, above all, in the knowledge that the best way to make sure the satire aimed at you is gentle and unchallenging is to create it yourself."
Boris Johnson has become his own satirist. Safe, above all, in the knowledge that the best way to make sure the satire aimed at you is gentle and unchallenging is to create it yourself."
Slavoj Žižek
Do you agree with this? Absolutely. And I will tell you why. First, one first line of associations is that I remember when I was much younger, remember when Umberto Eco published his Name of the Rose. In ex-Yugoslavia this was still—we immediately got engaged in a tremendous debate and me and my friends were absolutely opposed to the novel in the sense of, you know, the basic idea, laughter is liberating. No, totalitarian power also laughs. So, generally, I'm opposed to this idea, power is dignified, when you mock it, you are doing something subversive. Maybe, maybe not, as this guy says. Quite often laughter functions as the best way to neutralize effective reflection, criticism. You know who knew this also very well? Communist regimes. There was a rumor which is unfortunately a wrong one, but it indicates a deep truth. In Russian friends tell me that even in Russia, in Yugoslavia, there was this rumor that secret police had a special sub-department whose task was only to produce political jokes and they were then put into circulation, you know, to give ordinary people a simple means to laugh and to prevent them—I don't think this was happening. I know people were even put to prison for it. But I nonetheless claim that political jokes in communist countries had followed this logic. There was nothing subversive in them. Does any of this happen to you, um, that in some way people—a different way? I absolutely. You know what I mean? In other words, in other words— I know because there are people people who who write for big American weeklies like The New Yorker, people can characterize you in a certain way, can consider you to be a buffoon, can consider you all the time. Yeah. So how do you how do you reconcile yourself, or not, with— Okay, partially, I must say maybe I am co-responsible for it. But basically I think this is a defense against me in the sense that, you know, this standard line, "Oh, go to Žižek's talk, he is amusing, he is a little bit crazy, don't take it
Do you agree with this? Absolutely. And I will tell you why. First, one first line of associations is that I remember when I was much younger, remember when Umberto Eco published his Name of the Rose. In ex-Yugoslavia this was still—we immediately got engaged in a tremendous debate and me and my friends were absolutely opposed to the novel in the sense of, you know, the basic idea, laughter is liberating. No, totalitarian power also laughs. So, generally, I'm opposed to this idea, power is dignified, when you mock it, you are doing something subversive. Maybe, maybe not, as this guy says. Quite often laughter functions as the best way to neutralize effective reflection, criticism. You know who knew this also very well? Communist regimes. There was a rumor which is unfortunately a wrong one, but it indicates a deep truth. In Russian friends tell me that even in Russia, in Yugoslavia, there was this rumor that secret police had a special sub-department whose task was only to produce political jokes and they were then put into circulation, you know, to give ordinary people a simple means to laugh and to prevent them—I don't think this was happening. I know people were even put to prison for it. But I nonetheless claim that political jokes in communist countries had followed this logic. There was nothing subversive in them. Does any of this happen to you, um, that in some way people—a different way? I absolutely. You know what I mean? In other words, in other words— I know because there are people people who who write for big American weeklies like The New Yorker, people can characterize you in a certain way, can consider you to be a buffoon, can consider you all the time. Yeah. So how do you how do you reconcile yourself, or not, with— Okay, partially, I must say maybe I am co-responsible for it. But basically I think this is a defense against me in the sense that, you know, this standard line, "Oh, go to Žižek's talk, he is amusing, he is a little bit crazy, don't take it
Paul Holdengräber
too seriously." And and so they don't take—so in effect, the point is that the the jokes
too seriously." And and so they don't take—so in effect, the point is that the the jokes
Slavoj Žižek
you tell, which are many, can make us laugh the message— Yeah, but I nonetheless accept the game. You know why? I know well you not accept it, you you make it. Yeah, you know why? Because I nonetheless
you tell, which are many, can make us laugh the message— Yeah, but I nonetheless accept the game. You know why? I know well you not accept it, you you make it. Yeah, you know why? Because I nonetheless
Paul Holdengräber
think that this logic doesn't work. Like at the same time they cannot swallow my jokes, you know. I was already interrupted, accused of political incorrectness and so on. But now there is a new line, best epitomized by that crazy attack on me in The New Republic, Adam Kirsch. The title says everything: "Deadly Jester." The idea is, superficially he is a buffoon, but be careful, beneath it there is a deadly totalitarian, antisemitic, Stalinist, whatever you want, message, no? So now there is a new dogma on me, you know. It's no longer "he is a buffoon" but "the buffoon is a mask of something even more dangerous, deadly," and so on. So what can be done? Nothing. Read my books. I'm very naive here. Read my books. I put work— You know but they can be read much like the Casablanca passage in so many different ways so that you can be accused of antisemitism, you can be accused of all kinds of things that— Yeah, but here I'm very naive, you know, in the sense that no, I really think that I put my argumentation straight in that if you read me in a minimally honest way—by honest I don't mean anything mystic but just simply attentively—that it's absolutely impossible
think that this logic doesn't work. Like at the same time they cannot swallow my jokes, you know. I was already interrupted, accused of political incorrectness and so on. But now there is a new line, best epitomized by that crazy attack on me in The New Republic, Adam Kirsch. The title says everything: "Deadly Jester." The idea is, superficially he is a buffoon, but be careful, beneath it there is a deadly totalitarian, antisemitic, Stalinist, whatever you want, message, no? So now there is a new dogma on me, you know. It's no longer "he is a buffoon" but "the buffoon is a mask of something even more dangerous, deadly," and so on. So what can be done? Nothing. Read my books. I'm very naive here. Read my books. I put work— You know but they can be read much like the Casablanca passage in so many different ways so that you can be accused of antisemitism, you can be accused of all kinds of things that— Yeah, but here I'm very naive, you know, in the sense that no, I really think that I put my argumentation straight in that if you read me in a minimally honest way—by honest I don't mean anything mystic but just simply attentively—that it's absolutely impossible
Slavoj Žižek
to accuse me of anti—let's take the royal example of it, I love it. My Welcome to the Desert of the Real, the September book, was translated in Israel and also in Egypt. And you know what friends from both countries told me? I love this. The same book—so you can't say I write for one people like this, for other people the opposite—the same book: Jerusalem Post or some other attacked it as as brutal open antisemitism and Al-Ahram attacked it as the most perfidious Zionist propaganda. If this happens, maybe I'm doing something right, I claim. No, and and it reminds me, you know, of that wonderful line of Rilke where he says that fame is but the collection of misunderstandings that gather around a new name. But as yes, I agree, but as your great guy Kierkegaard knew it, no? You cannot you should not play the pseudo-authenticity here and simply say "fuck fame, this is what I really am." Kierkegaard was deeply, deeply aware of how you need a certain persona, maybe even a ridiculous public mask. Didn't he, I read in a biography of Kierkegaard, like he said, "It's crucial for me to show myself when I'm here almost every evening in theater, to go to certain—" You know, he was well well aware of this. So I'm I'm ready to to assume to assume this
to accuse me of anti—let's take the royal example of it, I love it. My Welcome to the Desert of the Real, the September book, was translated in Israel and also in Egypt. And you know what friends from both countries told me? I love this. The same book—so you can't say I write for one people like this, for other people the opposite—the same book: Jerusalem Post or some other attacked it as as brutal open antisemitism and Al-Ahram attacked it as the most perfidious Zionist propaganda. If this happens, maybe I'm doing something right, I claim. No, and and it reminds me, you know, of that wonderful line of Rilke where he says that fame is but the collection of misunderstandings that gather around a new name. But as yes, I agree, but as your great guy Kierkegaard knew it, no? You cannot you should not play the pseudo-authenticity here and simply say "fuck fame, this is what I really am." Kierkegaard was deeply, deeply aware of how you need a certain persona, maybe even a ridiculous public mask. Didn't he, I read in a biography of Kierkegaard, like he said, "It's crucial for me to show myself when I'm here almost every evening in theater, to go to certain—" You know, he was well well aware of this. So I'm I'm ready to to assume to assume this
Paul Holdengräber
risk. You know, we had about six or seven clips we wanted to show, and— We
risk. You know, we had about six or seven clips we wanted to show, and— We
Slavoj Žižek
can do a quickie, just— Sure. Shall we do one? Let's do
can do a quickie, just— Sure. Shall we do one? Let's do
Paul Holdengräber
the painful one, my God. Let's stay with Lynch, we don't have time for for Hitchcock. Let's do number seven, Wild at Heart. Seven. [Scene from Wild at Heart plays] Don't jump back so slow. I thought you was a bunny. Bunny jump fast. You
the painful one, my God. Let's stay with Lynch, we don't have time for for Hitchcock. Let's do number seven, Wild at Heart. Seven. [Scene from Wild at Heart plays] Don't jump back so slow. I thought you was a bunny. Bunny jump fast. You
Slavoj Žižek
jump back so slow. Means something. Means something to me. Means you want Bobby Peru. You want Bobby Peru to fuck you hard, baby. Open you up like a Christmas present. You want me to do it? Just a simple yes or no. Just feel me
jump back so slow. Means something. Means something to me. Means you want Bobby Peru. You want Bobby Peru to fuck you hard, baby. Open you up like a Christmas present. You want me to do it? Just a simple yes or no. Just feel me
Paul Holdengräber
breathing on you. Feeling? Know I mean business when it comes to fucking. Get out. Bobby
breathing on you. Feeling? Know I mean business when it comes to fucking. Get out. Bobby
Slavoj Žižek
Peru. Grab you. Hold you tight. Feel everything inside, yeah? Be quiet. Say "fuck me." And I'll... No. Get out. I'll do your fucking heart out, girl! Say "fuck me." Say "fuck me" and I'll leave. Say "fuck me." Whisper it. Say it. Say it. Say it. Say it. Say "fuck me." Whisper it. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Someday, honey, I will. But I got to get going. See? Don't cry. Goodness. Yeah, you know why I was fascinated by this scene? When I, I think
Peru. Grab you. Hold you tight. Feel everything inside, yeah? Be quiet. Say "fuck me." And I'll... No. Get out. I'll do your fucking heart out, girl! Say "fuck me." Say "fuck me" and I'll leave. Say "fuck me." Whisper it. Say it. Say it. Say it. Say it. Say "fuck me." Whisper it. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Fuck me. Someday, honey, I will. But I got to get going. See? Don't cry. Goodness. Yeah, you know why I was fascinated by this scene? When I, I think
Paul Holdengräber
it's one of the ultimate David Lynch scenes. Because in a way, it describes so nicely the terrifying logic of humiliation. The point is that in a way, at psychological
it's one of the ultimate David Lynch scenes. Because in a way, it describes so nicely the terrifying logic of humiliation. The point is that in a way, at psychological
Slavoj Žižek
level, of course, him not raping her or making love makes it even worse, the humiliation is even worse, you know. And I think what I developed from this scene in many of my books is how the the paradoxes of rape and enforced sex and so on, the that I had certain data that my friends told me from Bosnian war when I saw this scene and you may find shocking it, namely—okay, let me formulate it in the most abstract way—imagine two women. One of them is assertive, autonomous, strong person, the other one is very passive, maybe even, why not, dreaming about being misheld, brutally treated in sex, and imagine both of them are raped. I claim,
level, of course, him not raping her or making love makes it even worse, the humiliation is even worse, you know. And I think what I developed from this scene in many of my books is how the the paradoxes of rape and enforced sex and so on, the that I had certain data that my friends told me from Bosnian war when I saw this scene and you may find shocking it, namely—okay, let me formulate it in the most abstract way—imagine two women. One of them is assertive, autonomous, strong person, the other one is very passive, maybe even, why not, dreaming about being misheld, brutally treated in sex, and imagine both of them are raped. I claim,
Paul Holdengräber
and this is what sexual researchers into rape confirmed to me, that the first one,
and this is what sexual researchers into rape confirmed to me, that the first one,
Slavoj Žižek
assertive and so on, would get over it much more easily than the second one although in the case of the second one you can claim "but in some sense she got what she wanted." Let's say, why not, she really dreamt about being brutally mismanaged and she got that. Now, you know what I'm trying to do here? No, not the disgusting thing of claiming, "Oh, so those machos are right, women sometimes really want it." I claim that if you dream about something intimately, the most terrifying thing that can happen to you is to get it in reality. This is the ultimate,
assertive and so on, would get over it much more easily than the second one although in the case of the second one you can claim "but in some sense she got what she wanted." Let's say, why not, she really dreamt about being brutally mismanaged and she got that. Now, you know what I'm trying to do here? No, not the disgusting thing of claiming, "Oh, so those machos are right, women sometimes really want it." I claim that if you dream about something intimately, the most terrifying thing that can happen to you is to get it in reality. This is the ultimate,
unknown
this complicity of your fantasy that is aroused by it. This makes the pain unbearable. This second woman who secretly dreamed, let's say, of being brutally mismanaged and then is really raped, she is much more than the autonomous one in danger of maybe even killing herself afterwards, precisely on account of this shame that—so what my conclusion from this, again, don't be afraid, is not that not only is this male chauvinist argument but she secretly wanted it, not only it's not true but if anything, it makes things even worse. What
this complicity of your fantasy that is aroused by it. This makes the pain unbearable. This second woman who secretly dreamed, let's say, of being brutally mismanaged and then is really raped, she is much more than the autonomous one in danger of maybe even killing herself afterwards, precisely on account of this shame that—so what my conclusion from this, again, don't be afraid, is not that not only is this male chauvinist argument but she secretly wanted it, not only it's not true but if anything, it makes things even worse. What
unknown
strikes me also is
strikes me also is
unknown
that film serves you to think about politics and philosophy around the world. Yes, but a scene like that— But it's a tremendous scene, I think.
that film serves you to think about politics and philosophy around the world. Yes, but a scene like that— But it's a tremendous scene, I think.
unknown
It's, you know, this is David Lynch's genius at its best. This idea, I was shocked of then
It's, you know, this is David Lynch's genius at its best. This idea, I was shocked of then
unknown
"Eh honey, not today, thanks for the offer," and so on, you know. It shocked you. It shocked me because of because again of the sense of utter humiliation and so on and so on. It's a terrifying, that's my point. It's in a way at level of psychological interpersonal action, it's in a way in some way, in some way, even worse than real rape. That's my paradox. Because it's utter abandonment. Yeah, but precisely at the point when she opens minimally, he treats it as "Oh, okay you offered yourself," you know. This shift in his discourse—I hate this word, sorry—yes, when he says this "Oh, thanks," this is the most humiliating point. This is utter humiliation. Slavoj, in closing, a quotation from Peter Sloterdijk on the dangers of globalization. He says, "More communication means at first, above all, more conflict." Absolutely agree with him personally,
"Eh honey, not today, thanks for the offer," and so on, you know. It shocked you. It shocked me because of because again of the sense of utter humiliation and so on and so on. It's a terrifying, that's my point. It's in a way at level of psychological interpersonal action, it's in a way in some way, in some way, even worse than real rape. That's my paradox. Because it's utter abandonment. Yeah, but precisely at the point when she opens minimally, he treats it as "Oh, okay you offered yourself," you know. This shift in his discourse—I hate this word, sorry—yes, when he says this "Oh, thanks," this is the most humiliating point. This is utter humiliation. Slavoj, in closing, a quotation from Peter Sloterdijk on the dangers of globalization. He says, "More communication means at first, above all, more conflict." Absolutely agree with him personally,
unknown
although I mean he's a right-winger, but I have very good
although I mean he's a right-winger, but I have very good
unknown
relations
relations
unknown
with
with
Slavoj Žižek
him. You know, in one sense I agree with it. I'm sick and tired of this politically correct idea of "we should understand other cultures, not to condemn them," blah blah. No, other cultures are boring to me, I don't want to understand them, and you cannot ever do it. This is again an endless superego logic: how do we know that when an Arab says God he means the same thing as we do and so on, and then we are endlessly guilty and so on. No, the art of true, in good sense now, multiculturalism is precisely how to coexist when we don't understand each other. I don't want to understand everyone else. And why not for one good Freudian reason? That I suspect that they don't understand themselves, you know. It's not that if you really go deep into another culture you will discover some secret or whatever. I don't believe in this. I think cultures are cheating, inconsistent, and so on. I I think that, you know, true again true multiculturalism with me is not, you live in an apartment where a Jew is up side, an Arab down side, an Italian to the left, or a Chinese to the right and then you all tell each other ethnic stories and at the end understand each other. That's a nightmare. I want to live in a building, I love to live with foreigners, where you precisely remain at the level of superficial politeness. But you were also telling me— I don't want to understand you. —but you were also telling me that one of your worries is that there's less and less ethnic jokes told. Absolutely. I think they are one of the most progressive things there are here. Ah, but what kind of ethnic jokes? Wait a minute. Of course I am, maybe you don't believe me, I am not a racist. It's just my personal memory from my past. The great role that ethnic jokes played in old Yugoslavia. They were they didn't function
him. You know, in one sense I agree with it. I'm sick and tired of this politically correct idea of "we should understand other cultures, not to condemn them," blah blah. No, other cultures are boring to me, I don't want to understand them, and you cannot ever do it. This is again an endless superego logic: how do we know that when an Arab says God he means the same thing as we do and so on, and then we are endlessly guilty and so on. No, the art of true, in good sense now, multiculturalism is precisely how to coexist when we don't understand each other. I don't want to understand everyone else. And why not for one good Freudian reason? That I suspect that they don't understand themselves, you know. It's not that if you really go deep into another culture you will discover some secret or whatever. I don't believe in this. I think cultures are cheating, inconsistent, and so on. I I think that, you know, true again true multiculturalism with me is not, you live in an apartment where a Jew is up side, an Arab down side, an Italian to the left, or a Chinese to the right and then you all tell each other ethnic stories and at the end understand each other. That's a nightmare. I want to live in a building, I love to live with foreigners, where you precisely remain at the level of superficial politeness. But you were also telling me— I don't want to understand you. —but you were also telling me that one of your worries is that there's less and less ethnic jokes told. Absolutely. I think they are one of the most progressive things there are here. Ah, but what kind of ethnic jokes? Wait a minute. Of course I am, maybe you don't believe me, I am not a racist. It's just my personal memory from my past. The great role that ethnic jokes played in old Yugoslavia. They were they didn't function
Paul Holdengräber
in a racist way but a kind of a friendly competition. I meet a Montenegro or Serb friend and okay, you have
in a racist way but a kind of a friendly competition. I meet a Montenegro or Serb friend and okay, you have
Slavoj Žižek
first this official contact where it's all the bullshit of understanding, what a wonderful folkloric dances you have or what interesting food you have. And then I always say, "Fuck off, tell me a dirty joke, we will be friends." And then there was a high art of competition in ex-Yugoslavia. We were not telling primarily joke jokes about others, but jokes about ourselves. So that each nation in ex-Yugoslavia was in a racist way, of course, identified with a certain features. We Slovene were misers, avar—thrifty. Bosnians were a little bit sexually obsessed. Montenegro were lazy, Macedonians
first this official contact where it's all the bullshit of understanding, what a wonderful folkloric dances you have or what interesting food you have. And then I always say, "Fuck off, tell me a dirty joke, we will be friends." And then there was a high art of competition in ex-Yugoslavia. We were not telling primarily joke jokes about others, but jokes about ourselves. So that each nation in ex-Yugoslavia was in a racist way, of course, identified with a certain features. We Slovene were misers, avar—thrifty. Bosnians were a little bit sexually obsessed. Montenegro were lazy, Macedonians
Paul Holdengräber
were cheating, thieves and so on. And the whole point was to tell a joke mocking yourself and the competition was who
were cheating, thieves and so on. And the whole point was to tell a joke mocking yourself and the competition was who
Slavoj Žižek
will tell a nastiest joke about yourself. And it it it functioned in a marvelous way and again, as I always repeat, my negative proof of the positive function of these jokes is that when in early 80s, starting with the early 1980s, ethnic tensions really started to explode in ex-Yugoslavia, these jokes disappeared. Because again, they really—and this is how this is how I function all the time. I mean for example when I meet my Jewish friends, they tell me jokes about the Jews, I tell them jokes from Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and this is how this is how we are best friends. And that's for me the best of Jewish culture, like: can you imagine anything more sublime than the joke that my friend Udi Aloni recently told me? That an old, not old, a tired Jew comes home after work and says to his wife, "Listen darling, I want some sex to relax but I'm too tired to do it now. Could you please suck me, fellatio, and swallow it? This would really relax me." The wife said, "You know darling, I'm also tired, so let's do it like this: you masturbate, you finish in a glass, and I will drink it in the morning when I will be—" Sorry, I like that. This is civilization for me. Thank you very much. Thank you. Oh, roses again. Thank you.
will tell a nastiest joke about yourself. And it it it functioned in a marvelous way and again, as I always repeat, my negative proof of the positive function of these jokes is that when in early 80s, starting with the early 1980s, ethnic tensions really started to explode in ex-Yugoslavia, these jokes disappeared. Because again, they really—and this is how this is how I function all the time. I mean for example when I meet my Jewish friends, they tell me jokes about the Jews, I tell them jokes from Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and this is how this is how we are best friends. And that's for me the best of Jewish culture, like: can you imagine anything more sublime than the joke that my friend Udi Aloni recently told me? That an old, not old, a tired Jew comes home after work and says to his wife, "Listen darling, I want some sex to relax but I'm too tired to do it now. Could you please suck me, fellatio, and swallow it? This would really relax me." The wife said, "You know darling, I'm also tired, so let's do it like this: you masturbate, you finish in a glass, and I will drink it in the morning when I will be—" Sorry, I like that. This is civilization for me. Thank you very much. Thank you. Oh, roses again. Thank you.